WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

OECD

# AIDFORTRADE AT A GLANCE 2015

## REDUCING TRADE COSTS FOR INCLUSIVE, SUSTAINABLE GROWTH



WTO | 20 YEARS

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## REDUCING TRADE COSTS FOR INCLUSIVE, SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

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# FOREWORD

This joint OECD/WTO *Aid for Trade at a Glance* is a timely publication in a landmark year. From it a strong message emerges about the importance of trade and the multilateral trading system in delivering economic growth and development. It reminds us that high trade costs are a drag on economic development and trade integration, in particular for the poorest. Its call to action should resonate at the WTO's December 2015 Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Kenya - the first WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in Africa. It is a message that should also echo in the UN's Post -2015 Development Agenda and negotiations on its financing.

High trade costs hamper the economic potential of many of the poorest nations, pricing them out of global markets. Landlocked, remote, and small economies are marginalized by costs that reflect geography, not capability. Of particular concern is the stubbornly high level of trade costs for agricultural products. Trade costs also fall disproportionately heavily on small- and medium -sized enterprises. These companies are an engine of employment the world over and offer a route out of poverty, particularly for women.

An important step towards reducing trade costs was taken in 2013 at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali where Members concluded the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. Implementation of the Agreement promises to bring substantial cost reductions for traders in developing and least developed countries (LDCs), thereby supporting increased economic activity, and potentially increasing government revenues. Sustained donor support will be needed to assist developing countries if the Agreement is to deliver its full potential. The Trade Facilitation Agreement was only one of a number of decisions taken at the Bali meeting to support the integration of developing countries and LDCs into the global economy. Implementing these other commitments also remains a priority.

Since the start of the Aid -for -Trade Initiative, donors have disbursed a total of USD 264.5 billion in official development assistance and an additional USD 190 billion in other official flows for financing trade-related programmes in developing countries. This publication, and in particular the case stories that beneficiaries submitted, shows that these programmes have improved trade performance, generated employment, including for female workers, and attracted further domestic and foreign investment. The development benefits of reducing trade costs are impressive: a 1% decrease in global trade costs would increase global income by USD 40 billion at a minimum, with close to two-thirds of this amount accruing to developing countries, according to OECD calculations.

Focusing the Aid-for-Trade Initiative more firmly on reducing trade costs offers an action orientated agenda; and – more importantly – one that would make growth more inclusive. Governments, in dialogue with stakeholders, must now work to identify the most distorting trade costs, how best to reduce them, and how to use effectively the different development finance instruments offered by a wide range of providers. Reducing trade costs is an agenda where the private sector has much to offer and the development community much to learn. It is also an agenda that will maximise the contribution of trade to delivering the sustainable development outcomes that are envisaged in the emerging Sustainable Development Goals.

**Angel Gurría**
**Secretary-General**
**OECD**

**Roberto Azevêdo**
**Director-General**
**WTO**

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# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ABC | Brazilian Cooperation Agency |
| ACIS | Advance Cargo Information System |
| ADA | Austrian Development Agency |
| ADB | Asian Development Bank |
| AEC | ASEAN Economic Community |
| AEO | Authorized Economic Operator |
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| AfT | Aid for Trade |
| AfTra | African Trade Fund |
| AGOA | African Growth and Opportunity Act of the United States |
| AIM | Assess, Improve and Measure |
| ALTTFP | Abidjan-Lagos trade transportation facilitation project |
| AMEXCID | Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation |
| APEC | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| AsDB | Asian Development Bank |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| ASYCUDA | Automated System for Customs Data |
| AVE | Average ad valorem equivalents |
| BADEA | Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa |
| B20 | Business 20 |
| BCP | Border Crossing Points |
| BPC | building productive capacity |
| CAMEX | Brazilian Foreign Trade Council |
| CAREC | Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation |
| CARICOM | Caribbean Community |
| CAUCC | Central American Uniform Customs Code |
| CCC | Customs Cooperation Committee |
| CDC | Commonwealth Development Corporation |
| CE | Conformité Européenne |
| CEB | Council of Europe Development Bank |
| CEBAF | Centros Binacionales de Atención en Frontera |
| CGE | Computable General Equilibrium |
| CI | Confidence Interval |
| CIF | Climate Investment Funds |
| CNI | Brazilian National Confederation of Industry |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| CPMM | Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring |
| CRS | Creditor Reporting System |
| CS | Case Story |
| CSR | Corporate social responsibility |
| CSV | Creating Shared Value |
| CUTS International | Consumer Unity & Trust Society |
| DA | Development Agenda |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DANIDA | Danish International Development Agency |
| DC | Developing Country |
| DCED | Donor Committee for Enterprise Development |
| DDA | Doha Development Agenda |
| DFIs | Development Finance Institutions |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DFQF | Duty Free Quota Free |
| DP World | Dubai Ports World |
| DTIS | Diagnostic Trade Integration Study |
| EAC | East African Community |
| EATTF | East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project |
| ECA | Europe and Central Asia |
| ECLAC | Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |

| | |
|---|---|
| EDFI | European Development Finance Institutions |
| EFTPOS | Electronic Funds Transfer At Point Of Sale |
| EIF | Enhanced Integrated Framework |
| EnACT | Enhancing Arab Capacity for Trade |
| EOS | Executive Opinion Survey |
| ETI | Enabling Trade Index |
| ETLS | East African States Trade Liberalization Scheme |
| EU | European Union |
| EUR | Euro |
| EURODAD | European Network on Debt and Development |
| FAMEX | Fonds d'Accès aux Marchés d'Exportation |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FfD | Financing for Development |
| Finnfund | Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation Ltd. |
| G20 | Group of 20 |
| GATS | General Agreement on Trade in Services |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GDPPC | Gross Domestic Product Per Capita |
| GEA | Global Express Association |
| GEF | Global Environment Facility |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit |
| GMS | Greater Mekong Sub-region |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| GRVC | Global/Regional Value Chains |
| GRA | Gambia Revenue Authority |
| GVC | Global Value Chain |
| GTZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Development Cooperation) |
| HACCP | Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points |
| HIC | High Income Country |
| HLPE | High Level Panel of Eminent Persons |
| IADB | Inter-American Development Bank |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank Group) |
| ICD | Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector |
| ICT | Information and Communications Technology |
| IDS | Institute of Development Studies |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| ILAC | International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation |
| ILO | International Labor Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IPEA | Institute of Applied Economic Research |
| IPOA | Istanbul Program of Action |
| IPR | Intellectual Property Rights |
| IsDB | Islamic Development Bank |
| ISO | International Organization for Standardization |
| ISRTTFP-WA | Interstate Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme for West Africa |
| ITC | International Trade Centre |
| ITFC | International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation |
| JBP | Joint Border Posts |
| JICA | Japan International Co-operation Agency |
| KCA | Kyrgyz Centre of Accreditation |
| LAC | Latin America and the Caribbean |
| LDC | Least Developed Country |
| LIC | Low Income Country |
| LLDC | Landlocked Developing Country |
| LMIC | Low Middle-Income Country |
| LPI | Logistic Performance Index |
| LSCI | Liner Shipping Connectivity Index |
| M4P | Making Markets Work for the Poor |
| MAST | Multi-Agency Support Team |

| | |
|---|---|
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| MFN | Most Favoured Nation |
| MNE | Multinational enterprise |
| MRA | Mutual Recognition Arrangement |
| MW | Megawatt |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organisation |
| Norfund | Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries |
| NSC | National Steering Committee |
| NTB | Non-Tariff Barrier |
| NCTTCA | Northern Corridor Transit And Transport Coordination Authority |
| NTF | Netherlands Trust Fund |
| NTFC | National Trade Facilitation Committee |
| NTM | Non-Tariff Measures |
| OCTA | Office of the Chief Trade Adviser for Pacific Island Countries |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| ODI | Overseas Development Institute |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OECS | Organisation Of Eastern Caribbean States |
| OFID | OPEC Fund for International Development |
| OIF | Organisation internationale de la Francophonie |
| OLICs | Other Low-Income Countries |
| OOF | Other Official Flows |
| OSBP | One Stop Border Posts |
| OWG | Open Working Group |
| PACER | Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations |
| PAGE | Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment |
| PAIRCA | Programme of Support for Regional Integration in Central America |
| PDR | People's Democratic Republic |
| PHAMA | Pacific Horticultural and Agricultural Market Access |
| PIC | Pacific Island Countries |
| PIFs | Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat |
| PNG | Papua New Guinea |
| PPD | Public-private dialogue |
| PPP | Public-Private Partnership |
| PROCOMEX | Aliaca Pro-Modernizacao Logistica de Comercio Exterior |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| PSD | Private Sector Development |
| PTA | Preferential Trade Agreements |
| RBC | Responsible Business Conduct |
| RECs | Regional Economic Communities |
| RECAUCC | Regulation on the Central American Uniform Customs Code |
| RESW | Rwanda Electronic Single Window |
| RMC | Regional Member Countries |
| RTA | Regional Trade Agreement |
| SA | South Asia |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SDC | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SDT | Special and Different Treatment |
| SDTF | Standards and Trade Development Facility |
| SEA | South East Asia |
| SECEX | Brazilian Secretariat of Foreign Trade |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency |
| SIDS | Small Island Developing States |
| SIECA | Secretaria de Integracion Economica Centromaericana |
| SIPPO | Swiss Import Promotion Programme |
| SMEs | Small and Medium-sized Enterprises |
| SPS | Sanitary and Phytosanitary |
| SSA | Sub-Saharan Africa |
| STDF | Standards and Trade Development Facility |

| | |
|---|---|
| SWF | Sovereign Wealth Funds |
| TACB | Technical assistance and capacity building |
| TBT | Technical Barriers to Trade |
| TEU | Twenty-foot equivalent unit |
| TFA | Trade Facilitation Agreement |
| TFI | Trade Facilitator Indicators |
| TGVCI | Trade and Global Value Chains Initiative |
| TIM | International Customs Transfer for Merchandise |
| TMEA | TradeMark East Africa |
| TPO | Trade Promotion Organisation |
| TRIPs | Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights |
| TSCC | Transport Sector Coordinating Committee |
| TSI | Trade Support Institutions |
| TTFA | Trade and Transport Facilitation Assessment |
| TTFS | Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy |
| UEMOA | Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UMICs | Upper Middle-Income Countries |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCITRAL | United Nations Commission on International Trade Law |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| UNECE | United Nations Economic Commission for Europe |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNESCAP | United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific |
| UNESCWA | United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organisation |
| UN-OHRLLS | Un Office of The High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries And Small Island Developing States |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| VFTA | Vietnam Trade Facilitation Alliance |
| VSS | Voluntary sustainability standards |
| WB | World Bank |
| WCO | World Customs Organization |
| WEF | World Economic Forum |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

High trade costs inhibit numerous developing countries from fully exploiting the market access opportunities that the multilateral trading system creates. Cumbersome and time-consuming border procedures, obsolete or ill-adapted infrastructure, limited access to trade finance and the complexity and cost of meeting an ever broader array of standards all serve to price too many countries out of international trade. Comparative advantage remains underexploited. Market access does not always convert into market presence. The potential gains from trade are not always fully realised. The Aid-for-Trade Initiative was launched at the 2005 Hong Kong World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference to tackle these kinds of constraints and is making headway. The joint OECD-WTO report, *Aid for Trade at a Glance 2015*, cites many examples of where obstacles are being overcome and the attendant development benefits. Yet more remains to be done. The report calls for a redoubling of efforts to tackle the issue of trade costs which continues to marginalise many of the world's poorest and most fragile economies.

## Reducing trade costs matters …

Remoteness, inadequate or defective infrastructure and small markets with limited supply side capacity mean that some countries face higher trade costs than others. Policy measures at, between and behind borders is also important in raising trade costs. And when these "frictions" give rise to high absolute costs they can render exports uncompetitive and effectively nullify comparative advantages. High trade costs also erode consumer welfare, narrowing the range of goods and services on offer and pushing up prices. Moreover, they deny firms' access to technology and intermediate inputs, preventing their entry into, or movement up, global value chains.

While trade costs alone do not explain the development pathways of individual economies, they are a major factor in clarifying why some countries are unable to grow or diversify. Evidence suggests that developing countries bear a disproportionate share of global trade costs, even though they have become more integrated into the world economy in recent years. Some middle income countries have been successful in reducing such costs, but low income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to struggle with stubbornly high trade costs. Moreover, these costs are falling at slower rates than elsewhere, increasing the risk of marginalisation.

## …especially for the Least Developed Countries

The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) either on their own or with support are gaining traction in lowering trade costs. However, they find it hard to make a transformative shift because of the high absolute costs from which they start (particularly landlocked countries), limited institutional capacity and resource constraints. This is where aid for trade is contributing to lowering trade costs. A review of Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies, together with evaluations and case studies, shows that the impact of these interventions is highest when based on: robust and credible analytical work; a high level of country ownership; institutional capacity building; continuous support over a sufficiently long period; resource leveraging; and a co-ordinated donor response.

## … and small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent the backbone of economic activity especially in developing countries. Those that are integrated in global markets – whether directly or indirectly – are more productive than SMEs that do not participate in trade. More productive SMEs find it easier to integrate, but integration is also likely to contribute to raising productivity and closing the productivity gap between small and large enterprises. The result is higher and

more inclusive growth. However, SMEs suffer disproportionately from high trade costs, hampering their integration into the global economy. Reducing trade costs will therefore contribute to making trade more inclusive as it may allow SMEs to expand employment and increase wages. Gender equality can benefit from this, given that many SMEs are owned by women and employ more women than men.

### The WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation is an important step

An important step towards reducing trade costs was taken in 2013 when the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali concluded the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA). The TFA promises to bring substantial cost reductions for traders and revenue increases for governments. The TFA gives customs and border modernisation efforts a new focus and direction. Donors have expanded their financial support to implement trade facilitation measures to USD 1.9 billion since 2005, with positive results reported on many of the issues covered by the TFA. Sustained donor support will be needed to assist developing countries in making good on their commitments and realising the full potential of the agreement.

### … and helps countries to connect with global value chains.

Many of the costs that affect the smooth connection of various parts of the production chain transcend national borders. For this reason, regional initiatives to enhance connectivity can often be more effective in addressing such costs than purely national programmes. Thus, there is significant scope to tackle trade barriers on a multi-country or regional basis and in ways compatible with the principles of the multilateral trading system. In response, several aid-for-trade projects – often with multi-donor funding – have targeted regional trade costs and successfully improved regional economic co-operation. Going forward, it is important to learn from these examples that have succeeded in reducing trade costs sustainably

### Aid-for-trade disbursements are helping …

A total of USD 264.5 billion has been disbursed for financing aid-for-trade programmes and projects since the Aid-for-Trade Initiative was launched in 2006, while the share of aid for trade in sector-allocable aid has risen from 31% to 38% in 2013. To date, more than three-quarters of total aid for trade has financed projects in four sectors that are closely related to cutting trade costs; transport and storage (29%), energy generation and supply (21%), agriculture (18%) and banking (10%). Middle Income Countries received, in addition, USD 190 billion in trade-related other official flows mainly for infrastructure and private sector development. The LDCs received 10 USD per capita in aid for trade, more than double the average.

### … with further support through public-private co-operation.

In order to design effective solutions for cutting trade costs, in particular those occurring at the border, close collaboration between the public and the private sector is key. Partnership between the public and private sectors can ensure that efforts tackle the value chain-related constraints and reach tipping points for growth. To that end, a constant dialogue between government and the private sector can help adapt reforms to meet the needs of firms including SMEs which will also enhance poverty reduction. While business' first priority is implementing the TFA, a co-ordinated approach is required, that goes beyond encouraging trade. For example, enabling trade should go hand in hand with facilitating investment to enlarge the pool of finance for development.

## Aid for trade and the sustainable development agenda

The post-2015 development agenda, which aims at inclusive and sustainable development in social, economic and environmental dimensions, requires a significantly increased amount of financing. This will strengthen the prominence of international trade as a source of financing for development, particularly for the LDCs. However, the trade and development community should take care that the transformative nature of the post-2015 development agenda does not inadvertently result in a rise of unnecessary non-tariff measures that would increase trade costs and reduce the capacity of developing countries to use trade as an engine of economic growth and poverty reduction.

The new development paradigm under the post-2015 development agenda may require aid for trade to adopt a more integrated approach. Such an approach should ensure that aid for trade contributes to inclusive and sustainable development outcomes. That is, in addition to improving trade performance, the Aid-for-Trade Initiative should aim at positive social, economic and environmental impacts. For example, it should help developing countries to deal with the extra cost that may be associated with a greater burden of compliance with non-tariff measures.

# INTRODUCTION

Trade can play a powerful role in contributing to productivity, growth, incomes and jobs. The evidence is incontrovertible that openness to trade raises national incomes. Trade can also contribute to new and better jobs and improve overall working conditions. It is essential for the transfer of knowledge, technology and skills – and thus for development. Indeed, trade is in most cases the single most important external source of development financing. Aid for trade helps developing countries maximise the gains from trade by assisting them to analyse, implement and adjust to trade agreements and to build their supply-side capacity and infrastructure they need to compete internationally.

International trade is not a seamless process and frictions give rise to trade costs. The range of policies and procedures that affect trade costs is broad and located behind the border. They include as non-tariff regulatory measures, market access restrictions, trade finance availability and costs and general impediments to doing business, documentation and customs compliance requirements, lengthy administrative processes and other delays. Moreover, they occur at all stages of the international trade chain, such as during transport and in logistics. High trade costs effectively nullify comparative advantage by rendering exports uncompetitive.

The burden of trade costs falls heaviest on least developed countries (LDCs), although the impact may vary by region. Other factors (e.g. being landlocked) also play a role. LDCs are making progress in mainstreaming the issue of trade costs into national development policy frameworks, as assisted by the Enhanced Integrated Framework and other actors, but progress in bringing down trade costs varies widely. A virtuous circle of national action supported by aid for trade is laying the groundwork for export diversification and attracting FDI and can be observed in some LDCs – although in all too many others the situation remains challenging.

Trade costs are a major determinant of how developing country firms connect to GVCs – and their ability to draw benefits from their participation. The burden of trade costs falls heavily on SMEs, which – mindful of the positive employment and empowerment effects – increasingly focus their efforts on stimulating inclusive, sustainable growth in this segment of the economy. Non-tariff measures emerge strongly as a particular concern for SMEs, namely in connecting to value chains.

Several policy areas affecting value chain integration fall within the purview of the aid-for-trade initiative, in particular trade facilitation and the quality of infrastructure. The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement represents a historic opportunity to streamline border procedures and reduce trade costs. Aid-for-trade facilitation has already scored measurable successes, but TFA implementation requires further sustained financial and technical support, notably for LDCs and landlocked countries. It will also require a coherent approach at the regional and national level that not only involves customs but also other border agencies and the private sector.

Aid for trade is helping reduce trade costs, particularly where partner governments, regional economic communities and transport-corridor initiatives are mainstreaming this issue into their development strategies and where other sources of financing are being leveraged so as to ensure medium-term sustainability. Where sequencing is right and the engagement of governments, development partners and the private sector is sustained, rapid progress can result. Research highlights how regional initiatives to address trade costs are gaining traction in some regions, while in others efficiency gains from regional initiatives remain unrealised. Aid-for-trade flows have held up through the financial crisis – and other sources of development finance (i.e. new actors and new approaches) are coming onstream. The challenge is how to use aid for trade in a catalytic way so as to leverage other development financing, with inclusive, sustainable growth objectives in mind and ensuring equity in distribution of those funds, particularly for LDCs.

Realising the inclusive, sustainable growth that lies at the heart of the post-2015 development agenda will require concerted, ongoing action on the trade agenda, including on bringing down trade costs. There is scope to use aid for trade to leverage other sources of financing and as a catalyst for the transformational, sustainable vision that lies at the heart of the SDGs. Reducing trade costs is an area where the private sector has much to contribute – and the development community much to learn on how to integrate the private sector in development planning frameworks.

## MONITORING AID FOR TRADE

This is the fifth monitoring report on aid for trade. The aim of the report is to link accountability at the local and regional level with a global review process to build genuine partnerships and create incentives for delivering results in terms of trade performance, economic growth and poverty reduction. The monitoring framework provides transparency about the demand for aid for trade, which is based on the extent to which trade is prioritised in development strategies, the response in terms of aid-for-trade commitments and disbursements, the outcomes in terms of enhanced trade capacities and the impact in terms of trade performance and reduced poverty.

The framework consists of a qualitative and quantitative component. The qualitative component is based on self-assessments, case stories, evaluations and empirical studies. Quantitative monitoring tracks the aid-for-trade flows at the global level based on data extracted from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database, following the aid-for-trade proxies that most closely match the measurement of aid-for-trade flows as agreed by the WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade (WT/AFT/1).

## WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE MONITORING EXERCISE?

In 2015, 62 developing countries (half of them LDCs) submitted an aid-for-trade self-assessment in the context of the monitoring exercise. In addition, 10 organisations responsible for facilitating trade through transport corridors participated for the first time in the monitoring exercise. The total number of donors that participated in the 2015 survey reached 31, with 24 bilateral and 13 multilateral donors. Furthermore, three providers of South-South trade-related assistance (i.e. China, Chile and Indonesia) submitted a self-assessment. However, statistical data on their programmes remains anecdotal and has to be harvested from secondary resources (see chapter 3).

**Figure 0.1 Questionnaires by respondents**




*Source:* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933240669

The 2015 monitoring exercise also included a call to the public and private sector to submit case stories about aid-for-trade programmes. This followed the success of the 2011 call for case stories, which resulted in an OECD/WTO publication, Aid for Trade in Action (OECD/WTO, 2013). The purpose of this call for case stories was to probe more deeply into the objectives, challenges and processes of trade-related assistance to better understand the results – particularly what was working in the provision of aid for trade, what were the key ingredients of success and what governments and practitioners could learn from experience.

**Figure 0.2 Case stories by sector**




*Source:* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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A total of 117 case stories were submitted; 94 from the public sector, 18 from the private sector, and five from NGOs and academia. Half of the case stories focused on support for capacity building in trade policy and regulations and, in particular, trade facilitation projects. Building productive capacities was the topic of 35% of the case stories, and the rest recounted experiences in building infrastructure. Projects in the high income countries was the topic of 45 case stories, followed by 27 in the LDCs, 21 in the UMICs, 11 in the LMICs and four in the OLICs.

The substantive response is a clear reflection of members' active involvement in the aid-for-trade initiative and their generally positive response to the global monitoring exercise. The sheer quantity of activities described in these stories suggests that aid-for-trade efforts are substantial, that they have taken root across a wide spectrum of countries and that they are becoming central to development strategies. The fact that nearly half of the stories were provided by developing countries underlines the salience of these programmes – and highlights the potential for knowledge-sharing.

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The aid-for-trade initiative has allowed for the active engagement of a large number of organisations that are helping developing countries, and especially the least developed, build the infrastructure and supply-side capacity they need to connect to regional and global markets and improve their trade performance. Some of these organisations have contributed chapters which deal with specific aspects of the topic of reducing trade costs for inclusive and sustainable growth and which are related to their core competences. In addition, the World Economic Forum has provided the business perspective on these issues. These chapters are published under the responsibility of the respective international organisations.

**Chapter 1** was written by the **World Trade Organization** and addresses the question of why trade costs matter for inclusive, sustainable growth. The chapter defines trade costs and argues that policies matter in reducing trade costs in the goods and services markets. Next, the chapter illustrates the scale of the trade costs many developing countries must face and shows that lowering trade costs will result in more trade and potentially higher incomes, particularly in developing countries. The chapter highlights how LDCs and developing country governments are using aid for trade to support action to tackle high trade costs and integrate countries in regional and global trade networks. The analysis highlights that there are good reasons to believe developing countries and their partners are taking this issue seriously and their action in this area builds from solid practical and theoretical foundations.

**Chapter 2** was written by the **World Bank** and uses recent advances in trade theory and empirics to infer trade costs from the observed pattern of trade and production across countries. This then is used to provide evidence on recent trends in trade costs, focusing on the developing world. The data show that developing countries, particularly low income countries, suffer from relatively high trade costs. Although some middle income countries have been successful in reducing trade costs, low income countries and countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been proceeding at a much slower pace. They risk continued marginalisation from the global trading economy. However, empirical research suggests a variety of policies that can be effective in reducing trade costs, such as improving trade facilitation and logistics performance, boosting connectivity, and improving the business environment.

**Chapter 3** was written by the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development** and analyses aid-for-trade policies, priorities and flows. The chapter examines the USD 246.5 billion in aid for trade and an additional USD 190 billion in trade-related other official flows (OOF) that was disbursed between 2006 and 2013. Next, the chapter summarises the findings from empirical studies, evaluations and case stories to show the impact of this trade-related support. This is followed by a section that looks at the trade-related priorities of partner and donors countries and whether donors align their support around these priorities, including for reducing trade costs. The final section assesses the short-term outlook for aid-for-trade flows.

**Chapter 4** was written by the **World Trade Organization** and focuses on the landmark WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The chapter starts with a brief explanation of the new Agreement. Next, it analyses the needs of developing countries and, in particular, the least developed countries (LDCs), as well as the available support from donors that report to the OECD CRS. The WTO TFA provides a new locus to the extensive and ongoing trade facilitation support that donors have expanded in recent years. As such, there is emerging good practice in implementing some of the provisions of the Agreement and the resulting benefits. There is, however, an ongoing concern on the part of developing countries that the specific support needed to implement the so-called Category C provisions (i.e. those that would need support to be implemented) may not be available or adapted to their implementation challenges – a concern that has prompted the WTO to create the Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility.

**Chapter 5** was written by the **Executive Secretariat for the Enhanced Integrated Framework** and concentrates on the issue of reducing trade costs and the LDCs. The chapter starts with a discussion as to why trade costs matter, especially for the LDCs. This is followed by a section that analyses trends in LDC trade costs over the last ten years. The next section looks at LDCs' priorities in tackling trade costs and the role of development partners. Based on the EIF's experience, the chapter also investigates what works and what does not, as well as where improvements are needed in addressing the challenges of trade costs facing LDCs.

**Chapter 6** was written by the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development** and looks at the influence of trade costs and trade facilitation on connecting firms to regional and global value chains (GVCs). The chapter starts with analysing the global and regional value chains, in particular how countries engage in GVCs and what determines their participation. Next, the chapter provides a regional perspective on trade costs and, in particular, trade infrastructure and trade facilitation. This is followed by a section on regional aid-for-trade (facilitation) initiatives and their results.

**Chapter 7** was written by the **International Trade Centre** and analyses how aid for trade can help reduce the burden of trade costs for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries. First, the chapter defines SMEs and why fixed trade costs matter for them. Next, the chapter reports on the perception of SMEs regarding trade costs and, in particular, those that are fixed. This is followed by a section on how trade support institutions can help address these and other costs, which are often related to the problem of SMEs finding buyers.

**Chapter 8** was written by the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development** and looks at how to deepen private sector engagement in aid for trade. The chapter starts with highlighting the changing context of public-private co-operation for development, then it analyses how OECD countries are promoting private sector engagement to achieve economic growth and development. The next section looks at donor support for building productive capacities and the results of these programmes. The last section highlights some lessons learned about working with the private sector to achieve development outcomes.

**Chapter 9** was written by the **United Nations Conference on Trade and Development** and discusses the role of trade in the post-2015 development agenda and the implications for the aid-for-trade initiative. The chapter describes how trade is a means of implementing the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and how trade can help LDCs achieve them. The chapter finally highlights how aid for trade can be made more useful in the new development environment.

**Chapter 10** was written by the **World Economic Forum** and argues that it is important to engage the private sector at the beginning of aid-for-trade planning. Moreover, a constant dialogue between the government and the private sector can help adapt reforms to meet the needs of users and enhance their impact. The chapter reasons this should not only be limited to trade issues but also to investment matters. Finally, the chapter provides some examples of successful company-led efforts to reach trade tipping points.

**Chapter 11** was written by the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development** and **World Trade Organization** and assesses whether the aid-for-trade initiative it is still fit for the purpose of helping developing countries, particularly LDCs, build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure they need to implement and benefit from WTO agreements and more broadly expand their trade. The concluding chapter highlights some of the main achievements and challenges of the initiative and suggests a focus on the reduction of trade and investment costs could serve as a rallying point for integrated approaches to ensure inclusive and sustainable development outcomes.

The remainder of the report contains the **aid-for-trade factsheets** of the countries that participated in the monitoring exercise and the **aid-for-trade statistical data** used in the report. Lastly, all the information used in this report, including the self-assessments and case stories, is available on the OECD/WTO aid-for-trade website: www.aid4trade.org.

**TABLE 0.1 Responses to the Aid for Trade questionnaire**

| | Overall total | Partner country | LDCs | Donors | South-South |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Responses 2015** | 112 | 62 | 31 | 37 | 3 |
| **Responses 2013** | 133 | 80 | 36 | 43 | 9 |
| **Responses 2011** | 146 | 84 | 31 | 43 | 10 |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

**TABLE 0.2 Partner country responses to the Aid for Trade questionnaire**

| Region | Responses to questionnaire 2015 | Responses to questionnaire 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| **Africa (28)** | Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo DPR; Côte d'Ivoire; Gambia; Guinea; Guinea Bissau; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritius; Nigeria; Rwanda; São Tomé and Principe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Swaziland; Tanzania; Togo; Tunisia; Uganda; Zimbabwe | Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Côte d'Ivoire; Djibouti; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Morocco; Mozambique; Niger; Nigeria; Rep. of Congo; Rwanda; Senegal; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Tunisia; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe |
| **Arab and Middle East (1)** | Yemen | Jordan; Oman; Yemen |
| **Asia and Pacific (14)** | Bangladesh; Bhutan; Cambodia;Indonesia; Lao DPR; Mongolia; Nepal; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Thailand; Tonga; Vanuatu | Bangladesh; Bhutan; Cambodia; Fiji; India; Indonesia; Nepal; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Tuvalu; Vanuatu |
| **Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (1)** | Afghanistan | Afghanistan; Turkey |
| **Latin America and the Caribbean (18)** | Antigua and Barbuda; Belize; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominica; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Mexico; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and The Grenadines; Trinidad and Tobago | Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominica; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica, Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay |
| **LDCs (31)** | Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Benin; Bhutan; Burkina Faso; Cambodia; Central African Republic; Chad, Comoros; Congo DPR; Gambia; Guinea Bissau; Guinea; Haiti; Lao DPR; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Nepal; Nigeria; Rwanda; São Tomé and Principe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Vanuatu; Yemen | Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Benin; Bhutan; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Djibouti; Ethiopia; Gambia; Guinea; Haiti; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mozambique; Nepal; Niger; Rwanda; Samoa; Senegal; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Tuvalu; Uganda; Vanuatu; Yemen; Zambia |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

**TABLE 0.3 Donor country response to the Aid for Trade questionnaire**

| Region | Responses to questionnaire 2015 | Responses to Questionnaire 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| **Bilateral (24)** | Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, UK, US, UNDP-Uzbekistan | Australia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Canada; Czech Republic; Denmark, EU; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Korea; Lithuania; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Singapore; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; UK; US |
| **Multilateral (13)** | AfDB; AsDB; EBRD; IaDB; IsDB (ITFC); ITC; UNCTAD; UNDP; UNECA; UNECE; UNIDO; UNESCAP; WB | AfDB; EBRD; EIF; FAO; IaDB; IMF; IsDB; ITC; UNCTAD; UNDP; UNECA; UNECE; UNIDO; World Bank; WTO |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

**TABLE 0.4 Providers of South-South co-operation responses to the Aid for Trade questionnaire**

| Region | Responses to questionnaire 2015 | Responses to Questionnaire 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| **3** | Chile, China, Indonesia | Chile; China, Colombia; Costa Rica; Indonesia; Mauritius; Mexico; Morocco; Oman; Sudan |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

**TABLE 0.5 Regional & Transport corridor questionnaire**

| Responses to questionnaire 2015 | Regional Economic Communities | Regions |
|---|---|---|
| **10** | NCTTCA, OECS, Trade Mark East Africa, SIECA, OCTA, COMESA, CARICOM, SADC, PIFS, ECOWAS | Africa (5), Latin America and the Caribbean (3), Asia and the Pacific (2) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

## REFERENCE

OECD/WTO (2013), Aid for Trade in Action, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264201453-en, OECD Publishing, Paris.

# CHAPTER 1

# WHY TRADE COSTS MATTER FOR INCLUSIVE, SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

*Contributed by the World Trade Organization*

***Abstract:*** *International trade is not a seamless process. "Frictions" abound that give rise to trade costs. High trade costs effectively nullify comparative advantage by rendering exports uncompetitive. High trade costs deny firms access to technology and intermediate inputs, preventing their entry into, or movement up, global value chains. High trade costs also erode consumer welfare narrowing the range of good and services on offer and pushing up prices. While trade costs do not alone explain the development pathways of economies, they are a major factor explaining why some countries are unable to grow and diversify.*

*The range of policies that affect trade costs is broad. Although trade costs are ubiquitous, they are not immutable. Action can, and is, being taken to reduce trade costs. Policy reforms are yielding positive impacts, although these cannot be assumed, with research suggesting that the lowest income countries stand to gain the most from enacting such reforms. Much work remains to be done to reduce trade costs further and integrate countries more completely into the global economy, but there are positive reasons to believe that developing countries and their partners are taking this issue seriously.*

## INTRODUCTION

Trade costs matter. They exert a strong influence on trade flows; on who trades what and with whom; on where products are made and services traded; and on the goods and services available to consumers and the prices they pay for them. Trade costs interact with economic fundamentals like technology and factor endowments (labour and capital) to produce the pattern of trade and production we observe around the world. As such, they have a great potential to influence the trajectory of a country's economic development. Box 1.1 below provides an overview of why trade costs matter in the opinion of some least developed country (LDC) governments.

### BOX 1.1 Why trade costs matter to some least developed countries

"As a landlocked country, Bhutan tends to have higher trade costs in reaching markets beyond borders." **Bhutan**

"Trade costs are very important for the competitiveness of our exports because of our isolation, which together with transport costs and the transit of our goods for export makes us less competitive". **Central African Republic**

"The cost of trade remains decisive in the structure of the prices of imported products and significantly affects the purchasing power of the Congolese population." **Democratic Republic of Congo**

"Despite all the efforts already made, reducing the costs of trade remains a major challenge for Madagascar." **Madagascar**

"High trade costs for accessing imports directly from Sierra Leone are reflected in high prices for the same goods when compared to the prices in the neighbouring countries of Guinea and Liberia. This has to a large extent been responsible for the increase in illegal activities like smuggling across the porous borders, thus leading to loss of customs revenue for the government." **Sierra Leone**

"As a landlocked country, Uganda's trade costs are high, affecting the competitiveness of Uganda's exports." **Uganda**

"Our private sector has time and again informed responsible government ministries of the very high cost of doing business. Some even asked government ministries for support by lowering the cost of inputs, especially fuel, electricity, etc. Also, the transportation links do not suit our private sector, adding to the cost of exporting." **Solomon Islands**

*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise, 2015.

High trade costs effectively isolate countries from world markets: consumers in these countries cannot take advantage of competitively priced goods from abroad, and their firms cannot access high quality foreign inputs or export to overseas markets. For those living at the base of the pyramid, often in extreme poverty, high prices disproportionately impacts on their consumer welfare. Not surprisingly, lower trade costs are typically associated with net poverty reductions even though the distributional impact of trade costs differs across countries. This positive relationship between trade costs and poverty is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Developing countries with higher trade costs – measured by the number of days required to export in 2005 – tend to have a higher share of the population living on less than USD 2 per day.

High trade costs price some country regions, countries and companies out of export markets, thereby limiting their economic development opportunities. Trade costs may not explain why some countries are low income or least developed, but, in combination with other factors, they do explain why some countries struggle to grow and exploit their comparative advantages (see figure 1.2). Keeping trade costs at reasonable levels and reducing them as far as possible in some key areas is essential to enjoying comparative advantage and the gains from trade.

**Figure 1.1 Population living on less than USD 2 per day (2008-12) and number of days needed to export (2005)**




*Note:* The number of days required to export in 2005 is in natural logarithms. High income countries are not included in the figure.

*Source:* WTO Secretariat calculation. Data: World Bank World Development Indicators.

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**Figure 1.2 Doing Business costs to export, USD per container, 2014**




*Source:* World Development Indicators.

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In a static sense, economic welfare can increase from lower trade costs – the real economic cost of doing business is reduced and GDP correspondingly increases as new transactions take place. Dynamic gains are also possible. In particular, access to foreign inputs has been found to be associated with innovation activity: as firms gain access to new goods, they combine them in different ways to make new products. Indigenous technology development or adaptation is at the core of economic development over the medium to long term and harnessing the process is likely an important part of moving up global value chains.

High trade costs are a considerable burden on the poor, undermining economic welfare by pushing up consumer prices and keeping poor producers out of global markets. Figure 1.3 below highlights the average number of days to import. Time is an important parameter for trade costs. Against this background, it is important to note what happens

when trade costs for a particular country stay at an unnecessarily high level while those of its partners fall. The country will be less able to take advantage of specialisation by comparative advantage and thus will feel the gains from trade less fully than its partners. This point stands for countries that remain relatively marginalised from the global trading system as a result of high trade costs, for example, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states.

**Figure 1.3 Average number of days required to export by income group**




*Note:* Figures calculated based on simple averages across 44 LDCs, 16 LLDCs, 30 LICs, 48 LMICs, 49 UMICs and 46 HICs.

*Source:* World Development Indicators.

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Chapter 2 provides further details on the level of trade costs around the world, but as a general rule, they decrease as per capita income increases: on average richer countries tend to have lower trade costs than poorer countries (Figure 1.1). As a result, some countries are not able to fully reap the economic gains that come from specialisation by comparative advantage, and their pattern of production and trade is distorted due to the presence of high trade costs. Of course, high trade costs may be beneficial for certain people or groups within those countries – this is detailed below. But in an aggregate sense, trade costs prevent the market from allocating resources in the most efficient way possible overall. Consequently, countries that do more to lower trade costs – for instance, by improving logistics and trade facilitation performance – tend to grow more quickly than others. This correlation is highlighted by the large number of countries on the right side of the vertical line in Figure 1.4 below and the higher rates of GDP growth over the period 2006-13 for these countries (i.e. they are making improvements in their logistics performance).

Not only do trade costs matter between countries, they also matter within countries. Firms that face high costs of moving their goods from the factory gate to an international gateway, like a port or airport, effectively have an extra hurdle to clear when they try to enter international markets. Sometimes these barriers keep them out of business altogether, so Policy makers may not even realise the harm that is being done. Regions with high trade costs are often economically deprived and lie at the low end of income distribution (Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], 2013). Of course, many factors are at play in determining the ability of a country to grow and develop, and there are complex interactions among them. But trade costs stand out as one important source of disadvantage for some countries.

A substantial body of research has emerged that highlights the negative impact of trade costs on economic welfare and development, as well as trade connectivity (a range of metrics and indices are in place to track trade costs – see Chapter 2). Respondents to the 2015 joint OECD-WTO Aid for Trade monitoring survey questionnaire (2015 monitoring exercise) agreed strongly as to the impact of trade costs (see Figure 1.5 below). Some 87.0% of the 62 developing and least developed country respondents indicated that trade costs are very important for their export competitiveness. A higher number, 91.9%, believed that trade costs were important or very important for access to imports.

**Figure 1.4 Correlation between improvement in logistics performance and GDP growth rate**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank Trade Costs Database; World Development Indicators.

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**Figure 1.5 What contribution can reducing trade costs make to the target of inclusive, sustainable growth?**




*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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In the context of the emerging narrative in the post-2015 development agenda, respondents to the 2015 monitoring exercise highlighted issues such as export promotion, job creation, entry into value chains – as well as moving up within them – and export diversification as just some of the ways in which lower trade costs can contribute to the target of sustainable and inclusive growth. The relationships between trade policies, trade facilitation and inclusive growth are explored in UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), 2013.

## WHAT ARE TRADE COSTS?

In the economic literature, trade costs are defined as: "…[a]ll costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other than the cost of producing the good itself: transportation costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy barriers (tariffs and non-tariff barriers), information costs, contract enforcement costs, costs associated with the use of different currencies, legal and regulatory costs and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail)" (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004).

Although we live in an increasingly interconnected world, goods and services do not flow seamlessly across borders. A range of factors create friction, which in turn generates costs (Moïsé and Le Bris, 2013). How trade costs and economic fundamentals interact explains, in large part, the range of goods and services exported and the markets served by exporters and importers. The 2015 monitoring exercise asked for respondents' views on a representative cross-section of trade costs:

- For merchandise goods, the questionnaire surveyed views on trade costs: impacts of border procedures (i.e. trade facilitation); tariffs, fees and other charges; non-tariff measures; transport infrastructure; and access to trade finance.
- For services, the following trade costs were considered: network infrastructure (ICT, power, telecoms); transport infrastructure; non-recognition of professional qualifications; restrictions on commercial presence; restrictions on the movement of natural persons; a poor regulatory environment for services; tariffs on product inputs (e.g. on computers for ICT services); and low skill levels in the services sector.

Economists distinguish between fixed and variable trade costs. Fixed costs require investment (e.g. investment needed to meet a product standard in an importing market). Considering just a single period of operation, fixed costs are typically paid once. Variable costs are paid per unit shipped (e.g. transport costs). The international movement of goods is itself costly. Products need to be moved from a factory to a port or airport, processed at the border and loaded onto a cargo ship or airplane. They are then transported an often long distance and unloaded, processed again at the border, transferred onto a truck or train and moved into a local distribution network so that they can finally reach the consumer in the importing country. Externalities such as congestion and pollution arise in this process. Where markets do not operate effectively, pure friction, or economic "waste", can occur.

### BOX 1.2 What sets transport costs apart from tariffs?

IADB (2008) identifies at least three factors that set transport costs apart from other trade costs, particularly tariffs:

- Unlike tariffs, transport costs are highly variable over time and the degree of uncertainty is likely to be directly correlated to the quality of the country's infrastructure (quality of the regulation included). A high degree of uncertainty is likely to inhibit trade, particularly trade of new products, irrespective of the level of transport costs.
- Unlike tariffs, transport costs are not a simple, fixed proportion (*ad valorem*) of the price of products. They represent a per unit component that has important implications for the composition of the country's exports. Because of this component, transport costs are never product-neutral, bringing higher penalties for products that are more "transport intensive", not only in the sense of having low price-to-weight ratios, but also because of higher costs related to inventory-holding and depreciation.
- Unlike tariffs, transport costs are not fixed by fiat but respond to variables such as trade flows, the quality of the country's infrastructure and the degree of competition in the transport industry. Bringing transport costs down, therefore, goes well beyond the political economy of protection and requires a more complex set of policy actions than those involved in typical trade liberalisation.

Trade costs in goods markets take many forms. Tariffs are one well-known component, but they only account for a relatively small part of the total level of trade costs in most countries. Non-tariff measures are also important, including product standards, as well as other types of regulation that make it more costly to do business abroad than at home. The business environment and commercial and governance institutions also matter because they affect the cost of doing business for foreign firms. Over the last two decades, trade in services has expanded rapidly to reach more than a fifth of global trade flows. The participation of developing countries in this trade has increased dramatically, rising from 11% of world services exports in 1990 to 20% in 2011. As an input into other economic activities, services are a direct determinant of country's competitiveness. Services such as telecommunications, energy, transport and business services are critical inputs into the production of goods and other services and influence productivity and competitiveness. Opening up to services imports and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can be an effective mechanism to increase the availability, affordability and quality of these services, which are crucial for export diversification, economic growth and poverty reduction. In addition, services can offer dynamic new opportunities for exports (World Bank, 2015 monitoring exercise).

Services trade also involves transaction costs. Where pure cross-border trade is possible – for instance, via the internet – issues such as transport costs do not arise. Nonetheless, there may be issues of regulation or infrastructure investment that generate friction. Trade in services is governed entirely by domestic regulation. The regulatory framework governing services trade includes a vast range of domestic laws and regulations in areas that often include land ownership, establishment of foreign companies and migration policies. They exist in sectors as diverse as banking, professional services, transport, education and tourism. Laws and regulations on services sectors are generally dispersed throughout different government agencies and not easily accessible. As a result, the regulatory environment for trade and investment in services is often opaque and unpredictable, which impairs the investment environment and limits the policy making capacity (World Bank, 2015 monitoring exercise).

For instance, online banking is legal in many countries, and in many cases is open to international customers. However, many countries prohibit foreign banks without a local presence from advertising their services domestically, which means that it is relatively difficult for them to do business in a competitive marketplace. Regulatory heterogeneity—the ability to advertise in their home markets but not overseas—is a source of trade costs in the services sector, even in cases where pure cross-border trade is now possible. Of course, there may be strong rationales for regulation in some cases—such as consumer protection—but many countries could still benefit from making their services sector regulations more effective and efficient, which would tend to lower trade costs.

A further source of friction is that such services trade relies on the provision of backbone infrastructure services, such as phone networks or broadband connectivity, without which the service cannot be traded. Another example here would be tourism and transport infrastructure. Sierra Leone cited poor internet connectivity countrywide and poor transport infrastructure, especially in the attractive tourist destinations in the country, as the biggest bottlenecks or sources of trade costs for services. Likewise, Costa Rica highlighted shortcomings in transport infrastructure affecting the tourist sector, which is Costa Rica's largest export service sector. It also stated Costa Rican professionals face trade costs by not being able to exercise in other countries because of restrictions related to recognition of qualifications. (Costa Rica, 2015 monitoring survey)

Integration of goods and services markets has been proceeding apace in most parts of the world in recent decades. Nonetheless, trade costs remain surprisingly high. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), for example, review the available literature on goods trade and conclude that a reasonable estimate for the trade costs faced by a representative developed country are around 170% of the producer price of exported goods. The total is made up of international trade costs of around 74% and domestic distribution costs of around 55% (because they are typically referred to in *ad valorem* equivalent terms, trade costs are multiplicative not additive – the 170% figure therefore comes from multiplying 1.55 by 1.74 to get 2.70).

**BOX 1.3 Services trade costs – more research required**

Better evidence is needed on what the major sources of costs are for services exports in developing countries and the economic benefits of addressing these costs. World Bank studies have noted that since the 1990s services exports of 20 key developing countries have grown by over 15% annually. It is expected that there are considerable economic benefits from the better movement of people across borders. Greater transparency around labour mobility requirements would aid in further movements of natural persons. Related to this, non-recognition of professional qualifications would make it difficult or impossible for professionals to export services from developing countries. There are also a number of other factors which affect developing countries' ability to participate in services trade, including investment in human capital (through health and education services) and institutional impediments (for example, poor regulatory environments for services hamper the development of competitive services sectors in developing countries). In addition, poor and non-competitive infrastructure (e.g. telecommunications) and inadequate financial services inhibit the ability of services providers to efficiently deliver and advertise services. There is also a significant correlation between investment and services trade. Encouraging further FDI is important for increased services exports by developing countries.

*Source:* Australia, OECD/WTO Aid for Trade monitoring exercise, 2015.

Of course, recent years have seen significant declines in global trade costs (see Chapter 2). Technological innovations, such as the ability to connect buyers in one country with sellers in another through the internet, have made it easier for small firms, and even individuals, to participate in international trade. A case story submitted for the 2015 monitoring exercise provides a snapshot of eBay commercial sellers in Chile, Peru, Ukraine, South Africa, Jordan, India, Indonesia and Thailand. The case story authors argue that there is evidence of a real democratisation of trade due to lower trade costs associated with electronic transactions: 95% of these commercial sellers export to on average more than 30 markets around the world. Moreover, 60-80% of businesses survive their first year, which is about double the rate for the traditional business sector. eBay estimates that barriers related to distance are 83% lower for sales conducted via an electronic marketplace and that the figure is even higher for developing countries, at 94%.

Of course, business models like eBay and other e-commerce platforms cannot function without express delivery services. Those services have taken off in recent years and now reach most parts of the planet. Express delivery is a major international industry and its workers deal with trade costs on an everyday basis. Globally, the industry directly employs over 500 000 workers (GEA, 2015). Reducing trade costs makes it easier for express delivery services to move goods quickly, cost effectively and reliably from one place to another, including small shipments related to electronic transactions.

## Policy matters for trade costs in goods markets

Trade costs in goods and services markets can be loosely classified under two headings: locational factors and policy-related factors. Locational factors are exogenous: each country must take them as a given and cannot change them. They include issues such as sharing a common land border, geographical distance and remoteness, being landlocked or a small island state, having a population that speaks one of the main international languages and historical and commercial links with other countries.

Although countries must take geography and history as given, that does not mean that the trade costs related to those factors are completely impervious to government action. Geographical remoteness, for example, tends to increase trade costs substantially and poses particular problems that governments need to work hard to solve.

Policy makers can limit the effect of remoteness by developing the hard and soft infrastructure needed to build an economy that is strongly connected to global trade, transport and production networks. High country connectivity based on appropriate policies can reduce trade costs and limit economic remoteness, even though geographical remoteness in the strict sense cannot be changed.

### BOX 1.4 The Pacific agreement on closer economic relations (PACER) plus

The Pacific Islands are some of the remotest economies on earth. They are far from major trade routes and even from each other, which makes trade integration difficult. They face particularly high levels of trade costs as small island developing states. The PACER Plus agreement currently under negotiation is designed to support Pacific Island countries' increased participation in international trade. The Agreement will not be a traditional free trade agreement as its primary objective is to promote the economic development of Pacific Island Countries. It contains chapters on issues such as Customs Procedures, Transparency, SPS and TBT measures and co-operation fora chapter on economic and development, including addressing supply-side constraints co-operation. The latter will assist developing country parties to implement the Agreement and maximise the benefits flowing from it. The two developed country markets will be sources of technical assistance and capacity building in various areas, in particular trade facilitation, in line with the new WTO TFA agreement.

*Source:* Office of Chief Trade Adviser, Joint OECD/WTO Aid for Trade monitoring exercise, 2015.

The case of trade costs that stem from policy-related factors is even starker: action by Policy makers can reduce such costs substantially because they have endogenous causes. Policy measures affecting trade costs come in three types: at the border, between borders and behind the border (Figure 1.6).

**Figure 1.6 Types of trade costs in goods markets**




*Source:* Shepherd 2015.

Recognition of the importance of trade costs needs to be distinguished from action by governments to reduce trade costs. For example, while 87% of the 62 developing and least-developed country respondents to the 2015 monitoring exercise recognised the importance of trade costs, only 62% of respondents indicated that trade costs were addressed in their national development strategies, 60% in their national trade strategies and 53% in sector-specific strategies. Interestingly, the percentage is less for infrastructure strategy (35%), although this sector is one that has considerable potential to influence trade costs and performance.

The picture at the regional level is similar: 80% of respondents indicate that the regional development strategy addresses trade costs, 60% in the case of the regional infrastructure and trade strategies and 50% for sector- and corridor-specific strategies. While there is clear recognition of the importance of trade costs, there are difficulties capturing this insight at a policy level, both nationally and regionally. This is especially true on the side of donor partners.

All 37 donor countries and agencies which responded to the 2015 monitoring exercise recognised the importance of trade costs, with 54.1% of them indicating that trade costs are very important to the integration and development of countries and LDCs and 45.9% considering them important. However, only 59.5% of donor countries' aid-for-trade strategies specifically address the issue of trade costs. Of course, trade costs issues are still reflected in aid-for-trade programming, particularly in regional projects and programmes and in country work (73.0% and 64.9% respectively).

One set of border policies that affect trade costs in a very direct way relates to trade facilitation, i.e. customs and other border procedures. When those procedures are slow, expensive or unreliable, costs to business increase – with a resulting impact on trade costs. Trade facilitation reforms can therefore reduce trade costs, and the WTO agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) provides one framework for moving forward in this area. The OECD has estimated full implementation of the new WTO agreement could reduce developing countries' trade costs by 14% for low income countries, 15% for lower middle income countries and 13% for upper middle income countries (OECD, 2014).

Trade facilitation in this sense is of particular importance in some contexts. For example, India and Pakistan have only one permitted land border crossing, at Attari-Wagah. In 2012-13, 54% of India's imports from Pakistan and 25% of India's total exports to Pakistan passed through this crossing, even though only a restricted list of products is allowed to be traded. Historically, this border crossing has been well known as a chokepoint for traders. However, recent trade facilitation measures appear to have improved performance somewhat. India has introduced an Integrated Check Post, with a dedicated cargo building, an export warehouse and truck parking facilities. Similar facilities are being developed in Pakistan. Border crossing hours have been increased from eight hours per day to 12, and truck capacity has been increased tenfold. Trade facilitation has brought concrete benefits to the trading community in the form of lower trade costs and higher volumes. (CUTS, 2015 monitoring exercise)

The TFA deals with one set of factors that determine trade costs in goods markets, namely customs and other border procedures. However, many other policies are also at play. As already mentioned, transport plays a key role. On the one hand, goods have to be moved internationally, so policies governing the development and operation of maritime and air gateways have the potential to affect trade costs. Similarly, policies governing air and maritime transport are also relevant. Countries that sign liberal bilateral air services agreements can expect to see their trade costs go down for goods transported by air, such as parts and components that circulate through global value chains (GVCs) or horticultural products and new agricultural productions. Some countries limit competition in some aspects of their maritime services sectors, such as cabotage (movement between domestic ports), with resulting increases in trade costs.

**Figure 1.7 Changes in road governance conditions 2010-2013 in West Africa**




*Source:* West Africa Trade Hub

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So far, the analysis has focused on policies at and between borders. But behind-the-border policies are also relevant (e.g. Moïsé and Le Bris, 2013). Wholesale and retail distribution, as well as transport and logistics, determine the ability of producers to get their goods to market in a cost-effective way. Countries with poorly performing distribution and logistics networks tend to suffer from high trade costs and can become insulated from world markets. In some countries in West Africa, for example, completion of national markets – not just the interface between national and international markets – is an issue. Roadblocks are frequent along main trucking routes (Figure 1.7), which lead to significant delays and the prevalence of unofficial "speed money" payments that add to overall transaction costs and uncertainty. A trade costs priority for these countries is reducing or eliminating internal roadblocks, which is not an easy matter in an environment of weak and fragmented governance. It is, however, an area in which local governments and regional institutions are active. Despite the difficulties, progress has been reported between 2010 and 2013 in addressing this issue through the West Africa Trade Hub/UEMOA Improvement in Road Transport Governance Project (IRGT).

Another policy question of relevance for trade costs is product standards. This is a type of behind-the-border measure that is usually not protectionist in intent but can be in practice because of the competitive advantage it creates for national firms. Overseas firms need to certify their products and production processes to meet foreign norms, an often expensive proposition, which adds to the wedge between producer and consumer prices. Box 1.5 highlights some of the concerns raised by respondents as part of the 2015 monitoring exercise.

A case story submitted by the World Bank suggests that in Central America, non-tariff measures are creating obstacles that hinder effective trade integration - with the issue being less about the measures enacted and more about the way they are applied in practice. The Bank study estimates that SPS measures—such as inspection requirements or labeling standards for meats and grains – increase import prices in Central America by approximately 30% on average.

In one country, the entry of foods and drinks into the sanitary registry – a process that verifies that all the products meet the country's SPS standards – requires between 48 hours (for low-risk goods) and 20 days (for goods that require laboratory testing). The exporting company must then spend two to four weeks preparing a product file. They must also pay between 250 and 450 US dollars per item registration. The Bank study suggests that when faced with this type of requirement, some companies – especially if they are small – abandon the effort altogether. The Bank study concludes that while non-tariff measures are effective policy tools to achieve non-trade objectives, such as the protection of human, animal and plant health, the imprudent use of these measures can hurt poor consumers.

**BOX 1.5 Examples of trade costs associated with product standards, cited by 2015 monitoring respondents**

"Other issues currently exist such as the connection between non-tariff barriers and new trends regarding approval of products by consumers, which are reflected in private standards." **Guatemala**

"Yemen's exports to the Gulf countries face border processing and non-tariff obstacles without appropriate justifications." **Yemen**

"Trade costs depend on markets. In Africa the costs are related to border procedures, while in the EU they are geared towards stringent standards." **Mauritius**

"According to the series of studies by the UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) on regulatory and procedural barriers to trade, non-tariff measures, such as standardisation (standards, standardisation policy, use of national, regional and internationally agreed standards), and regulatory issues are a significant source of barriers to trade." **UNECE**

Research undertaken by the Standards and Trade Development Facility concludes that countries can make huge progress in reducing SPS trade transaction costs, while simultaneously strengthening or reinforcing the protection of human, animal and plant health, through proper implementation of the WTO SPS Agreement and implementation of measures in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.

More generally in the area of behind-the-border measures, it is necessary to consider issues such as the business environment and investment climate, which affect the ability of firms to do business internationally. Finance is also crucial: as seen during the Great Trade Collapse, trade finance plays a key role in enabling private sector operators to move goods across borders. Indeed, it is important to remember that it is the private sector that trades. Governments put in place regulations, institutions and structures, but it is people and businesses that buy and sell goods and services. As a result, private sector development is also a key part of the trade costs agenda.

Figure 1.8 summarises the above discussion by means of reference to a broad set of trade cost factors that are of relevance to many countries.

**Figure 1.8 Policies affecting trade costs in goods markets at all points in the supply chain**




*Source:* Moïsé and Le Bris (2013).

As this section has made clear, trade costs come in a variety of different forms. However, each country has its own particular circumstances. A particular constraint may be binding in one country in the sense that it represents the main source of trade costs that prevents businesses from engaging with the world economy. The critical policy may be something quite different in another developmental or regional setting.

The OECD-WTO survey provides some information on the types of trade costs that are most important in partner countries (Figure 1.9). The most commonly identified are trade facilitation (in the sense of customs and border procedures), transport infrastructure and non-tariff measures, including product standards. Each of these areas is one in which aid for trade can play an important role. In the case of trade facilitation, aid for trade is built into the architecture of the new WTO Agreement, so there is a strong chance that progress in this area will be possible with a combination of political will in partner countries and mobilisation of resources in donor countries. Transport infrastructure is a key component of traditional aid-for-trade spending, and Figure 1.10 indicates that although progress has been made critical needs obviously remain in partner countries. Finally, non-tariff measures like product standards are frequently the subject of technical assistance programmes run by donor agencies – either governmental or multilateral organisations – and have real potential to reduce the trade cost burden on partner country exporters.

**Figure 1.9 Number of partner country survey respondents indicating that a particular source of trade costs is important (goods)**




*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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In the context of aid for trade, it is important to ensure that partner country and donor country priorities are aligned. That appears to be the case in the area of trade costs in goods markets (Figure 1.10). The top three priorities are the same: trade facilitation, transport infrastructure and non-tariff measures such as product standards. The evidence in this case suggests that donor countries and partner countries have a sound basis for working together to reduce the most important sources of trade costs in the developing country context.

**Figure 1.10 Number of donor country survey respondents indicating that a particular source of trade costs is important (goods)**




*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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One example reported of a successful aid-for-trade initiative in an area identified as important by partner countries and donors alike is Japan's support for One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs) in East Africa. Japan has worked with local counterparts to develop OSBPs on key routes in the region. As the project enters its advanced phases, the focus is now shifting to capacity building to ensure that customs and border agencies are well versed in the operation of these facilities. It can be expected that this series of interventions will reduce trade costs on key economic corridors in the region, with corresponding economic benefits.

This example is by no means an isolated one. According to the OECD-WTO survey, partner countries, with donor support, have been active in pursuing aid-for-trade activities aimed at reducing trade costs. Over 93% of partner countries have taken action on trade facilitation, and the corresponding figures for infrastructure and non-tariff measures are about 70% and 68%. There is clear evidence of activities aligned with common priorities.

## Services policies also affect trade costs

The discussion so far has focused on trade costs in goods markets. But as mentioned at the outset, trade costs in services are also significant. Border measures like tariffs usually do not apply in services markets, but a variety of other issues can contribute to trade costs in the services sector. Recent estimates suggest that despite technological advances like e-commerce, trade costs in services sectors may actually be substantially higher than in goods sectors, perhaps as much as double (Miroudot et al., 2013).

Firstly, there are policies that directly restrict trade in services. The WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) recognises four ways in which services can be traded, known as modes of supply (Figure 1.11). Mode 1 most closely resembles goods trade: it is pure cross border trade, for example, through the internet. Some countries apply direct restrictions on this kind of trade in certain sectors – such as the retail banking example cited earlier. More generally, the ability to engage in pure cross-border services trade depends on the quality and quantity of ICT infrastructure that is available, as well as the way in which access to and use of the infrastructure are regulated. Better connected countries can be expected to have lower trade costs for Mode 1.

**Figure 1.11 Trade in services under the GATS**




*Source:* Shepherd 2015.

Although Mode 1 services trade is becoming more important, proximity between the producer and the consumer remains necessary in many sectors. For that reason, GATS Mode 3 is often the preferred means of services trade for business. Under Mode 3, services are exported from a country when one of its firms sells services to foreigners through a subsidiary set up in the importing country. Explicit trade policies again affect firms' ability to enter markets through

Mode 3. Some countries apply restrictions on commercial presence in certain sectors, for example, only permitting foreign companies to enter the market through a joint venture with a local company or setting foreign ownership limits. Restrictions on commercial presence, such as a form requirement, limit a company's ability to compete in the marketplace in the most efficient way possible and therefore increase trade costs.

GATS Mode 4 is also a potentially important way for services to be traded internationally. In this case, the service provider (a natural person) moves temporarily to provide the service to the overseas consumer and then returns home. Globally, Mode 4 trade is relatively restricted. One possible reason is that Mode 4 trade intersects with countries' visa regimes, and this trade is seen as having potential implications for local labour markets.

Common to all the GATS modes of supply is the issue of regulation (Figure 1.12). And it is not just border regulations that matter for trade costs. As in the case of goods, behind-the-border regulatory measures also play an important role. Particularly in the case of services, an important factor is regulatory heterogeneity, i.e. differences in sectoral regulations between countries. Services firms develop their business models based on a particular regulatory and institutional environment. Making that business model work in a foreign setting can be challenging because the regulatory and institutional environment may be quite different. Transactions that can be legal in one form in one country may need to take a different form in another. Advertising needs to be adapted to meet not only local standards but also local tastes and interests. More generally, services need to be tailored to meet the environment in which they are being supplied. All of this adds to the cost of doing business abroad as opposed to at home. To a large extent, it is likely factors such as these that make it plausible that despite improvements in ICTs, trade costs in services remain high, potentially even higher than in goods markets, as noted above.

**Figure 1.12 Partial typology of policy measures affecting trade costs in services, according to the GATS mode of supply**




*Source:* Shepherd 2015.

Respondents to the OECD-WTO monitoring exercise provide an indication of the most important sources of trade costs affecting services' trade (Figure 1.13). The two most commonly cited are network infrastructure, such as information and communication technologies, and transport infrastructure. These issues are important to all service providers because ICTs are typically an important input into the production of modern services. However, network services are of particular importance to services traded by GATS Mode 1 (pure cross-border supply), which includes international e-commerce.

A key issue to emerge from these data is that for partner countries GATS Mode 1 is a key mode of supply. This finding makes sense because GATS Mode 3 (commercial presence) requires substantial investment resources that may not be available in the developing country context, although it is often the preferred means of entry for developed country firms. E-commerce may be particularly attractive to developing country service providers because of its low start-up and operational costs and could represent a significant commercial opportunity in the future.

In addition to issues of infrastructure and connectivity, the Survey data highlight a number of areas in which opening up to services trade could be beneficial in terms of reducing trade costs. Although opening up can provide competitive discipline for local firms and induce quality and process upgrading, it is also important to ensure that there is a sound basis in place for developing the competitiveness of the services sector (locally owned and foreign invested). Aid for Trade has a role in developing this kind of supply side capacity.

**Figure 1.13 Importance of trade costs sources (services): partner country view**




*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Donor countries (Figure 1.14) also identify network infrastructure as the most significant source of trade costs facing partner countries in services markets. However, there are notable differences in terms of other priorities. For instance, donors highlight poor regulatory environments, low levels of skills and non-recognition of professional qualifications as major issues. To be sure, partner countries also recognise the seriousness of these trade costs factors, but the relative pattern of responses is different in the two cases. There is perhaps evidence that donor countries see trade potentials outside Mode 1 – for instance, in Mode 4 (temporary movement of service providers) – as a subject of future interest for partner countries.

**Figure 1.14 Importance of trade costs sources (services): donor view**




*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Working together, donors and partner countries have seen concrete results come from aid-for-trade initiatives in their priority areas (Figure 1.15). There have been improvements in trade facilitation, infrastructure and non-tariff measures, in particular.

**Figure 1.15 Impacts from actions to reduce trade costs**




*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Trade costs in goods and services markets have been presented separately in this chapter, but they can also interact in complex ways. In the context of GVCs, for example, lead firms often need to supply headquarters (business) services to subsidiaries and even arm's-length suppliers that provide inputs into the final production process. Restrictions on trade in services can therefore increase trade costs in goods sectors, as well as in services sectors. Similarly, service providers usually need goods – such as computers and telephones – to provide their services. In this case, trade costs in goods have an indirect impact on trade costs in services. The link in both examples is that services are inputs into goods and goods are inputs into services. In a world of interlinked production processes, trade costs too become interlinked.

## LOWER TRADE COSTS MEAN MORE TRADE AND POTENTIALLY HIGHER INCOMES, PARTICULARLY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

One reason trade costs matter in terms of the post-2015 development agenda is that they affect national trade and income performance, including in poor countries. Net effects, as well as distributional issues, are both important from the perspective of sustainable and inclusive growth. This section examines the ways in which trade cost reductions can be associated with changes in trade flows and national incomes.

Countries with lower bilateral trade costs tend to trade more. As a result, measures to reduce trade costs can boost trade all around the world. They can also increase diversification, as new sectors become competitive and start to play a role in world markets. According to the UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) response to the 2015 monitoring exercise: "Reductions in trade costs can support economic diversification, this effect depends, however, on the supply-response of the private sector; hence the diversification is ultimately contingent on private sector skills and capabilities, as well as on the broader industrial policy framework."

## Box 1.6 Empirical evidence on the relative trade impacts of lower trade costs

Policies designed to reduce trade costs have been extensively modelled using CGE models. The net result is standard across models: lowering trade costs has the potential to support a major boost in trade flows and enhances welfare. Lowering trade costs eliminates economic waste and improves efficiency.

An example of this kind of analysis is WEF (World Economic Forum) and World Bank (2013). This report considers the incidence of supply chain barriers to trade – a broad concept that includes many of the trade cost factors considered in this chapter. The CGE analysis finds there is great trade and economic welfare potential in the area of trade cost reductions (this is in line with previous work such as Decreux and Fontagne [2011] and Zaki [2014]). Even under a modest scenario in which countries improve trade facilitation performance half way to the regional average, global trade would increase by 9.4% and GDP by 2.6%.

Of course, it is not just global effects but also their distribution across countries and regions that matters. As is typically the case in trade policy simulation exercises, the greatest relative gains – i.e. in terms of percentage of baseline performance – accrue to those countries that reform the most. This means the countries with the highest trade costs, namely developing countries, and particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. As Figure 1.16 shows, the trade and GDP gains from lower trade costs are strongly development friendly in that they are considerably larger in relative terms in the developing world than in the developed world.

**Figure 1.16 Trade and GDP gains from reducing supply chain barriers to trade.**


*Source:* WEF and World Bank (2013).

Indeed, the benefits of reducing trade costs on a broad basis are particularly attractive from a systemic point of view because many reforms affect all trading partners simultaneously, not just a selection of partners, as in a regional agreement. For example, upgrading gateway infrastructure like ports makes it easier to export to and import from all countries in the world, not just those countries in the same regional grouping. Similarly, many trade facilitation reforms that have been implemented unilaterally are effectively extended to all partners in much the same way as a cut in most favoured nation tariffs. Of course, some aspects of trade cost reduction – such as improving transit for landlocked countries – do have a regional dimension and benefit particular countries in very specific ways. Nonetheless, the point remains that general reforms to reduce trade costs tend to be beneficial to the multilateral trading system as a whole even when implemented unilaterally.

The fact that trade costs remain relatively high while tariffs are usually at historical lows suggests that the potential trade gains from reducing trade costs more broadly than just through cutting tariffs could have major scope to promote global trade. The empirical evidence bears out this contention. Studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of the world economy typically find that the gains from modest but broad based trade cost reductions – such as through improved trade facilitation – have great potential to boost trade. What is more, the largest welfare gains go to those economies with the highest trade costs. As a result, lowering trade costs has particular potential to boost economic welfare in developing countries where trade costs are usually higher – sometimes much higher (see Chapter 2).

## TRADE COST REDUCTIONS HAVE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS WITHIN COUNTRIES

Lower trade costs typically bring aggregate economic benefits in the form of increased trade and higher levels of national income. Lower trade costs are also typically associated with net poverty reduction in a general sense, even though local outcomes can vary and depend crucially on patterns of consumption and production within a country.

Innovative recent research has analysed this question using household survey data. Porto (2005) considers the case of Moldova, a lower middle income country. He analyses the effects of a range of trade cost reduction measures covering what he terms "informal" export barriers. Examples include transport costs, cumbersome customs procedures, costly regulations and rent-seeking behaviour. The data on these barriers that increase trade costs come from a World Bank survey of exporters and importers. By linking these data to household-level data on income and expenditure, Porto shows that reducing these types of trade costs has an overall positive effect on poverty: the poverty head count ratio falls by 2.8% to 5.0%, depending on the degree of pass-through that is assumed.

The same author (Porto, 2010) uses household data to examine the poverty impacts of trade cost reductions in Argentina. Specifically, he focuses on the case of improvements in export market access, which could accrue from a number of sources, including trade liberalisation abroad. He finds that the overall effect of improved market access abroad is to reduce the local poverty rate, even though it can be associated with domestic price increases.

A number of other studies look at African countries using similar methods. Balat et al. (2009) consider Uganda, for example, and Diop et al. (2005) examine Rwanda. The former author shows that villages with their own markets – which are associated with lower trade costs in the sense of local distribution costs – tend to have inhabitants with higher incomes than those in villages without market infrastructure. The latter paper finds that trade costs focusing on various factors linked to market access are important determinants of poverty rates. Based on their simulation results, a cut in transport costs could translate into a 20% increase in producer prices, which would in turn see poverty incidence reduced by 6%. Importantly, they show that a decrease in rural transport costs disproportionately benefits poor people, suggesting that appropriate trade cost reduction policies can be part of an overall package of reforms to reduce poverty.

Consumption baskets of the poor vary considerably across countries and also within them. Poor urban people do not consume goods in the same relative quantities as poor people in rural areas. Nonetheless, a significant number of poor people consume imported goods of one kind or another. Most typically, consumption of imported goods is relatively more important among urban poor people than among rural poor people. Lower trade costs clearly have implications for poor people who consume imported goods, whether they are food staples or other products. Lower trade costs should translate into lower consumer prices as part of the friction involved in moving goods from one country to another is eliminated. Of course, these gains are not always fully passed on to consumers. Capture can occur if there is a lack of competition at crucial points in the supply chain, for example, in the transport sector or in wholesale or retail distribution. Improving competition all along the value chain is an important complementary policy to any kind of trade cost reform. Indeed, reducing domestic trade costs – not just international trade costs – can have important impacts on consumption and production patterns, and can represent a "win win" scenario in which consumers and producers both benefit.

The same is also true for intermediate goods, i.e. those products used in the production of other goods. For example, poor farmers in many countries depend on imports of fertilisers. Fertilisers in this case are an intermediate good for farmers. Lower trade costs can help farmers and other producers, including manufacturers, access intermediate goods at lower costs. The effect is to lower their own production costs and make them more competitive in the marketplace, including regionally and globally. Lower trade costs can therefore benefit poor people through intermediate goods channels as well, particularly farmers, but also those employed in labour intensive industries such as clothing manufacture. Increased competitiveness can allow businesses to grow and take on more workers, who are typically unskilled and may include economically vulnerable groups such as women.

Poor producers who are involved in producing export goods benefit from lower trade costs because their production becomes more competitive on world markets, so they can expand. The ability of the production channel to translate lower trade costs into improved outcomes for poor people depends on the degree lower costs are passed on.

### BOX 1.7 Managing Aid for Trade projects for inclusive growth

Understanding the distributional effects of aid-for-trade projects is a growing area of focus for some donors. For example, the UK Department for International Development requires an assessment of the poverty impacts of all new aid-for-trade investments to be undertaken before approval. Programmes that are not able to present a credible link between growth and poverty reduction will run the risk of falling out of favour with funders (ICAI 2013).

The Aid for Trade at a Glance 2013 report emphasised the importance of effective results based management systems for the delivery of Aid for Trade. Indeed, evidence of recent evaluations of Aid for Trade programmes (e.g. EIF, ITC, STDF) would suggest that projects are getting better at measuring their direct impacts, for example the reduction in trade times. What is still lacking, however, is the understanding of the more fundamental impacts these initiatives may have on issues such the levels of employment, especially at the lowest percentiles, staple food prices and consumer goods. Some analytical frameworks (e.g. Winters) and practical guidance for incorporating inclusive and sustainable growth into aid for trade programming do exist, yet few initiatives have been able to make a compelling case for their positive contribution to the trade-poverty *nexus*.

While measuring or monitoring the inclusive and sustainable growth agenda at intervention level can be challenging, and resource intensive, some positive examples of how this can be done are emerging. For example, UNIDO has had success in using a value chain approach, and Trade Mark East Africa is mainstreaming gender issues into all new programming as part of their upcoming Results Based Project Cycle Management system, allowing for a disaggregated understanding of impacts on men and women.

*Source:* Saana Institute

Where dysfunction or a lack of competition impedes this and allows part or all of the gains to be captured by intermediaries in the value chain, the positive effects on poor producers are mitigated. As was the case for the consumption channel, the logic of the production channel is such that complementary policies to upgrade value chains and make them more competitive is crucial to ensuring that poor people in fact benefit in a real way from lower trade costs.

One area of potential concern is of course the impact that falling trade costs can have on domestic producers through increased import competition. A range of policy options exist within WTO legal agreements to deal with such situations, including when import surges are the result of unfair competition. One difficulty is that some developing countries lack a legal basis in their laws or technical competence in their ministries to apply these measures. Equally, they may face commercial pressure from trading partners to desist from such actions. Complementary policies must strike a delicate balance between short-term pressures resulting from import surges and more medium-term objectives, such as creating an appropriate enabling environment and promoting productivity growth.

## AID FOR TRADE IS HELPING REDUCE TRADE COSTS

This chapter has so far shown that trade costs matter for the global pattern of trade and production, as well as national incomes and poverty rates and distribution. It has also brought into the foreground the importance of policy as a determinant of trade costs. This is both directly through trade policies and indirectly through other policies that affect the economic implications of trade costs from other sources, such as transport.

If policy matters for trade costs, then it must be true that aid for trade can be part of a successful policy mix to reduce trade costs. This is backed up by the results of the 2015 monitoring exercise. Figure 1.17 below highlights the outputs that have been achieved form aid-for-trade actions to reduce trade costs, as reported by partner developing countries, donors, regional economic communities and South-South partners.

**Figure 1.17 Outputs achieved by actions taken to reduce trade costs**




*Source:* OECD/WTOAid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Respondents also believe project outputs translate into economic outcomes. Figure 1.18 gives a sense of the extent to which this has been taking place. Partner countries, donors and regional economic commissions all note similar outcomes, such as reduced border crossing times, increased customs revenue (due to higher volumes) and increased trade, both in exports and imports. There is therefore the positive perception that aid for trade is making a difference in terms of trade costs and the economic outcomes engendered by trade cost reductions.

**Figure 1.18 Outcomes achieved by actions to reduce trade costs**




*Source:* OECD/WTO Aid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Furthermore, there is also a positive perception that these outputs are translating into positive impacts on the ground. Figure 1.19 highlights that the most positive impacts are expected on export performance.

**Figure 1.19 Impacts achieved by actions to reduce trade costs**




*Source:* OECD/WTO Aid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Given the range of actions available to reduce trade costs, it is important to have a clear understanding of what works best in particular contexts. This understanding can be used to help prioritise interventions and provide a joint framework for ongoing collaboration. Based on Figure 1.20, partner countries consider customs reforms, tariff reforms and infrastructure upgrading to have had the most positive results in terms of reducing trade costs for goods and services. Donors identify similar measures but stress the importance of infrastructure relatively more. Regional economic communities consider customs reform to be by far the most effective measure – perhaps influenced by the fact that this survey includes corridor authorities, who are particularly concerned with the question.

**Figure 1.20 Types of actions that have achieved the most positive results in reducing trade costs for goods and services**




*Source:* OECD/WTO Aid for Trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Broadly speaking, aid for trade covers the full set of activities that help developing countries trade more with the rest of the world. Following the categories used in the OECD's Creditor Reporting System, aid for trade includes: technical assistance for trade policy and regulations; trade-related infrastructure; building productive capacity, including trade development; trade related adjustment; and other trade-related needs. All of these categories have something to offer national policy efforts designed at reducing trade costs, so there is much that the donor community and partner countries can do to work together successfully in this area.

As evidenced by donor and partner country responses to the OECD-WTO survey, the three main priorities for aid for trade in the area of reducing trade costs in goods markets are infrastructure, border procedures (trade facilitation) and non-tariff measures such as product standards. Aid for infrastructure can include assistance with the construction or upgrading of important gateway infrastructure, such as ports and airports, or infrastructure that connects those gateways with the rest of the country, like road and rail links. In addition to the costs of developing infrastructure, there is also the cost of maintaining it – and aid resources frequently need to be mobilised for this purpose in contexts where user-pay fee systems are unlikely to be effective, sufficient or equitable. Indeed, developing countries themselves need to mobilise to support key infrastructure development, including in partnership with neighbours, as in the case of the new international Rumichaca Bridge and structural revision of the old bridge. Ecuador and Colombia have collaborated on this project, which is expected to bring trade and tourism benefits to the two countries. Road haulage volumes have increased accordingly and waiting times have been reduced, which is suggestive of benefits to the transport sector that can be passed on to consumers and producers.

In the area of border procedures, the aid community has been active in upgrading relevant infrastructure, such as border posts, and in streamlining procedures themselves, as in the India-Pakistan example discussed above. The WTO TFA gives existing trade facilitation support a legal framework and certainty – as discussed in Chapter 4.

There has also been significant activity in relation to non-tariff measures, particularly product standards. For instance, UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) – operating under programmes financed by the EU, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and the Norwegian Agency for Development – has assisted Malawi in developing robust national infrastructure. The Malawi Bureau of Standards was identified as a critical point in the country's quality infrastructure and the areas of testing and certification were also seen as needing to improve relative to the strong demand for them from industry. The response has been an ambitious programme of capacity building so that tests, inspections and certifications issued by Malawian authorities can be recognised internationally, thereby reducing compliance costs for exporters.

As these examples show, targeted interventions can significantly alter the trade costs landscape in developing countries. They, of course, need to be demand driven: the partner country must identify and prioritise needs and international resources can then be mobilised for delivery and upgrading. These three key areas are widely recognised to be the most important ones for aid for trade that aims to reduce trade costs in the developing world, but they are of course not the only ones. Interventions in other areas also matter, depending on particular national contexts. The key is for interventions to be backed up with sufficient resources, as well as the availability of technical know-how, to make a sustained difference in the trade costs environment of a partner country or group of partner countries.

Trade costs often have a regional dimension, so it can be beneficial to work with small groups of countries on regional initiatives. TradeMark East Africa, a multi-donor initiative, has been doing this by promoting standards harmonisation and upgrading capacity in the region. Indeed, the OECD-WTO survey indicates that nearly all partner countries work regionally on reducing trade costs, the most common means being through regional economic communities, free trade agreements and initiatives supported by development partners (like TradeMark East Africa). Trade in partner countries often takes place through key corridors that cross borders and involve multiple modes of transport. A comprehensive aid-for-trade approach is crucial to enhancing corridor performance and reducing trade costs for groups of countries. There is clear evidence that efforts to date are going in the right direction: 76% of partner countries in the OECD-WTO survey indicate that external support is aligned with national and regional needs in reducing trade costs.

## CONCLUSIONS

There is clear scope to boost trade and economic welfare by reducing trade costs. Policies to reduce trade costs can be one part of an overall strategy to leverage trade for sustainable and inclusive growth, particularly if designed carefully to ensure that lower trade costs benefit the poorest in the economy. Reducing trade costs needs to be considered as part of the trade and development debate and policies need to be designed carefully and collaboratively.

Key messages from this chapter are as follows:

- The global pattern of trade and specialisation in production is heavily influenced by trade costs. They limit the extent to which countries can profitably engage in specialisation by comparative advantage. High trade costs can price economies out of global trade. Changes in relative trade costs also impact on comparative advantage.
- Although tariffs are at relative lows historically speaking, trade costs remain high and a significant impediment for economic development for many of the poorest economies in the world. Trade costs are influenced by geography and history. But policy matters too: at the border, between borders and behind the border.
- Trade costs in services are important in just the same way that they are in goods markets and may even indeed be quantitatively more important. Moreover, the two interact in complex ways. The emergence of e-commerce, allied with express delivery, is offering new pathways to the global market – one in which distance may be less of a defining characteristic of trade patterns.
- Trade costs are not immutable. Action to reduce trade costs can be, and is being, taken. There are significant global gains to be had in terms of increased trade and GDP from reducing trade costs in a broad-based way. In a distributive sense, the largest relative gains go to the countries that start with the highest levels of trade costs, i.e. developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Well-designed aid-for-trade interventions can be effective in reducing trade costs in areas that partner countries and donors agree are priorities, such as infrastructure, trade facilitation and non-tariff measures like product standards. There are positive reasons to believe that developing countries and their partners are taking the area of trade costs seriously and that action in this area builds from solid practical and theoretical foundations.

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# CHAPTER 2

# HOW ARE TRADE COSTS EVOLVING AND WHY?

*Contributed by the World Bank*

***Abstract:*** *Recent advances in trade theory and empirics make it possible to infer trade costs from the observed pattern of trade and production across countries. This chapter uses that insight to provide evidence on recent trends in trade costs, focusing on the developing world. The data show that developing countries, particularly low income countries, suffer from relatively high trade costs. They risk continued marginalisation from the global trading economy. However, empirical research suggests a variety of policies that can be effective in reducing trade costs, such as improving trade facilitation and logistics performance, boosting connectivity and improving the business environment. There is scope to tackle trade costs on a regional basis – and in a way that is strongly compatible with the aims and values of the multilateral trading system. Going forward, it will be important for partner countries and donors to learn from successful examples of on-the-ground projects that have reduced trade costs sustainably.*

## INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter showed that trade costs are an important determinant of the cross-country pattern of trade and production. They have an effect on industrial specialisation and, consequently, on incomes, poverty rates and many other important economic outcomes. In the current trade policy environment, the concept of competitiveness is key. Many different things are meant by the term, but to economists it most typically encompasses the Ricardian concept of productivity-based comparative advantage. A country is said to be competitive in industries where it has a high level of productivity relative to others. Competitiveness is seen as an important driver of economic outcomes, and countries all around the world are working hard to become more competitive and attract a greater share of economic activity, including trade and investment. Trade costs are, of course, an important link between productivity and outcomes. Under Ricardo's paradigm, in a world without trade costs countries would specialise in the industries in which they are relatively more productive. Trade costs alter that outcome and give rise to a different pattern of revealed competitiveness.

Building on the framework set out in Chapter 1, this chapter will take a quantitative look at trade costs as a driver of competitiveness and economic outcomes. The discussion will be data driven. By way of introduction, it is useful to look at some simple correlations to examine the links between trade costs on the one hand and important indicators of competitiveness and economic outcomes on the other. For the moment, we do not provide a technical, empirical definition of the term trade costs – we will discuss this in more detail in the next section. Suffice to say the data we employ reflect the broad sense in which the term will have been used in this report. It is important to stress that the relationships we are going to examine are correlations only. We will not be saying anything about causation – for that, a detailed econometric model is required, not a simple chart. The connections we will be uncovering are evidence of associations, or co-movement, between variables.

## TRADE COSTS DRIVE COMPETITIVENESS AND TRADE OUTCOMES

A first key linkage the data can say something about is between trade costs and trade growth. Based on the analysis in Chapter 1, we would expect countries that do more to reduce trade costs to experience faster relative growth in exports than other countries. Is that in fact what the data say? Figure 2.1 presents evidence supporting that contention. The horizontal axis of the figure shows the percentage change in trade costs between 1995 and 2012, and the vertical axis shows the percentage growth in merchandise exports over the same period. The line of best fit is downward sloping, which indicates a negative correlation: bigger reductions in trade costs are associated with stronger trade growth, just as expected. — we cannot be sure based just on a —it would suggest that policies to reduce trade costs can indeed be effective in boosting integration into the global trading economy, in the way suggested in Chapter 1.

**Figure 2.1 Percent change in trade costs versus percent change in merchandise exports, 1995-2012**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank Trade Costs Database; World Development Indicators.

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From a competitiveness standpoint, not all sectors of the economy are created equal. Some sectors have the potential for significant spillovers, such as technology creation or upgrading of production processes or human skills. In the context of economic development, manufacturing has usually been considered such a sector, as opposed to agriculture, in which technological spillovers are less significant (although not entirely absent either). Many developing countries are therefore keen to develop their manufacturing potential as a way of fostering these positive spillover effects in addition to the benefits that come with labour intensity – a factor that can help reduce unemployment and encourage people to move into the formal labour market.

Trade costs in a relative sense can affect the balance between sectors – for example between manufacturing agriculture. In a world without trade costs, countries specialise according to their comparative advantage. When trade costs are real, they distort specialisation decisions. For instance, protection of the agricultural sector encourages resources to flow into agriculture at the expense of other sectors, like manufacturing, and supports an anti-export bias in those other sectors. Examining the relative balance of trade costs across sectors is therefore important from a competitiveness standpoint because it has implications for the ways in which export activity is structured. Figure 2.2 shows trade costs in manufacturing relative to agriculture on the horizontal axis, and the percentage of manufactures in total merchandise exports on the vertical axis. The downward sloping line of best fit shows there is an association (again, a correlation, not causation) between lower trade costs in manufacturing relative to agriculture, and specialisation in manufacturing exports.

**Figure 2.2 Trade costs in manufacturing relative to agriculture versus manufactures exports as a proportion of total merchandise exports, 2012**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank Trade Costs Database; World Development Indicators.

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Another issue of concern for many developing countries is participation in GVCs. This issue is linked to the previous one, since many well-known GVCs – but not all – are based on manufacturing. GVCs link together businesses in a range of countries, some providing design and headquarters services, some doing research, some manufacturing components of different sorts and some assembling everything into a final product that is then shipped to a consumer somewhere else in the world. GVCs offer real opportunities for employment and manufacturing sector growth, as well as production upgrading through investment and technology adoption and adaptation over time. Many developing countries see GVCs as an opportunity to deploy a new development paradigm, focused on the mastery of tasks rather than complete commodity production cycles. Of course, GVCs are not without their critics, and attention also needs to be paid to the ways in which they are structured and value added is accounted for throughout the network. But on balance there is an opportunity for development in GVCs if the right policy settings are in place.

Theory and practical business sense suggest that trade costs are important for participation in GVCs. These production models need to move goods across borders multiple times prior to final assembly. Transport is a key input, and border procedures need to be fast, reliable and cost effective if the business model – in which inventories are kept very low – can succeed. We would therefore expect that countries with lower levels of trade costs would be more involved in GVCs than those with higher levels of trade costs. Figure 2.3 investigates this contention, using data from the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added Database. Trade costs are again on the horizontal axis, and the vertical axis records values of an index of GVC participation based on the OECD-WTO data. A country that has a higher participation index exports more of its goods as intermediates that are used in other countries' exports and/or imports more intermediate goods for use in its own exports. Both types of linkages are evidence of participation in GVCs.

As expected, the line of best fit in Figure 2.3 is downwards sloping. Countries with lower trade costs tend to have higher GVC participation indices. Again, this is a statistical association that is not necessarily causal. But the linkage is potentially important from a development and competitiveness standpoint. There is reason to believe that policies that reduce trade costs might help developing countries integrate further into GVCs.

**Figure 2.3 Trade costs in manufacturing versus GVC participation index, 2009**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank Trade Costs Database; OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added Database.

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The three associations presented in this section have shown that based on a simple review of the data trade costs matter for important trade and development outcomes. If borne out as causal relationships, these associations would imply that lowering trade costs can improve country competitiveness. This has important implications for the growth of industry and its internationalisation.

We have presented these associations using data on trade costs from a new UNESCAP-World Bank database. It reflects very well the way in which trade costs were defined in Chapter 1. We now consider the database in more detail, working from a discussion of its roots in economic theory and trade empirics to an analysis of its main trends and patterns and their association with development and aid for trade.

Another source of information on the link between trade costs, sources of trade and competitiveness are the surveys of costs actually incurred by firms, such as logistics costs. At the firm level, a major mechanism for the transmission of trade costs is the cost actually incurred by firms to move goods, generally referred to as logistics or total logistics costs. Logistics costs include three categories: administrative, transport and inventory costs. Logistics costs reflect logistics performance, with clear patterns across country groups. (Figure 2.5). Differences in logistics costs are primarily associated with the reliability of supply chains rather than with transportation costs. Inventory costs are higher in countries with less efficient logistics.

**Figure 2.4 Structure of Logistics Expenditures**




Sources: TU Berlin for Germany, Turku School of Economics for Finland and Estonia and World Bank for Kazakhstan.

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Along with Chapter 1, this section has examined the possible economic and development outcomes that may be associated with lower trade costs. Partner countries have direct experience of these effects and can speak to how real they are in practice, as opposed to in principle or on average (Box 2.1).

## BOX 2.1 Outcomes of lower trade costs – what partner countries say

Figure 2.4 presents responses from the OECD-WTO aid-for-trade survey. Partner countries identify impacts associated with actions taken to reduce trade costs. As the figure shows, policies that aim to reduce trade costs have great potential to support important economic and development outcomes.

**Figure 2.5 Partner country impacts associated with actions taken to reduce trade costs**




StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933240862

*Source:* OECD-WTO aid-for-trade survey.

Indeed, inventory costs are the consequence of a lack of reliability of the supply chain in a development context: firms need to maintain higher inventory to hedge against the consequences of less predictable deliveries. Furthermore, firms willing to enter global manufacturing value chains encounter a double penalty, with extra logistics costs on both inputs and exports. The causes of unreliability are rarely found in deficient physical infrastructure but rather in inefficient clearance processes, especially at land borders and in ports. Poor services available to traders, such as rail or truck services, forwarding or customs agents, also compound logistics costs.

SMEs are even more vulnerable to supply chain inefficiencies than large firms, typically facing doubled logistics costs. The first reason for this is pure economics. Smaller firms have fewer economies of scale in their inventory (via a higher inventory ratio) and hence incur higher inventory costs, which can be punitively high in developing countries with poor logistics performance. Size is also a disadvantage in several other respects: Small exporters tend to be more affected by a lack of transparency in clearance processes and depend more on independent services to move goods or clear them with border agencies. Logistics services may not be forthcoming when SMEs need to consolidate their goods in single containers to reach their destination market. Consolidation services can be very expensive or simply not available at all. Data from a 2012 study on trends and strategies in logistics supports the notion that many SMEs encounter disproportionally high logistics costs: on average logistics costs may be more that twice as high for industrial firms with less than 250 staff compared to those more than 1 000 staff (Straube et. al., 2013).

## Trade costs can be inferred from the global pattern of trade and production

Chapter 1 reported an estimate by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) that a representative developed country's level of trade costs are around 170% of the producer price of exported goods. That estimate was based on a bottom-up approach, in which research identifying different trade cost factors was effectively added up to give the overall headline number. Although useful as an order of magnitude –including for emphasising to economists and others that trade costs are large relative to tariffs – this kind of estimate is really a back of the envelope calculation that suffers from a number of drawbacks.

First, how can a bottom-up estimate be sure that it includes all the relevant factors? Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) used a selection of trade cost factors that had been well established in the previous literature. Yet they did not address many of the issues discussed in the previous chapter, at least not in detail. In particular, behind-the-border regulatory barriers arguably received insufficient attention, given that we know from business that these factors loom large in decision making.

Second, a bottom-up approach necessarily suffers from omitted-variable bias. Each of the estimates that Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) added together focused on one trade cost factor and were perhaps controlled for a small number of others. Yet the act of adding up the various estimates suggests that all the factors are relevant. As a result, each econometric model needs to include data on all factors, or it risks suffering from omitted-variable bias and providing potentially misleading estimates.

Clearly, it would be desirable to have another approach to measuring trade costs, one less based on bottom-up summation. Intuitively, the opposite approach is top down, i.e. inferring what the level of trade costs must be given the observed pattern of trade and production. Application of a top-down approach necessarily requires the use of some economic theory because trade and production have to be related to trade costs in a cross-country setting. But once the relationship is established, it can be rearranged and solved to give an expression for trade costs. This is in the sense of the full range of factors that drive a wedge between export and import prices rather than the selection used in summation exercises, even if it is very representative.

## The gravity model can be used to infer trade costs

The most common way of modelling trade flows between countries, and indeed the model type that Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) relied on in their summation exercise, is the gravity model. It has a decades-old history in international economics. Its core findings are regarded as some of the most reliable empirical regularities in all of economics, not just trade. At its most basic, the gravity model – which takes its name from an analogy to Newton's law of gravity – postulates that trade between two countries is stronger the larger they are and weaker the further apart they are. Distance is a proxy for trade costs, yet other factors can easily be included.

The gravity model started its life as a sensible empirical rule of thumb that matched the available data well. In more recent times, however, it has been given a sound set of theoretical foundations. Indeed, it has been observed that just about any reasonable trade model should give rise to an equation that looks something like gravity. The important point is that the model now rests on firm microeconomic foundations, based on sometimes sophisticated assumptions about consumer and producer behaviour.

In gravity modelling, the analyst's task is typically to assess the effects of a given trade cost factor on bilateral trade. Trade costs are given, and trade is modelled as the endogenous variable. However, it is perfectly possible to use some basic mathematics to reverse the setup – the "inverse" gravity model of Novy (2013). In that approach, trade costs are expressed as a function of observables (trade and production). The inverse gravity approach produces an index of trade costs expressed in *ad valorem* equivalent terms for each bilateral country pair in a given trade database. The index is the ratio of international trade costs to domestic trade costs and is bilateral in the sense of being an average of trade costs from country A to country B and from country B to country A. Intuitively, if all else is held constant and a country starts to trade more with a neighbour relative to the amount it trades with itself (intra-national trade), it must be because the ratio of domestic to international trade costs has changed. It is this basic insight that the inverse gravity methodology captures.

## The UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database implements the inverse gravity methodology

Novy (2013) implemented the inverse gravity approach for a small number of developed countries, and subsequently extended its reach in a series of papers. However, data constraints meant that the methodology was primarily useful for providing information on developed country trade costs. A collaborative project between UNESCAP and the World Bank sought to bring developing countries into the picture (Arvis et al., 2013). Doing so required a major data collection effort, focusing on international trade data and national accounts data (production).

The UNESCAP-World Bank Trade Costs database now provides data on bilateral trade costs for up to 167 developed and developing countries over the 1995-2012 period, differentiating between trade in agricultural products and in manufactured goods (updated annually with a lag due to data reporting schedules). It differentiates between trade in agricultural products and trade in manufactured goods. Trade costs are reported in *ad valorem* equivalent terms as the ratio of international to domestic trade costs and are bilaterally symmetrical. Disaggregation is by country pair, sector and year.

The database is the first attempt to systematically and comprehensively measure the level of trade costs in the developing world. It is freely available through UNESCAP and World Bank servers. It takes a nearly 20-year time horizon to provide scope to analyse changes in the trade costs environment and to relate them back to policy. The next two sections develop data-based insights using the information in the database. In interpreting results, a significant caveat should be kept in mind: because of the structure of the inverse gravity model used, it is not possible to identify international trade costs in the strict sense but only as the ratio of international to intra-national trade costs (the model is discussed further in Arvis et al, 2013). Changes in that ratio therefore need to be interpreted carefully. An increase could indicate that international trade costs are increasing, or it could alternatively mean that domestic trade costs are falling or that both processes are happening simultaneously. Known realities on the ground make it possible to limit the seriousness of this shortcoming in analytical work. The method and its results have been extensively used by other researchers – including by the OECD (2014), which uses trade costs data like these to quantify the reduction in trade costs due to the implementation of the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).

## TRADE COSTS ARE HIGHER IN LOWER INCOME COUNTRIES

What does the UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database say about the most important patterns in trade costs across countries and the key trends through time? The first point that emerges clearly from the data is that trade costs decrease as per capita income increases: trade costs are lowest in high income countries and highest in low income countries. The relationship proceeds steadily from one income group to the next (Figure 2.5). Although developing countries have made great strides in recent years in terms of their integration into the global trading system, there are still many poorer countries that are relatively marginalised because their trade costs are high.

To give an idea of the orders of magnitude involved, we can compare figures for 2010. On average, trade costs in high income countries for the manufacturing sector were 82%, compared with 98% in the upper middle income group, 125% in the lower middle income group and 227% in the low income group. These numbers make clear that it is by far the low income group that is the most marginalised in world trade: on average, trade costs there are close to three times as high as in the most developed countries. The gap is less striking, but still apparent, for the two middle income groups – which is in line with the fact that it is primarily the middle income countries that have been increasing their share of world trade markedly over recent years.

It is also important to analyse the dynamics of Figure 2.6, which shows the change in trade costs in each country group between 1996 and 2010. The upper middle income country group is where the fastest decline in trade costs has taken place: a fall of nearly 20% over the sample period. The difference with the next group, the lower middle income countries, is considerable – trade costs there fell by 13% during the same time. Results for the high and low income countries are very close, with falls of about 11% each.

**Figure 2.6 Trade costs in manufacturing, 1996 and 2010, by income group**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database

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From a policy perspective, these trends have two important implications. First, some middle income countries have been very successful in lowering trade costs in recent years – without a doubt the same countries that have seen their share of world trade increase so impressively, both before and after the Great Trade Collapse. The second implication is less encouraging from a development standpoint: the relative marginalisation of the low income countries, on average, continues unabated. They have drawn no closer to the other groups in relative terms and have even lost ground with respect to other developing countries, despite the fact they have kept pace with changes in the high income countries. In terms of the level and trend of their trade costs, the low income countries are in general in a very worrying position: to boost their competitiveness relative to other developing countries, they need to take significant actions to lower their trade costs. They will, of course, need support from the aid-for-trade community if they are to do that.

Thus far, the discussion has focused on trade costs in manufacturing. Figure 2.7 takes the discussion in a different direction, to agriculture, the other macro-sector in the UNESCAP-World Bank database. The first striking fact about Figure 2.7 is its similarity to Figure 2.6: trade costs in agricultural markets are also higher in poorer countries, and the pattern is consistent across income groups. However, the levels of trade costs involved are starkly different: trade costs in agriculture are much higher than in manufacturing, in all income groups. The gap is starkest in the high income group: although their absolute level of trade costs is lowest, agriculture trade costs are 74% higher than for manufacturing. The difference is less as we move down the income groups: 70% for upper middle income countries, 50% for lower middle income countries and 37% for low income countries. These results have important implications for competitiveness in agriculture, a key development sector. Although manufacturing is crucial for its spillover potential, it is difficult for a country to develop without steady productivity gains in agriculture, which allow labour to be reallocated from farm to factory, at the same time as maintaining or increasing food production.

In terms of dynamics, trade costs in agriculture are falling from their high levels in all income groups. However, the rate of change in all cases is slower than in manufacturing. In this case, the low income countries are becoming even more marginalised from international agricultural markets: in 1996 their trade costs were 108% higher than those of the high income countries, whereas in 2010 the difference was 117%. Trade costs in agriculture are high absolutely and in relative terms. They are falling more slowly than in manufacturing, and the marginalisation of low income countries appears to be worsening, not improving. Effective policies to lower the full range of trade costs that affect agricultural producers and consumers are much needed, as is donor support for successful programmes that help developing country producers deal more effectively with the trade costs they face. An example would be those linked to product standards (including sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures) in developed countries.

**Figure 2.7 Trade costs in agriculture, 1996 and 2010, by income group**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database.

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## EXPERIENCE DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY WITHIN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

The previous section has already made clear that trade costs vary widely across developing countries, particularly between the low and middle income groups. Variation is also regional, however, and is only partly related to different average income levels by region. Geography also plays a role, for instance, whether countries are landlocked or small island developing states makes a difference. It is important to tease out the differences in trade cost performance across developing regions so that the implications for development and aid for trade can be clearly understood.

Figure 2.8 shows trade costs for manufacturing by World Bank region, for 1996 and 2010. East Asia and the Pacific has the lowest trade costs of any developing region in both periods. Although East Asia and the Pacific as a whole performs well, there is heterogeneity within the region, and the Pacific islands face particularly high trade costs compared with East Asia. This finding is unsurprising given the region's reliance on external orientation and its leverage of international trade to serve development objectives. In 2010, trade costs in East Asia and the Pacific were on average 93%, which compares favourably with the high income group's 82%. It is clear that some developing countries have made great strides forward in reducing trade costs over time, and some are now indeed at or near the level of some developed countries – a significant achievement.

Trade costs in the other developing regions are higher. This includes in Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. The most striking difference is really between the last two regions, and especially between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest: trade costs in Africa were over 50% higher than in East Asia in 2010. This is a very substantial difference in the context of GVCs and companies deciding where to invest and grow their businesses. Clearly, much work remains to be done on trade costs in some developing regions, and there is an important role that aid for trade can play in supporting the infrastructure and institutions that are associated with lower trade costs.

It is also important to take note of the dynamics that are apparent in Figure 2.8. Most developing regions have reduced their trade costs substantially, with the largest relative reductions of around 20% in Europe and Central Asia and East Asia and the Pacific. Performance in South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa is also strong, but the two remaining regions lag behind, with much slower rates of decline in their trade costs. The problem is particularly clear in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, which starts from the highest baseline in 1996 and remains the highest cost region in 2010 – by a considerable distance. As was the case for the income group data, there is evidence from the regional split that some developing countries are reducing their trade costs effectively and becoming more internationally competitive, but others remain marginalised.

**Figure 2.8 Trade costs in manufacturing, 1996 and 2010, by region**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database.

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Another important dimension for the trade costs data is intra- versus extra-regional trade. In general, we would expect trade costs on regional routes to be lower than on more distant ones, firstly because of transport costs, but also because of regional integration efforts and institutional similarities among neighbouring countries. Table 2.1 provides some quantitative data that more or less bear out this insight. Each cell in the table shows average trade costs for a combination of regions. The boxes on the diagonal are intra-regional trade costs and all the others are extra-regional. The table is symmetrical because the UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database uses an average of underlying trade costs in both directions to form its index.

It is clear from Table 2.1 that intra-regional trade is generally a good deal less costly than extra-regional trade. An exception that has been well noted in practice is South Asia: it costs approximately the same to move goods between South Asian locations as it does to move them between South and East Asia. There is indeed a good deal of shipment between South Asian ports that goes via Singapore rather than directly, so this result is expected – albeit indicative of a considerable degree of dysfunction in the intra-regional transport market and trade facilitation arrangements.

Reading across Table 2.1, East Asia and the Pacific again stands out for its relatively low level of trade costs compared with other regions. It is frequently the lowest cost extra-regional destination for developing country exports. This fact is explained by the region's strong performance on transport connectivity: it contains international best practice hubs like Hong Kong, China and Singapore, as well as a large number of maritime ports in other locations. It is also a region that has worked hard on trade facilitation – including through projects funded through aid for trade. The policy lesson is that it is possible to make a region – or a country – a low trade cost environment through concerted policy action. The fruits of such policies are high levels of trade and the potential for sustainable and inclusive growth and poverty reduction. Indeed, the East Asia and the Pacific region has been remarkable for its rate of poverty reduction over recent years, and it appears that international trade has played at least some role.

**TABLE 2.1 Regional trade costs matrix for manufacturing, 2010 (Percentage of average trade costs)**

| | East Asia & Pacific | Europe & Central Asia | Latin America & Caribbean | Middle East & North Africa | South Asia | Sub-Saharan Africa |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **East Asia & Pacific** | 84% | 143% | 148% | 166% | 116% | 161% |
| **Europe & Central Asia** | 143% | 94% | 240% | 138% | 173% | 238% |
| **Latin America & Caribbean** | 148% | 240% | 113% | 206% | 184% | 232% |
| **Middle East & North Africa** | 166% | 138% | 206% | 106% | 156% | 225% |
| **South Asia** | 116% | 173% | 184% | 156% | 117% | 166% |
| **Sub-Saharan Africa** | 161% | 238% | 232% | 225% | 166% | 120% |

*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database.

One group of developing countries that is known to have very high trade costs is the landlocked countries. Lacking direct access to maritime shipping lanes, landlocked countries are dependent on often long overland routes that pass through third countries. They depend on transit arrangements, the administration of which is often challenging in the developing and transition economy context. Landlocked countries tend to have difficulty trading with distant partners and are highly reliant on immediate neighbours. Being landlocked poses serious problems for externally oriented development policies, although good policy in areas such as backbone services – transport and network services – and trade facilitation can greatly help in reducing the burden of being landlocked.

Figure 2.9 presents average trade costs for landlocked and coastal countries in 1996 and 2010. The difference is stark: in 2010 trade costs for landlocked countries were on average nearly one third higher than in coastal countries, at 163%. Even more serious is the dynamic in action: coastal countries reduced their trade costs on average by nearly one quarter over the sample period, whereas the comparable figure for landlocked countries is only 10%. Figure 2.9 provides strong evidence that landlocked developing countries suffer from particularly high trade costs that effectively marginalise them from the trading system, and that the problem is getting worse, not better, in relative terms. This is because they are reducing trade costs much more slowly than other countries. Aid for trade for landlocked countries, particularly in the areas of infrastructure and trade facilitation, should therefore be a particular priority going forward.

**Figure 2.9 Trade costs in manufacturing, 1996 and 2010, by landlocked versus other developing countries**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database.

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The discussion in this section has made it clear that developing country experiences with trade costs vary greatly on a case-by-case basis. Trade costs are important for all developing countries. Some, such as many countries in the East Asia and the Pacific region, have been very successful in adopting policies to reduce them. Others, such as sub-Saharan Africa and the landlocked countries, have suffered particular difficulties in relation to trade costs and continue to be marginalised from world markets due to the long distances that separate them from trading partners. In general, the direction of change is the right one: trade costs are falling across the board. However, more work is needed – and aid for trade can support it – to help those groups where trade costs remain stubbornly high, both on an intra- and inter-regional basis.

## VARIOUS POLICIES ARE AVAILABLE TO REDUCE TRADE COSTS

What can developing country Policy makers do in practice to reduce trade costs, and bring about the economic and development benefits that can potentially result? There are many possible policy levers that can be used, and it is impossible to canvass them in their entirety. Much depends on individual country circumstances, and programmes aimed at reducing trade costs need to be tailored to particular needs and situations, as well as development objectives. What follows in this section is an attempt to show some associations between commonly used policies and trade costs to serve as a backdrop to policy and analytical efforts aimed at identifying what works. Again, it is important to stress that the methodology used here presents correlations, not causal links. However, each of the cases examined has strong economic reasoning and mechanisms behind it, as well as detailed econometric analysis (Arvis et al., 2015).

The first set of policy measures we consider is logistics and trade facilitation. As noted in Chapter 1, trade facilitation can be a broad concept, encompassing a wide range of activities aimed at reducing trade costs. Customs and border procedures – the focus of trade facilitation at the WTO – are just one aspect. A good overall measure of country performance on the broader front is the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index (LPI) (Arvis et al., 2014). The LPI measures country performance along six key dimensions:

- The efficiency of customs and border clearance
- The quality of trade and transport infrastructure
- The ease of arranging competitively priced shipments
- The competence and quality of logistics services
- The ability to track and trace consignments
- The frequency with which shipments reach consignees within scheduled or expected delivery times

Performance is measured through a survey of trade logistics professionals around the world, who rate it on a scale from one to five. The overall LPI – which is the focus of the analysis here – aggregates performance across all six dimensions, with a higher score indicating stronger performance.

Figure 2.10 shows the association between trade facilitation performance as measured by the LPI and trade costs. The line of best fit is strongly downward sloping, which suggests that countries with better logistics and trade facilitation performance tend to have lower levels of trade costs. The correlation emerges very strongly from the data. Based on more rigorous analysis using an econometric model, there is thus good reason to believe that countries can reduce trade costs by moving forward on the six key dimensions of logistics and trade facilitation identified by the LPI. The agenda is a broad one, and it significantly includes the private sector (especially service providers), as well as the public sector. Working together to improve the regulatory environment, enhance market efficiency and upgrade private sector development in the logistics sector can bear fruit in terms of lower trade costs and improved competitiveness.

**Figure 2.10 Logistic Performance Index score versus trade costs, 2012**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database; World Bank Logistics Performance Index.

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Another issue that is currently increasing in importance on the policy agenda is connectivity. In the Asia-Pacific, ASEAN and APEC, both have major policy documents aimed at boosting regional connectivity in a wide variety of ways. Connectivity can be seen as new-generation trade facilitation: it moves beyond the point-to-point paradigm of the supply chain to deal with the ways in which trade costs affect networked production platforms like GVCs. Based on this analysis, we would expect that improved connectivity would be associated with lower trade costs in the same way as improved logistics and trade facilitation performance.

The Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) developed by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) is one measure of a country's ability to connect to global transport markets. It compiles data on a number of measures of connectivity performance, such as container ship deployment, carrying capacity, number of shipping companies, services and vessels and average and maximum vessel size. The vast bulk of international trade by volume, and a strong majority by value, travels by sea. Firms depend on maritime connectivity to be able to move goods through global markets. Typically, it is only goods that have a high value to weight ratio that travel by air, so sea lanes remain particularly important for many developing countries.

Figure 2.11 shows the association between the LSCI on the horizontal axis and trade costs on the vertical axis. The line of best fit is again downward sloping, which indicates that stronger maritime connectivity is associated with lower trade costs. As was the case for the LPI, the fit is very tight, which means that the association between the two variables is strong. More detailed analysis based on an econometric model backs up the finding in Figure 2.10: improving connectivity is one important way in which developing countries can reduce trade costs.

Connectivity is, of course, a broad agenda, but the components of the LSCI are suggestive of a number of ways in which countries can helpfully intervene in a policy sense. Moreover, many of these measures are common to other transport modes, such as air. Examples of important policy initiatives include infrastructure development at key gateway facilities such as ports and airports, as well as the roads and rail links that connect them to the rest of the economy. It is also important to get the regulatory stance right: liberalising transport services markets, including through relaxing restrictions on FDI, can promote consolidation and productivity upgrading, as well as the diffusion of global and regional best practices in terms of operating procedures.

**Figure 2.11 Linear Shipping Connectivity Index versus trade costs, 2012**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database; UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index.

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Thus far, we have focused on policies at and between borders. But behind-the-border measures are also important, as was stressed in Chapter 1. These policies are harder to measure by their very nature, and it is again impossible to be comprehensive here. Instead, we take one representative measure that is a good indicator of a country's business environment and investment climate: the cost of starting a business (market entry). The source is the Doing Business database. In this case, we expect the association with trade costs to go in the other direction: countries where starting a business is costly should have higher trade costs on average than those in which starting a business is relatively inexpensive, all other things being equal. A significant association between the two variables would be evidence consistent with the importance of behind-the-border barriers for trade costs.

Figure 2.12 shows that there is indeed a positive association between the cost of starting a business and trade costs, as evidenced by the upwards-sloping line of best fit. However, the observations in this case are not as tightly bunched around the regression line as in the other figures. Indeed, there is very wide dispersion at the low entry cost end of the graph. One possible implication is that the main policy priority is to avoid very high entry costs, which can contribute to a poor business environment and high trade costs; however, below a certain threshold, the effect of start-up costs becomes harder to divine. In any case, Figure 2.12 clearly suggests that behind-the-border measures are important determinants of trade costs, and need to be addressed as part of any comprehensive package aimed at reducing trade costs. From an Aid for Trade point of view, the implication is that measures to build productive capacity and undertake regulatory reform may be of great importance as part of a broad-based effort to help developing countries reduce trade costs.

**Figure 2.12 Cost of market entry versus trade costs, 2012**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database; Doing Business database.

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A final policy measure that needs to be discussed in the context of reducing trade costs is regional integration. Figure 2.13 shows that trade costs for country pairs not in the same regional trade agreement (RTA) are about twice as high as those for country pairs that are in the same RTA. As noted in Chapter 1, trade costs in some cases have a regional dimension, for example when transit arrangements are involved. In any case, there is scope for countries to move forward collaboratively on trade costs within broader regional frameworks – and many are doing so, with trade facilitation chapters and even chapters on behind-the-border measures, included in new generation RTAs.

Of course, a regional approach to trade costs could give rise to concerns about trade diversion if trade costs are reduced in a discriminatory way. There is as yet no evidence as to whether RTAs that include a trade facilitation component in fact lead to much trade diversion, or whether they aid or hinder broader efforts at multilateral progress. There is reason to believe, however, that the sorts of policy measures being discussed here can be implemented in a regional framework in a way that is reasonably non-discriminatory and therefore highly compatible with the rules based multilateral trading system. Many policies aimed at reducing trade costs in fact have benefits for all trading partners, even if the motivating factor for introducing the policy is a regional agreement. For example, upgrading customs and border procedures is in many cases an MFN (most favoured nation) policy – one that benefits all trading partners, not just RTA partners. There is therefore good reason to be hopeful that measures such as these mean that the there is strong compatibility between regional approaches to trade costs and the core values of the multilateral trading system. Indeed, the evidence for services markets is strongly suggestive of such compatibility (Miroudot and Shepherd, 2014).

**Figure 2.13 Trade costs for country pairs not in an RTA versus in the same RTA, 2012**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank trade costs database; De Sousa (forthcoming).

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## CONCLUSIONS

The previous section highlighted the fact that although developing countries have serious work to do on the trade costs front, they have a number of policy options available to them that can be effective and, it is hoped, reasonably non-discriminatory. This section looks at how individual countries and projects have adapted these ideas to concrete circumstances so as to successfully reduce trade costs.

**Policy makers must begin with an accurate diagnosis of the sources of trade costs for their country.** No two countries face identical challenges in lowering trade costs, and as we have seen, performance varies within regions and income groups. The highest priority needs to be given to the greatest drivers of trade costs, particularly given the way in which the weakest links tend to drive costs up along the rest of any given supply chain.

**A number of indicators and diagnostic tools are available to help governments identify the most important drivers of trade costs within countries and regions.** Cross-country benchmarks include the following:

- The Logistics Performance Index identifies covers customs and border management, transport infrastructure, ease of arranging shipments, logistics services quality, tracking and tracing and timeliness. The index was developed based on an understanding of the key determinants of logistics performance. It has been used by a number of countries as the basis for designing reform programmes.
- The World Bank Doing Business index provides a metric for the ease of processing trades in terms of the number of documents or a notional time involved in importing and exporting a standard 20-foot equivalent container.

Such indicators provide a starting point for strategies to lower trade costs and make international supply chains more efficient. However, country indicators are not diagnostic tools but rather coarse indications of where countries stand in certain policy dimensions. Policies addressing the source of trade costs should be designed on comprehensive assessments and specific facts and data. This effort can be supported by a series of guidelines and toolkits. In the area of trade logistics one popular reference is the Trade and Transport Facilitation Assessment (TTFA) (See Box 2.2).

### BOX 2.2 Trade and Transport Facilitation Assessment (TTFA)

The facilitation audit establishes a diagnosis, as comprehensive as possible, of procedural or operational constraints to external trade and international transportation services. The three main areas of focus are: 1) procedures and regulatory requirements for international trade transactions (e.g. customs); 2) efficiency and market structure of transport services and infrastructures; and 3) measurement of costs and delays. This analysis is carried out through a series of interviews of private sector operators and public agencies, according to the methodology published by the World Bank in *Trade and Transport Facilitation Assessment: a Practical Toolkit*, World Bank 2011. It results in a comprehensive analysis of the present situation and a remedial action plan, which would break ground for future trade or transport facilitating projects. The Toolkit has been applied in 50+ countries.

*Source:* World Bank

**Across developing countries, several priorities for policy reform to lower trade costs are clear, even if actions to address them must be designed for the unique circumstances each country faces.** Priorities vary according to income level, with some patterns across income groups. Take for instance the three main dimensions in trade logistics reforms:

- Trade facilitation reforms to simplify processes at the border (e.g. customs)
- Trade related infrastructure such as rail or road corridors, ports but also ICT (e.g. broadband)
- Development and quality of logistics services.

The indication from the LPI surveys, confirmed by field work, is that typically core trade facilitation reforms have been more important in low income countries, while the service reforms are critical in more advanced economies with a diversified export composition. (Figure 2.14)

**Figure 2.14 Policy dimensions and income levels**




*Source:* Logistics Performance Index 2007 and 2014

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Policy dimensions are complementary and non-separable in practice. For instance the popularity of trade facilitation programmes don't replace improvements in infrastructure. **Many countries continue to face significant infrastructure gaps that need to be addressed as part of programmes to lower trade costs.** It is true that even the costliest elements of trade facilitation reform programmes (e.g. setting up single-window systems or upgrading border infrastructure) are in general far lower investments than infrastructure projects like port or airport upgrades, or road and rail re-construction. However, in practice these facilitation reforms are better implemented when tied to physical infrastructure. For instance, in Africa some of the most impactful trade facilitation projects have been tied to corridor projects (e.g. Mombassa, Dar es Salam and Douala) project. Linking "hard" and "soft" is likely to bring more sustainable participation from stakeholders and agents. It also provides a good framework for donor co-ordination. Over the last decade, the corridors serving the African Interior from the port of Mombasa, Dar es Salam, Douala, have seen significant performance improvement, in part because the agencies supporting the corridors, such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank, have supported this link.

**Trade facilitation needs to be one of the priority areas for action**. Inefficient border management is one of the most significant sources of trade costs for developing countries. This makes trade facilitation a highly cost-effective area of reform. Increasingly, trade facilitation reforms target the implementation of comprehensive border management reforms, with participation of the full set of institutions involved in regulating trade. This includes agencies responsible for quarantine, health, security, etc. (in many countries there can be more than ten agencies involved in trade facilitation). The impact of resources invested to improve the efficiency of customs procedures – the traditional focus of trade facilitation reforms – can be diminished if other agencies involved in clearing goods at the border maintain inefficient procedures. Results from the Logistics Performance Index 2014 show this as an ongoing area of weak performance, with respondents identifying more problems with non-customs agencies, including those involved in standards, transport, veterinary issues and health/SPS.

**Implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement is a key instrument in developing countries' trade facilitation reform programmes – however, countries should not stop with TFA implementation.** Current reform programmes in many countries go well beyond the TFA measures, and they should be seen as setting a reform floor that can be built on. In fact, most active reform programmes, supported by international agencies such as the World Bank, in middle income countries and in most low income countries, are already pushing the modernisation of the trade facilitation infrastructure much beyond the provisions of the TFA.

**Services must receive greater priority in reform strategies to lower trade costs.** The latest World Bank Group Logistics Performance Index results underline the importance of improving the quality of logistics service provision. Private sector firms, rather than governments, are the service providers, but the services sector policy environment is heavily influenced by government decisions. Sectors such as trucking or customs brokerage need to be regulated effectively. Regulations include entry in the business, enforcement of technical regulation and standards of access to market by regional and international operators. Closed markets or lack of enforcement competence in regulatory agencies are quite common and prevent the emergence of quality oriented services that exporters need. In major economies, the most efficient exporters have most logistics services provided by third parties, allowing firms to maximise productivity in their core area of business. This is in contrast to the situation in middle income, and especially low income, countries, where there is little use of third party logistics providers. A classical example is trucking in regions such as West Africa, where the traditional market organisation relies on many small operators with old trucks running a few days per month. This situation is now targeted by several projects (including a policy loan by the World Bank) aiming at the consolidation of the profession.

**Non-tariff measures (NTMs) comprise a significant source of trade costs**, the importance of which has risen as tariffs have fallen globally. Streamlining NTMs, and harmonising them between trade partners and within regions, can have a significant impact in lowering trade costs. Diagnostics like the World Bank NTM Toolkit can help governments analyse NTMs in a more systematic manner and provide a basis for more objective discussion with different stakeholder groups on NTMs than is often the case.

Aid for trade should also address groups of countries with special needs due to comparatively very high trade costs. **Such is the case of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS)**. Figure 2.15 provides strong evidence that landlocked developing countries or islands states indeed suffer from particularly high trade costs that effectively marginalise them from the trading system. There are indeed at are at an obvious disadvantage given the need to cross a transit country (landlocked countries) or the dependence on trans-shipment (island states) to access international markets.

**Figure 2.15 GDP per capita and Aggregate Trade Costs**




*Source:* World Bank 2014

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Even more serious is the dynamic. Figure 2.16 presents average trade costs for landlocked and coastal countries in 1996 and 2010. Coastal countries reduced their trade costs on average by nearly one quarter over the sample period, whereas the comparable figure for landlocked countries is only 10%. Thus the difference is stark: in 2010, trade costs for landlocked countries were on average nearly one third higher than in coastal countries, at 163%.

**Figure 2.16 Trade costs in manufacturing, 1996 and 2010, by landlocked versus other developing countries.**




*Source:* UNESCAP-World Bank 2014Trade Costs Database.

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More than the "tyranny of distance", LLDCs are affected by the additional complexity and potential inefficiencies of their supply chain. The main difference with coastal countries is the need for transit system that makes possible the movement of goods in the country of transit to be cleared at the LLDC of destination. Transit systems tend not to be very integrated across transit routes; multiple clearances and controls result in additional costs delays and especially uncertainty.

The UN and other agencies have promoted the Almaty Programme of Actions (2003), expanded by the Vienna Programme of Actions (2014), targeting LLDCs and their transit countries. These programmes identify This programme identifies a series of sectors for aid for trade and co-operation between countries. These include the transit regime, corridor development, regional integration of customs and transport policies. Greater priority should be given to Aid for Trade for landlocked countries, particularly in the areas of transit system and regional integration and transit regimes. Due to the additional challenge of cross-country projects, these should therefore be a particular priority going forward. Unfortunately, reforms in these areas have had lower traction and aid-for-trade support than trade facilitation reforms at the country level or infrastructure support.

**The OECD-WTO monitoring exercise 2015 confirms the importance of these policy areas and the intensity of initiatives at the country level.** The survey shows that there has been a significant amount of activity in the area of reducing trade costs, using a variety of different methods (Figure 2.17). Two aspects are important. First, there needs to be an overall strategy in place to unify efforts across the distinct and often administratively distinct areas in Figure 2.17. Second, it is important to identify and scale up what works in the context of individual projects in individual countries. On-the-ground experience is key to understanding the steps developing country governments can take to reduce trade costs.

**Figure 2.17 Actions undertaken or ongoing in partner countries to reduce trade costs**




*Source:* OECD-WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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Many factors go into building successful trade cost reduction programmes. The key for individual governments is in getting the mix right and ensuring the right actions are matched with the right conditions and structures. Again, partner countries speak to this issue in the OECD-WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (Figure 2.18). They identify sustained engagement at a political level and by the private sector as the two most important keys to success.

**Figure 2.18 Key factors in achieving trade cost reductions in partner countries**




*Source:* OECD-WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

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# CHAPTER 3

# AID-FOR-TRADE POLICIES, PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMMES

*Contributed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*

***Abstract:*** *This chapter looks at the volume of aid-for-trade disbursements and commitments and provides details about the sectoral, geographic and income distribution. In addition, it summarises academic literature that has analysed the links between aid, trade, economic growth and poverty reduction and finds that on average these links are positive, both at the aggregate and country level. These findings are confirmed by the case stories submitted by the public and private sector about aid-for-trade programmes. Finally, the chapter assesses the outlook for aid for trade as moderately positive.*

## INTRODUCTION

The Aid-for-Trade Initiative will celebrate its tenth birthday at the WTO's Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Kenya on 15-18 December 2015. One of the objectives of the initiative is to secure "additional, predictable, sustainable and effective financing" for building trade capacities in developing countries. To assess additionality and assure accurate accounting, clear benchmarks at the global level were agreed. These include official development assistance (ODA) for helping developing countries elaborate trade strategies, negotiate trade agreements and implement their outcomes; build roads, ports and telecommunications networks; connect domestic markets to the global economy; support the private sector; exploit their comparative advantages and diversify their exports; help with the costs associated with trade liberalisation, such as tariff reductions, preference erosion or declining terms of trade; and other trade-related needs if identified as trade-related priorities in partner countries' national development strategies (WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade (WT/AFT/1).

The remainder of this chapter will analyse aid-for-trade flows, programmes and priorities. The next section will present the aggregate aid-for-trade disbursements since the Aid-for-Trade Initiative became operational. In particular, the section will look at the countries that received the aid, the type of support provided and the financial conditions. The second section presents the findings of empirical work to establish the link between aid-for-trade disbursements and results in terms of trade performance and poverty reduction. In addition, the section also presents the aggregate findings from the case stories regarding output, outcomes and impacts. This is followed by a third section on the aid-for-trade priorities from donors and partner countries and particularly the importance they give to reducing trade costs. The fourth section analyses the 2013 aid-for-trade commitments in terms of recipients, categories and donors. The fifth section presents the budget and the medium term aid-for-trade outlook. The final section concludes.

## AID FOR TRADE DISBURSEMENT

A total of USD 246.5 billion has been disbursed for financing aid-for-trade programmes and projects since the Initiative was launched in 2006. This sum consists of around 250 000 projects ranging in size from USD 1 000 to just under USD 1 billion with the most occurring project value between USD 500 000 and USD 1 million. Aid-for-trade providers are made up of some 60 bilateral and multilateral donors that report their official development assistance (ODA) to the OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Since 2006 bilateral donors have provided almost two thirds of total support and multilateral donors the rest. Over the same time period middle income countries have benefitted more than twice as much as low income countries from aid-for-trade spending. The support is equally divided between grants and concessional loans, with low income countries, specifically the least developed, receiving most of their support in the form of grants and middle income countries mostly in loans.

Geographically, 146 developing countries received aid-for-trade assistance, mainly in Asia (38.4%) and Africa (35.1%). Regional and global programmes also attracted 15.5% of total aid-for-trade disbursements. To date, more than three quarters of total aid for trade has financed projects in four sectors: transport and storage (29%), energy generation and supply (21%), agriculture (18%) and banking and financial services (10%). In terms of population, the least developed countries received USD 10 per capita in aid for trade; the highest compared to other income groups and more than double the average aid for trade per capita.

In addition, USD 190.4 billion in trade-related other official flows (these transactions are known as OOF and are made by the official sector with countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients which do not meet the conditions for ODA eligibility, either because they are not primarily aimed at development or because they have a grant element of less than 25%) has been disbursed since 2006, of which almost 80% is from international financial institutions. Most of this non-concessional funding supported projects in economic infrastructure (47%) and building productive capacities

(52%) and almost exclusively in middle-income countries (92%). Asia is also the main beneficiary of trade-related OOF at USD 72.5 billion, or 38% of the total support. At USD 30.75 billion, Africa is surpassed by middle income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe, with USD 45.9 billion and USD 38.7 billion respectively.

The remainder of this section will look more closely at the aggregate aid-for-trade disbursements since 2006. In particular, it will examine the distribution of the disbursements among the different categories (i.e. trade policy and regulations, economic infrastructure and building productive capacity) that are used as proxies to measure the volume of aid for trade at the global level. Next, the section will look at the countries and regions which receive these aid disbursements and the donors who provide the concessional funds. Finally, the financial terms of the disbursements will be studied. Throughout this section reference will also be made to trade-related other official flows.

## Sectoral and geographic distribution

Between 2006 and 2013 a total of USD 128.9 billion was disbursed to support programmes and projects that are aimed at reducing the infrastructure gap in developing countries. Transport and storage projects attracted the majority of these funds (56%), followed by energy generation and supply projects (40%), while communication projects attracted relatively little concessional financing (4%). Asia was the main beneficiary with USD 58.4 billion, followed by Africa with USD 44.8 billion. Much less support was destined to the transition economies of Eastern Europe (USD 12.0 billion), Latin America and the Caribbean (USD 8.9 billion) and Oceania (USD 1.6 billion). In addition, a total of USD 89.7 billion in OOF was used to finance economic infrastructure programmes and projects, with USD 47.0 billion financing transport and storage projects and USD 37.7 billion for projects in the energy sector. These OOF were predominantly made available by multilateral developing banks and Korea for programmes that were for the most part concentrated in middle income countries, especially in Asia.

Programmes and projects aimed at building the productive capacities in developing countries received USD 109.6 billion in aid between 2006 and 2013. Improving agricultural productivity and food security was the specific objective of USD 43.8 billion This was partly in response to the 2009 L'Aquila G8 Summit, where a number of donors (G8 members along with Australia, the EU, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) pledged a total of USD 22.2 billion to support food security over a three-year period. Banking and financial services as well as other business services received respectively USD 24.9 billion and USD 13.2 billion. Most disbursements for building productive capacity went to Africa (USD 39.1 billion) followed by Asia (USD 34.5 billion), Latin America and the Caribbean (USD 11.1 billion), Europe (USD 9.9 billion) and Oceania (USD 0.96 billion).

In addition, a total of USD 98.7 billion in trade-related OOF has also been made available to finance productive capacity building programmes since 2006. Addressing market failures in banking and financial services and other business services received respectively USD 40.4 billion and USD 8.8 billion, while pro-active industry specific policies in the area of manufacturing, agriculture and mining reached respectively USD 30.2 billion, USD 8.9 billion and USD 7.7 billion. The main recipients of these flows were middle income countries in Asia (38.1% of total OOF flows), Latin America and the Caribbean (24.1%) and Europe (20.4%). Relatively little went to Africa (16.1%).

Aid for trade in its narrowest sense of support for trade policy and regulation has attracted a total of USD 7.6 billion, or only 3.1% of total disbursement, since 2006. Trade policy and management, which covers technical support to trade ministries and implementation of trade agreements, including technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, attracted most of the support. This amounted to USD 4.3 billion, followed by support for trade facilitation (USD 1.8 billion), active participation in regional trade negotiations (USD 0.9 billion), multilateral trade negotiations (USD 224 million) and training and education (USD 222 million). Support for trade-related adjustments – one of the initial objectives of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative – only attracted USD 169 million. Given the technical assistance character of support for trade policy and regulations, only USD 1.8 billion in trade-related OOF was used to finance projects in this area.

**Figure 3.1 Aid for Trade share by category (Total disbursements 2006-2013)**




*Source*: OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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**Figure 3.2 Trade-related OOF share by category (Total disbursements 2006-2013)**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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Since 2006 Asian countries have been the main recipients of aid-for-trade disbursements (USD 94.8 billion), with an additional USD 3 billion for regional programmes. Most of these funds were destined for countries in South and Central Asia (47.7%), followed by East Asia (37%) and the Middle East (13.3%). Trade-related OOF to Asia totalled USD 72.5 billion, with USD 37 billion going to finance programmes in East Asia and USD 30 billion in South and Central Asia. Over the same period, aid for trade to Africa reached USD 86.5 billion, three quarters of which was destined to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, it also received USD 10.7 billion in disbursements relating to regional programmes. Overall, only 16.0% of trade-related OOF was disbursed to countries in Africa, less than that received by Latin America and the Caribbean (24.1%) and Europe (20.4%). In fact, trade related OOF is overwhelmingly directed to middle income countries (91.0%) and hardly to the least developed (3.2%).

The tendency to provide more concessional aid-for-trade funds than non-concessional OOF to the poorest countries is also reflected in the distribution of loans to grants. At aggregate level, the share of loans to grants has been almost equal since 2006. But low income countries have received 65.0% of their disbursements as grants, whereas middle income countries received the same share in loans. The least developed countries' share in total country-specific aid-for-trade disbursements was 31.2%, while other low income countries received 6.1%, with the remaining 62.7% going to middle income countries. However, the aid for trade per capita to least developed countries is USD 10, while other to low income countries it is USD 8.9, lower middle income USD 4.9 and the upper middle income USD 2.5.

**Figure 3.3 Aid for Trade disbursements by region and income group, 2006-2013, % share in total Aid for Trade**




Source: OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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**Figure 3.4 Trade-related OOF disbursements by region and income group, 2006-2013, % share in total trade-related OOF**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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The top ten aid-for-trade recipients have received a little over 40% (USD 86 billion) of total country specific aid-for-trade disbursements since 2006. They consist of six countries in Asia, four in Africa. Only Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Tanzania belong to the LDCs. To put the USD 86 billion in perspective, it should be noted that the total population of these top ten recipients is close to 30% of the total population of developing countries. The top ten recipients of trade-related OOF consist of five countries in Asia and two in Europe, two in the Americas and one in Africa. All top ten OOF recipients are middle income countries. Together they received 58% of total OOF.

Since 2006, bilateral donors have provided almost 63% of total aid-for-trade disbursements, with the remainder being financed by multilateral donors. Together the top donors (both bilateral and multilateral) provide over 80% of total aid for trade. For trade-related OOF, the concentration is even stronger, with the top ten donors providing over 98% of the funds.

**Figure 3.5 Aid for Trade: Top 10 recipients (Total disbursements 2006-2013)**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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**Figure 3.6 Trade-related OOF: Top 10 recipients (Total disbursements 2006-2013)**




Source: OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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## RESULTS FROM AID-FOR-TRADE PROGRAMMES

The significant amount of aid and OOF devoted to helping developing countries build trade capacities through improving infrastructure and invigorating the private sector should show results. The 2011 joint OECD/WTO Aid for Trade at a Glance was specifically devoted to this topic. The report painted an encouraging picture of numerous donor-supported, trade-related projects and programmes delivering a wide range of tangible results in terms of trade performance, private investment and employment creation in a large number of developing countries. Showing results is not a one-off exercise but requires continues attention. The next section will highlight some of the empirical evidence concerning the links between aid for trade, trade performance and poverty reduction. This is followed by a section presenting the aggregate findings in terms of outputs, outcomes and impacts of aid-for-trade programmes that were showcased in stories submitted in the context of the 2015 monitoring exercise.

**Figure 3.7 Aid for Trade: Top 10 aid providers (Total disbursements 2006-2013)**




Source: OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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**Figure 3.8 Trade-related OOF: Top 10 providers (Total disbursements 2006-2013)**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

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## Empirical findings

A literature review by Basnett et al. (2012) finds that the empirical studies support the presumption that trade liberalisation reduces poverty in the long run and on average (Basnett et. al., 2012). For developing countries – which tend to have scarce capital and abundant labour – increased trade allows for a higher return to labour and in turn an improvement in the income distribution towards wages and the poor. This can happen through a number of different transmission channels, including lower prices, increased competition, the creation of economies of scale and the creation of new industries and GVCs.

The impact of aid for trade on trade performance is well established. The Commonwealth-ODI (Overseas Development Institute) (2013) conclude that the empirical literature confirms that aid for trade, in general, is effective at both the micro and macro level. The impacts, however, may vary considerably depending on the type of aid-for-trade intervention, the income level and geographical region of the recipient country and the sector at which the support is directed. For example, Bearce et al. (2010) suggest that an investment of USD 1 in aid for trade from the United States would increase on average exports by between USD 42 and USD 53. Ferro et al. (2012) found that a 10.0% increase in aid to transportation, ICT, energy and banking services is associated with increases of 2.0%, 0.3%, 6.8% and 4.7%

respectively in the exports of manufacturing from the recipient countries. Cirera and Winters (2015) analysed whether aid for trade has assisted the process of structural transformation in sub-Saharan African countries and found a positive impact in reducing the time of exporting and importing but that factors other than aid-for-trade flows explain different experiences in relation to structural change.

The effects of aid for trade on reducing trade costs also have great potential. Busse et al (2011) used panel data estimation for a sample of 99 developing countries for the period 2004-09 and showed that aid for trade and aid-for-trade facilitation are closely associated with lower trade costs and therefore may play an important role in helping developing countries benefit from trade. Importantly, they found the impact was not only significant in statistical terms but economic terms as well. Cali and te Velde (2011) examined the impact of aid for trade on trade costs and exports and found that a USD 1 million increase in aid-for-trade facilitation is associated with a 6% reduction in the cost of packing, loading and shipping to the transit hub. OECD/WTO (2013) found that one dollar invested in aid for trade is on average associated with an increase of nearly USD 8 in exports from all developing countries and an increase of USD 20 in exports for the poorest countries. These effects are even higher for exports of parts and components.

## Economic infrastructure

There is now an extensive body of research that points to the importance of hard and soft infrastructure for the trade performance and trade integration of developing countries. These studies show that eliminating infrastructure constraints can facilitate the process of shifting resources to more productive sectors. Econometric analysis of aid for infrastructure has emphasised its positive impact on trade performance. For instance, a comparative study by Dollar et al. (2006) of four countries in Latin America (Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru) and four Asian countries (Bangladesh, China, India and Pakistan) found that access to core infrastructure services is one of the key factors that explains the more rapid pace of international trade integration in the latter group of countries. Research by Mariana Vijil and Laurent Wagner also suggests that infrastructure is a highly significant determinant of export performance. Their research

| IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE: RESULTS AT GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Ecuador** | The construction of the bridge on the border between Ecuador and Colombia will increase trade and tourism between the two countries (CS 20). |
| **Kenya** | The Nairobi-Thika Highway Improvement Project spurred growth and created jobs, employing 3 600 unskilled personnel and 600 technical staff and engineers (CS 35). |
| **Tanzania** | The US Millennium Cooperation disbursed USD 386 million to improve Tanzania's road networks and upgrade the Mafia Island Airport to increase tourism and business potential. Over the next 20 years, estimated household income is projected to increase by USD 427 million as a result of these activities. |
| **Viet Nam** | Japan financed the construction of a 600 MW Son Coal Fired Thermal Power Plant with a USD 170 million ODA Loan. This project is categorised as one of the most important projects in the long-term power development plan for responding to increasing power demands in Viet Nam, where significant economic growth is being achieved. |
| **Afghanistan** | The construction of a 75 km railway at the border with Uzbekistan has increased employment by more than 10% per year since 2010 and cross border trade from USD 170 million in 2008 to USD 732 million in 2011 (CS 46). |
| **Uganda** | The Kalangala Infrastructure Services and Renewables Project generated USD 1 million in government revenue and created more than 300 jobs. It also empowered women by providing them with electricity and creating job opportunities for them (CS 99). |
| **Ecuador** | The improvement of the CEBAF-Huaquillas infrastructure will enhance control processes and contribute to the modernisation of the Border Services Centres (CS 19). |

*Source:* OECD/WTO 2015 aid-for-trade case story.

concludes that a 10% increase in aid for infrastructure commitments per capita in developing countries leads to an average 2.3% increase in the exports over GDP ratio. These results highlight the high potential impact of aid for trade on developing countries' export performance throughout the infrastructure channel. OECD/WTO (2013) arrives at similar findings and calculated that a 10% increase in aid for infrastructure translates into a 2.3% increase in the trade-to-GDP ratio and a 0.3% increase in exports.

## Building productive capacities

To promote private sector-led inclusive and sustainable growth, donors provide support to building productive capacities. As direct forms of business support have been found to be relatively costly and prone to failure, indirect approaches have been preferred (Danish International Development Agency [DANIDA], 2009). One of them consists of improving access for SMEs to financial services by strengthening local banks. A recent evaluation of this approach

| ONLINE PROGRAMMES FOR TRADE PROMOTION: RESULTS AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Chile** | The Agricultural Market Intelligence System is a free online system that enables producers, processors and exporters to access up-to-date agricultural information (CS 25). |
| **Lao PDR** | As a single authoritative source for all trade-related laws, regulations, business processes and fee schedules, the online Lao Trade Portal increased export productivity (CS 31). |
| **Uruguay** | The creation of a national trade intelligence platform is supporting SMEs in their international expansion (CS 103) |
| **Indonesia** | Through a USD 1 million Murabaha trade-finance operation, coffee farmers no longer have to wait 45 days for payment but receive cash upon delivery (CS 70). |
| **Pacific Islands** | The Pacific Islands Micro-enterprise e-Marketing Support is providing local companies with internet training to increase bookings through online sales (CS 76). |
| **Fiji** | The project improved SMEs business knowledge in financing, record keeping and developing energy-saving measures in order to efficiently manage their businesses in the tourism industry (CS 78). |

*Source:* OECD/WTO 2015 aid-for-trade case story.

employed by European development finance institutions found that these banks were better placed to sustainably offer financial services to their clients, including their SME clients. However, they continued serving a relatively small number of select SME clients and failed to develop methods for expanding credit provision to large numbers of SME customers (Horus Development Finance, 2014). Interventions that directly target actors in the private sector are in the area of capacity-building programmes, business-to-business programmes and trade promotion (i.e. import offices).

Brenton and von Uexkull (2009) evaluate whether technical assistance in export development programmes has been successful and, in general, find that these programmes induced a stronger export performance in the targeted sectors. However, they qualify this by saying these programmes appear to be more effective where there is already significant export activity, and that there are concerns that the support may be channelled to sectors that would have prospered anyway. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) shows that business organisations in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were able to contribute to the aid-for-trade process. These organisations are formed through collective action and although they bear risks (e.g. rent-seeking), they come with a series of positive characteristics, such as their networking and intermediary function and serve both as potential beneficiaries as well as multipliers and facilitators of aid-for-trade actions. However, the organisations face a variety of constraints in the areas of human resources as well as organisational and financial management preventing them from exerting their potential role.

## Trade policy and regulations

Most empirical studies in the area of donor support to trade policy and regulations have focused on aid-for-trade facilitation. OECD (2013) calculated that fully implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement could reduce global trade costs by between 12% and 15%, noting that a 1% cost reduction would increase worldwide income by more than USD 40 billion, almost two-thirds of which would accrue to developing countries. An econometric analysis by Massa (2013) provided new insights into the determinants of aid-for-trade facilitation effectiveness. The study found that aid-for-trade facilitation on its own is important for fostering exports, but it is its combination with good quality institutions in recipient countries that allows aid-for-trade facilitation disbursements to unfold their positive effects.

Subramanian, Anderson and Lee (2012) estimated the effect of reducing trade transaction times on exports. Their results show that reducing the time to export could potentially increase trade by 0.6% on average for sub-Saharan African countries. Furthermore, Djankov et al. (2010) collected data from 98 countries on the number of days it takes to

| TRADE FACILITATION: RESULTS AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Global** | AIM for Results assisted 50 trade support institutions to address their managerial and operational weaknesses, thus helping SMEs to connect to GVCs (CS 49). |
| **Asia** | GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) provided capacity building for local governments and for the Greater Tumen Initiative, organising dialogue events and conducting sector studies to foster trade between border regions on a sub-national level (CS 66). |
| **Pacific Islands** | PHAMA (Pacific Horticultural Agricultural Market Access Program) provided a structured strategic approach to Pacific Island Countries (PICs), allowing them to access key markets for selected high-value primary products (CS 55). |
| **Vanuatu** | The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus – currently negotiated between 14 Pacific Island Countries, Australia and New Zealand – will improve efficiency and lower the cost of doing business in PICs (CS 41). |
| **Central Asia** | Trade facilitation programmes enabled the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) to achieve a fivefold increase in interregional trade value, a 30% increase in travel speed along the CAREC corridor and a 20% decrease in costs incurred at a border crossings (CS 60). |
| **West Africa** | An USAID-supported Borderless Alliance increased trade across West Africa and facilitated the free movement of persons, goods and vehicles within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (CS 65). |
| **West Africa** | The West Africa Joint Border Post Programme undertook border management and the construction of modern joint border posts to reduce trade costs by 20% and enhance intra-regional trade and increase revenues (CS 38). |
| **East Africa** | The East African Community (EAC) Secretariat improved the EAC integration process, advancing the implementation of the core areas of the common market and taking into account the interests of non-governmental actors (CS 67). |
| **East Africa** | The Project on Capacity Development for International Trade Facilitation enhanced the compliance levels and improved the efficiency of border clearance, fuelling poverty reduction (CS 7). |
| **Tunisia** | The Single Window of Information and Communication Technologies simplified the telecommunications imports, reducing clearance time (CS 10). |
| **Uganda** | The Customs Business Systems Enhancement Project decreased the average time to clear goods from 18 to 4 days, allowing businesses to save USD 373 million per year and increase trade volumes (CS 6). |
| **Peru** | Focusing on security requirements and partners' skills, the customs Authorized Economic Operator programme improved trade promotion, trade facilitation and decreased technical barriers (CS 12). |

*Source:* OECD/WTO 2015 aid-for-trade case story.

| ADOPTING STANDARDS TO GROW: RESULTS AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Cambodia** | The introduction of food safety procedures and the promulgation of the internationally recognised Cambodian Rice Standards doubled the export volume of rice in three years (CS 15). |
| **Ecuador** | Ecuador, through the harmonisation of foot-and-mouth programmes at the regional level, has been without new outbreaks for 41 months (CS 18). |
| **Honduras** | The creation of a national system for phytosanitary inspection and certification of agricultural export products will strengthen the framework of Honduras' National Agricultural Safety Service. (CS 30). |
| **Pakistan** | Once Pakistani companies obtained the CE conformity marking, its exports increased. For instance, Suntex, a manufacturer, saw its exports increase by 20% and expects them to rise by an additional 30% by the end of 2015 (CS 75). |
| **Papua New Guinea** | The four-year-old bilateral trade agreement between Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the European Union resulted in a EUR 987 million increase in PNG exports to the EU in 2012 and the creation of 40 000 jobs in the fisheries sector alone.(CS 44) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO 2015 aid-for-trade case story.

move standard cargo from the factory gate to the port and found that each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by more than 1%. The study also found that delays have an even greater impact on exports of time-sensitive goods, such as perishable agricultural products.

## Aggregate case story findings

These empirical findings are confirmed by the anecdotal evidence which can be gleaned from 117 case stories that were submitted by the public sector, private sector, academics and NGOs in response to the 2015 call for these studies. The case stories were analysed for references to outputs, outcomes and impacts, which together with the inputs and the activities form the basis of the results chain which underlies the Theory of Change of most donors. A results chain shows how changes happen to achieve the desired objectives, starting with inputs, moving through activities and outputs and culminating in outcomes and impacts. (see Figure 3.1) This process is centred on a strong notion of causality, but at any point in this chain other, possibly more powerful, intervening causal variables may affect the next stage positively or negatively, complicating the attribution of outcomes to the project intervention (OECD, 2011).

**Figure 3.9 Theory of Change**




Any conclusion from the collection of case stories must be tempered by the awareness of its limitations. First, the stories are written by the participants, who include governments, donors or consultants working on the project. This introduces two selection biases: respondents are less likely to report on failed projects and self-evaluations are likely to be somewhat more forgiving and less objective than outside evaluations of any given project. Second, the intentional call for heterogeneity is a virtue if the exercise is intended to elicit broad participation, but can also be a vice insofar as it renders comparisons unsystematic. Third, the level of abstraction from a particular intended outcome differs widely, from global stories to project-specific stories. Both present difficulties in evaluating attribution (OECD/WTO, 2011).

From the case stories submitted by the public sector (94), 377 outputs were reported. Almost 60% of all the outputs reported were related to facilitating trade at the border, including new customs procedures (57 times) or the introduction of a single window (27 times). The adherence to standards was ranked 66 times as an output, followed by the training of officials (54 times). Significantly, reforms in tariffs and other fees were mentioned less often (18 times). The remainder of the outputs from public sector case stories covered issues such as new service skills (16 times), new infrastructure (12 times), new laws (11 times) and improved storage (10 times). From the case stories submitted by the private sector, 17 listed a total of 50 outputs with a similar distribution, e.g. facilitation of trade at the border was detailed a total of 12 times and standards a total of 14 times.

Almost 40% of the 366 outcomes that were listed in the public sector case stories focused on the reduction of trade costs in terms of a reduction in customs/border clearance times (57 times) or the cost of customs/border clearance (39 times). Increased trade – both the import and export of merchandise goods and services – was the other main outcome which was mentioned a total of 120 times. Other results reported cited a reduction in informal payments (15 times) or requests for informal payments (8 times). These findings were also reported in the private sector case stories, which highlighted an increase in service and merchandise exports and tariff revenue, plus a reduction in the cost of trade finance, customs clearance and customs rejections.

In 94 public sector case stories 299 impacts were mentioned. The most important ones were a reduction in poverty, an increase in welfare (69 times) and an increase in foreign and domestic investments (also 69 times). These impacts were closely followed by a rise in employment, including for women (65 times), and diversification of imports and exports (63 times). Again, similar impacts were reported in the private sector case stories (see graph 3.10).

**Figure 3.10 Aggregate findings (impacts) from the public and private sector case studies**




Note: 111 case results - multiple impacts were allowed.
Source: OECD/WTO 2015 case story.

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## AID-FOR-TRADE PRIORITIES

One of the recommendations of the task force on aid for trade was that donors and developing countries should pay more attention to trade issues in their aid and development strategies. Successive monitoring exercises have shown that both donors and recipient countries did indeed respond to this suggestion and developed specific strategies for the delivery of aid for trade. Based on the responses to the Joint OECD/WTO Aid for Trade monitoring exercise, 2015, the remainder of this section discusses the priorities highlighted in the aid-for-trade strategies of donors and the development strategies of partner countries.

## Donors

Two-thirds of the donors that have participated in the survey have a specific aid-for-trade strategy. Since 2012, they have revised their strategies to focus their support more on trade facilitation (9 donors), inclusive and sustainable growth (8 donors), private sector development (8 donors) and regional integration (7 donors). Less important were issues such as more focus on poverty reduction and private sector development (see Figure 3.11). The Australian government is considering a new aid-for-trade strategy to assist developing countries with: 1) improving their regulatory environment; 2) increasing their infrastructure investments; and 3) improving the productive capacity of their private sector. New Zealand added trade as a new sector priority to its aid programme in 2014, with the aim of supporting Pacific Island Forum countries in building their capacity to trade, including through implementation of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER). An evaluation of the German aid-for-trade strategy recommended a revision to reflect better: 1) the inclusion of current topics such as green and inclusive growth, social standards, investment and coherence between trade and development policies; 2) the potential synergies between domestic trade and trade-related development; and 3) highlight the importance of trade promotion for German companies and for the development of partner countries to help raise awareness of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative (German Institute for Development Evaluation, 2015).

**Figure 3.11. Donor aid-for-trade priorities**




Note: 14 respondents - multiple responses were allowed
Source: OECD/WTO 2015 case story.

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In recent years, UNCTAD has focused on capacity building, which in selected LDCs has included projects on mainstreaming trade into national development. In addition, UNCTAD promotes building productive capacity (investing in industries and sectors so that countries can diversify exports and build on comparative advantages) and policies that are conducive to stable economic growth and sustainable development. UNDP's Strategic Plan for 2014-17 aims to help countries eradicate poverty and significantly reduce inequalities and exclusion. UNDP articulates its contribution around seven outcomes, including three under which most of UNDP's aid-for-trade support falls: 1) growth and development are inclusive and sustainable, incorporating productive capacities that create employment and livelihoods for the poor and excluded; 2) faster progress is achieved in reducing gender inequality and promoting women's empowerment; and 3) development debates and actions at all levels prioritise poverty, inequality and exclusion.

The World Bank Group's aid-for-trade priorities are aimed at systematically strengthening its engagement in the trade and competitiveness issue in pursuit of the twin goals of ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity. The strategy charts the way forward for a newly constituted Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice to respond better to the

demands of clients in lower and middle income countries and fragile and post-conflict affected states. It also aims to scale up support for policies, institutions and catalytic initiatives that boost the volume and value of trade, improve the investment climate, promote competitiveness and foster innovation and entrepreneurship.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is updating its institutional strategy, and aid for trade will become one of the three institutional priorities. Under the heading Productive Integration, the strategy aims to increase the participation of Latin American and Caribbean firms in regional and global value chains. The focus will be on how to further reduce trade costs to increase the competitiveness of firms and create better quality jobs aimed at unleashing a new growth process in the region that can further reduce poverty. This is to be achieved through simultaneous investments in trade software and hardware, with a strong regional approach aimed at generating regional public goods.

The Ten Year Strategy adopted in 2013 by the African Development Bank (AfDB) sets out how to leverage recent African growth performance into a more profound transformation of the economy. The bank will continue to help link Africans from Cape Town to Cairo into a single economic space. One of the ways in which this will be achieved is through regional transport corridors to lower the costs of trade and enable African producers to become more competitive while helping adjacent rural areas to access markets and services. In addition, the bank launched the USD 2 billion Africa Growing Together Fund, and the Africa Trade Fund was created to modernise customs systems, reduce the incidence of non-tariff barriers and enhance standards capacities.

The International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) has initiated an Aid for Trade Initiative for the Arab States together with the League of Arab States, five UN agencies and seven donors. The joint initiative aims to achieve the following: 1) enhance regional competitiveness through trade reforms; 2) strengthen trade supply side and value chain integration; and 3) strengthen regional and sub-regional organisations' capacity to foster trade integration.

## Partner views

Partner countries that participated in the survey reported in most cases that their responses had been co-ordinated with other government departments and agencies, such as the prime minister's office, the ministries of finance and planning, agriculture, infrastructure, rural development, the customs office, the chamber of commerce and industry, the federation of small and medium size enterprises, etc. Partner countries answered overwhelmingly (93%) that they had formulated specific aid-for-trade priorities. Trade facilitation was ranked 44 times among the top three priorities and is highlighted as a priority in almost all (93%) regional, national or sectoral trade development strategies. This is followed by competitiveness and trade policy analysis and negotiations and implementation, which are both ranked 35 times as a priority. As has been the case in previous surveys, little importance was accorded to trade adjustment costs, (4 times) and WTO accession (8 times), which is becoming less of an issue with the increasing WTO membership.

Bangladesh suggested regional integration and cross border infrastructure are among their top priorities. Chad highlighted their priorities were analysed and identified in the DTIS (Diagnostic Trade Integration Study) 2 report and approved in November 2013. Sierra Leone noted the lesson learned from the implementation of the 2006 DTIS and the second PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) 2008-12 is a holistic approach is needed to ensure trade related strategies and investments achieve their objectives. This entails that investments and trade strategies are underpinned by institutional reforms and the capacity to fully implement, which requires careful planning and sequencing. Sierra Leone reported this was unfortunately not yet the case and therefore the full benefits of progress made in areas like building infrastructure and adopting trade-related national strategies did not translate into lower trade costs, increased value-added exports or reliable supply chains. As the country makes the transition from the *Agenda for Change* to the *Agenda for Prosperity*, with aspirations to achieve middle income status by 2035, it becomes more important than ever to overcome both supply-side and institutional impediments to trade and boost the overall competitiveness of the country.

The aid-for-trade priorities have not changed in 31 developing countries since 2012, whereas they did in 29 countries. The top three factors driving this change were new competitiveness objectives (17 countries), trade-facilitation capacity needs (14 countries) and new trade-capacity building needs (13 countries). Costa Rica reported that the promotion of trade and foreign investment are a fundamental part of its development strategy. Through trade facilitation, infrastructure investment and programmes to increase production chains, Costa Rica seeks to promote the benefits of trade and investment in all regions of the country. In nine out of ten countries these new priorities have been reflected in an updated development strategy, and in eight out of ten cases they were also raised in the dialogue with donors. The majority of partner countries (80%) consider that since the launch of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative alignment of donor support around national priorities has improved due to better dialogue with donors (43 countries), the private sector (35 countries) and regional partners (31 countries). (see Figure 3.12).

**Figure 3.12 Partner priorities**




*Note:* 14 respondents - multiple responses were allowed
*Source:* OECD/WTO 2015 case story.

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Three South-South trade-related assistance providers – Chile, China and Indonesia – responded to the monitoring survey. Indonesia noted that its budget for trade-related assistance had increased by 10% since 2012 and expects an additional 10% in the next five years, with a focus on the LDCs and private sector development while streamlining issues and countries that are receiving support. China also expects to focus more on the LDCs and the reduction of poverty. Chile expects a greater focus on trade facilitation and regional integration, with greater involvement of the private sector and alignment around the SDGs (sustainable development goals). The issue of trade costs is specifically addressed in the aid-for-trade strategy of China and Indonesia.

Since 1981, Indonesia has launched many initiatives for South-South co-operation, including training programmes on SMEs, investment, agriculture and food security, microfinance, women's empowerment, renewable energy, governance, disaster management and poverty alleviation. Indonesia's South-South and triangular co-operation activities are coordinated by the National Coordination Team, which was established in 2010. The team mainly consists of four core ministries, namely the Ministries of National Development and Planning, Foreign Affairs, State Secretariat and Finance. For the period of 2000-14, Indonesia carried out more than 404 programmes and activities, with total funding of at least USD 56 million. Chile provided technical expertise on market intelligence and established an online system, enabling producers, processors and exporters, among others, to access detailed and up-to-date agricultural information and publications, such as technical guides, planting projections and statistics on exports and price. The web platform offers comprehensive information about domestic and international market performance and access is free.

### Reducing trade costs

Increasingly, trade costs are recognised as an important factor in determining the competitiveness of firms and the trade performance of countries. As set out in Chapters 1 and 2, producers in developing countries are often competitive at factory and farm gates but are limited in their capacity to expand their business by high trade costs. This section looks at the extent to which the reduction of trade costs is a priority for donors and how donors track trends in trade costs.

### Trade costs: An aid-for-trade focus

The issue of trade costs are specifically addressed in almost 60% of donor's aid-for-trade strategies. In most cases this is done through in-country programmes and projects (73%), regional programmes and projects (64%), and thematic programming (64%). For instance, Germany, through its implementing agencies, operates trade facilitation and trade cost reduction projects on a country as well as regional level. Finland addressed trade costs through three programs: the WCO-implemented programme on customs modernisation in East and Southern Africa; the UNDP-implemented aid-for-trade project in Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; and via the multi-donor programme TradeMark East Africa. In line with the UK Economic Development Strategic Framework, operational plans prioritise delivering programmes that reduce trade costs through reducing cross-border red tape and complex regulations that prevent businesses from trading and supply chain upgrading. For example, the regional Trade Facilitation Facility project helps developing countries reduce the transaction costs associated with trading across

The ADB (Asian Development Bank) has developed a process-based corridor performance measurement and monitoring (CPMM) methodology to capture data on the time and cost of moving freight within the CAREC region, particularly at border crossing points (BCPs) astride six CAREC transport corridors. The methodology, which is based on internationally accepted tools for monitoring and measuring the performance of transport movements and trade flows, is a process-based measurement tool that can aid policy reform efforts, particularly by identifying viable, cost-effective ways to circumvent or mitigate impediments to the movement of goods and people along CAREC corridors and throughout the region. CPMM data are provided by national associations of carriers and forwarders from each of the ten CAREC countries. Together they have established a regional federation to ensure that private sector concerns and analyses based on CPMM data are presented coherently and consistently to policy makers (ADB, 2014).

## AID-FOR-TRADE COMMITMENTS

Aid-for-trade commitments are firm obligations, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation. As such commitments are an expression of the current priorities of the recipient and donor. The commitments are recorded in the full amount of the expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements, which in some cases, such as those for economic infrastructure, may take many years. The remainder of this section provides an analysis of the aid-for-trade commitments up to 2013, the latest year for which detailed information is available. The section will highlight the sectoral, regional and income distribution, the donors and the financial terms of the support committed.

### Budgets

In 2013, aid-for-trade commitments reached USD 55.4 billion; an increase of USD 1.8 billion in real terms compared to 2012 and an additional USD 30.1 billion compared with the 2002-05 baseline average. This is a 119% increase in real terms. Trade related OOF increased by more than USD 10.0 billion to reach USD 48.8 billion in 2013 compared to 2012 and more than doubled compared to the 2002-05 baseline average of USD 17 billion.

According to responses to the Joint OECD/WTO Aid for Trade monitoring exercise, 2015, only four donors reported a decrease in their aid-for-trade allocation since 2012. No change was reported by nine donors, while 12 donors augmented their spending by more than 10.0%, and another seven donors less than 10.0%. The average annual increase of aid-for-trade commitments of almost 15.0% has resulted in a significant rise of almost six percentage points in the share of aid for trade in total sector allocable aid from 32.5% during the baseline to 38.4% in 2013. It appears that the Aid-for-Trade Initiative has contributed to reversing the trend that started in early 1980 of a declining share of ODA devoted to promoting economic growth.

## Sectoral distribution

In 2013, aid commitments for economic infrastructure reached USD 33.4 billion, up 10.0% compared to 2012. Most of the increase was in the area of transport and storage, which rose USD 3.0 billion compared to 2012 and has almost tripled in volume since the 2002-05 average baseline. Commitments to Information Technology and Communications (ICT) also grew by 37.0% in 2013 to USD 1 billion, Support for energy generation and supply decreased USD 426.0 million to USD 13.7 billion, the first decline since the 2002-05 baseline average of USD 5.5 billion The share of commitments to economic infrastructure in total commitments now stands at 60.4%, up 8.2 percentage points since the 2002-05 baseline average. Trade-related OOF for economic infrastructure also increased in 2013, reaching USD 24.6 billion. Most of the 16.0% increase compared with 2012 was in support of transport and storage, which rose by USD 3.3 billion to USD 13.8 billion.

In 2013, commitments for building productive capacities dropped slightly by USD 1.5 billion and now stand at USD 20.3 billion This drop is the first since the start of the initiative when support for the category only reached USD 11.2 billion The largest share of support is directed at agriculture, which attracted USD 9.1 billion in commitments, USD 1.1 billion less than in 2012. Commitments to banking and financial services remained stable at around USD 5.0 billion, while those to business services increased 25% to USD 1.8 billion. Commitments to industry and to mining fell respectively to USD 2.2 billion and USD 0.4 billion, while fishing and tourism rose to USD 0.4 billion and USD 153.0 billion. Although commitments to building productive capacities declined by 6% in 2013, the trade development marker continued to grow, reaching USD 5.4 billion. This marker was introduced to identify those activities in the category of productive capacity building that contribute "principally" or "significantly" to the development of trade. In 2013, this was the case for 26% of all support to the private sector and concentrated in the area of business services, industry and tourism. Commitments to trade-related OOF for building productive capacities rose from USD 16.0 billion in 2012 to USD 22.0 billion in 2013. In volume terms the main increases were in banking and financial services, up USD 3.5 billion, and industry, up USD 1.8 billion

Aid for trade in its narrowest sense of support to trade policy and regulations attracted USD 1.6 billion in 2013, up USD 0.3 billion compared to 2012. Aid to trade policy management and regional trade agreements both increased by USD 35 million and USD 73 million respectively. The largest increase was for trade facilitation up by USD 210 million to reach USD 673 million in 2013. In fact, support to trade facilitation has increased seven fold since the 2002 – 2005 baseline average of USD 76 million (see also Chapter 6). Trade-related OOF commitments reached USD 1.5 billion in 2013 almost double its 2012 level.

## Regional distributions

In 2013, most of the aid-for-trade commitments were destined for Asia, which recorded a total of USD 22.6 billion in commitments, an increase of USD 5.6 billion compared to 2012. Commitments to South and Central Asia were up USD 3.5 billion and to East Asia USD 1.9 billion. The rise in commitments also increased the share of Asia in total aid for trade to 40.9% in 2013, compared to 31.7% in 2012. However, it should be noted that the share of Asia in total aid for trade fluctuates significantly from one year to the other. This is caused by large biennial commitments from Japan and the ADB in the area of economic infrastructure.

### Figure 3.13 Aid for trade by category




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241127

### Figure 3.14 Aid for trade by region, commitments




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241132

### Figure 3.15 Aid for trade by income group, commitments




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241149

### Figure 3.16 Trade-related OOF by category




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241153

### Figure 3.17 Trade-related OOF by region, commitments




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241169

### Figure 3.18 Trade-related OOF by income group, commitments




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241175

Commitments to Africa declined in 2013 by USD 2.6 billion to USD 19.3 billion compared to 2012, a year of exceptionally high commitments, especially to North African countries. Consequently, the decline was particularly pronounced for these countries, amounting to a drop of USD 1.7 billion, while those destined for programmes to sub-Saharan Africa only declined by USD 0.8 billion. Commitments to Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean also declined by USD 0.5 billion and USD 0.7 billion respectively, while those to Oceania increased USD 0.3 billion.

Aid-for-trade regional and global programmes were allocated USD 6.7 billion in 2013. This is almost a threefold increase compared to the 2002-05 baseline average, but it is a USD 0.75 billion drop compared to its highest 2011 level of USD 7.4 billion. Regional aid for trade offers great potential as a catalyst for growth, development and poverty reduction, but projects are often difficult to realise. While regional aid for trade faces many practical implementation challenges, experience has shown that associated problems are not insurmountable but do require thorough planning, careful project formulation and prioritisation on the part of policy makers (OECD, 2014).

Most of the 2013 trade-related OOF was destined for middle income countries in Asia (40.0%), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (23.7%), Europe (17.3%), Africa (16.4%) and Oceania (0.2%). Regional and global programmes only attracted 2.4% of total trade-related OOF commitments in 2013.

### Income distribution

Aid-for-trade commitments to the LDCs increased in 2013 by USD 5.1 billion to reach USB 18.2 billion. Other low income countries saw their support cut by USD 1.8 billion to USD 1.0 billion. Together the share of commitments to the low income countries reached 34.6% of total aid-for-trade flows in 2013, compared to 29.6% in 2012. With a commitment of USD 20 billion, the lower middle income countries are the largest aid-for-trade recipients in 2013. The upper middle income countries saw their commitments drop with USD 1.4 billion to USD 9.5 billion.

### Donors

Bilateral donors provided USD 31.5 billion to total aid-for-trade commitments, the largest contribution. Japan is the largest donor, with commitments of USD 10.3 billion destined to a large extent for building infrastructure in Asia. Germany is the second largest bilateral donor, with USD 5.0 billion, followed by the United States, with USD 3.8 billion and France with USD 2.4 billion The United Arab Emirates are also becoming important aid-for-trade donor, with commitments in 2013 reaching USD 1.8 billion, followed by Kuwait with USD 832 million. Most bilateral donors provide the majority of their support in the form of grants, with the exception of Japan and Germany, who also provide a large share in loans.

Meeting at the Seoul Summit on 11-12 November 2012, the assembled leaders of the Group of 20 pledged to at least maintain aid-for-trade levels that reflected the average of the period 2006-08 beyond 2011. They tasked the OECD and WTO to monitor the pledge. The G20 average for the period 2006-08 stood at USD 22.6 billion, reaching USD 34.8 billion in 2013, which is an increase of 53.8%. Commitments of all G20 members increased, with the exception of Italy (down USD 168.0 million), Spain (down USD 669.0 million) and the United States (down USD 1.9 billion).

The OECD also prepares estimates for nine bilateral providers of development co-operation with whom it collaborates but do not report to the OECD-DAC. They are based on publicly available information and, to the extent possible, are calculated according to the ODA definition. It should be stressed that the information presented here from these countries may not cover all grants and concessional loans that could be eligible as ODA. As a result, the estimates presented in Table 3.1 should be treated only as an indication of the volume of the development co-operation provided by these nine countries and would tend to be a low estimate.

**TABLE 3.1 Estimates of development co-operation flows: bilateral providers of development co-operation that do not report to the OECD-DAC (gross, USD millions, current prices)**

| Country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Brazil** | 500 | ... | ... | ... | Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and Brazilian Co-operation Agency (ABC) |
| **Chile** | 16 | 24 | 38 | 44 | Ministry of Finance |
| **China** | 2 561 | 2 776 | 3 114 | 3 009 | Fiscal Yearbook, Ministry of Finance |
| **Colombia** | 15 | 22 | 86 | 95 | Strategic institutional plan 2013, Presidential Agency of International Co-operation |
| **India**[1] | 709 | 788 | 1 076 | 1 257 | Annual Reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| **Indonesia** | 10 | 17 | 27 | 12 | Ministry of National Development Planning |
| **Mexico** | ... | 99 | 203 | ... | Mexican Agency for International Development Co-operation (AMEXCID) |
| **Qatar** | 334 | 733 | 543 | 1 344 | Foreign Aid reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| **South Africa**[1,2] | 151 | 227 | 188 | 183 | Estimates of Public Expenditures 2013, National Treasury |

*... = not available.*

*Note 1) Data includes only development-related contributions. This means local resources, financing from a country through multilateral organisations earmarked to programmes within that same country, are excluded. Moreover, as for reporting countries, coefficients are applied to core contributions to multilateral organisations that do not exclusively work in countries eligible for receiving ODA. These coefficients reflect the developmental part of the multilateral organisations' activities. 2) The flows channelled through multilateral organisations is (partly) based on websites of multilateral organisations, www.aidflows.org and data from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), except for Brazil and India.*

*1) Figures for India and South Africa are based on their fiscal years. For example, 2012 data correspond to fiscal year 2012/13.*

*2) The decrease in South African development co-operation from 2013 onwards reflects exchange rate fluctuations.*

The majority of China's foreign assistance projects are spent on economic infrastructure, followed by industry, energy and resource development and agriculture. Grants, concessionary loans, and assistance for joint ventures are the primary forms of financing, which are used in concert with its investment and trade policies in order to leverage greater investment from the commercial sector (Institute of Development Studies, 2014). India uses mainly lines of credit to provide finance on concessional terms with the objective of promoting trade with a partner country. In the case of Brazil, bilateral co-operation is focused on agriculture, education, health and human rights. Brazil's support related to international trade is done mainly through export credits (IDS, 2014). Russia's co-operation concentrates on energy, health and education, and South Africa's co-operation is focused on peacekeeping, security and governance.

The multilateral donors committed together USD 23.9 billion, a drop of USD 3.8 billion compared to 2012 but still significantly above their commitment in all other years since the inception of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative. The EU institutions are the largest multilateral donor, with USD 10.1 billion in commitments, followed by the multilateral development banks, i.e. the IBRD (USD 6.4 billion), the AsDB (USD 2.2 billion), the AfDB (USD 1.3 billion), the Arab Fund (USD 986 million), the IADB (USD 600 million) and the IsDB (USD 157 million) The multilateral donors provide two-thirds of their support in the form of concessional loans. In addition, they also provide non-concessional loans to the amount of USD 41.1 billion

### Aid-for-trade outlook

The medium-term prospects for continued increases in aid-for-trade allocations look positive, with 21 donors reporting increases and only one donor a decrease, while seven donors are unsure what the future will bring. The International Trade Centre plans to grow the organisation's spending by 20% over the next three years. The AfDB also expects a significant increase in their aid-for-trade financing through a number of financing instruments that are currently being developed, such the Africa 50 Fund, the Africa Trade Fund and the Africa Growing Together Fund. France is committed to continue providing support for trade, but in a tight fiscal environment funding for official development in 2015 will remain similar to that in 2014. Switzerland's development co-operation for the period 2017-20, including the share focused on economic development, is currently being prepared, with aid-for-trade spending expected to increase.

Looking ahead, 29 donors expect that in the next five years their aid-for-trade strategy will align with the post-2015 development agenda. Almost all of these donors also consider that working with the private sector will be essential to achieving the sustainable development goals. This engagement of the private sector in delivering inclusive and sustainable growth will be achieved more easily when trade is facilitated. This is an explicit objective for 20 donors, with the implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement mentioned by 18 donors. As OECD (2013) highlights, facilitating trade is often most cost-effectively achieved through regional programmes, a priority for 19 donors. For instance, the EU will deliver most of its aid for trade through regional programmes from 2014 onwards. As was the case with recent shifting priorities, donors expect little effect from budgetary changes or streamlining of priority issues or recipients. Also, little impact is expected from focusing on gender or green growth issues, new priorities from developing partners or focusing on the least developed countries.

## CONCLUSIONS

Since the Aid-for-Trade Initiative was launched in 2006, a total of USD 246.5 billion has been disbursed for financing aid-for-trade programmes and projects, mainly in Asia (38.4%) and Africa (35.1%). To date, more than three-quarters of total aid for trade has financed projects in four sectors: transport and storage (29.0%), energy generation and supply (21.0%), agriculture (18.0%) and banking and financial services (10.0%). In addition, USD 190.4 billion in trade-related OOF has been disbursed since 2006, of which almost 80.0% has been provided by international financial institutions. Most of this non-concessional funding has supported projects in economic infrastructure (47.0%) and building productive capacities (52.0%), and this has been almost exclusively in middle income countries (92%).

The significant amount of aid and OOF devoted to helping developing countries build trade capacities through improving infrastructure and invigorating the private sector is showing results. Empirical studies support the presumption that trade liberalisation reduces poverty in the long run and on average and confirms that aid for trade, in general, is effective at both the micro and macro level. But the impacts may vary considerably depending on the type of aid-for-trade intervention, the income level and geographical region of the recipient country and the sector at which the support is directed.

These empirical findings are confirmed by the anecdotal evidence which can be gleaned from the 117 case stories that were submitted by the public sector, private sector, academics and NGOs in response to the 2015 call for these studies. The case stories paint an encouraging picture of numerous donor-supported trade-related projects and programmes delivering a wide range of tangible results in terms of trade performance, private investment and employment creation in a large number of developing countries.

Increasingly, trade costs are recognised as an important factor in determining the competitiveness of firms and the trade performance of countries. Producers in developing countries are often competitive at the factory and farm gates but are limited in their capacity to expand their business by high trade costs. Both partner countries and donors prioritise trade costs in their development strategy and focus trade efforts on facilitating trade.

In 2013, aid-for-trade commitments reached USD 55.4 billion, an increase of USD 1.8 billion in real terms compared to 2012 and an additional USD 30.1 billion compared with the 2002-05 baseline average. Since the baseline period, aid-for-trade commitments have increased by 118% in real terms, while trade related OOF has increased by more than USD 10 billion to reach USD 48.8 billion in 2013 compared to 2012. Meeting at the Seoul Summit on 11-12 November 2012, the assembled leaders of the Group of 20 pledged to at least maintain aid-for-trade levels that reflected the average of the period 2006-08 beyond 2011. They tasked the OECD and WTO to monitor the pledge. The G20 average for the period 2006-08 stood at USD 22.6 billion, reaching USD 34.8 billion in 2013, which is an increase of 53.8%.

The medium-term prospects for continued increases in aid-for-trade allocations look positive, with 21 donors reporting increases and only one donor a decrease, while seven donors are unsure what the future will bring. Looking ahead, 29 donors expect that in the next five years their aid-for-trade strategy will align with the post-2015 development agenda. Almost all of these donors also consider that working with the private sector will be essential to achieving the sustainable development goals.

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# CHAPTER 4

# IMPLEMENTING THE TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT

*Contributed by the World Trade Organization*

***Abstract:*** *Economic research and field evidence show that removing administrative and regulatory bottlenecks at borders can have powerful effects on reducing trade costs and increasing trade. The purpose of the new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement is to expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. Implementation should help developing and LDC members reduce border inefficiencies, and the resulting costs, so realizing these gains. One particular feature of the Agreement is the implementation flexibility that it accords to WTO members. First, many of the approximately 35 technical trade facilitation measures are written in language that does not mandate but rather requires "best efforts." Second, the Agreement allows each developing or LDC member to determine when it will implement each trade facilitation measure, and to determine the support needed for its implementation*

## INTRODUCTION

After nearly 10 years of work, WTO members concluded negotiations on the WTO agreement on trade facilitation (TFA or the Agreement) at the Ninth Ministerial Conference held in Bali, Indonesia in December 2013 (the final edited version of the TFA was issued on 15 July 15 2014 as WT/L/931). The Agreement was opened for acceptance by the WTO's 160 members on 27 November 2014 and will enter into force once two-thirds of the membership notify the WTO of its acceptance (the General Council Decision and the Protocol of Amendment can be found in document WT/L/940).

This Agreement is a milestone for the WTO as well as for the trade and development communities. It is the first WTO multilateral trade agreement reached since the WTO's creation in 1995. Perhaps more significantly, it is an agreement that incorporates the principle, not found in any prior WTO or GATT agreement, that a developing or least developed country (LDC) country's obligation to implement the provisions of the agreement shall be conditioned upon that member's acquisition of the necessary technical capacity, which may require donor support, based on each member's evaluation of its own needs and priorities.

To realise this unique principle, the Agreement contains extensive provisions that define the roles and responsibilities of developing and LDC members on the one hand and the donor members and the international and multilateral organisations supporting trade facilitation on the other. It also sets out the institutions and procedures to support delivery of assistance.

This chapter will explain, briefly, the new Agreement, the needs and priorities of developing and LDC members and the available support. Because trade facilitation, in general, has been on the agenda of donors and developing and LDC members for a number of years, this paper will also provide examples of members' successful implementation of some of the provisions of the Agreement, with donor support and the resulting benefits.

## THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE FACILITATION

The purpose of the new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement is to expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. At present, importers and exporters incur significant costs due to inefficient control and clearance procedures at customs and other border authorities, unnecessary border formalities and documentation requirements and opaque administrative fees and charges – all of which add significant dead-weight economic cost to international trade.

To give more context as to why the TFA is important, consider the positions of stakeholders that are especially impacted by inefficient procedures. Smaller firms, who do not have the same resources to cope with burdensome controls, are particularly disadvantaged by these kinds of inefficiencies, as are exporters and producers in landlocked developing countries, whose goods and supplies must cross borders multiple times (often those of other developing countries). The same is also true for producers of agricultural and other perishable goods or goods that compete in just-in-time markets, where any delays in delivery can have a direct detrimental effect on the value of the goods and the financial well-being of the companies sending or receiving the goods.

Economic research bears this point out strongly. Hummels (2001) calculated that a one-day border delay drives up costs on average by about 0.8% around the world. Building on this work – and based on a study of 126 countries using a gravity model – Djankov et al. (2010) found that each day in transit had the effect of reducing trade volumes on average by slightly more than 1.0%. They were able to capture the effects of administrative delays by using the proxy of the number of signatures required to export or import. These delays had the equivalent effect of adding 70 kilometres to the distance between the plant and the final market. Hoekman and Nicita (2010, 2011) estimate that efforts to move the logistics and trade facilitation performance of low income countries (as measured by the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index and Doing Business cost of trading indicator) closer to middle income country levels would increase trade by 15.0%, double what would be achieved by converging on middle income average import tariffs.

The dead-weight cost of unnecessarily burdensome border controls also emerges strongly from many of the case stories submitted by respondents to the 2015 Aid for Trade Global Review monitoring exercise. A submission by ECOWAS noted that land border crossing points have been identified as crucial bottlenecks along key regional road corridors in West Africa. Various levels of malpractice as a result of discordant procedures and documentation and multiplicity of government agencies have been recorded, resulting in long and cumbersome border crossings by goods, persons and vehicles. A study quoted by TradeMark East Africa notes that only 43% of truck transport time along Rwanda's trade corridors is spent moving; the rest is time spent waiting at border crossings or road blocks or resting.

Removing the administrative bottlenecks can have powerful effects on reducing trade costs. Box 4.1 below highlights the savings and other benefits recorded by case story respondents as a result of single windows for border clearance.

### BOX 4.1 Savings from single windows

"The Kenya TradeNet System enables traders who depend on East Africa's economic gateway seaport of Mombasa, and the country's airports and land borders to track, clear and move their goods across borders much faster, easier and cheaper through a simplified cargo clearance process. The potential benefits of the Kenya TradeNet System to the economy based on the present volume of goods imported and transited through Kenya as a result of streamlined procedures will result in annual savings to the Kenyan economy ranging between USD 150 million and USD 250 million during the first three years. This is expected to increase to between USD 300 million and USD 450 million annually in subsequent years." **Kenya Revenue Authority**

"With a budget of USD 3.5 million staggered over four phases between 2010 and 2014, the Rwanda Electronic Single Window project already reports results in reducing the time taken to clear goods to 23 hours in 2014 from two days and ten hours in 2010. The resulting estimated total cost of a declaration for an authorised economic operator has gone down from USD 350.0 to USD 64.5. It is estimated that return on investment based on savings is USD 18 million per year". **TradeMark East Africa**

"Since 2008, the government of Tajikistan has been developing with the support of development partners a single window facility to reduce the costs associated with exports and imports and improve trade facilitation conditions in the country. The single window programme stipulates a phased approach. The first phase focuses on standardising, simplifying and automating the exchange of information and documentary requirements associated with customs clearance, thereby setting the context for including other agencies, such as logistics service providers, during a subsequent second phase." **Tajikistan**

"The single window is part of our strategy to attract more international trade, reinforce the local economy and improve our position in the World Bank's competitive index in its Doing Business report. A particularly innovative billing system lies at the heart of the new Togolese single window: all payments and transactions are listed on one single document, enabling costs and taxes to be monitored more efficiently." **Togo**

*Source:* WTO Secretariat research

Studies show that reducing these unnecessary or overly burdensome administrative barriers can have significant economic benefits in terms of added export potential, increased foreign investment and greater access to a wider variety of goods for consumers. Developing countries, where these administrative and procedural barriers tend to be more prevalent, may have the most to gain from reforms. For example, according to OECD studies, a 1% decrease in global trade costs would yield an increased global income of USD 40 billion at a minimum, the bulk of which (63%) is expected to be realised by developing countries (OECD, 2013). Box 4.1 highlights the savings reported by monitoring respondents following implementation of the single window system as laid out in the TFA. Implementation of the WTO TFA should help developing and LDC members reduce border inefficiencies and the resulting costs, leading to substantial gains.

## Reducing border costs: The technical measures

The TFA contains approximately thirty-five technical measures to expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods (see main article headings in Box 4.2. These technical measures impose obligations on WTO members to: 1) increase transparency; 2) improve governance through disciplines on rule and decision-making processes; 3) implement streamlined and modernised border procedures and control techniques; and 4) enhance the movement of goods in transit.

### Greater transparency

Difficulty in obtaining accurate and reliable information about import, export or transit requirements is a significant source of delay and costs. A substantial amount of time in the total import or export process is spent by traders obtaining and completing the required forms and documents. Confusion about requirements leads to additional delays and costs in clearance when documents must be corrected and possibly penalties assessed. This is a particular concern of SMEs, who often do not have the resources to search out and comprehend the requirements of export markets, where they typically do not have a presence, particularly if requirements are available only in the form of legal acts or other technical documents and in a foreign language. A UNESCAP study found increased transparency and predictability tend to "increase the probability of exporting by SMEs…as well as export propensity" because the costs and risks of doing business are lowered. It also concluded that improvements in policy predictability by one unit generate a 66% increase in the probability of SMEs participating in export activities (Li and Wilson, 2009).

To improve transparency, the Agreement requires governments to publish certain specified trade information in an easily accessible manner. They are also required to publish on the internet the required forms and documents, as well as a practical description of import, export, transit and appeal procedures (in a WTO language, whenever practicable). In addition, they must establish enquiry points that traders and other governments may contact to obtain information and forms. To increase the predictability and certainty of costs, governments are required to provide binding rulings on the application of laws and procedures to a particular shipment of goods prior to their importation (advance rulings).

### Improved governance

Inefficiency also results from redundant, indiscriminate or unwarranted border formalities and documentation requirements. These inefficiencies may persist where the government is not aware of their negative impacts on trade or that, possibly, other more efficient and effective solutions are available that would fulfil the government's regulatory objectives.

The Agreement requires governments to review their import, export and transit formalities and documentation requirements to ensure that such requirements are adopted or applied with a view to rapid release and clearance of goods, to reduce the cost and time of compliance and to determine there is no other reasonable alternative that would be less trade restrictive. Moreover, given that the persons directly affected by regulation are often the best source of information about impacts and alternatives, the Agreement requires governments to provide interested parties with opportunities to comment on any proposed new or amended laws and regulations and to hold regular consultation with their stakeholders.

To improve fairness in decision-making by border authorities, the Agreement also requires WTO members to provide rights of appeal against adverse customs decisions and imposes disciplines on the assessment of penalties by customs, requiring that the amount of any such penalties be commensurate with the level of the offense.

**BOX 4.2 Trade facilitation agreement**

**"TECHNICAL AGREEMENT TECHNICAL MEASURES"**

**Article**

1. Publication and availability of information
2. Comments and consultations
3. Advanced rulings
4. Procedures for appeal or review
5. Measures to enhance impartiality, non-discrimination and transparency
6. Disciplines on fees and charges
7. Release and clearance of goods
8. Border agency co-operation
9. Movement under customs control
10. Import, export and transit formalities
11. Freedom of transit
12. Customs co-operation

*Source:* WTO

## Modernised border procedures

Most of the technical measures of the Agreement are those intended to streamline and modernise the processing of goods by customs and other border authorities. These measures will require implementation of new techniques and processes such as the following:

- the use of risk management to focus customs controls on high-risk goods
- pre-arrival processing to allow importers to declare and possibly clear goods before they arrive
- procedures to allow the release of goods from customs before payment of duty and tax
- the use of electronic forms for payments and documents in clearance
- the use of clearance simplifications for authorised (i.e. low risk and highly reliable) traders and express consignment operators.

There are also important provisions to promote greater co-ordination among the different border authorities (the lack of which is itself a common source of delay), including cross-border co-operation and implementation of a single window to permit traders to submit documents required by all border authorities at a single point.

## Transit

Finally, the Agreement contains extensive provisions to respond to many of the costs and delays that importers and exporters face when their goods are moved through transit countries, such as excessive data and documentation requirements, internal checkpoints and mandatory use of convoys, delays in terminating transit operations and returning transit guarantees, poor transit infrastructure and lack of regional co-operation.

## Implementation flexibility – a new approach to special and differential treatment

The feature that marks this new Agreement as unique and historic, more than any other, is the implementation flexibility that it accords to WTO members. This flexibility is of two kinds: first, a number of the approximately 35 technical measures are written in language that does not mandate ("shall" or "shall not") but rather requires "best efforts". That is, under these best efforts provisions, a WTO member is "encouraged" or obligated "to the extent practicable", or "as appropriate", to implement the technical requirement. This flexibility that is built into these particular technical measures is available to all WTO members (developed or developing) and allows each member to implement them in a manner they deem suitable to their capacity and specific legal, technical or other local factors.

Second, the Agreement reflects an understanding that without external technical assistance and capacity building (TACB) support developing or least developed country members may not be able to implement some or all of the technical measures. And the Agreement reflects the further understanding that these members themselves should determine what support they require and when they will be prepared to implement the measure. Essentially, these special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions of the Agreement allow each developing and least-developed country member to define its own implementation schedule, measure by measure, which can be conditioned on the receipt of the technical and capacity building support it deems necessary.

The Agreement sets out the mechanics by which countries may benefit from these unique SDT provisions. Each developing or least developed country member that wishes to take advantage of these provisions must categorise all the trade facilitation measures into one of three categories and notify these categories to the WTO Committee in accordance with specific timelines. These categories are as follows:

- **Category A:** provisions that a developing country member designates for implementation by the time the Agreement enters into force (LDC countries have an additional year)
- **Category B:** provisions that a developing or LDC member designates for implementation after a transitional period of time after entry into force of the Agreement
- **Category C:** provisions that a developing or LDC Member designates for implementation after a transitional period of time following the entry into force of the Agreement and requiring the acquisition of implementation capacity through the provision of assistance and support for capacity building.

The Agreement also provides additional safeguards for developing and LDC members:

- **Early warning mechanism:** whereby a member can request an extension from the WTO Trade Facilitation Committee if it experiences difficulties in implementing a provision in Category B or C by the date it had notified;
- **Expert group:** where a requested extension has not been granted and lacks capacity to implement, the Trade Facilitation Committee will establish an expert group to examine the issue and to make a recommendation
- **Shifting between Categories:** Members may shift provisions between Categories B and C;
- **Grace period:** developing and LDC members cannot be taken to dispute settlement in an initial period following the date they begin implementing the individual trade facilitation measures. With respect to developing countries, this grace period will apply for a period of two years to those measures placed under Category A.

Greater flexibility is to be accorded LDC members in light of their special needs. The Agreement thus lays down the general principle that LDC members "will only be required to undertake commitments to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities." On that basis, the Agreement specifically allows LDCs more relaxed notification requirements than developing countries, longer extensions of time to implement commitments, if needed, and longer grace periods of six years for Category A and eight years for Categories B and C, which will shield them from dispute settlement related to all categories of measures, not just Category A commitments.

The down side to this flexibility is that members can put off implementation of the TFA which would not only delay a country's realisation of the benefits resulting from its implementation, but could be harmful to neighbouring trade partners, especially if those neighbors are landlocked and hope to benefit from streamlined border and transit procedures. The opportunity is there for members to take advantage of the implementation support on offer to make meaningful reforms within reasonable time periods.

## IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES

What type and level of implementation support will be required by developing countries and LDCs? Which measures of the Agreement will be the most difficult for these countries to implement? Which measures are priorities in terms of staging? And which measures will be the subject of the heaviest demand for external support?

Although these questions can only be definitively answered when countries make their Category B and C notifications, some insights are nonetheless possible based on information WTO members have communicated to date.

These communications are in the form of responses to questionnaires by 62 developing and LDC members as part of the 2015 monitoring exercise. In addition, 54 members countries have notified their Category A notifications (received by 31 March 2015), which indicate the measures that are least likely to require external support. And, most importantly, the large majority of WTO developing and LDC members have conducted one or more detailed self-assessments – an evaluation of their current situation in relation to each of the technical measures of the Agreement and their implementation needs and priorities – with support of the WTO Secretariat and development partners (see Table 4.1 below).

**TABLE 4.1 WTO needs assessments conducted**

| | No. of needs assessments conducted | Developing Countries (DC) | LDC | Landlocked (also counted in DC LDC column) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2007–10** | 94 | 60 | 34 | 18 |
| **2013–14** | 90 | 40 | 30 | 14 |

*Source:* WTO

Typically, these assessments include participation of representatives from customs and other border authorities; the ministries of law or justice, trade or commerce and foreign affairs, as well as representatives from private sector trade associations, such as customs brokers, chambers of commerce and industry or trade associations.

### Implementation Support Priorities

These sources indicate that the following technical measures of the Agreement are considered by developing and least developed countries to be the highest priority for technical assistance and support for capacity building – see Table 4.2 below.

As is apparent from these results, certain measures, namely single window, border agency coordination, authorised operator, risk management and advance rulings, are mentioned most frequently as priorities for technical support. What is less apparent from these topline results are the reasons these particular measures are considered to be a higher priority for technical assistance than others. It is not necessarily because they are the most challenging to implement.

No country is starting from scratch. All WTO members that completed a needs assessment are fully compliant with some of the measures. Most countries are already fully implementing, or in the process of implementing, a good number of the measures, often with donor support. In many cases a measure might be considered a high priority because it is already part of the country's modernization programme and/or is in high demand from traders. This is likely the case for single window, one of the many measures that the TFA only requires members' best efforts to implement. Many countries might be already implementing certain measures but see this as an opportunity to expand or improve their existing programmes, this could frequently be the case for risk management.

**TABLE 4.2 Measures that are high-priority for support**

| WTO member Needs self-assessment priorities | Category A least-notified measures | Developing and LDC questionnaire (most difficult to implement – needs TACB focus) | Donor questionnaire – (needs most focus for TACB) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Single window** | **Single window** | **Border agency co-operation** | Formalities (includes **single window**) |
| Test procedures | **Authorised operators** | Formalities connected with import, export, transit (includes **single window**) | **Border agency co-operation** |
| **Risk management** | Enhanced controls | Publication and availability of information | Customs co-operation |
| **Authorised operators** | Test procedures | Advance rulings | Release and clearance of goods (including **risk management** and **authorised operators**) |
| National committee on trade facilitation | Average release times | Release and clearance of goods (includes **risk management** and **authorised operators**) | The Agreement as a whole |
| Publication and availability of information | Enquiry points | Customs co-operation | Other measures to enhance impartiality |
| **Border agency co-operation** | **Border agency co-operation** | | |
| Advance rulings | Advance rulings | | |

*Note: Measures in common are highlighted in bold.*

## Implementation support for needs

The "self-assessments" conducted by developing and LDC members with the WTO Secretariat and other donor support, as described above, may provide some information as to the challenges that some countries face implementing some of the measures. This is of course important to understand as the underlying reason for the difficulty will determine the type of external support (e.g., legal expertise, IT or other technical expertise, infrastructure support, etc.) that may be required.

In conducting the self-assessments each country determined what would be needed to implement the measures where it was not already in compliance. Although many measures of the Agreement are "best effort", during the assessment participants assessed what would be required to fully implement each measure. A summary of the most commonly identified challenges and support needs are provided in this section.

Some of the case stories completed in connection with the 2015 Aid for Trade Global Review are mentioned throughout this section to draw attention to examples of successful implementation of the TFA measures. The trade facilitation programmes highlighted in the case stories predate the TFA. As such, while they do not speak to TFA implementation, they are instructive as to the type of issues and opportunities that arise in areas where the TFA has introduced rights and obligations.

■ *Co-ordination of Border Authorities*

A commonly-identified implementation challenge is the lack of co-operation and coordination between government border authorities; often complicated by overlapping roles and responsibilities. This can complicate implementation of the TFA in several ways.

First, co-ordination and co-operation of border authorities is an explicit requirement of the Agreement. Second, to oversee national implementation of the Agreement each member must establish a national trade facilitation committee that, to be effective, requires the participation of all relevant border agencies. Third, border agency co-operation and co-ordination is also an implicit condition of a number of measures of the Agreement. For example, it is an essential prerequisite to the implementation of a single window, which essentially requires integration or co-ordination of information requirements of different border authorities.

In some countries, some border authorities have expressed concerns that implementation of the TFA will conflict with their legal mandate. This may be due, in part, to a lack of understanding by these authorities of the TFA measures. Although officials from a range of border agencies typically participated in the national needs assessments, sensitisation about the terms and purposes of the Agreement may not always have been shared more broadly within all agencies.

It is important to note that the provision requiring each country to establish and maintain a national trade facilitation committee does not fall under the Agreement's special and differential treatment provisions and must be implemented by the time the Agreement enters into force. But this does not mean that donor support is not needed.

A case study on the development of Nigeria's national trade facilitation task force highlights its successful co-ordination of 23 ministries, departments and agencies as well as members of the organised private sector. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) supported the development of short, medium and long term Action Plans that set out the role of the task force. This task force is the focal point of Nigeria's trade facilitation activities and provides a co-ordination role over an extensive reform programme that is supported by many donors.

■ *Information and Communication Technology (ICT)*

As a general rule, where implementation of a measure involves or depends on an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) project, developing and LDC members have identified the measure as a high priority for assistance and/or as a particular challenge.

Thus, many countries have indicated that they comply only partially with the provision requiring internet publication because of the lack of ICT capability, including deficient internet services, obsolete software and hardware, and limited capacity of both public and private sector agents to handle transactions electronically; in a few countries automation has yet to be implemented.

These deficiencies also hamper the ability to implement measures such as electronic payment and single window that require the use of IT. In addition, many measures require the capture and analysis of information such as risk management and establishment of release times. While others require fast and efficient exchange of information such as the measure on enhanced controls (so called "import alerts" systems), pre-arrival processing, enquiry points, and release of guarantees, to name a few.

Of the approximately 40 case stories, 19 included an ICT component, for example: enhancement of e-government modules for more efficient exchange of information (Belize); implementation of an electronic exchange for single customs forms – FAUCA (Central America); creation of trade information portals (Lesotho, Haiti, Lao PDR); creation of single windows (Rwanda, Kenya, Togo, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Peru); setting up electronic cargo tracking (Uganda, Tanzania, and El Salvador and Honduras); and upgrading the customs clearing system (Uganda, Rwanda).

A TradeMark East Africa case story highlights the return on investment of undertaking reforms to improve transit and clearance time through the use of ICT and streamlined procedures. This programme consists of 3 components: 1) enhanced automated customs clearing system (upgrade to ASYCUDA World), 2) authorised operators scheme, and 3) electronic cargo tracking system. Although this assistance project is still on-going substantial benefits have already been recognised. The average time to clear goods and get them from Mombasa to Uganda through the Northern Corridor has dropped from 18 days to 4 days. There has been a dramatic reduction in the number of customs documents, for instance, the number of customs documents for importations of fuel has been reduced by 90%. This reduction in the time to transport and clear goods has directly induced trade volumes so that fuel imports, for example, have jumped from 32.1 million litres to 108 million litres. The total savings for business resulting from these time savings is estimated at USD 373 million per annum.

- *Policy/legal framework*

Many countries lack a legal basis for the application of certain of the TFA measures. Outdated and obsolete legal frameworks could be a consistent impediment to the implementation of many provisions that were not considered at the time of the drafting of the countries' national legislation. Many countries indicated a need for technical assistance to review and revise laws and regulations to align to the Agreement.

Examples of modern procedures that typically require changes to legislation include allowing declarations to be filed before the goods arrive (pre-arrival declaration), allowing goods to be released before duties have been paid (separation of release from final determination of customs duties, taxes, fees and charges), allowing government agencies to accept copies of documents, and requiring laws to be published for comment in advance. Laws of some countries contain provisions that would impede the implementation of controls based on risk management principles, coordination among border authorities, and implementation of a single window.

- *Procedures*

A commonly reported impediment is the complexity and lack of clarity in procedures. Excessive and inefficient bureaucratic apparatuses seem to be frequent. Some countries need to develop trade and customs procedures and guidelines in line with the requirements, including the streamlining and simplification of trade-related documents and procedures.

Excessive and inefficient import, export and transit procedures are one of the main problems the TFA aims to address. It does so not only through the technical procedures to accelerate release of goods and improve customs controls, such as pre-arrival processing and risk management, but also through a direct requirement that members review their formalities and documentation requirements with a view to minimizing their incidence and complexity.

An innovative Joint Border Committee project in Tanzania funded by US-COMPETE aims to improve administrative and regulatory bureaucracy through the establishment of team work and close working relations amongst all agencies at the border as well as by offering a single package of services to importers and exporters at the particular border post. This project has been successfully established in 7 out of 14 key transit border posts.

Members must further provide simplified procedures to trusted traders or "authorised operators"; those traders that have a good compliance record and meet specified criteria. Authorised operators is one of the top priority measures noted above and is addressed in several of the case studies, either as a programme on its own, or as part of a broader authorised economic operator programme.

In a case story on an Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) scheme introduced in Uganda, with support from TradeMark East Africa, a plastics manufacturer in Kampala explained the benefits her company has realised since becoming an AEO.

> "Nice House Plastics saves approximately US USD 150 per day for 25 containers as a result of time savings that are as a result of reduced examination and inspection of goods and acceptance of pre-arrival import declaration. Additionally, we used to spend USH. 10 million to clear our cargo, this cost has come to zero. We used to adjust our prices every month prior to becoming an AEO. But now, we have not adjusted our prices for the last one year because our cost of doing business has remained stable."

■ *Human resources/training*

One of the most common concerns about implementing new trade facilitation measures is understaffing and a lack of training programmes for government officials as well as private sector. It is sometimes the case that trade facilitation measures are provided for in national legislation but the measures are not in use because government officials do not know how they should be implemented. In many countries technical assistance is needed in the development of official instructions or standard operating procedures to provide guidance to border officials on how to apply measures. This will also help to ensure more consistent uniform application.

The importance of having highly trained officials is reinforced by the fact that this was the most common "output" of the case stories, having been reported as an important component in 24 out of 40.

One of these case stories is on the very successful implementation of Peru's single window. Prior to its implementation, all government officials that work with the single window, as well as more than 8,000 national exporters and importers, were trained in its use by experts from the Inter-American Development Bank. This single window has now been used by more than 23 000 traders from all over the country and has resulted in a savings of USD 70 per transaction that has led to a cumulative savings of USD 11 million in 2014 alone.

■ *Equipment and infrastructure*

Countries commonly identified poor infrastructure as an obstacle that general trade facilitation support should address, including lack of reliable sources of electricity, roads and ports. Specific to implementation of the TFA measures the greatest needs reported by members were ITC equipment (as mentioned above) and equipment for inspection and laboratory testing. In a number of countries government laboratories are limited and private accredited laboratories do not exist. Laboratories are necessary if members implement the provision on notifications for enhanced controls or inspections and the provision for test procedures.

Although not required by the TFA many case stories reported on infrastructure projects that will help ensure more efficient border processing such as the integrated check posts (ICP) at a significant border between India and Pakistan through which mostly perishable goods pass through. This ICP aims for speedy clearance, provides expanded space for cargo and provides one-stop integrated facilities, such as quarantine, fumigation and a weigh bridge. The ICP has led to an increase in imports and exports, speedy clearance of goods and a significant reduction in clearance costs.

■ *Engaging the business community*

Another commonly-identified barrier is the lack of cooperation and coordination between government and private sector stakeholders. This problem was evident in the needs assessment programme, where attaining a high level of participation from the private sector was one of the biggest challenges.

**BOX 4.3 The Viet Nam Trade Facilitation Alliance**

In December 2014, Vietnam Trade Facilitation Alliance was established as a collaboration between U.S. Agency for International Development, the American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The private sector-led alliance supports TFA implementation, as well as next generation of free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Alliance also aims to improve competitiveness of Vietnam's domestic and foreign companies through a more predictable and transparent business enabling environment. There is special emphasis on helping Vietnam achieve the target it established in Resolution No. 19/NQ-CP to improve its performance trading across borders by significantly reducing the time and cost of importing and exporting to regional averages. Through its multi-stakeholder networks, the VFTA will improve information sharing on trade facilitation including participation in the annual Traders Satisfaction Survey, implemented by Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry in partnership with General Department of Vietnam Customs, and the sharing of private sector generated data on customs performance.

www.usaid.gov/vietnam/press-releases/dec-12-2014-us-backed-alliance-facilitate-trade-through-public-private
*Source:* USAID.

There were several reasons for this. In some cases traders were not aware of the WTO negotiations and did not grasp the significance for their business. In other cases there was a hesitation to express views in front of government agencies for fear of reprisals at the border. Sometimes it was just the matter that time is money and a small business could not afford to have an employee away from the office for several days to participate in the assessment.

Improvements at the border are normally driven by the needs of the private sector. The WTO trade facilitation negotiations were no exception. WTO members negotiated this new agreement in order to secure improved conditions for their exporters in other WTO members. Continued engagement by the private sector helped sustain and move the negotiations forward throughout the 10 year period. The engagement of the International Chamber of Commerce and the Global Express Association in support of the TFA throughout its negotiation underlines this point.

To properly oversee implementation of the Agreement it is important for both governments and private sector to strive for effective co-operation. Representation of key industries and associations in the national trade facilitation committee is important in this regard.

It is in the best interest of the private sector to continue to press governments to ensure their needs are met in the implementation process. Many of the provisions of the agreement are best endeavor, and the measures were drafted to allow flexibility in the way they can be implemented at the national level. In some countries pressure from the private sector will be needed to ensure that governments make meaningful reforms; and that timeframes for implementation are reasonable.

In addition, private sector must ensure that in designing new programmes the government takes into account the needs and constraints of the private sector in order to help ensure that they will succeed. Business may have information about the way a modern business operates that the government is not aware of. In the case studies completed in connection with the 2015 Aid for Trade Global Review, 27 of the 44 submissions stated that engagement of the private sector was considered to be a key factor in successful implementation of trade facilitation reforms.

### *Other issues*

Other issues reported by members as creating a challenge include security risks, lack of awareness of best practices and inadequate financial resources. Some countries need to devise a strategy to work with donors, and to create work plans to increase their awareness of the needs and challenges. Other countries mentioned the need to establish customs unions to simplify compliance and reduce costs. Many countries expressed their desire to receive information from other countries on national experiences and previous efforts for reform.

## REALISING THE OPPORTUNITY

The most common objective of the case stories is improved transparency and reduction of trade costs through improved clearance times. As evidenced from the case stories, great success is already being achieved in these areas through the implementation of trade facilitation measures. It is also evident from these case studies that donor organisations are in fact responding to the very needs and priorities that developing and LDC members have identified as their highest priorities.

**BOX 4.4 Case stories – wider impacts from implementation of TFA measures**

These studies also reported wider economic impact to the economy and development through increases in: the volume of trade, foreign investment, export market diversification, government revenue, domestic investment, and employment. With other side benefits such as reduced pollution and improved relationship between private sector and customs. In this context it is also interesting to note that donors responding to the 2015 monitoring exercise also highlighted that TFA implementation would have positive spin-offs on governance programme (75% of respondents) and reducing costs and delays associated with procurement by in-country programmes (67%).

## IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT

Implementation of the TFA will take place within a legal framework that defines roles and responsibilities of the developing and LDC members on the one hand, and the "donor members" and the international and multilateral organizations supporting trade facilitation on the other.

TFA implementation takes place within on-going, well-established relationships between developing countries and their development partners. TFA implementation does not take place in isolation, but within the context of these existing frameworks. As such, the legal obligations underpinning TFA implementation overlay these existing development relationships. Past trade facilitation support has been provided on the following basis:

- demand for trade facilitation support, as expressed through national and regional development strategies and other national planning documents (e.g. trade strategies, export strategies, transport infrastructure development etc) by LDCs and other developing countries; and
- provision of assistance by development partners (donor members, international and multilateral organizations) and south-south partners aligned around the needs expressed by the developing country in the context of planning documents and *ad hoc* requests.

In this context, the new element is not trade facilitation *per se*; it is the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Of particular note in this regard is that the TFA adds a layer of scrutiny to the supply and demand for TFA implementation assistance, and the efficacy of the support provided.

This section examines how this system can work from the perspective of the TFA's provisions on the provision of assistance, an overview of existing TFA support and how the WTO's new Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility can seek to ensure that this system works in support of TFA implementation, notably where donors and developing countries might need matchmaking support.

### Procedures and Mechanisms

Under the Agreement, WTO "donor members" agree to facilitate the provision of assistance and support for capacity building "on mutually agreed terms either bilaterally or through the appropriate international organizations." That is, the Agreement does not mandate that donors provide this assistance or define a process to match donors with countries requiring assistance, but leaves it to the respective members to work these arrangements out among themselves.

This both provides flexibility and imposes an obligation on developing and LDC members to seek out the development partners that will meet their needs.

To facilitate matchmaking, the Agreement imposes some transparency obligations on donors. It requires donor members to make information available about their assistance programmes, including contact points and information on the process and mechanisms for requesting assistance. WTO donor members are required to report annually on technical assistance projects. Non-Member organizations that provide trade facilitation implementation support are also encouraged to provide information on existing or concluded arrangements to the TFA committee.

To help ensure the assistance that is provided is effective, the Agreement sets out principles that should be followed, such as: assistance should be provided on mutually agreed terms, targeted assistance should help LDCs build sustainable capacity, it should take account of the overall developmental framework and promote regional integration and coordination. Box 4.4 below highlights an example of how trade facilitation has been integrated into national planning frameworks in Lao PDR and how assistance has been aligned around this prioritization of trade facilitation needs.

**BOX 4.5 Trade facilitation in Lao People's Democratic Republic**

Lao PDR has successfully obtained the support it needs to implement general trade facilitation reforms by highlighting trade facilitation as a priority in its 7th Five-year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011-2015). Lao PDR also elaborated a Trade Facilitation Strategic Plan for the same period, with six strategic measures: mainstreaming trade facilitation objectives across line ministries, simplification, harmonization and modernization of trade and customs procedures, implementation of WTO, ASEAN and GMS commitments; development of private sector capacity; provision of equipment and facilities; and creation of a national trade facilitation body.

Prioritization of trade facilitation by the Lao PDR government has attracted on-going donor support. For example, the Word Bank is providing support for customs and trade facilitation programmed on the basis of the Bank's Country Assistance Programme for Lao PDR for the period 2012-2016. The Asian Development Bank is likewise providing multi-annual assistance, through the Greater Mekong Delta Sub-region (GMS) programme, focusing on implementation of the GMS Cross-Border Transport Facilitation Agreement. Lao PDR is also receiving support to implement the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, ASEAN single window and benefits from ASEAN's Strategic Programme of Customs Development. Donors active in Lao PDR include the EU (which also contributed funding for the World Bank's Lao PDR Trade and Development Facility) and the US through the Lao PDR – US and ASEAN Integration Project.

*Source:* WTO Secretariat research

Since beneficiary countries are in the best position to coordinate the assistance they receive, the Agreement encourages them to work with their assistance providers to avoid overlap and duplication and to promote internal co-ordination in the implementation of the Agreement and technical assistance.

To allow implementation oversight, the Agreement lays down certain reporting obligations for those members who wish to take advantage of implementation flexibilities accorded to developing and LDC members.

As noted, these members will be required to classify and notify to the WTO TF Committee each of the technical measures of the agreement into one of three categories, the so-called "Category A-B-C" notifications. Initial notifications will include indicative dates for implementation for each measure; subsequent notifications to the WTO Committee will include definitive dates of implementation. These notifications will be published thereby allowing all interested parties to track the implementation status in all developing and LDC WTO members.

Individual developing and LDC members, through their national trade facilitation committees, are expected to monitor their implementation progress, and to determine if it is developing sufficient capacity to implement the measures. If not, then the Agreement requires additional communications to the WTO Committee.

- A member can request an extension of the implementation date it notified for a particular measure or measures. If an extension is not granted then it can ask the WTO Committee to establish an Expert Group to examine the issue and make recommendations.
- If a member experiences difficulty in implementing parts of the Agreement by the implementation deadlines that it has notified, it can request the new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility to conduct a matchmaking exercise.

As noted above, the legal architecture of the TFA fits into existing national and regional development dialogues. In these dialogues, the provision of support is influenced by (a) the expression of trade facilitation as a priority area for support by the partner country in its dialogues with development partners and (b) donor(s) responding by programming support, e.g. on a discrete project basis, as part of multi-annual commitments (e.g. as part of country or regional assistance programmes) or due to membership of a technical organisation with technical assistance programmes in this subject area (the World Customs Organization).

The 2015 monitoring exercise suggests growing demand for trade facilitation support. Fifty-seven of the 62 partner countries that responded to the monitoring questionnaire stated that trade facilitation was reflected in new policy documents currently being updated and formulated – with 39 noting that trade facilitation was already a priority in the national development or trade development strategy. Trade facilitation was also noted as a priority in all the regional development strategies of the 7 regional economic communities and corridor projects that replied to the monitoring questionnaire.

## Trade Facilitation Support

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 underline the fact that substantive funding has been expended on trade facilitation reform in the past decade - and that significant expertise has been acquired. Trade facilitation funding commitments rose from an average of USD 80 million in the period 2002-2005 to reach USD 668 million in 2013. Since 2005, some USD 1.9 billion has been disbursed in trade facilitation support, according to figures reported to the OECD Creditor Reporting System.

**Figure 4.1: Trade facilitation funding commitments, 2002-2013**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241189

Figure 4.2 on trade facilitation support disbursements, however, highlights a more nuanced story. It is a story of a rising trend in trade facilitation disbursements, but one also marked by considerable fluctuations, of peaks (such as 2010) and drops (such as 2011 and 2012) in flows – coupled with considerable regional and national variations in funding flows.

Donor responses to the 2015 monitoring exercise suggest that aid for trade facilitation may rise still further. Twenty-two of the 37 donor respondents indicated that they expected their trade facilitation support to increase in the next five years – with 4 of the respondents (Australia, New Zealand, UNCTAD, African Development Bank) expecting a more than 10% increase in support offered. Figure 4.1 makes clear that as the TFA negotiations progressed to their successful conclusion so the donor community has placed greater priority on trade facilitation as a development objective in its aid programming.

**Figure 4.2 Trade facilitation disbursements, 2002-2013**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241197

The fluctuations in funding are evident at the regional level – see figure 4.3 below. For example, trade facilitation assistance to the Americas reported to the OECD CRS peaked in 2011 at USD 58 million and fell back to USD 24 million in 2013. The region also attracted considerably less support, as compared to Asia (USD 277 million in 2013) and Africa (USD 263 million in the same year).

**Figure 4.3 Trade facilitation commitments by region, 2002-2013**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241205

The variation is also pronounced at a national level. OECD Creditor Reporting System figures highlight that 12 countries received over USD 3 million in trade facilitation assistance over the period 2002 and 2013. In contrast, some 56 developing countries received less than USD 1 million in the same period - with some 14 countries not registering any direct national trade facilitation support in this period according to OECD figures.

It should be noted here however that there is a growing amount of assistance provided through regional and global programmes (USD 189 million in 2013 as compared to an average of USD 26 million over the period 2002-2005). This provides another important route for trade facilitation funding. As such, many countries that may not have been able to access trade facilitation support at the national level, may instead have been able to access regional funding sources. Box 4.5 discusses the example of Gambia.

**BOX 4.6 Accessing regional trade facilitation support — the case of Gambia**

Trade facilitation is a priority expressed in Gambia's national development strategy: the Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE). PAGE, which runs for the period 2012-2015, seeks to position Gambia as a transit hub by improving the road network and increasing the capacity of the Port of Banjul and Banjul International Airport. A TF needs assessment was also conducted by the WTO in the fall of 2013.

Trade facilitation reforms have been initiated, including the creation of an autonomous Gambia Revenue Authority (GRA) to enhance efficiency, the Customs and Excise Act updated in 2010 and the ASYCUDA system upgraded to ASYCUDA++. A Trade Facilitation Sub-Committee under the Ministry of Trade, chaired by the Customs Authority, discusses and co-ordinates actions relating to trade facilitation.

Trade facilitation support received to date has been geared towards regional integration and transport infrastructure upgrading. On-going projects include the EU Regional Indicative Programme and the African Development Bank/ World Bank West Africa Regional Transport and Transit Facilitation Program. The EU is funding a programme on Joint Customs Border Posts between Gambia and Senegal and the World Customs Organization has run a West African Customs Administration Modernization Project. In April 2015, national officials from Gambia participated in a two day ECOWAS Trade Negotiation Capacity Building project workshop (funded by the ECOWAS Commission and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) on the TFA. Most trade facilitation support has been programmed on an ECOWAS-wide level to date.

*Source:* WTO Secretariat research

The OECD's Creditor Reporting System includes a discrete reporting code on trade facilitation. The OECD creditor reporting system guidelines give the following definition for trade facilitation assistance: "Simplification and harmonisation of international import and export procedures (e.g. customs valuation, licensing procedures, transport formalities, payments, insurance); support to customs departments; tariff reforms." (OECD , 2004) Reporting to this code has so far captured a broad definition of trade facilitation, rather than one based specifically on implementation of the TFA. The TFA was agreed at the WTO's Ninth Ministerial Conference in December 2013. The OECD is taking steps to offer further guidance on reporting under the trade facilitation code as a result of this new agreement. The OECD is also engaging with the World Customs Organization to ensure that assistance provided by the WCO is reflected in their reporting. Table 4.3 below highlights the ten largest trade facilitation projects reported by donors in 2013.

Taken together, the top 10 donors (both bilateral and multilateral) have accounted for between 77-97% of all trade facilitation assistance since 2002. Table 4.4 highlights that 2013 trade facilitation assistance was particularly concentrated on a core group of donors, the US, EU and the World Bank, that accounted for 78% of all trade facilitation support. Multilateral sources of funding are particularly important. In 2013, 43% of trade facilitation assistance was provided through multilateral organisations.

**TABLE 4.3 Largest Trade Facilitation Projects, 2013**

| Aid provider | Aid recipient | USD million | Type of finance | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | Southern African Development Community | 42.49 | ODA Grants | SADC Trade Related Facility |
| World Bank | Myanmar | 30.80 | ODA Loans | Myanmar Reengagement and Reform Support Program |
| EU Institutions | Afghanistan | 30.54 | ODA Grants | Support for Afghanistan's Regional Cooperation |
| United Kingdom | South of Sahara, regional | 21.28 | ODA Grants | TradeMark Southern Africa Implementation Arrangement with the Common Market for East and Southern Africa |
| World Bank | Georgia | 18.13 | ODA Loans | Fourth East West Highway Improvement Project |
| United States | Pakistan | 17.00 | ODA Grants | Pakistan Private Investment Initiative - Business Enabling Environment |
| World Bank | Nepal | 16.56 | ODA Loans | Nepal-India Regional Trade And Transport Project |
| EU Institutions | Ethiopia | 13.28 | ODA Grants | Trade Enhancement and Facilitation Programme |
| United States | South Sudan | 12.84 | ODA Grants | Priority Infrastructure Development Transport Services |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

**TABLE 4.4 Trade facilitation by donors, 2002-05 average and 2010 – 2013, USD million (2012 constant)**

| | 2002 – 05 avg. | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 6 | 7 | 1 | 12 | 260 |
| EU Institutions | 13 | 102 | 171 | 43 | 31 |
| World Bank | 11 | 89 | 55 | 258 | 130 |
| United Kingdom | - | 143 | 5 | 14 | 36 |
| Japan | 25 | 22 | 25 | 49 | 31 |
| Canada | 1 | 5 | 12 | 6 | 21 |
| AsDB | 9 | - | - | 25 | 18 |
| Sweden | 0 | 11 | 4 | 18 | 10 |
| Norway | 0 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| Germany | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| **Total Trade Facilitation** | **80** | **412** | **361** | **466** | **668** |
| **Top 10 share in total** | **83.5%** | **93.2%** | **77.1%** | **92.0%** | **97.0%** |
| Total bilateral | 47 | 214 | 133 | 138 | 385 |
| Total multilateral | 33 | 197 | 228 | 328 | 283 |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database

Important to note also is that Aid for Trade Facilitation figures capture official development assistance (ODA) reported to the Creditor Reporting System. In addition to ODA financing, donors also provide non-concessional financing (typically loans that do not meet the 25% concessional element to qualify as ODA, but are more advantageous than borrowing at market rates) to countries for trade facilitation projects. In 2013, other official flows for trade facilitation support totalled USD 174.5 million, mostly aimed at middle income developing countries. An example here is the IADB's work with Pacific Alliance countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) to support the inter-operability of their single windows

Several points emerge strongly from the preceding analysis:

- Trade facilitation support has grown strongly in the past decade. A great deal of expertise and experience has been accumulated in trade facilitation areas covered by disciplines of the TFA, including those identified as the challenging measures by developing countries (such as implementation of single window, border agency co-operation, and authorised operator schemes).
- Trade facilitation support relies on a core group of bilateral and multilateral donors. Past assistance has also tended to focus on specific regions and countries, with trade facilitation assistance wrapped up in projects of infrastructural upgrading, business environment or regional trade integration.

## Developing Country Concerns in Implementation Support

Despite the evident rise in donor support for trade facilitation projects, and the built-in flexibilities for implementation, there remains concern on the part of a number of developing and LDC members about placing themselves under binding obligations to implement the trade facilitation measures without assurance that they will be able to access the support they need.

Table 4.5 below bears this point out strongly from the responses to the monitoring questionnaire. Some 37 out of the 62 respondents expected to face problems accessing external funds, due mainly to lack of information on funding opportunities, differing priorities of in-country donors or problems in demonstrating political will for TFA reforms. This last point ranked strongly among donors in their estimation of the likely problems to be faced in integrating TFA implementation support into their aid programming, with 20 of the 36 donor respondents citing it as a potential difficulty.

Funding issues are evidenced in a case story submitted by ECOWAS about a Joint Border Posts (JBPs) project in 2011 that was started with the aim to "decongest borders to enable the smooth passage of goods, transport and trade." Joint Border Posts have been completed between Togo/Ghana and Benin/Niger, but the JBPs between Nigeria/Benin, Benin/Togo, and Gambia/Senegal are still under construction and the JBPs between Ghana/Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea/Mali, and Ghana/Burkina Faso have yet to be built. The authors of the case story attribute this situation to a lack of funding and financiers for the designed JBPs, inadequate capacity and knowledge within Member States to support implementation of the JBPs, as well as long procurement processes in line with donor procedures. They conclude that with only two out of the eight planned JBPs completed, it is too early to say at this point whether or not the project will become a success.

Although many developing countries have expressed concern about accessing funds this is clearly not the case for Nicaragua as described in Box 4.6 below. Nicaragua undertook a TF needs assessment in October 2013 and notified its category A commitments to the Preparatory Committee on Trade Facilitation on 3 July 2014. Nicaragua has now to decide how (a) to proceed with national ratification of the TFA and the deposition of its acceptance of the TFA and (b) how it wishes to schedule outstanding TFA commitments (i.e. those not notified as Category A) between category B and category C commitments.

**TABLE 4.5 Difficulties developing countries expect to face in securing Aid-for-Trade support for Trade Facilitation Agreement implementation**

| Options | Response percent | Response count |
|---|---|---|
| Problems accessing external funds | 59.7% | 37 |
| Lack of information on funding opportunities | 58.1% | 36 |
| Differing priorities of in-country donors | 51.6% | 32 |
| National coordination and demonstration of political will | 41.9% | 26 |
| Accessing the necessary expertise | 32.3% | 20 |
| Accessing global programmes | 32.3% | 20 |
| Problems to quantify TFA implementation needs | 30.6% | 19 |
| Integrating TFA implementation into on-going programmes | 30.6% | 19 |
| Accessing regional programmes | 29.0% | 18 |
| Ensuring TFA implementation is a priority in national development planning documents | 27.4% | 17 |
| Problems in formulating requests | 24.2% | 15 |
| Ensuring coherence with past programmes | 24.2% | 15 |
| Programming cycles | 16.1% | 10 |
| None | 4.8% | 3 |
| Other (please specify) | 3.2% | 2 |
| | | Number of responses: 62 |

*Source* OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

To alleviate these concerns, developing and LDC members requested the WTO Director-General to establish a WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility. This new Facility, which became operational at the end of 2014, can assist members to find the donor support they need by making information available on assistance programmes and, where needed, conduct matchmaking between donors and recipients. The Facility will also support members' efforts to implement the Agreement by acting as a repository for training materials, case studies and best practices on implementation of the measures. As such, the Facility will seek to leverage the experience accumulated by developing countries and their development partners from the past support provided. In addition, it will provide training programmes and support materials to assist members to fully understand their obligations.

In situations where no other support is available, the Facility will offer two types of grants: 1) a project preparation grant for up to USD 30 000 (USD); and, 2) a project implementation support grant for up to USD 200 000 (USD). With these grants a country can hire a consultant with the necessary expertise to meet their needs.

Another important role of the Facility will be to work with regional and multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and other assistance providers to promote coherence in the delivery of assistance support.

**BOX 4.7 Nicaragua and Trade facilitation agreement implementation**

Donors active in Nicaragua on trade facilitation issues include the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the European Union and United States. The World Bank's Country Partnership Strategy for 2013 – 2017 includes reference to trade facilitation and transport infrastructure co-operation. The Inter-American Development Bank Country Assistance Strategy 2012 – 2017 also picks up the same themes. Article 54 of the EU -Nicaragua Association Agreement, signed in 2012, deals specifically with Cooperation and Technical Assistance on Customs and Trade Facilitation. In 2007, the USTR and Nicaragua agreed a "Capacity Building and Best Use of Trade Agreements Plan of Action". Other active development partners include EU member states, Japan and Switzerland. The OECD CRS reports that Nicaragua has received USD 6.7 million in assistance since 2002 – with some USD 0.4 million provided since 2010.

There is also an important regional dimension to TFA implementation through Nicaragua's membership of the Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SIECA), IADB's Regional Public Goods Initiative and trade facilitation specific programming, the DR-CAFTA free trade agreement with the US and the Association Agreement signed with the European Union in 2012. For example, the EU has been supporting regional integration in Central America through the Programme of Support for Regional Integration in Central America (PAIRCA) through two phases over the period 2004-2014

*Source:* WTO Secretariat

## CONCLUSIONS

Implementation of the TFA can bring about significant reductions in cost for traders, and increased revenue for governments, fulfilling the promise of the Agreement.

WTO donor members and international organisations have committed to providing support to assist developing and LDC members to implement the Agreement and, as indicated in the case studies reviewed in this paper, the evidence to date is that these donors and organisations are responding to the very needs and priorities that developing and LDC members have themselves identified.

The evidence gathered here gives cause for optimism that support can be delivered in a coherent and timely manner. Ensuring that trade facilitation is aligned with other national priorities and expressed by developing and LDC members through existing national and regional development dialogues with their development partners is a critical step in TFA implementation.

The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility can play an important role in this regard by contributing to this process of matching supply to demand and helping developing and LDC members access the support they need, in part, by working to promote coherence of support programmes.

At the national level, successful implementation of reforms requires co-operation between government and private sector. In particular, implementation is most successful when the measures are important to the private sector, are measures that can receive sustained political support by the government; and these reforms are also something that donors are willing to support.

It will be equally important for all relevant border agencies to participate actively in their country's national committee in order to ensure that the SDT (or ABC) notifications and implementation time frames accurately reflect their country's needs. Apart from compliance with terms of the Agreement, a developing or LDC member that fails to notify needs and priorities within required time frames risks losing an opportunity to benefit from donor support and the possibility of meaningful reforms.

## ANNEX 4.A1 Third party monitoring: Sources

| Objective and methodology | Key areas |
|---|---|
| **Global Express Association: Global Express Association (GEA) Customs Capabilities Report**<br>http://global-express.org/index.php?id=4 | |
| To compile reports on market access and customs barriers in a large set of developed and developing countries; to identify national law and policies that make it difficult for express delivery companies and other transport companies to serve a particular country in an efficient manner as well as to identify capacity building needs in the country's customs administration<br>**Methodology**<br>Questionnaires, Surveys | Transparency<br>Customs efficiency<br>Post-release process |
| **OECD: Trade Facilitation Indicators**<br>http://www.oecd.org/trade/facilitation/indicators.htm#About-TFI | |
| The purpose of the indicators is to help governments identify priorities in implementing trade facilitation. In doing so, technical assistance and capacity-building will ideally be better targeted at where it is needed most.<br>**Methodology**<br>Values for indicators are taken from open-source data and confirmed by interested parties | Advanced rulings<br>Appeal procedures<br>Internal/External co-operation<br>Fees and charges<br>Automation, documents, procedures formalities<br>Governance and impartiality<br>Information availability<br>Involvement of the trade community |
| **World Bank: Doing Business Indicators and Trading Across Borders Indicator**<br>http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/trading-across-borders | |
| To compile all the official procedures for exporting and importing a standardised cargo of goods by ocean transport and to measure the associated time and costs (excluding tariffs)<br>**Methodology**<br>Information collected from different stakeholders that comprise of local freight forwarders, shipping lines, customs brokers, port officials and banks | Number of all documents required to export/import goods<br>Time necessary to comply with all the procedures required to export/import goods<br>Cost associated with all the procedures required to export/import goods |
| **World Bank: Logistics Performance Index**<br>http://lpi.worldbank.org/ | |
| Measuring performance along the logistics supply chain within a country<br>**Methodology**<br>Worldwide survey of global freight forwarders and express carriers | Level of fees and charges<br>Clearance time<br>Percentage of physical inspections<br>Efficiency of processes<br>Changes in the Logistics Environment since 2005<br>Quality of tele-communications and IT |

## ANNEX 4.A1 Third party monitoring: Sources

| Objective and methodology | Key areas |
|---|---|
| **World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report**<br>http://www.weforum.org/reports | |
| To provide an assessment of national competitiveness, offering a useful portrait of a country's economic environment and its ability to achieve sustained levels of prosperity and growth<br>**Methodology**<br>Information collected from international organizations, national sources, and WEF's Executive Opinion Survey | Transparency of government policy making<br>Judicial independence<br>Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations<br>Irregular Payments and Bribes |
| **Institutional Profiles Database (IPD)**<br>http://www.cepii.fr/IPD.asp | |
| To provide indicators on institutional characteristics of 123 developed and developing countries<br>**Methodology**<br>World survey | Effective of institutions<br>Quality and implementation of institutional arrangements<br>Dialogue structures between private and public actors within a country<br>Functioning of courts with regard to commercial matters |
| **Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Sub-Committee on Customs Procedures – 2010 Evaluation Report on Customs Activities on APEC**<br>http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/ | |
| To determine the status of the Collective Action Plan (CAP) items seeking to promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation<br>**Methodology**<br>Surveys and questionnaires | Harmonization of Tariff Structure with the HS Convention<br>Public availability of information on customs laws, regulations, administrative guidelines and rulings provided to the business sector on an ongoing basis<br>Simplification and harmonization on the basis of the Kyoto Convention<br>Adoption and support for the UN/EDIFACT/Paperless trading<br>Adoption of the principles of the WTO Valuation Agreement<br>Introduction of clear appeals provisions<br>Introduction of an advance classification ruling system<br>Risk management techniques<br>Integrity<br>Customs-business partnership |
| **World Trade Organization: Trade Policy Reviews (Trade Policies and Practices By Measure)**<br>https://www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp410_e.htm | |
| To review the national trade policies of various WTO members for consistency with their obligations to the WTO Agreements (all WTO members are subject to review with its frequency of review based on its share of world trade)<br>**Methodology**<br>Reviews are conducted by the Trade Policy Review Board (TPRB) with a report prepared by the economists of the Secretariat's Trade Policy Review Division | Measures directly affecting imports (e.g., customs, tariffs, ROO, MFN, SPS)<br>Measures directly affecting exports (e.g., taxes, licensing)<br>Measures affecting production and trade (e.g., taxes, subsidies, SOEs, competition policy, IPRs)<br>Notifications<br>Once the TFA enters into force the TPRs will report on its implementation. |

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# CHAPTER 5

# REDUCING TRADE COSTS FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

*Contributed by the Executive Secretariat for the Enhanced Integrated Framework*

***Abstract:*** *For the LDCs reducing trade is doubly important because since they start from a lower base, they can potentially derive disproportionately higher benefits compared to other countries. Thus LDCs are taking necessary measures aimed at lowering trade costs either on their own or with the support of the private sector, and some have achieved considerable success. However, they are unable to make a transformative shift because of limited institutional capacity and resource constraints. This is where aid for trade can help, as evidenced by the success achieved by various multilateral, regional and bilateral aid-for-trade initiatives. The paper shows that the impact of aid-for-trade intervention on reducing trade costs in LDCs tends to be higher when they include a robust and credible analytical work, a high level of country ownership, institutional capacity building on a sustained basis, continuous support for a sufficiently long period, resource leveraging and a co-ordinated response from donors. Moreover, such intervention can be successful if political economy challenges are appreciated, mainstreamed and mitigated.*

## INTRODUCTION

Trade costs have become a focus of discussion within trade policy and academic circles in the recent past due to their increased visibility when it comes to reducing traditional trade barriers. In the context of rapid integration of the global economy and its significance for propelling growth, the imperative to reduce trade costs to become and remain competitive in the international and regional markets is well documented. However, this is more urgent in the context of the LDCs, where most of the exporting firms are Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), where trade costs are reducing more slowly compared to those of their trading partners, where export diversification is an urgent need, which have the lowest level of participation in the global/regional value chain (GRVC) and which are amongst the landlocked countries and/or in fragile situations.

Realising the growing need to reduce trade costs, the LDCs have been taking various initiatives either *suo moto* or in collaboration with the private sector, although these actions alone are not likely to contribute significantly to overcome the entire range of impediments facing the LDCs. On the one hand, LDCs are taking considerable time to undertake these reforms, either because of lack of resources or due to the absence of relevant expertise. On the other hand, other countries are reforming at a much faster pace, making it difficult for the LDCs to catch up, thereby further eroding the latter's competitiveness in the global market. On the positive side, given that LDCs are starting with lower bases, the bang for the reform buck is likely to be higher for them compared to developed countries, which have almost reached the point of reform saturation.

The LDCs have also been receiving aid-for-trade support to address the issue of trade costs, among other things, from various bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as through the EIF – a multi stakeholder co-ordination framework that is exclusively devoted to building the LDCs' trade capacity. Although LDCs face a host of trade-related challenges, including alleviating their supply side constraints and building their productive capacity, the focus of this chapter is exclusively on trade costs, as this features as a predominant agenda within the broad universe of aid-for-trade support. This chapter is organised as follows:

The next section discusses why trade costs matter for the LDCs and whether there are important differences in the relative importance of trade costs for different categories of LDCs. This followed by a section that analyses trade costs in LDCs over the last ten years with a view to finding if there are any distinct differences in these costs between different categories of LDCs. The following section looks at priorities for LDCs in addressing trade costs and whether or not such priorities have changed over time. It will also identify drivers of change in cases where reform has been successfully undertaken to lower trade costs.

The penultimate section looks at the role of development partners and other agencies involved in the delivery of aid for trade by considering the evolution and flow of aid for trade, particularly in the context of the LDCs, and examining the evidence to see if aid for trade has contributed to reducing trade costs in LDCs. Based on the experience of the EIF, the section also investigates what works and what does not, as well as where improvements are needed in addressing the challenges of trade costs facing LDCs. The final section concludes.

## SALIENCE OF TRADE COSTS FOR LDCs

A relatively new generation of trade literature predicates that more than six decades of multilateral trade negotiations, a series of preferential trade arrangements and a large number of autonomous liberalisation measures have contributed to the reduction of border trade barriers, i.e. tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions to a significant extent, particularly for the exports of LDCs. This has resulted in increasing focus of researchers and policy makers towards other elements of trade costs.

The definition of trade costs for merchandise trade can encompass any barrier and impediment that can increase the cost of international trade. However, due to a limitation on the availability of information and data and to ensure a focused analysis, trade costs for the purpose of this chapter are narrowly defined to include costs related to border procedures and transportation and logistics for merchandise trade only. The narrow tailoring of this definition is in no way purported to undermine the significance of other elements of trade costs both for merchandise as well as services trade.

Although trade costs matter to all groups of countries, their heightened significance in the context of LDCs is explained by the following inter-related but distinct factors:

First, although trade costs are generally reducing, they are falling more slowly in low income countries (Arvis et al., 2013), a category within which a large majority of LDCs belong. ITC (2013a), which supports this argument, suggests that the average trade costs in LDCs are substantially higher than in other countries. Using costs relating to cross-border movement of a standard container, Koniger et al. (2011), for example, find that when compared to other countries LDCs on average paid 43% more to export and 54% more to import.

Second, LDCs' participation in the GRVCs is increasing but limited. ITC (2013b), for example, shows that LDCs have been gradually catching up over the past decade with their developing country counterparts in terms of their participation in GVCs as measured by exports of transformed products and imports of intermediary goods. However, there is a considerable variation within the LDCs, and the pace of their integration leaves much to be desired. In their pursuit to participate in GRVCs, LDCs face exclusionary barriers, which include factors that drive up trading costs and undermine competiveness (ITC, 2013a). Although trade costs are not the only element that contribute to the success of LDCs in integrating themselves into GVRCs, they are certainly important. Since reductions in exports as well as import costs are necessary to achieve results on this front, LDCs need to make a transformative shift towards reducing both types of trade costs, particularly the latter, which tends to be disproportionately higher in LDCs.

Third, export concentration in LDCs – both product-wise and market-wise – is much higher than in developing countries (ITC, 2013a). At the same time, the LDCs' attempt to diversify exports – both at intensive and extensive margins – has failed to produce the desired results. For example, despite several attempts by LDCs, the survival rate of new products introduced by LDCs into the regional and global markets has been low. Nicita et al. (2013), who studied the survival of the flows of LDCs' exports to 190 countries between 1993 and 2007, show that 41% of LDCs' products face extinction compared to 15% for other developing countries. This is consistent with Fernandes et al. (2013), who find that the new entry rates for countries with low per capita income are lower, and that exit rates are higher compared to relatively higher income countries.

Fourth, most LDCs are handicapped by several natural barriers that add to their trade costs. Of 31 Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), 16 are LDCs. Similarly, out of 40 Small Island Developing States (SIDS), nine are either LDCs or recently graduated LDCs. Although the occurrence of natural disasters cannot be avoided, limited disaster mitigation capacity means that such disasters can have serious implications for trade costs in the LDCs. For example, the earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010 caused the collapse of the main deck of the public wharf, as a result of which the capacity of the international Port-au-Prince port was severely affected. The port now operates with only three floating docks, thereby

restricting trade potential and increasing trade costs due to delays (Haiti DTIS, 2013). As recently as mid-March 2015, the damage caused by the tropical cyclone Pam to infrastructure in the Pacific Islands Countries, such as Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tuvalu, is likely to have debilitating effects on trade costs in these countries. For example, as documented by the Asian Development Bank, in the case of Kiribati tidal surges extensively damaged the Betio-Tarawa causeway, a key transport link in the country (ADB, 2015).

Additionally, several LDCs are vulnerable to climate changes due to: i) their location in parts of the world that are expected to be badly affected by temperature and precipitation changes; ii) a huge reliance on climate-sensitive economic sectors, such as agriculture, for generating export revenues; and iii) a limited capacity to adapt to negative external events due to a low level of economic development and stretched institutional capacity (Bruckner, 2012). Since the LDCs tend to incur higher trade costs than other countries on average due to these natural handicaps, which cannot be changed in the short run, they should focus on reducing other elements of trade costs to remain competitive in the global market.

Fifth, given that the size of the domestic market is highly correlated with the average size of firms and exports, as Fernandes et al. (2013) point out, firms in a large majority of LDCs, where the market size is small, are likely to be SMEs. According to the study, firms from the LDCs comprised SMEs whose exports values were relatively low. These firms exported much fewer products, with most of them exporting just one product to a single market. Since these firms are unlikely to achieve economies of scale and the level of competitiveness that is required to survive in the global market, their survival rate in the international market tends to be much lower compared to the enterprises in advanced countries. Due to limited and uncertain revenues, including export earnings, the burden of higher trade costs converted into percentage terms disproportionately disadvantages the SMEs. Moreover, unlike large companies, they do not have the in-house capacity or expertise to overcome these barriers and need to hire professional agents, which further increases their trade costs (ITC and WTO, 2014; Snow et al., 2004).

The combined effect of all these factors is reflected in various global indicators, including the Doing Business indicator, the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) and the Enabling Trade Report. Figure 5.1, which is based on the Doing Business database, provides a comparative picture of trade costs incurred by LDCs – both for export as well as import in the past decade. Going by these numbers, it appears that both categories of trade costs faced by LDCs have generally increased. While the cost to export was USD 1 578 in 2005, it increased to USD 1 980 in 2014, posting an increase of 25%; the corresponding figures for imports were USD 1 928 and USD 2 484 respectively, suggesting an increase of 29 % over the past decade (Figure 5.1).

**Figure 5.1 LDCs' costs of exporting and importing, 2005-214**




*Source:* World Bank, Doing Business database.

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Since there is considerable heterogeneity among LDCs based on their geographic location, political situation, governance status, structure of economies, natural resource endowment, institutional capacity, level of integration with the global and/or regional economies, etc., there is a sizeable variation on trade costs faced by different groups of LDCs. Moreover, it is equally necessary to take cognizance of the fact that trade costs are also affected by the willingness and capacity of the LDCs to design and implement reforms, their participation in various aid-for-trade initiatives and their participation in regional trade.

Although reducing trade costs is a worthy goal to be pursued by all the countries alike, they are relatively more important for some categories of LDCs than others due to a confluence of factors. For the purpose of this chapter, they are divided into the following categories: i) sub-regional dimension; ii) landlocked status; iii) commodity dependence; and iv) fragile situation.

## Sub-regional dimension

At a general level, LDCs are conventionally divided into three convenient sub-regions, namely sub-Saharan Africa (which includes Haiti), South Asia and South East Asia/Pacific. Based on such classification, trade costs have been increasing in the first two and reducing in the latter according to Doing Business Report figures. However, there are considerable variations in trade costs within these four groupings. Therefore, we have prepared the following detailed sub-regional groupings to present the data, which will guide our analyses: i) Caribbean; ii) Central Africa; iii) East Africa; iv) Middle East and North Africa; v) Pacific; vi) South Asia; vii) South-East Asia; viii) Southern Africa; and ix) West Africa (countries included in these sub-regions are provided in Annex 1).

Two of these sub-regions where the trade costs faced by LDCs, as measured by import and export costs, are the highest are Central Africa and South Asia. These are precisely the regions within the LDCs that should focus more on reducing trade costs than other sub-regions. Figure 5.2 depicts the situation of the Central Africa sub-region, where the left axis is the change in export cost between 2005 and 2014 and the right axis is the percentage change. In this sub-region where six LDCs are located, the average cost of exporting for LDCs was USD 2 598 in 2005. This has increased to USD 3 200, reflecting a 23% rise over a period of eight years (Figure 5.2a). The average cost for importing increased from USD 2 524 to USD 3 441, representing an increase of 36% during the corresponding period (Figure5.2). It is not the increase in these costs that is problematic but the base itself, which was very high to begin with. This is due to the poor state of transportation within the Central Africa region, as aptly captured by an AfDB report. Due to the presence of several landlocked countries in the region and limited air connectivity, around 80% of people and goods in the region are transported by land, yet asphalted roads represent less than 20% of the whole regional road network (Harding, 2011).

Despite the presence of coastal countries, such as Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, which incur much lower export costs compared to the LDC average, high costs are largely driven by landlocked countries in the sub-region, namely Chad and the Central African Republic. Although the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a costal country in theory, it can be considered as *de facto* landlocked as it has a short coastline far from the main cities (World Bank, 2010). Chad is the country with the highest cost of exports as well as imports in the world. Its export costs are consistently higher than the sub-regional average by anywhere between 43% and 59% (Figure 5.2).

Moreover, based on the figures available for 2014 from the World Bank's Doing Business Report, it takes 70 days to export from Chad, which is the second highest next to Afghanistan, where it takes 86 days to export. In terms of time taken to import, Chad is at 90 days, again second only to Afghanistan, where it takes 91 days. It is also clear from the figures that Chad is the only country where the costs of both imports and exports have increased significantly, whereas in the case of other countries in the sub-region, costs have either plateaued or even marginally declined after 2009 (not shown in the figure).

**Figure 5.2 Cost of exporting and importing from LDCs in the Central Africa sub-region, 2005-2014**




*Source:* World Bank.

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South Asia is a sub-region that presents a different picture. This is because the initial costs faced by LDCs are not very high, unlike in the Central Africa sub-region. However, they have increased rapidly over the years. The average costs for exporting faced by the LDCs in the sub-region increased from USD 1 458 in 2005 to USD 2 561 in 2014, reflecting an increase of 75% (Figure 5.3). Similarly, the average costs for importing, which surged from USD 1 723 to USD 2 845 in the corresponding period, represent an increase of 65% (Figure 5.3). Just like the Central Africa sub-region, where the bulk of the cost increase was due to Chad, in the South Asia sub-region, Afghanistan accounts for the majority of costs as well as the increase in costs.

Another similarity is that the high average costs are driven by the presence of three landlocked countries in the South Asia sub-region, which tend to take longer time to import and export due to internal transportation-related weaknesses, as well as weaknesses in the transit providing countries. However, unlike in the Central Africa sub-region, costs of all the LDCs in the South Asia sub-region, including a relatively better performing Bangladesh, have increased.

**Figure 5.3 Costs of exporting and importing from LDCs in South Asia sub-region, 2005-2014**




*Source:* World Bank.

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## Landlocked status

Trade costs tend to be much higher in landlocked countries compared to their coastal counterparts, and in particular the transit neighbours, for a variety of reasons. First, they need to rely on transit providing countries for international shipments – both for imports and exports. For example, as stated in the EIF supported DTIS of Malawi, which is dependent on transport corridors and ports in neighbouring countries for all of its trade, unreliable and unpredictable delivery times prevent producers from competing in regional and international markets (Malawi, 2014).

Second, typically, landlocked countries are isolated from major markets and have small economies, limited natural resources, weak institutions and a history of conflict (World Bank, 2010). Most of them fall into the bottom quintile of the Human Development Index. Third, although there has been some improvement in the domestic transportation infrastructure in the landlocked LDCs, they tend to have the lowest quality of infrastructure, which contributes to increased trade costs. For example, based on data available for a maximum of 29 LDCs, their average quality of road infrastructure on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 7 (best), was 2.37 in 2005. It increased to 3.1 in 2011 but decreased to 3.06 in 2012, only to rise marginally to 3.08 in 2013 (World Economic Forum, 2014).

Moreover, a recent report published jointly by the World Bank and UN OHRLLS (2014) shows that LLDCs generally face much higher trade costs compared to transit coastal countries. Even among LDCs, landlocked countries tend to incur higher costs for exporting as well as importing, compared to their coastal counterparts. Figure 5.4 not only shows the higher cost incurred by landlocked LDCs compared to coastal LDCs but also the evolution of costs over the past decade. The left axis represents the export costs per twenty-foot equivalent unit container for landlocked LDCs and coastal LDCs and the right axis shows higher costs incurred by the latter in relation to the former in terms of percentage. As shown in Figure 5.4, landlocked countries suffered from higher export costs in the beginning, and their costs are rising rapidly compared to their costal counterparts: there was a difference of 96% in 2005, increasing to 168% in the matter of a decade. It is worth noting while the export costs of landlocked LDCs increased by 46% between 2005 and 2014, coastal countries' export costs increased only by 7% during the corresponding period.

**Figure 5.4 Export and import costs of landlocked LDCs vis-à-vis coastal LDCs, 2005-2014**

**Export costs**




**Import costs**




*Source:* World Bank.

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Import costs, as shown in Figure 5.4, further expose the precarious situation of the landlocked LDCs compared to their coastal counterparts. Import costs for landlocked were much higher to begin with, and the cost difference between the two groups was 120% in 2005. This figure increased to 180% in 2014. As with the variation between export costs in the two different periods, the import costs increased by exactly 46% in the case of LDCs between 2005 and 2014, whereas the cost increase in the case of coastal countries was limited to 12%. Even within the same geographical sub-region, the cost for coastal countries is much lower compared to that of landlocked countries, as seen from Figure 5.2 as well as Figure 5.3.

There are a number of reasons that explain exceptionally high trade costs incurred by landlocked LDCs. First, a feature that is endemic to landlocked LDCs is that these are among the poorest of the poor countries in the world, with low human development indicators, as noted above. Therefore, it is only natural that resource constraints – financial, human and technological – act as the major barrier to upgrading infrastructure, where they tend to be the weakest. This can be one of the reasons why trade costs tend to inversely correlate with the level of income (World Bank and UN OHRLLS, 2014).

Second, the death of distance postulation appears highly exaggerated if we look at the situation of landlocked LDCs, not least because their export as well as import consignments have to travel on an average between 1 112 km and 1 494 km to and from the nearest port (World Bank and UN OHRLLS, 2014). While a part of these distances falls within their own territory, over which they have some control, a large majority of the distance lies within the territory of their transit neighbour(s), over which they have no influence.

Third, related to the second factor discussed above, transit neighbours of most landlocked countries themselves are not among the countries with the most efficient road and port infrastructure, which makes the transit process extremely burdensome and time consuming. They might be marginally less bureaucratic than their LDC counterparts, but are more bureaucratic than the global average. Some of their ports are congested by their own freight traffic, let alone providing the opportunity of seamless movement for the freight of the neighbouring landlocked countries. The DTIS of Bhutan, a country that is dependent on transit traffic through India for access to sea and third country markets, provides testimony to this predicament. Bhutan, which relies on the Port of Kolkata for the transit of its seaborne trade, finds its trade performance hampered by operational delays in the port, a lengthy clearance procedure and frequent strikes en route (Bhutan, 2012).

Similarly, the 2014 DTIS of Malawi documents that unreliable and unpredictable delivery times prevent producers from competing in regional and international markets. The 2012 Burundi DTIS highlights customs delays and high costs in the ports of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Mombasa (Kenya), through which Burundi trades. This is reflected in transport and logistics costs that reach approximately 40% of export prices of agricultural products in Burundi, according to some estimates. The peace and security situation of the transit neighbours also affects transit time and cost, as posited by Faye et al. (2004). This is highlighted in Burkina Faso's 2007 DTIS, where it shows that unrest in Côte d'Ivoire and the disruption of the principal corridor to the coast resulted in increased trade costs.

Fourth, the existing governance and institutional arrangements of the road transport sector in most landlocked countries, where oligopoly is the predominant market structure, provides the breeding ground for cartel and anti-competitive practices to thrive. While this leads to supernormal profits for the truck operators, traders are obliged to pay more than what they would pay in a competitive market structure (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009). The DTIS of Burkina Faso presents this predicament in a slightly different manner by highlighting the fact that transport companies in the country are chosen because they are next in line, not because they perform. Moreover, the air transportation sector, which seems to provide a more efficient, albeit costly, alternative to surface transportation, is also heavily protected in some landlocked countries. This is because, as Borchert et al. (2012) found, the pay-offs from protection for well-organised vested interests are likely to be higher in these countries as these countries tend to have weaker checks on policy makers' tendency to favour vested interests at the expense of public welfare. This results in a serious lack of competition in the transportation sector and the unwillingness of policy makers to liberalise it due to political economy considerations.

Fifth, high transit overheads, including superfluous services and bribes, affect a range of landlocked LDCs, which must rely on the regulatory and administrative structure and practices of their transit neighbour. Burdensome paper requirements, clearance procedures and loading and unloading can be extremely time and resource consuming for traders from landlocked countries. In order to avoid this cost, most of them hire clearing and forwarding agents, which are experienced in transit operations at a relatively higher costs (Snow et al., 2003). Although bribery and corruption is not endemic to transit providing countries, complicated and opaque procedures at the border, including documentary requirements and numerous security checking points often result in a high level of bribery.

For example, in West Africa, as documented by Ben Barka (2012:6), bribes collected by various agencies, including customs, police, gendarmerie and other uniformed services, range from USD 3 to USD 23 per 100 km.. In the case of Burkina Faso, although Snow et al. (2003) do not provide any numbers, they argue that rigorous police checkpoints in the trade routes not only cost time, but often money in the form of bribes. The frequent road-side demand for bribe payment was also highlighted in the earlier version of Burkina Faso's DTIS completed in 2007.

## Commodity dependence

According to UNCTAD's classification, more than half of the LDCs (27 out of 48) are dependent on commodities (agriculture, fuels and minerals) for their exports. Since commodities are bulky products, overall trade costs for their exports tend to be higher than light manufacturing. In order to calculate the trade costs, we rely again on the export-cost data derived from the Doing Business Report for the period 2005 to 2014. Since most of the commodities exporting countries do not import raw materials and export commodities in more or less raw form, we decided to not include costs for importing.

In order to identify commodity exporting countries, we follow UNCTAD's (2010) classification, which divides the countries into various categories of commodity exporters, as presented in Table 5.1. Of the 25 countries included in the list, data for two countries, namely Somalia and Tuvalu, were not available. Therefore, the analysis below is based on the data of the following countries.

**TABLE 5.1 Commodity-exporting LDCs**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Agricultural exporters** | Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Liberia, Malawi, Solomon Islands and Uganda |
| **Mineral exporters** | Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone and Zambia |
| **Oil (fuel) exporters** | Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Yemen |

*Source:* UNCTAD (2010).

Figure 5.5 depicts the cost of exporting incurred by all three categories of commodity exporting LDCs, as well as all the countries included in Table 5.1, for which data are available. For the purpose of benchmarking, the average for all LDCs is also included. As shown in the figure, commodity exporting LDCs in general face higher export costs compared to the LDC average, and mineral exporting LDCs face the highest export costs. This is followed by oil exporting LDCs and agriculture exporting LDCs.

**Figure 5.5. Cost of exporting for commodity-exporting LDCs, 2005-14**




Source: Based on the World Bank.

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Since commodities are by nature bulky products no matter what countries export, there may not be any specific reason for mineral exports costing more than costs of exporting other commodities. One explanation, however, for the higher trade cost faced by mineral exporters compared to oil exporters is that among the exporters of oil, all but Chad happen to be coastal countries, which incur lower export costs. This seems to suggest that the higher trade costs for mineral exporting countries are due to their being landlocked rather than anything else. However, further research is required to establish that this is actually the case.

## Fragile situation

LDCs are also amongst the most fragile countries, either facing ongoing political unrest, armed revolt and/or the threat of terrorism, which can impose trade costs that are not trivial. These can be due to damage caused to vital infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, telecommunications or ports, additional security checks that are required to contain potential damages, threats of strikes and shutdown of trade routes and higher insurance premiums due to the above mentioned threats. For example, the 2006 Sierra Leone DTIS takes account of the damage caused by civil conflict to much of the country's infrastructure and trade related services.

Although the impact of conflict on trade costs is a relatively under-researched area, Blomberg and Hess (2006), who conducted an empirical investigation with the annual observation of a panel dataset of 177 countries between 1968 and 1999, found that for a given year, the presence of terrorism coupled with internal and external conflict is equivalent to a nearly 30% tariff on trade. This is much larger than many other trade costs discussed so far.

No less than 23 out of 48 LDCs are on the World Bank 2014 Harmonized List of Fragile Situations. Some are still reeling under civil strife, while others are in the post-conflict stage. Three countries on the World Bank list (Somalia, South Sudan and Tuvalu) were not included in the Doing Business Report, consequently, they could not be included for comparative analysis. The final list of countries was grouped into the six sub-regions as presented in Table 5.2.

**TABLE 5.2 List of fragile states and their sub-regions, 2014**

| Sub-region | Country |
|---|---|
| **Asia** | Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Yemen |
| **Pacific** | Kiribati and Solomon Islands |
| **East Africa** | Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea and Sudan |
| **West Africa** | Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone and Togo |
| **Central Africa** | Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| **Southern Africa** | Malawi |

*Source:* World Bank (2014).

Based on the costs for exporting obtained from the Doing Business Report, we take the costs per sub-region as well as overall costs incurred for exports by fragile LDCs. We also include the LDC average figure for comparison. As it turns out, the fragile states tend to pay anywhere between 29% and 34% more than what is paid by all the LDCs for exporting their goods, and the costs have been generally rising over the past few years, except for the Pacific sub-region (Figure 5.6). According to the figure, Central Africa, South Asia, East Africa and the Southern Africa sub-region pay more costs to export than the overall LDC average, as well as the average for all the fragile states. However, fragile states in the South East Asia sub-region, followed by the Pacific, the Middle East and West Africa, face lower trade costs as compared to the averages for the LDCs and the fragile states.

**Figure 5.6 Costs of exports in fragile states, their sub-regions and LDCs, 2005-14**




*Source:* World Bank.

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Although the above findings tend to suggest trade costs are higher in fragile states, lending credence to the findings of Blomberg and Hess (2006), more analysis is required to see if the cost differences are actually not driven by the countries being landlocked. This is because if we take out landlocked countries from all the sub-regions, export costs are actually lower than the overall LDC average for all sub-regions, except for Central Africa, which is an outlier in any case.

## The changing structure of trade costs in the last decade

There has been some reduction in trade costs over the past ten years, although they are far limited compared to other countries, as pointed out by Arvis et al. (2013). Based on the review of a dozen of case stories submitted by the LDCs to the Third Global Review of Aid for Trade and an analysis of data published in the Doing Business Indicators (between 2007 and 2013) and the LPI (between 2007 and 2012), ITC (2013a) infers that LDCs, to their credit, have taken initiatives to address policy-induced barriers to reduce trade costs. It further shows that between these periods, the number of days needed for exports fell from 40 to 33 and the logistics performance indicators for the LDCs as a whole improved from 2.2 to close to 2.4. However, there were variations between the Asian and Pacific Islands LDCs and African LDCs and Haiti (ibid.).

Individual country performance on these fronts indicates that some LDCs are making considerably more progress as compared to others. The evolution of the indices (rather than the ranking, which is also affected by the number of countries chosen for the indicator) for the top ten LDC performers in 2014 shows that there has been some progress, although they have a long way to go in terms of improving their LPI (Table 5.3). The fact that the best performing LDC, Malawi, features only 73 in a list of 160 countries included in 2014, shows that LDCs will have to undertake significant and far reaching reforms to catch up with the rest of the world. It is also worth noting that out of the bottom ten countries, seven are LDCs.

It appears from the table that Rwanda, which achieved a change of 0.98 points in the Index, although starting from a low base, is a shining example worth highlighting. Also starting with a relatively low base, LDCs such as Malawi, Burkina Faso and Nepal, despite being landlocked, have also made significant progress in improving their LPIs. Such a jump in score is not possible in the case of developed countries, which already have a relatively higher score and are close to perfection. For example, Germany, the best performer in 2014, made a marginal improvement from 4.10 to 4.12 in the corresponding period.

**TABLE 5.3 Changes in the Logistics Performance Index for the top ten performing LDCs, 2007-14**

| Country | 2007 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Malawi** | 2.42 | - | 2.81 | 2.81 | 0.39 |
| **Rwanda** | 1.77 | 2.04 | 2.27 | 2.76 | 0.98 |
| **Cambodia** | 2.50 | 2.37 | 2.56 | 2.74 | 0.24 |
| **São Tomé and Principe** | - | - | - | 2.73 | - |
| **Burkina Faso** | 2.24 | 2.23 | 2.32 | 2.64 | 0.40 |
| **Senegal** | 2.37 | 2.86 | 2.49 | 2.62 | 0.26 |
| **Liberia** | 2.31 | 2.38 | 2.45 | 2.62 | 0.31 |
| **Ethiopia** | 2.33 | 2.41 | 2.24 | 2.59 | 0.27 |
| **Nepal** | 2.14 | 2.20 | 2.04 | 2.59 | 0.45 |
| **Solomon Island** | 2.08 | 2.31 | 2.41 | 2.59 | 0.51 |

*Source:* World Bank.

Based on the four categories of LDCs discussed in Section 2 above, if we look at the evolution of cost structure over the period of the last decade, it is clear that costs have been rising rapidly in the Central Africa region, followed by South Asia. As discussed, higher costs in these regions over the past decade can be ascribed to the presence of a large number of landlocked countries, including outliers like Chad and Afghanistan, which face higher initial costs that further increased in the past decade. That being landlocked adds to the trading costs is also proven by the fact it is this factor that contributes predominantly, if not exclusively, to the high initial as well as increased costs in mineral exporting LDCs (Figure 5.5) and fragile states (Figure 5.6).

Trade cost information gathered from 20 DTIS and DTISUs from across different sub-regions, shows that trade costs are not only changing in magnitude but also in nature. Table 5.4 provides the details of major elements of trade costs in the earlier versions of DTISs completed between 2002 and 2008 and the latest versions, including DTISUs completed between 2012 and 2014. However, problems such as transit, which are outside the control of the landlocked countries, are highlighted as challenges in both versions of DTISs in some countries. Another set of problems, which seems to persist despite its diagnosis in the previous versions of DTISs, is corruption, lack of competition in the transportation sector and complicated, non-transparent and lengthy procedures at the border.

## LDCs' PRIORITIES IN ADDRESSING TRADE COSTS: THEN AND NOW

As indicated in the different LDCs' DTISs, the nature of trade costs in LDCs over the past decade has varied to some extent, but there has been no drastic change in their orientation. In Table 5.5, on the basis of DTISs and DTISUs of 11 countries reviewed for the purpose of this chapter, we compile the priorities of the LDCs in relation to lowering trade costs for an earlier period (2002 08) and compare them to the recent period (2013-14).

This review shows that at the generic level a reduction in transportation costs, an improvement in logistics performance and enhanced border management were recurring themes during both periods. However, the major priority areas in transportation and logistics in the earlier versions of DTISs prepared between 2002 and 2008 include the issues of quality of road construction, allocating more resources for transport infrastructure, promoting competition in the transportation sector, controlling bribery and corruption and better handling and management of regional trade and transit traffic. Similarly, the major priorities identified in this period in border management include putting into place improved systems through enhanced transparency of various processes, implementing appropriate mechanisms for customs valuation, facilitating digital exchanges and enhancing the capacity of the border management agencies. Moreover, reducing duplications and achieving the harmonisation and simplification of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and increasing transparency were also priorities.

**TABLE 5.4 Evolution of trade costs in LDCs based on DTIs, 2002-14**

| Country | Major elements of trade costs (2002-08) | Major elements of trade costs (2012-14) |
|---|---|---|
| **Bhutan** | N/A | Transit problems; fragmented administrative processes; absence of telecommunications and data connection between clearance and inspection locations; and limited sharing of information between agencies |
| **Burkina Faso** | Transit; corruption; informal nature of trucking business; demand for dispensable fees imposed on trucking; and duplication of forms | Transit challenges; informal checkpoints and roadblocks; inadequate transport infrastructure; inefficient customs practices; corruption; trucking firm monopolies; and poor quality service in three transit corridors |
| **Burundi** | Absence of clear rules; limited capacity, corruption and inefficiencies in customs administration; poor condition and unreliable physical infrastructure; high transportation costs; and incompatibility of customs clearance procedures from intervening institutions | Poor infrastructure, including road network; inadequate computerization; underdeveloped logistics services sector; long customs delays; corruption; and high transportation costs |
| **Cambodia** | Opaqueness and limited capacity of customs administration; and high transportation costs. | Poor implementation of cross border procedures; checkpoints and informal payments at main trade corridors; monopolies of trucking firm; and insufficient logistics to support agricultural exports |
| **Haiti** | N/A | Reduced capacity of the international port due to the earthquake; absence of a single window to facilitate the issuance of registrations, permits, and certifications; and lack of a co-ordinated mechanism between government agencies at the border |
| **Lao PDR** | Underdeveloped and limited logistics industry, mostly operated by small, family run companies; time spent dealing with regulatory procedures; multiple steps involved in complying with trade regulations; weak and fragmented customs system; lack of infrastructure and capacity at border crossings; and administrative practices requiring applicants to stand in long queues or apply for formal appointments with the right officials | Complex trade procedures at the border requiring excessive documentation; lack of equipment and facilities to ensure the smooth and efficient administration of trade and customs procedures; informal fees at the border; small size of the local freight forwarding industry; poorly developed container transport network; underdeveloped river port facilities not suited to handle containerised cargos; and some cross-border points lacking basic facilities, such as working weighbridges and permanent paving |
| **Malawi** | Outmoded customs procedures and management practices, including lack of data on processing times and on volume of declarations processed at various entry points; inefficient and inadequate transport system; lack of liberalised trucking routes and restrictions on competition from international haulers; outdated customs legislation inconsistent with international and regional agreements; ineffective transit computerised system; poor communications infrastructure; corruption; lack of technical expertise; and poor condition of road networks | Limited transparency in the preparation of trade policy and its implementation; outdated technical regulations and their application at the borders; complicated border and transit procedures; limited competition in the transport sector; traditional fragmented markets of customs brokers; and cabotage restrictions for domestic road transport |

**TABLE 5.4 Evolution of trade costs in LDCs based on DTIs, 2002-14**

| Country | Major elements of trade costs (2002-08) | Major elements of trade costs (2012-14) |
|---|---|---|
| **Senegal** | Complicated and lengthy import procedures; corruption; irregularities and lack of data on release procedures by customs officers; inadequate customs information system; customs officers inexperienced in modern valuation techniques; and inadequate administrative capacity to implement trade policy | Poor road network and infrastructure leading to high transportation costs; multiplicity of customs related platforms and procedures; and customs fraud |
| **Sierra Leone** | Underdeveloped logistics and transport sectors; inexperienced customs officials and managers; lack of transparency and inconsistent application of the customs valuation system; lack of infrastructure to implement the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation; misuse of the customs role; lack of knowledge and skill in tariff classification; time consuming, costly and corrupt border clearance systems; limited clearing and forwarding companies and restricting legislation in place for clearing and freight forwarding activities to be carried out by national companies or individuals; and poor infrastructure coverage and quality (telecommunications and electrical power) due to the civil war | Poor infrastructure due to civil conflict; underdeveloped logistics services; increased transit time, particularly during the rainy season; lack of transparency in border post operations; arbitrary roadblocks/checkpoints and unlawful collections on transport routes; ineffective cross border trucking services and truck congestion and extensive delays at border posts due to a high level of bureaucracy; and high transportation costs |
| **Sudan** | Fragmented transport infrastructure due to internal conflict and geography; absence of logistics service providers; relatively disorganised clearing and forwarding industry; limited number of container handling facilities; inefficient rail services and infrastructure; lack of road maintenance; frequent delays in the port; customs bonds for transit goods required by the East African countries; and lack of a formal articulated plan for the modernisation of the customs general administration | Inefficient border agencies, including requirement to submit same information to multiple agencies; high transportation costs; poor co-ordination with neighbour countries to form regional corridors; and poor registration system for trucks |
| **Zambia** | Long clearance times; inadequate information sharing between all the border control agencies; unnecessary complicated procedures requiring redundant information, checking and physical inspection; inadequate use of risk assessment to reduce the proportion of goods being inspected; corruption; onerous transit trade procedures; and bad road network, as well as the failure to prevent systematic overloading of trucks | Non-transparent and unpredictable non tariff regulatory measures; excessive documentation requirements; lengthy administrative procedures; and rent seeking tendency amongst border agencies |

*Source:* Author's compilation based on DTIS and DTISUs.

The relatively newer versions of the DTIS (those finalised in 2013 and 2014, with most of them being updates) also identify similar priorities at the general level. However, within the transport and logistics domains, issues such as the management of transit corridors, the implementation of cross border transport arrangements for regional and transit traffic and improvement in port infrastructure feature prominently. In terms of improved border management, major priorities include a better management of infrastructure, the use of information technology – including the introduction of electronic clearance systems – the professionalisation of customs administration, the reduction of duplication, the increase in transparency of procedures and the fight against corruption. Some of the new priorities that emerge from the latest version of DTISs for the reduction in trade costs are addressing cross cutting barriers for infrastructure development, designing transport policies and regulations to strengthen market structures in the transport as well as the logistics sectors, modernising the regulatory frameworks and improving the collaboration among border agencies and with the private sector. This is more in line with the tendency among many developing countries towards focusing on the "software" of trade cost dynamics alongside the "hardware".

## Reforms undertaken

A closer look at reform measures undertaken by LDCs over the past decade in the indicators of trading across borders of the Doing Business Report shows that LDCs are undertaking far reaching and often sweeping reforms to improve their indicators as well as reduce costs. Our count shows that 21 LDCs undertook some reform measures to improve their ranking in cost of trading across border between 2006 and 2014. Some LDCs have undertaken many more reform measures than the global average number of reforms in this area, which is close to two. These LDCs are Benin (5), Madagascar (4), Rwanda (6) and Uganda (4) (World Bank, 2015a). A review of DTISs and other published documents reveals that reforms have indeed been far reaching. Select examples are as discussed below.

Burkina Faso has considerably improved the effectiveness of transport and logistics on the Tema Ouagadougou Corridor in the period from 2008 to 2012, and due to an increased transparency, informal payments dropped by more than 50%. In Cambodia, the simplification of licensing procedures, the elimination of unnecessary steps and documents and the introduction of time limits for the issuance of licences reduced trade costs for processed agricultural products by 30% by December 2014. Following the simplification of export procedures, the cost to obtain export licenses for milled rice was reduced by 28% – generating about USD 700 000 annually in savings for rice exporters (World Bank, 2015a). Similarly, the number of days required for the clearance of containers at the border was halved through the computerisation of customs operations using the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) and bringing the customs system into compliance with WTO obligations. As a result, the time to export decreased from 37 days in 2007 to 22 days in 2012, and the time to import from 45 days in 2007 to 26 days in 2012. Awareness programmes on trade facilitation for customs officials, Camcontrol, port officials and the private sector have further contributed to increased productivity at Sihanoukville Port from 10 containers/hour to 30 containers/hour (EIF, 2014).

In Lao PDR, opening Lao transit trade to all Thai truckers on the Vientiane-Bangkok Corridor reduced logistics costs by 30% (UNOHRLLS 2014). The launching of a trade portal in 2012 contributed to increased transparency and helped reduce trade costs. As a result, the clearance times for goods by non customs agencies have reduced by 42%, from five days in 2009 to 2.9 days in 2012. More importantly, this idea is being replicated by the Malawi DTISU (2014). At the same time, Myanmar and Lesotho are trying to replicate this model. For Sudan and Cambodia, the national trade portal is part of the recommendations going forward.

The introduction of ASYCUDA in Haiti in 2008 helped to significantly improve the logistics performance of the country, which resulted in Haiti moving from 123 in 2007 to 98 in 2010 in the LPI. In Liberia, the automation of the national business registry by the Ministry of Trade with the support of the EIF drastically reduced the time it takes to register a company, allowing Liberia to move up the in World Bank's Doing Business ranking from 167 in 2008 to 144 in 2014.

Malawi for its part decided in March 2013 to reduce the number of border agencies from 14 to 5, thereby significantly curtailing duplications and improving efficiency (Malawi DTISU, 2014). In Rwanda, TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) introduced, among other things, a one-stop electronic customs clearing system, thus cutting the time required to clear goods by 40%, or one full day, which brings Rwanda almost a day closer to the ports of Mombasa or Dar es Salaam. This has resulted in direct savings for businesses of around USD 8-17 million a year.

Sierra Leone rehabilitated 85 km of roads (76 km in Sierra Leone and 9 km in Guinea) along the Freetown-Conakry Highway and constructed a joint border post between 2009 and 2012 with funding from the European Union's in a bid to connect its closest neighbours along the Atlantic coastline. As a result of this infrastructure upgrade, transport costs and travelling time have been reduced by 30%, with trade volumes between Sierra Leone and Guinea expected to have increased significantly. Another major road project was the rehabilitation of 165 km of roads along the Masiaka-Bo Highway, which took place over five years from 2006. As a component of the Conakry-Freetown-Monrovia road, it also contributes to the regional connectivity of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone DTISU, 2013).

The establishment of a one-stop border post at Chirundu on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe, which uses a non invasive inspection scanner for pre-clearance, has led to a reduction in the average time spent by a truck at the border from seven to nine days to about three to four hours and an increase in the number of trucks passing through the border from an average of 1 800 to 2 000 per month in 2009 to 12 000 to 14 000 in 2012. These reforms resulted in average savings of about USD 20 million a month for the private sector. This is due to faster transit times since mid-2012 and an increase in trade tax collection at the Zambian side of Chirundu by more than 100% from an average of USD 10 million a month in 2009 to USD 20.3 million a month in 2012. Time saved at border, which is valued at USD 600 000 a day, further trickles down to transporters, brokers, traders, producers and consumers (TradeMark Southern Africa).

## DRIVERS OF CHANGE

Reducing trade costs is an agenda being pursued by all the countries regardless of their economic status; it is only that the focus has now shifted more towards host country barriers, border formalities and transport and logistics. The agenda for lowering trade costs is driven by the interplay of several factors. In the context of LDCs, based on the factual descriptions as well as the analysis presented above, the following can be considered as the major driver of change:

### Evolving dynamics in global trade

Pressures emanating from international trends, such as GRVCs, have also contributed to a change in perception as the countries now realise that they need to focus on the seamless movement of goods – both for exports as well as imports. Although limited in number, this issue came out clearly from the LDCs' responses to the questionnaire administrated by the WTO for the Fifth Global Review of Aid for Trade. Countries as varied as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Sierra Leone and Uganda thought that trade costs were important to access imported inputs. Some of these countries did emphasise the fact that increased trade costs on imported inputs eventually tax their exports.

Another path-breaking development that could have a significant impact is the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) agreed during the Bali Ministerial Conference of the WTO, which was eventually adopted in November 2014A number of initiatives such as the needs assessment exercise and the creation of national level co-ordination mechanisms have sprung up in LDCs, with some of them opting to utilise the EIF National Steering Committee (NSC) as the National Trade Facilitation Committee. Although LDCs can select themselves what they would like to notify as Category C measures, the TFA presents a landmark opportunity for the LDCs to initiate beneficial reform measures, which they would have undertaken anyway (see Chapter 4 for further detail). Moreover, availability of various financing facilities for the implementation of the Agreement means that LDCs are more likely to make use of such opportunities for this purpose.

**TABLE 5.5. Evolution of LDCs' priorities in relation to reducing trade costs, 2002-14**

| Country | Major priorities identified (2002-08) | Major priorities identified (2013-14) |
|---|---|---|
| **Bhutan** | N/A | Better management of border infrastructure at the major border points; increasingly using information technology for customs procedures; and building transit corridors |
| **Burkina Faso** | Instituting mechanisms for containing frequent road-side demands for bribes and unnecessary though legal fees imposed on trucking; modernising sealed container transport; and introducing competition in the transport sector | Reducing transport costs; creating a dynamic, equitable and professionalised customs administration; developing a common government and private sector vision to fight corruption; simplification and computerisation of customs procedures and operations; and increasing the availability of documents and international customs manuals |
| **Burundi** | Preparing an action plan on regional transit issues; designing a programme of action on customs tariffs and valuation; implementing a customs reform programme; finalising an accord on trade facilitation; and facilitating the digital exchange of data between agencies involved in trade facilitation | Improving logistics, customs modernisation and corridor management; reducing connectivity gaps in lagging regions; upgrading storage facilities; and creating a charter for cross-border traders to remove constraints faced by small traders and facilitate regional trade |
| **Cambodia** | Reducing the degree of unofficial interventions and increasing transparency to enhance customs efficiency; reducing institutional duplication; strengthening capacity in customs administration; and reducing the cost of transport by improving quality and reducing unofficial fees and charges | Simplifying and automating trade procedures and processes to decrease clearance costs and time; implementing customs practices conforming to WTO Customs Valuation requirements; increasing the transparency of customs tariffs and trade regulations; improving cross border procedures to support a full integration into the ASEAN; and eliminating checkpoints (and informal payments) along the main trade corridors |
| **Haiti** | N/A | Reconstructing the Port-au-Prince port and improving and maintaining the infrastructure |
| **Lao PDR** | Developing regulations to implement the new customs law; reforming the national customs administration; simplifying, modernising and automating border clearance procedures and data processing; strengthening and expanding anti smuggling programmes; licensing of customs brokers; piloting the gold card programme to expedite clearance procedures for approved traders; improving the single window operations in provinces; trade logistics development; developing standards/technical regulations; facilitating cross border trade; and simplifying or eliminating export/import licensing and indicative plans | Strengthening the capabilities of the National Trade Facilitation Secretariat and Trade Facilitation Division; mainstreaming trade facilitation across relevant line ministries and departments; continuing to develop additional functionality of the Lao Trade Portal to reduce transaction costs related to import and export; designing and implementing the national single window; exploring opportunities to reduce transport costs; developing private sector capacity to trade efficiently in compliance with rules and regulations; adopting and implementing the revised customs law to be consistent with WTO principles; and automating customs clearance procedures at major checkpoints |
| **Malawi** | Enforcing compliance mechanisms for harmonised transit fees; streamlining customs procedures and documentation; promoting infrastructure development; professionalising immigration personnel; establishing a standardised customs payment system; harmonising the national customs administration with regional systems and procedures; and more effectively implementing the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement | Reducing the processing fee for use of the Simplified Trade Regime (STR); implementing the Charter for Cross-Border Trade and identifying specific constraints impacting women traders; amending legislation to empower the core border agencies to perform cross border functions; introducing a national trade portal that contains all legally binding information on trade procedures; and identifying selected internal routes and reducing restrictions on foreign truckers delivering/collecting goods in Malawi |

**TABLE 5.5. Evolution of LDCs' priorities in relation to reducing trade costs, 2002-14**

| Country | Major priorities identified (2002-08) | Major priorities identified (2013-14) |
|---|---|---|
| **Senegal** | Enhancing efficient management of import procedures; improving customs valuation procedures; and improving management of duty-free imports for exporter schemes | Improving and maintaining the road network and infrastructure; reducing multiplicity of customs related platforms and procedures; and addressing customs fraud |
| **Sierra Leone** | Reducing clearance costs; increasing transparency; sensitising traders about applicable customs tariff rates and customs procedures; improving valuation procedures; building capacity of customs services; reducing cross border smuggling; upgrading transport infrastructure; encouraging private participation in building and operating ports and terminals and handling and storage facilities; improving coordination between various ministries and related agencies; training private sector transport actors; strengthening public-private dialogue in transport and trade facilitation, transit and border crossings; and developing cheap transport alternatives | Eliminating infrastructure bottlenecks and improving intermodal connectivity; improving the quality and operating environment of core logistics services to build efficient supply chains; building on progress made in customs and border management to boost revenue collection and efficiency in cargo clearing and transit; and introducing measures to better monitor cross-border trade and address challenges of informal traders to help bring them in to the formal sector |
| **Sudan** | Improving trade logistics services; reducing bottlenecks at Port Sudan; streamlining national customs procedures and harmonising them with WTO rules; simplifying and harmonising taxes, fees, and charges; eliminating measures that restrict exports; and introducing more uniformity and predictability into trade policies | Adopting improved mechanisms to ensure integrated border management; improving the existing one-stop service and continuing implementing the national single window; introducing a national trade portal for all legally binding information on trade procedures; revising requirements for obtaining a clearing agent licence; allowing self-clearing by importers; revising regulations for trucking and forwarding business; expediting the implementation of the agreed upon business plan for the rail network on the Port Sudan-Khartoum Corridor; building a bypass to Soba Dry Port or developing a new dry port north of Khartoum; and developing a comprehensive logistics strategy to implement the national transport master plan |
| **Zambia** | Upgrading equipment and infrastructure of the Zambia Revenue Authority; integrating border agencies; reducing border clearance times while ensuring integrity and increased compliance; implementing trade facilitation agreements; improving regulatory framework for transport/transit logistics/efficiency/ costs; reducing transit costs; accelerating investment in new transport infrastructure; and augmenting capacity in the transport industry | Developing a coherent logistics approach with the definition of a core strategic logistics network; linking a strategy to trade facilitation needs assessment as part of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement; designating an agency with overall responsibility for border co-ordination and management; prioritising the quality of service to major shippers and offering incentives for co-peration between local and cross-border railways; developing a clear logistics plans to integrate into potential regional supply chains; and implementing the charter for cross border traders |

*Source:* Authors' compilation based on DTISs and DTISUs.

## Rise of regional integration

Regional integration is burgeoning, and the pace is likely to increase regardless of the development taking place within the multilateral trading system. All LDCs are now party to regional trade agreements, and some of them have realised that regional integration can be a cushion against vulnerability associated with excessive dependence on countries outside of the region for their trade relations. At the same time, landlocked countries find it more convenient and cost effective to trade with their immediate neighbours where transit issues are not a problem.

Moreover, some of the reduction in trade costs can be more conveniently and economically achieved at the regional level rather than at the international level. Considerable evidence shows that trade could be expanded within existing regional integration schemes by relatively less costly and straightforward reforms, such as simplifying and reducing documentation requirements across borders, enhancing transparency, expediting the release of goods from customs, standardising trade-related regulations and improving border agency co-ordination within and among members of a common regional trading arrangement (Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu, 2008). This issue features prominently in some of the new versions of DTISs. Two noteworthy examples of regional endeavours to reduce costs are Sierra Leone and Zambia, which show that regionally-induced reform measures can have a multiplier effect on lowering trade costs.

## Analytical work

The past decade has witnessed a vast amount of analytical work that underpins the DTIS process, national trade policies and national export strategies, as well as various reports produced by multilateral institutions, regional economic commissions and not for profit foundations. Trade facilitation, which is a major constituent part of the trade cost universe, is included as a dedicated chapter or as a cross cutting issue in the new generation of DTISUs (e.g. Burkina Faso DTISU 2014, Burundi DTISU 2012, Cambodia DTISU 2014, Haiti DTIS 2013, etc.) or national export strategies (for example, the national export strategies of Gambia and of Malawi include trade facilitation as an important agenda).

These works have also contributed to the publication of the global ranking of trade costs as reflected in the World Bank's Doing Business Report and the LPI and the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report and Enabling Trade Report. These rankings have become powerful tools not only because of the carrot they offer to reformers but also the stick they provide to countries that maintain the status quo or regress. Despite their methodological limitations, as accepted measurements these rankings exert considerable pressures on the countries to reform, because as the organisation theorist Mason Haire once suggested, "What gets measured, gets done". Moreover, potential traders, lead firms in GVCs and foreign investors who wish to engage in business transactions with the countries included in these global rankings use this type of information to make their business decisions (see Kelley and Simmons [2015], for example), which provides a further impetus for reforms.

## Changing priorities and policies of governments

Trade is being increasingly perceived as a key instrument for achieving development objectives, including inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction in the LDCs. Given relatively strong government adherence to this agenda within the LDCs, countries are keen to take the necessary measures to expand and diversify trade, which offers a significant developmental spin off. It must be noted that one of the major objectives of the EIF is to ensure trade mainstreaming into the national development strategies as well as sectoral programmes and policies. For example, based on the EIF Annual Progress Report 2014, 82% of EIF countries have reached a "satisfactory" level of trade mainstreaming into their national development plans compared with 32 per cent in 2010, and 93% of EIF countries implementing "productive capacity building" projects have at least one productive sector that prioritises trade in its strategy (EIF, forthcoming).

Based on the limited response received from the LDCs on the WTO's Fifth Global Review of Aid for Trade questionnaire, one can observe the inclusion of this agenda in various policy documents, such as the DTISs of the governments in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

### Role of the private sector

The private sector in many LDCs is becoming increasingly aware of the significance of their involvement in issues such as private sector development, improving the business climate, trade policy and aid for trade. In some countries, various bilateral donors as well as multilateral agencies have been supporting private sector development and business climate projects, of which trade policy is a major constituent part. The private sector is represented in all the working groups that have been constituted and the public private dialogue fora that have been organised, which have helped enhance the private sector's capacities as well as expertise. Similarly, representation of the private sector in the National Steering Committee– the apex policy making body within the National Implementation Arrangements of the EIF – has been ensured in all the LDCs. This has contributed to building an active involvement of the private sector in the key decision making processes. Because private sector entities pay the price of higher trade costs, they tend to exert pressure on their governments to identify bottlenecks and undertake reforms aimed at reducing trade costs, as well as contribute to the reform process.

The success rate of programmes with the involvement of the private sector tends to be high. For example, in Bangladesh, the Dhaka Custom House Automation Project is a joint initiative of the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry and of DataSoft Management Services, which has brought together several public and private sector entities dealing with various trade-related services. It is anticipated that the implementation of the project may ensure doubling revenue within two years, reducing the cost of doing business by at least 70% and lowering customs processing time by 80%. It is also envisaged that the project will help to ensure the precise monitoring of international and domestic prices, enhance transparency, provide a level playing field for business and achieve better risk management (see Datasoft website for further details).

Similarly, the success of the one-stop border post established at Chirundu on the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe, as discussed above, is attributed to the involvement of the private sector right from the beginning of the initiative on both sides of the border. Likewise, in Bhutan, joint efforts by the public and the private sectors, including better cross-border co-ordination, is recommended by its DTIS in order to remove regulatory and other constraints and to facilitate trade and the movement of cargo along the Phuentsholing–Kolkata road Corridor (Bhutan DTIS, 2012).

### Global development discourse and initiatives

Recent development discourse, particularly after the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), has recognised the role of trade in promoting sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development. This is reflected in the LDCs' specific action plans, such as the Brussels Programme of Action, as well as the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPOA). These are further supported by the inclusion of trade as a priority issue in the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Increased focus on trade at the political level has not only influenced the priority setting of the governments as noted in 4.2.4 above, but also led to the creation of various initiatives aimed at addressing the challenges facing developing countries and LDCs in their pursuit of leveraging trade for economic development and poverty reduction.

This has led to the launch of various global initiatives and programmes aimed at building the trade capacity of developing countries in general and of LDCs in particular in the past decade. These include the aid-for-trade initiative of the WTO, the Standards and Trade Development Facility, the Trade Facilitation Facility and the EIF. The reduction in trade costs is one of the objectives of these initiatives, although they are not always explicitly mentioned.

Various regional initiatives, such as the TMEA (a multi-donor initiative which aims for an enhanced trade environment and has specific and measurable targets) and the Trade Hub Projects (A USAID-funded initiative that targets customs reforms and modernisation and trade facilitation, WTO compliance and trade costs reduction) have supplemented these global efforts aimed at reducing trade costs. Moreover, there are several other initiatives at the bilateral level – both traditional and with South-South donors. The existence of these initiatives has provided an incentive for the governments to undertake reforms to lower trade costs.

## AID FOR TRADE PROGRAMMES TO REDUCE TRADE COSTS

As discussed above, various trade capacity building initiatives have contributed to reducing trade costs in a number of LDCs, of which the aid-for-trade initiative is a prominent one. A rich body of literature has emerged in the areas of aid for trade in general and the role of these initiatives in reducing trade costs in particular. Although the literature is inconclusive, there is a general acknowledgement that support provided for trade policy and reform have been effective in reducing trade costs in developing countries because of its focus on "soft" infrastructure and investment in enhancing institutional quality (see, for example, Cali and te Velde [2009], Portugal-Pérez and Wilson [2010], Helble et al. [2012] and Massa [2013]). This finding is, however, not ubiquitously unambiguous, particularly when it comes to low income countries and LDCs. The reason for this is because the support towards strengthening institutional quality does not seem to produce the desired impact without addressing infrastructural or supply-side bottlenecks for which more and targeted aid for trade is necessary (see, for example, Busse, Hoekstra and Königer [2011], Vijil and Wagner [2012], Hühne, Meyer and Nunnenkamp [2013]).

### Aid for trade in numbers

Ever since the launch of the aid-for-trade initiative in 2005, aid for trade has not only been increasing but has also proven resilient to the shock emanating from the global financial crisis. This is not only true for commitment but also for disbursement. Going by the data provided by the OECD CRS, it appears that aid-for-trade commitment as well as disbursement nearly doubled between 2006 and 2013, posting growth rates of approximately 100% and 98% respectively (see OECD CRS database and Chapter 1).

Although the annual growth rate varied considerably, overall, there had been a fairly steady growth expect for 2011, when a slight dip of 5% was experienced on aid-for-trade commitment compared to 2010. This may be explained by the austerity measures pursued due to low growth in most member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. In 2012, the growth rate of commitment rebounded, although there was again a fall in 2013. However, what really matters is that the disbursement rate has remained consistently positive (ibid).

Aid-for-trade disbursement to LDCs has also been increasing in the past eight years; in fact, it has surpassed the growth achieved for total aid for trade. Compared to the 98% growth between 2006 and 2013 for overall aid-for-trade disbursement as indicated above, disbursements to LDCs increased by 104% during the corresponding period. The annual growth rate has been erratic not only for the LDCs but for the entire group of developing countries. Although the growth rate in LDCs declined in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and plummeted to 2% in 2012, it rebounded in 2013 (Figure 5.7). According to CRS figures, LDCs received the second highest share (27%) among various groupings, followed by lower middle income countries (34%).

**Figure 5.7 Disbursements, developing countries - LDCs, 2006-13**




*Source:* Authors' calculation based on the OECD-DAC aid activity database (CRS).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241270

However, what may be a matter of concern from a development perspective is the concentration of aid for trade, with the top ten countries receiving 63% of aid-for-trade resources and the bottom ten receiving only 2%. Although this might not be a major problem, because those countries at the bottom of the list are the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) with a limited population, the amount of resources LDCs are receiving comparable to their needs as well as absorptive capacity needs to be considered.

In order to observe the regional variation in aid-for-trade disbursement, we present the share of various groups of LDCs in the aid-for-trade disbursement over the past eight years for LDCs divided into nine sub-regions in Figure 5.8.

**Figure 5.8 Shares of aid for trade disbursement for nine LDC sub-groups, 2006-13**




*Source:* Authors' calculation based on the OECD aid activity database (CRS).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241288

According to Figure 5.8, two sub-regions – East Africa and South Asia – have accounted for a lion's share of aid-for-trade disbursement over the past eight years, with their cumulative receipt being 54%, of which 28% went to East Africa and 26% to South Asia. Other sub-regions were left with a total of 46% of aid-for-trade disbursement. Even within these two sub-regions, aid-for-trade support received by the countries varied significantly. What we present here are country specific pictures within these two sub-regions (Figures 5.9).

**Figure 5.9: Aid for Trade to East Africa and South Asia sub-regions (disbursements)**




*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241291

As can be seen from the figures above, there are a few countries receiving a higher share than the rest of the LDCs, and a much higher share than the LDC average tends to dominate. For example, in the case of East Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda receive more than the rest of the countries in the region. Similarly, in the case of South Asia, Afghanistan receives a significantly higher amount than the other LDCs, although the aid-for-trade receipt of Bangladesh is also much higher than the other two countries in the region and certainly much higher than the LDC average.

Finally, turning to aid for trade provided by the EIF, which takes the equity principle into account while providing catalytic resources, support is provided mainly under three broad headings. These are: 1) analytical work (pre-DTIS, DTISU and feasibility study); 2) institutional support (creation and strengthening of national institutional structure and trade mainstreaming support); and 3) building productive capacity (sector specific or cross cutting support in areas such as agribusiness, textiles and apparel, tourism, standards and trade facilitation). As of 3 May 2015, the EIF Programme had made a total allocation of USD 193 million, which represents 97% of the resources available in the EIF Trust Fund. Although 48 LDCs and three recently graduated countries have joined the EIF, institutional support (up to USD 1.5 million) has been provided to 37 countries and 36 incidents of productive capacity building support (up to USD 3 million per project) have been so far delivered in 27 countries (see EIF website for further details).

## LESSONS LEARNED

Based on aid-for-trade intervention on the ground, of which the EIF is an integral part, the following lessons can be learned with a view to addressing trade-related challenges facing LDCs in an effective and sustained manner:

**Analytical work:** Before starting any aid-for-trade intervention, it is necessary to conduct robust, evidence-based analytical work to understand the needs and priorities of the country as well as the trade related opportunities and challenges. It is equally important to understand reforms undertaken and the political economy aspect of reforms and aid-for-trade interventions already in place, as well as to identify gaps. The EIF helps countries to prepare DTISs, which also include priority action matrices, and update them at periodic intervals of three to five years. This comes as a handy tool for the respective government, other in-country stakeholders, the EIF, various bilateral, multilateral and regional donors and EIF partner agencies to design and sequence their interventions. This also contributes to ensuring that the aid-for-trade support is targeted to the needs and priorities identified by the EIF country.

**Institutional capacity:** Countries with better institutional capacity not only tend to set their priorities right but also utilise aid for trade effectively. If the institutional capacity is built and the government is committed to ensuring that benefits derived from the project are sustained, it is likely to contribute institutional, human and financial resources to sustain the gains. The EIF creates two types of institutional structures within the country that are vital for the building of trade-related institutional capacity. First, an NSC is created as the apex body to oversee the implementation of the EIF programme in the country. The NSC is normally chaired by a high ranking government official and comprises representatives of trade and other sectoral ministries, the EIF Donor Facilitator (DF), the private sector, civil society and the academic community. Second, a national EIF Focal Point, usually a senior bureaucrat from the Ministry of Trade, guides the functioning of an EIF National Implementation Unit, which is often housed within the ministry itself.

**Country ownership:** Commitment and ownership runs right from the highest level of political leadership to the street level bureaucrats. The private sector and civil society are necessary for any aid-for-trade intervention to succeed. If the stakeholders in the country are convinced that they own and lead the process and any outside intervention is only contributing to the agenda that they are pursuing, the chances of success are higher. An indicator of country ownership is the mainstreaming of trade into the national development agenda, as well as sectoral programmes and policies, which are successfully achieved by the EIF as noted above. Moreover, the EIF multi-stakeholder governance structure means that ownership from all the relevant stakeholders tends to be fairly strong.

**Time horizon:** While some reforms can be undertaken with a stroke of a pen, in others it takes time for the benefits to percolate down to the real users. For example, a customs reform programme, such as putting in place a single window system, does not bring immediate results because it is bound to face some teething problems due to the lack of capacity of the actors and operators to deliver and derive benefits, co-ordination failure and opposition by vested interest groups. Once these issues are resolved, which may take considerable time, benefits can be realised. Therefore, perseverance on the part of the stakeholders is extremely important.

**Resource requirement:** Since some of the measures aimed at addressing transportation and logistics problems are resource intensive and the domestic actors – i.e. the government and the private sector – alone cannot meet these costs, donors should contribute sufficient resources to help countries achieve desired results. If a donor is unable to support an initiative in its entirety, it would be advisable either to support the initiative through a consortium approach, with the participation of multiple donors, or to encourage the recipient country right from the beginning to leverage resources. Another alternative approach is to include challenge funds supported by donors that encourage more private sector participation in logistics and transport, as is happening in East Africa. This is an area in which the EIF has achieved mixed results and needs to scale up its work (Capra International Inc., 2104).

**Donor co-ordination:** This is vital to avoid duplication of funding as well as achieve synergy between the support provided by various donors. One of the objectives of the EIF is to ensure a co-ordinated delivery of trade related technical assistance, which is achieved through three different channels. First, the EIF encourages aid-for-trade support to be based on country priorities identified by the DTIS process. The various institutional structures created under the EIF are well informed about these priorities as well as support already provided by other donors. Second, the DF conducts regular consultations with other donors on the ground to co-ordinate the delivery of aid-for-trade support. Third, the DF, who is represented in the NSC, is abreast of the status of aid for trade received by the country in any given period.

**Political economy factors:** In any country, vested interest groups are present, trying to thwart reforms to protect the rent they are used to receiving. Therefore, when undertaking reforms these factors need to be taken into account either by creating an incentive structure such that vested interest groups do not oppose reforms or by convincing them of the long-term benefits of the reform, even if some problems are likely to occur in the short run. This is an area in which the EIF has yet to make inroads.

It needs to be noted that some of these lessons are intimately intertwined. For example, analytical work leads to mainstreaming, mainstreaming relates to ownership, ownership leads to leveraging, particularly through the contribution of domestic resources, and both of these elements contribute to sustainability.

## CONCLUSIONS

The LDCs' participation in global trade, including GRVCs, remains low. Average trade costs are substantially higher in LDCs. Such costs include those related to transport and logistics, onerous border procedures, weak policies and regulatory frameworks and a low capacity in meeting standards. They play a significant role in preventing LDCs from improving their productivity and competitiveness. As a result, LDCs are unable to realise their trade potential as a means to accelerate economic growth and development.

This is compounded by a combination of other inter related structural factors, which are pronounced in LDCs, such as poor levels of human development, high levels of export concentration and prominence of SMEs involved in trade that bear a disproportionate burden of trade costs. There are also other important factors, such as fragility and conflict, and those that are natural, which further disadvantage LDCs, such as being landlocked or being highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change and/or natural disasters.

There has been a shift in the prioritisation of addressing trade costs by LDCs, which reflects the evolving dynamics of global trade and the increasing focus on behind-the-border measures and the growing importance of regional integration. Furthermore, the private sector is more active in shaping country priorities in this area, and there is more access to analyses and data that help better identify such priorities. Finally, there is an improved alignment of aid-for-trade initiatives to address such priorities at the country level.

LDCs have been making progress in undertaking the necessary reforms to reduce their trade costs, of which there are clearly many good examples. However, there are variations among regions, and there is a need for more consistent performance at the country level. There is still much work to be done. Evidence based prioritisation should continue to underpin the reform agenda of LDCs, particularly the EIF's DTIS analytical work.

Aid-for-trade initiatives can play a particularly critical role in terms of financial assistance and technical capacity building and institutional support to help LDCs reduce their trade costs. Support provided for economic infrastructure and trade policy and regulations has been growing over the past eight years, with both of these categories exhibiting robust growth in the past two years. Literature on aid for trade shows that the initiative is contributing to a reduction in trade costs. Given the extensive needs of the LDCs and the significance of high trade costs, commensurate levels of AfT flows to LDCs must continue and also better target those LDCs that are in need the most. As the only global aid-for-trade programme focused on addressing the trade needs of LDCs, the EIF offers a unique opportunity for development partners to support and find ways to advance work in this area.

The impact of aid-for-trade intervention in the context of LDCs tends to be higher when it is underpinned by a robust and credible analytical work; where country ownership is high; when sustainable institutional capacity is built; where support is provided for a sufficiently long period; where diverse resources are tapped into and when a co-ordinated response from donors is achieved. Moreover, such intervention can be successful if political economy challenges are appreciated, mainstreamed and mitigated.

While all of the above are relevant for pursuing the agenda of lowering trade costs in LDCs, this can be bolstered by ensuring an increased participation of the private sector and the enhanced use of regional instruments and mechanisms. Finally, LDCs need to explore how they can leverage global development processes, including the Istanbul Programme of Action for LDCs (IPoA) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to support their trade related priorities in general and directly reduce trade costs to realise their overall vision of achieving inclusive and sustainable development.

## ANNEX 5A.1 Regional sub-groupings of the LDCs

| Sub-region | Country |
|---|---|
| **South Asia** | Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal |
| **South East Asia** | Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Timor-Leste |
| **Pacific** | Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu |
| **Caribbean** | Haiti |
| **Middle East and North Africa** | Mauritania and Yemen |
| **East Africa** | Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda |
| **West Africa** | Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Mali |
| **Central Africa** | Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Madagascar |
| **Southern Africa** | Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Zambia |

*Source:* African Development Bank <http://www.afdb.org/en/>; Asian Development Bank <http://www.adb.org/>; and Inter-American Development Bank <http://www.iadb.org/en>.

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# CHAPTER 6

# CONNECTING TO VALUE CHAINS: THE ROLE OF TRADE COSTS AND TRADE FACILITATION

*Contributed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*

***Abstract:*** *This chapter highlights the importance of trade costs for the participation of developing countries in Global and Regional Value Chains. It considers in particular the role of different trade facilitation aspects such as border procedures and quality of infrastructure and shows how developing countries can reduce trade costs through those two specific areas. It discusses then how regional co-operation can be an effective strategy to promote integration into value chains by addressing regional bottlenecks. In addition it reviews multi-country and regional aid for trade initiatives highlighting some of the projects which are yielding good results and others which have not seen as much progress.*

## INTRODUCTION

The internationalisation of production has given rise to complex cross-border flows of goods, know-how, investment, services and people, referred to as supply-chain trade. These chains can offer developing countries new opportunities to integrate into the global economy by allowing firms to join international production networks rather than having to build their own from scratch. They call however for a stronger focus on addressing policy and non-policy related trade costs so as to ensure that every stage of the production chain functions efficiently and that trade is as frictionless as possible.

The growing fragmentation of production across borders highlights the need for countries to have an open, predictable and transparent trade and investment regime as tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other restrictive measures affect not only foreign suppliers but also domestic producers. Success in international markets today depends as much on the capacity to import world class inputs as on the capacity to export. Barriers to imports of intermediate products increase the costs of production and reduce a country's ability to compete in export markets: tariffs and other barriers on imports such as inefficient border procedures are a tax on exports.

Multilateral and regional trade agreements can help firms enter and grow in GVCs if they are consistent with regional production networks. Gains will be greatest when more countries participate and intermediate inputs can be sourced globally. However, regional trade and investment agreements can also be effective if they help deepen integration by covering as many dimensions of GVCs as possible, including tariffs, technical measures, services and trade facilitation measures, as well as competition policy, investment, intellectual property protection and dispute settlement.

Many of the costs that affect the smooth connection of various parts of the chain often seem to transcend national borders. In both developing and developed countries, trade facilitation in its narrow (World Bank Logistics Performance Indicator for customs) or broad (infrastructure, IPR, broadband and electricity) definition seems to be an important determinant of GVC participation. With goods crossing borders multiple times as a result of enhanced GVC activity, trade facilitation has become central to the smooth functioning of GVCs. For this reason initiatives to enhance connectivity which are undertaken at the regional level can often be more effective in addressing such costs than purely national initiatives. In response, several aid-for-trade projects have targeted regional constraints and successfully improved regional economic co-operation.

## THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL DIMENSIONS TO VALUE CHAINS

The international fragmentation of production has enabled firms to participate in an increasing array of tasks scattered across diverse international locations. Participating in international value chains means being linked to activities such as farming, extraction of natural resources, research and development, different types of manufacturing, design, management, marketing, distribution or post-sale services through the process of value creation. However, the complexity of production is growing, and bringing a product from conception to end-use now requires not just co-ordinating activities across different sites but also seamlessly moving products between these. Trade costs are therefore key to the well-functioning of GVCs, as is born out in a recent empirical assessment of the relative importance of the different determinants of GVC participation (OECD, 2015).

### How do countries engage in GVCs?

Indicators of GVC participation distinguish between situations where firms use foreign goods and services as inputs into their exports (backward participation) and where firms supply intermediate goods and services for other countries' export activities (forward participation). Backward participation is measured as the share of foreign value added in country's gross exports, whereas forward participation is measured by the share in gross exports of domestic value added embodied in exported intermediate products, which are in turn used by firms in other countries to produce their own exports.

When added together (backward and forward participation) across different regions to form the GVC participation index (as shown in OECD [2015], factors behind the two types of GVC participation tend to be different but adding the two together in the GVC participation index provides a first pass indication of the overall GVC engagement of a country), a clear trend emerges, showing a growing participation in GVCs beginning in the early 2000s, especially by developing countries (Figure 6.1). Nevertheless, developed countries still exhibit, on average, higher participation rates, with European countries leading the way. Among developing regions, South East Asian (SEA) economies and those in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) show the highest rates of participation, while the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries also have relatively high participation ratios. In contrast Latin America (LAC), South Asia (SA) and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) trail behind but have seen their participation grow by 26%, 34% and 28% respectively between 2001 and 2011.

**Figure 6.1 Average GVC participation index by region over 1996-2011**




*Source:* OECD (2015).

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The GVC participation index in Figure 6.2 shows that there are significant cross-regional differences in the way countries integrate into GVCs around the world. Among developing countries South-East Asia is the region where the most comprehensive and deepest regional integration agreements can be found. It has the highest average share of intra regional GVC participation (58% in 2011 and 57% in 2001), which is even higher than for developed economies (48 %), usually well integrated with their neighbours.

In the rest of the developing world the share of intra-regional GVC participation is lower than extra-regional links. For example, in Latin America the share of intra regional value chain activity is roughly 20% over the period, while Europe and Central Asia comes next with a steady share of intra-regional participation (18% and 17% in 2001 and 2011 respectively). In Eastern and Southern Africa this share was 16% in 2011, down from 21% in 2001. The Middle East and North Africa, Western and Central Africa and South Asia lag behind with intra-regional GVC participation below 10% in 2011, though very slightly up from the values recorded in 2001.

These findings raise questions as to what determines these global and regional participation rates and the role of trade costs in impeding or further facilitating GVC activity.

**Figure 6.2 Average intra and extra-regional participation in GVCs across regions in 2011**




*Source:* OECD (2015), calculations based on EORA database.

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## What determines participation and what is the role of trade costs?

Understanding how a country integrates into production networks requires more than just looking at their relative participation rate. Indeed, larger countries tend to have lower rates of participation and this is often attributed to the fact that they have larger domestic markets from which to draw their intermediates from. Also, natural resource based economies, as well as the highly technologically developed ones, tend to be a source of intermediate inputs, albeit very different ones rather than international purchasers of these (OECD 2015). Therefore country specific characteristics are likely to be strong determinants of participation rate differences. To further investigate this issue, it is useful to first distinguish between sourcing foreign value added for exports (backward participation ) and providing domestic value added for partners' exports (forward participation) and then identify the different factors and country characteristics that determine such engagement. This makes it possible to disentangle the role that different factors play in determining participation, so as to gauge the relative importance of trade-related policies and therefore identify ways in which aid for trade, for example, can boost participation in production networks.

To shed further light on the importance of different determinants of GVC engagement the participation ratios (backward and forward) are analysed against a number of factors which have been posited in the literature to influence the degree and type of GVC integration and for which there exists data (OECD, 2015). Although the border is sometimes blurry, these factors can be broadly grouped into two categories: non policy factors – or factors that are not easily influenced by policy at least in the short to medium term – and policy factors reflected in measures such as trade and investment openness.

Figure 6.3 presents a decomposition of the policy and non-policy determinants of backward and forward participation respectively in developing regions. These are obtained by regressing the participation indicators against a set of structural parameters or non-policy characteristics that are hard to shape in short to medium run (such as economic size, level of development, share of manufacturing in GDP and distance to economic centres of activity) and policy variables (such as tariffs faced or charged, presence of FTAs and openness to foreign direct investment). The bars show how the predicted backward linkage (from the model) decomposes according to these structural and policy elements.

Clearly, structural characteristics of countries are the main determinants of participation – the size and geographical location of countries, as well as their manufacturing share in GDP explain most of the variation in participation rates but trade and investment policies also matter. Removing tariff barriers to trade is important since fragmented modes of production imply multiple border crossings and therefore exponential effects (OECD, 2013). But their removal may be a necessary albeit insufficient condition for further integration if products are held back at the border by onerous customs procedures or if burdensome rules of origin prevent regional cumulation.

One overarching question is therefore whether promoting regional integration should be a priority over reducing trade barriers with all trading partners and to what extent RTAs and other regional co-operation initiatives can play a role in enhancing participation at the regional level. Indeed, competitiveness is more strongly associated with global rather than regional sourcing of intermediate inputs, implying that regional initiatives aimed at facilitating access to intermediate inputs, while welcome, should not come at the expense of pursuing inputs sourced more globally (OECD, 2015).

Also, while some suggest that RTAs can enhance GVC activity (Orefice and Rocha, 2013 and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2012) others argue that this is not the case (see Menon, 2013 for the case of South East Asia) since FTAs are discriminatory by nature. The debate centres on the direction of causation – whether countries that already engage heavily in GVCs are more likely to sign RTAs or if it is the RTA itself that enhances participation – but one does not preclude the other. Not taking into account the fact that countries which are more integrated are also more likely to sign trade agreements can lead to biases in the attribution of the impact of FTAs on flows (see Lopez-Gonzalez, 2012 for a discussion). However, deep integration measures (WTO+) negotiated at the regional level, and which include trade facilitation measures as well as, competition policy, investment, intellectual property protection, services and dispute settlement do not tend to discriminate between firms (Baldwin, 2013), and therefore there remains a case for co-operating with regional neighbours on these issues irrespective of the debate on preferential liberalisation.

**Figure 6.3 Relative contributions of non-policy and policy factors in participation ratio**




*Source:* OECD (2015), estimations based on EORA database, see Annex E Table E.1.

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An open trade policy can help boost participation, and this is particularly important for countries in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa where the remaining tariff barriers are high and where regional integration is lagging behind and therefore a negative impact of trade policy is observed. An open investment regime is also key and is seen to play an active role in promoting GVC participation, but to identify the role of trade costs it is important to focus on other determinants of participation. In particular, it is the case that some determinants of trade costs are related to the so-called structural variables previously identified. That is to say that, for example, a country which is geographically remote is likely to face higher trade costs for both import and export. Similarly, levels of development correlate positively with infrastructure and therefore to better understand the role of these costs in determining participation separate regressions are needed. These are ranked by order of importance for GVC participation in Figure 6.4, which shows that in both developing and developed countries, trade facilitation in its narrow (World Bank Logistics Performance Indicator for customs) or broad (infrastructure, IPR, broadband and electricity) definition seems to be an important determinant of GVC participation. With goods crossing borders multiple times as a result of enhanced GVC activity, trade facilitation has become central to the smooth functioning of GVCs.

Recent OECD analysis (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2013; OECD, 2015a) which explores the different impacts of specific trade facilitation measures further shows that addressing procedural obstacles at the border can boost integration to value chains across all regions, not only for importing but also for exporting countries. The estimated results in the case of imports are not only important for the direct impact on imports themselves but also for the significant effects that this can have on the domestic market and the export competitiveness through the access to necessary imported intermediate goods. Improvements in the trade facilitation environment of developing countries are essential for increasing their export performance. Sector-specific analysis shows that these indicators are particularly significant for manufactured goods.

**Figure 6.4 The estimated impact of other policies on GVC integration**




*Source:* OECD (2015), estimations based on OECD TiVA database. See also Annex 6A.2.

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Hence the ability of economies to integrate efficiently into the global economy depends to a great extent on the quality of both hard and soft infrastructure, ranging from transportation, telecommunications and financial services to border processes, customs practices and the business and regulatory environments. A regional co-operation approach to tackling these costs is likely to be beneficial since regional trade and indeed trade with partners located outside the region will need to transit through neighbouring countries on its way to its users (firms or consumers).

## A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON TRADE COSTS

The ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database estimates that only 0-10% of trade costs are tariffs, while 10-30% correspond to natural trade costs (i.e. geographical and cultural factors). The remaining 60-80% relates to non tariff policy measures such as indirect costs of trade procedures, maritime connectivity and services, the business (regulatory) environment, currency fluctuations and the availability/use of ICT services (ESCAP, 2014). Cadot et al. (2015) found that SPS and TBT measures would increase import unit values by roughly 25% for food products. Figure 6.5 shows the *ad valorem* equivalent of trade costs estimated by Arvis et al. (2012).

**Figure 6.5 Trade costs across regions**




Note: Bars show *ad valorem* equivalents of trade costs calculated from Arvis et al. (2013) using the trade cost measure proposed in Novy (2013). Since the data is bilateral, here we show trade-weighted values per country for the year 2010.

*Source:* OECD (2015), calculations based on ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database.

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South East Asian (SEA) countries face the lowest costs among the developing regions under investigation, a factor which surely contributes to their impressive GVC integration. Although much of this might be due to non-policy-related factors, such as economies of scale in shipping (Haddad, 2007), it also reflects the important investment in the region in physical infrastructure. For example, Vietnam invests around 8-10% of its GDP in physical infrastructure (World Bank, 2010). The master plan on ASEAN connectivity, which explicitly aims to tackle trade facilitation issues, has also made an important contribution. It delimits a set of actions ASEAN countries have committed to implementing in view of enhancing connectivity, thereby supporting the goals of the EAC blueprint. In addition to its focus on upgrading physical infrastructure and multimodal transport systems, its institutional infrastructure dimension, with agreed frameworks on the facilitation of transit and inter-state transport as well as the national single window, is likely to bring about important efficiency gains. This not just in terms of connecting regional partners to each other but also in connecting these to other global poles of activity. This should help attract further investment (both domestic and foreign), thereby providing impetus for greater value chain integration.

**TABLE 6.1 Region by region trade-weighted trade costs**

| | E27 | ECA | ESA | LAC | MEN | NA | SA | SEA | WCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **E27** | 34.3 | | | | | | | | |
| **ECA** | 67.3 | 64.8 | | | | | | | |
| **ESA** | 112.0 | 146.0 | 103.7 | | | | | | |
| **LAC** | 109.5 | 158.4 | 186.2 | 93.6 | | | | | |
| **MEN** | 76.0 | 109.4 | 91.0 | 135.0 | 48.3 | | | | |
| **NA** | 65.5 | 102.6 | 125.0 | 92.3 | 72.2 | 14.8 | | | |
| **SA** | 94.8 | 136.5 | 161.9 | 183.8 | 60.8 | 88.6 | 92.0 | | |
| **SEA** | 88.0 | 119.5 | 155.1 | 127.9 | 69.4 | 71.9 | 103.6 | 68.8 | |
| **WCA** | 106.7 | 168.2 | 93.7 | 123.7 | 112.4 | 105.4 | 99.6 | 162.0 | 104.3 |

*Note: Figures show ad valorem equivalents of trade costs calculated from Arvis et al. (2013) using the trade cost measure proposed in Novy (2013). Data is trade-weighted average costs of trade by region for the year 2010.*

*Source:* OECD (2015), calculations based on ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database.

Table 6.1 shows intra- and inter-regional trade costs. Central Asia, which has relatively high costs for trading with other regions, has the lowest costs among developing countries for intra-regional trade (64.8). Investment in infrastructure and trade facilitation in South East Asia (SEA) has contributed to the low intra-regional trade costs (68.8), although distances also play a role since these are trade-weighted measures. Nevertheless SEA still has some way to go in catching up with the trade costs seen in the EU (34.3) or North America (14.8).

In contrast, South Asia (SA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), which spend much less on physical infrastructure and where regional co-ordination on trade facilitation is lacking, display high intra-regional trade costs (92 and 93.6 respectively). Here, investment in the maintenance and upgrading of existing and new infrastructure could provide an important boost to economic activity, particularly in countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan where the quality is lowest.

In sub-Saharan Africa, too, remoteness is a critical factor that impedes further GVC participation. Furthermore, the cost of trading across borders in Africa is substantially higher than in other regions: according to the World Bank Doing Business indicators, in sub-Saharan Africa it takes an average of 38 days to import and 32 days to export goods across borders (World Bank, 2012). Calculations of *ad valorem* equivalents of trade costs for each of the regions in our sample confirm the burden firms face in trading both outside and inside their regions: the cost of trading intra regionally in Eastern and Southern Africa and Western and Central Africa (103.7 and 104.3 respectively) is about twice, three and six times the equivalent cost of shipping goods within the Middle East and North Africa, the European Union and North America respectively (Table 6.1).

## Two important components of trade costs: trade infrastructure and trade facilitation

These findings are confirmed by the results of the OECD/WTO survey conducted for the Fifth Global Review of Aid For Trade (Table 6.2). Surveyed entities and countries, including ten regional economic communities or transport corridors and sixty-two developing countries, consider trade facilitation in the narrow sense (i.e. border procedures) is the most important source of trade costs for goods exports (83.3% of respondents), together with transport infrastructure (80.6% of respondents) and other non-tariff measures (79.2 % of respondents). Other types of trade costs such as tariffs or access to trade finance are reported as less important.

**TABLE 6.2 Question to Recipients of Aid for Trade on sources of Trade Costs: What are the most important sources of trade costs for the export?**

| Answer options | Goods | Services |
|---|---|---|
| **Border procedures (trade facilitation)** | **83.3%** | |
| Tariffs, fees and other charges | 51.4% | |
| **Non-Tariff Measures (including standards)** | **79.2%** | |
| **Transport infrastructure** | **80.6%** | **68.1%** |
| **Network infrastructure (ICT, power, telecoms)** | 55.6% | **77.8%** |
| Access to trade finance | 59.7% | |
| Other | 4.2% | 5.6% |
| Non-recognition of professional qualifications | | 44.4% |
| Restrictions on commercial presence | | 22.2% |
| Restrictions on movement of natural persons | | 44.4% |
| Poor regulatory environment for services | | 44.4% |
| Tariffs on product inputs (on computers for ICT services..) | | 19.4% |
| Low levels of skills in service sectors | | 43.1% |

*Source* : OECD/WTO aid for trade monitoring exercise (2015).

In the case of services export, transport infrastructure is still key for 68.1% of respondents, but the major impediment is network infrastructure (77.8% of respondents).

East Asia is frequently cited as an example for its success in decreasing trade costs. In terms of infrastructure quality, Malaysia and Thailand lead the way in East Asia (see Figure 6.6). China is a little behind but still ahead of many Asian countries. Unsurprisingly, given their lower level of development and late entry into ASEAN, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have the lowest quality of infrastructure in the region. The leading position of East Asia is clearly showcased in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) project, which includes some of the most effective facilitation mechanisms among all sub-regional arrangements within ASEAN (see Box 6.1). The GMS advances regionalism without hampering multilateralism because it is based on market and not institutional integration, along the lines of ASEAN's development of its free trade area based on an ambitious liberalisation programme in the context of open regionalism (Menon, 2005). Hence, the GMS and the other sub-regional groups are seen as building rather than stumbling blocks for ASEAN integration, with the GMS plan through 2022 aligning closely to ASEAN roadmaps.

**BOX 6.1 Greater Mekong Sub-region**

To counteract increasing income disparities and to realise a poverty-free and environmentally rich GMS, the ADB developed the economic corridor model, embedding it in the GMS programme. At the core of this model is the development of trans-boundary roads between major economic centres. On these roads are end-nodes and stepping-stone markets that connect remote and impoverished areas to economic hubs. Within the context of the GMS, economic corridors have succeeded in increasing agricultural growth in some Mekong provinces by upgrading roads in the east-west economic corridor and completing the Second Mekong International Bridge. In addition, the programme is now championing contract farming in Lao PDR for the Thai and Chinese markets (sugarcane, maize and cabbage). Through a leadership training programme for officials in the GMS, called the Phnom Penh Plan for Development Management, ADB has enhanced the capacity of middle- to high-level officials in areas related to competitiveness and inclusive growth.

*Source:* OECD (2014).

## Figure 6.6 Infrastructure quality in regions




*Source:* World Competitiveness indicators, 2010.

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The quality of infrastructure is below average in all countries of South Asia except Sri Lanka (see Figure 6.6), and this is likely to hamper integration not just domestically (i.e. connecting more remote regions) but also regionally and internationally. India's and Pakistan's performance stands, comparatively, between that of China and Indonesia, but the other South Asian countries are among the lowest performers in Asia, with landlocked Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal scoring particularly low.

In comparison to other developing regions, Latin American and Caribbean countries on average outperform countries in Africa and South Asia in both road and rail density. Even in comparison to SEA, countries in LAC have denser railway networks though sparser road coverage (World Bank, 2015). A caveat is that measures of road and railway densities are imperfect indicators of the quantity of transport services relevant for the development of cross-border linkages to the extent that they do not convey whether production centres are effectively connected to markets. The quality of the road network, proxied by the share of unpaved roads, in LAC is relatively poor when contrasted with other developing regions: almost 70% of the roads in LAC are on average unpaved, contrasting with less than 30% of the roads in SEA and MENA and less than 50 % of the roads in South Asia. Hence, half of countries are well below the average of the quality infrastructure index.

Remoteness in the case of Africa cannot only be thought of in terms of geographical distance; critical elements related to the quality of infrastructure exacerbate this. Figure 6.6 illustrates that, with the exception of South Africa and a few smaller partners, most countries in the region score below the world average (the zero line) in quality of infrastructure. Landlocked countries may be disproportionally affected by the unreliability of supply routes, as firms face high levels of uncertainty over the supply of inputs through other jurisdictions and their production costs. According to anecdotal evidence, firms in Burundi and Zimbabwe, for example, are forced to hold inventories of imported inputs covering up to one year of production to prevent stocking out.

### BOX 6.2 Transport in ECOWAS

**Road transport**

Assessments as of 2006 indicate that more than 80% (3 777 km out of the 4 560 km) of the Lagos-Nouakchott trans-coastal road had been completed. Similarly, 3 894 km of the Dakar-Ndjamena trans-Sahelian road, representing 87% of the total length of 4 460 km, had been completed. In 2012, ECOWAS and the People's Republic of China signed an agreement for economic co-operation. Part of the agreement covers the construction of a 2000 km long trans-West African coastal highway between Dakar and Lagos.

**Rail transport**

A loan agreement between ECOWAS and the AfDB for a feasibility study on a sub-regional railway master plan was signed in 2002. The 1178 km-long rail line, estimated to cost USD 58.9 billion, which is to link Nigeria to Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, has witnessed very slow progress. There are high expectations regarding the prospects of the project, which is considered as being capable of transforming the region's transport system through the introduction of new high-speed goods and passenger rail services. The project has potential for greatly enhancing the movement of goods and passengers, generating employment, increasing efficiency, reducing international trade costs and ultimately boosting intra-regional trade.

*Source:* OECD (2014).

Both ECOWAS and UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) have given special attention to integrating road transport in the sub-region. ECOWAS adopted a priority road transport programme (PRTP), which entails the facilitation of cross-border road transport and the construction of a trans-west African road network that includes the Lagos-Nouakchott trans-coastal and the Dakar-N'Djamena trans-Sahelian roads. Another phase targets vertical

interconnection of road segments (north-south) to link landlocked countries to coastal countries. Although yet to be completed, the West African road network is considered one of the most important achievements of the ECOWAS integration programme. The railway project in ECOWAS has been less successful. While the project has been backed by strong political will from the member countries of ECOWAS, it is less clear which donor agencies have committed to funding the project.

But decreasing trade costs is not only about trade infrastructures, it is also about facilitating trade procedures. As regards the disruptive impact burdensome border procedures can have on trade, the example of South Asia is quite revealing. The World Bank (2010) notes that for Nepal to trade goods with India it takes around 200 signatures while trading from India to Nepal requires around 140. But these bottlenecks are not exclusive to landlocked countries: in one important border point between Bangladesh and India, trucks are often required to wait over four days to cross the border (World Bank, 2010).

### BOX 6.3 Border post between India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan share an important border point at Attari-Wagah, which is the only land route for trade between the two countries. Although cross-border trade at this border point is confined to only 137 products mutually agreed between the two countries, the importance of this border point for improving their bilateral trade is well understood. India's major exports to Pakistan include soya meal cake, fresh fruits and vegetables, biscuits, fresh meat, cotton bales, household goods and polypropylene granules. On the other hand, India's major imports from Pakistan include gypsum rock, clinker, gypsum powder, salt, soda ash, dry fruits, caustic flake, dry dates, herbs, hydrogen peroxide, limestone, calcium, sugar and household goods. In 2012, the government of India established an Integrated Check Post (ICP) at Attari in Indian Punjab, bordering Wagah in Pakistan Punjab

The government of India has a dedicated 4 700 $m^2$ cargo terminal building, a 7 400 $m^2$ import warehouse, a 3 400 $m^2$ export warehouse and a 55 000 $m^2$ parking area for efficient cargo processing. It provides one-stop integrated facilities such as quarantine, isolation rooms, fumigation centres, a weighbridge, a public address system, boom-barriers, and dormitories. Similar facilities are being developed at Wagah, the Pakistan side of this border point.

According to the data provided by the Indian Customs, in 2012-13, the total value of imports through this border was USD 292 million (54% of India's total imports from Pakistan that year), against USD 161 million in 2011-12, while exports reached USD 509 million in 2012-13 (25% of India's total exports to Pakistan that year), as compared to USD 229 million in 2011-12. This increase in trade was mainly attributed to the establishment of the ICP. Traders indicated that the launching of the ICP has significantly reduced their trade transaction costs and provided a speedy clearance of consignments across borders.

This ICP can now handle ten times the number of trucks, and the cargo movement between the two countries is allowed for 12 hours a day, as opposed to eight hours previously. Traffic congestion is negligible since the token system for traffic clearance was introduced. In short, since the establishment of this ICP the number of trucks and the volume of exports and imports has increased substantially.

*Source:* OECD-WTO case stories (2015).

The potential impact of border performance on trade volumes, trade costs, and indicators of GVC participation can be assessed more rigorously using the Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs). These were developed by the OECD to help governments schedule and prioritise action in the policy areas covered by the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Covering 152 countries across income levels, geographical regions and development stages, the OECD TFIs provide extensive insights into regional performance.

Figure 6.7 provides an overall picture of trade facilitation performance across Asia, Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting the differences in the state of implementation of trade facilitation measures included in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and the areas where the most substantial improvements could be introduced. The most significant performance disparities among regions are in the areas of consultations and opportunities to comment, advance rulings and, to a lesser extent, the simplification and harmonisation of documents. Trade facilitation also has the potential to spur intra-regional trade. This proves to be another important insight as trade facilitation measures can act as a catalyst for consolidating regional production networks.

Consultations and opportunities to comment, together with the availability of trade-related information, the proportionality and transparency of import and export fees and charges, the automation of border processes and the streamlining of border procedures, are key sets of measures for developing the supply side (forward-type linkages) of the value chain activity or the reference country's export base (OECD, 2015a). On the other hand, advance rulings, the streamlining of border procedures and controls, the proportionality and transparency of import and export fees and charges, and the automation of border processes appear to encourage the most linkages on the demand side (backward-type linkages) of the value chain activity. These findings strongly highlight the importance of predictability and speed of the goods movement in shaping companies' sourcing decisions.

The OECD TFI analysis also points to a strong positive correlation between trade facilitation performance improvements on the one hand and participation in GVCs on the other. The impact of trade facilitation measures seems to be most significant when the value added originates in medium-low tech industries, such as mining and quarrying or basic metals sectors, or in high and medium-high tech industries, such as transport equipment, chemicals and electrical and optical equipment, while the destination sector belongs to high and medium-high tech industries. Sufficient and easily accessible up-to-date trade-related information, as well as simplified and internationally-harmonised documentary requirements, appear particularly significant in the case of foreign input sourcing for transport equipment, chemicals, and electrical and optical equipment.

**Figure 6.7 TFIs and geographic country groups**




Note: The TFI values range between 0 and 2, where 2 corresponds to the best performance. The values indicate the average TFI performance by country group.

*Source:* OECD, Trade Facilitation Index.

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OECD TFIs also make it possible to explore differentiated impacts of trade facilitation measures across selected regions and thus highlight differing priorities (OECD, 2013). Streamlining border procedures is the policy area that seems to matter most for enhancing trade flows and reducing trade costs in non-OECD Europe, all regions of Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean. On the other hand, what seems to matter the most in sub-Saharan Africa is the simplification of trade documents and in Middle East and North Africa the automation of border processes. The potential for comprehensive trade facilitation reform to reduce trade costs is 17% for sub-Saharan Africa, 16.7% for South Asia, 16.2% for Latin America and the Caribbean, 12.7% for non-OECD Europe and Central Asia, 15.9% for East Asia and 10.2% for Middle East and North Africa.

**Figure 6.8 Potential reduction in trade costs by regional grouping (%)**




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Index.

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## REGIONAL INITIATIVES ON TRADE FACILITATION

Trade-related infrastructure, trade facilitation and the creation of a trade-enabling environment are not only among the main hurdles to GVC integration identified by both economic analysis and surveys, they are central themes of the aid-for-trade initiative. They are often channelled through regional co-operation initiatives, intended to create trade and investment within regions, thereby resulting in the strengthening of regional production networks. The most obvious argument in favour of such initiatives to address trade costs relates to geography, given that many of these costs are determined regionally. Regional initiatives in this area include sharing of border facilities or regional harmonisation and co-operation to address duplication (arising because of differing standards across countries) and friction costs (for example, inefficient time usage because of repeated loading and unloading of commodities).

### Regional Agenda on aid-for-trade facilitation

As observed by Helble et al (2012), the share of aid-for-trade spending directed at trade facilitation in the narrow sense (i.e. border procedures) as compared to spending directed at infrastructure has hardly changed over time. However, significant heterogeneity can be observed across regions. Over 2004-13, the share of funding for trade facilitation varied from 1.2 % in SA to 12.3 % in SSA region (Figure 6.8). As regards infrastructure, most of the funding goes to transport, representing 95% in South Asia and East Asia. Support for communication infrastructure is greatest in East and South Asia the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

**Figure 6.9 Aid flows for trade facilitation and infrastructure from 2004-13 by regions**




*Source:* OECD based on OECD-DAC/CRS data.

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In Central Asia, most of the support goes to transport infrastructure projects. Among them a prominent project is a corridor development concept called Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC). A strategic framework for the Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation Program 2011–20 (CAREC 2020) was formulated at the end of the first decade of programme implementation in 2011 and translated the original programme goals into a more focused set of objectives (see Box 6.4). Strategies and action plans at the sector level have been refined to align with CAREC 2020, including lessons from implementation and responding to the changing environment. CAREC membership has expanded to include Pakistan and Turkmenistan.

## BOX 6.4 CAREC

In line with CAREC 2020, the CAREC Transport Sector Coordinating Committee (TSCC) and the Customs Co-operation Committee (CCC) have together been implementing the CAREC Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy (TTFS). The TTFS seeks to achieve three target outcomes: 1) competitive corridors across the CAREC region; 2) the efficient movement of people and goods through CAREC corridors and across borders; and 3) sustainable, safe, user-friendly transport and trade networks. The consolidated approach of the TTFS seeks to optimise the use of resources devoted to increasing the region's competitiveness and trade.

In 2013, a midterm review of the TTFS was conducted to improve the contribution of sector outputs to outcomes by re-examining their linkages. As early as 2012, 80% of corridor roads targeted in the TTFS 2008-17 to be in good condition by 2013 had already achieved the goal. In 2013, 1 312 km were built or upgraded, surpassing the 1 200 km target for the year; this also represents 17% of the total 7 800 km of corridor length identified for improvement by 2020. This achievement brought the cumulative completed length for 2008–13 to 4 970 km of road sections, which is equivalent to 85% of the 24 000 km targeted to be in good condition. The additional road length includes the Bishkek–Torugart Road section in the Kyrgyz Republic, the East–West Highway in Azerbaijan, the Western Regional Road in Mongolia and the Aktau–Beyneu Road in Kazakhstan. The regional Ulaanbaatar–Russian Border Road Rehabilitation Project was mostly completed and is open to traffic.

For railways, approximately 3 226 km, amounting to about 85% of the targeted 3 800 km, had been completed. In 2013, construction of the Atamyrat-Ymamanzar-Akina Railway (88 km) was initiated. In other transport sub-sectors, such as civil aviation, ports, and logistics centres, 13 projects were being implemented.

The resulting TTFS 2020, containing an implementation action plan for 2014–20, seeks to achieve the three original goals more efficiently and comprehensively. Completion of the six strategic multimodal corridors continues to be a priority. The TTFS 2020 also introduces corridor extensions that will 1) connect with seaports; 2) provide alternative routes along existing corridors; 3) increase geographic coverage and interconnectivity; 4) include a rail network, which is ideal for long-distance freight; and 5) establish intermodal hubs.

*Source:* OECD, 2014.

Infrastructure and trade facilitation elements may also be combined in regional projects, such as the TTFS in CAREC, which also includes a trade facilitation component managed by the Customs Co-operation Committee. The combined aspects of the project helped reduce the average clearance time at border crossings by 8%, or almost an hour, from 10.9 hours in 2012 to 10.0 hours in 2013 (CAREC CPMM Annual Report 2013). In particular, road border-crossing times shortened remarkably, from an average of 8.9 hours to 5.6 hours due to shorter durations across almost all corridors.

An African road project which sought to combine trade facilitation components with transport infrastructure components, but with less success, is the Abidjan-Lagos trade transportation facilitation project (ALTTFP), initiated by ECOWAS. ALTTFP is not only about improvement of the corridor's road infrastructure but also includes features such as co-ordination and corridor performance monitoring and evaluation. Eight indicators have been developed to measure the performance of the project. Interim assessment indicates that the project is proceeding gradually. However, it is confronted with implementation problems, particularly, insufficient country ownership of the project and problems relating to the data collection that would enable a better evaluation of performance.

Projects specifically focusing on trade facilitation are most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. Recently and in conformity with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) action plan, ECOWAS and UEMOA developed a regional Interstate Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme for West Africa (ISRTTFP-WA) (the EU has committed EUR 63.8 million to this project from the 9th European Development Fund [EDF] to finance technical assistance). It involves the following activities: simplification and harmonisation of road transport regulations, procedures and documents, the establishment of joint border posts along interstate corridors and the creation of observatories to identify and analyse abnormal practices which impede traffic fluidity on road corridors. While some successes have been achieved, the implementation of the transport facilitation programmes by member states has encountered many difficulties. An analysis of the extent of implementation by the ECOWAS Commission and USAID highlights a number of factors stalling effective implementation, including a low-level of promulgation of ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) protocols into national laws and insufficient publication of rules and procedures. Economic operators are thus not adequately sensitised to the conventions of the ISRT. Hence numerous checkpoints and non-tariff barriers due to uncoordinated procedures for goods and passengers continue to exist.

The ECOWAS Joint Border Posts (JBPs) have also created high expectations but still face important challenges due to the lack of funding for remaining JBPs and inadequate capacity and knowledge within member states to support ECOWAS in implementing JBP projects, as noted in the recent review of the project.

**BOX 6.5 Joint border posts in ECOWAS**

The programme includes the construction and equipment of JBPs, with scanners and weighbridges. Thus far, the Togo/Ghana and the Benin/Niger JBPs have been completed. Currently ongoing elements include the Nigeria/Benin, Benin/Togo and the Gambia/Senegal bridge. The latter two are being implemented by the African Development Bank. The three remaining JBPs that require funding include Elubo/Noé (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), Kouremale (Guinea/Mali) and Paga (Ghana/Burkina Faso).

The programme has also developed a generic regional text to guide the establishment and operation of JBPs in West Africa. The framework also includes a compendium of operational procedure manuals containing the step-by-step procedures governing each statutory border agency and customised to suit the situation of each border.

The JBP concept is based on the exchange of information and interconnection of customs administration systems. The use of ICT to ensure simultaneous inspection and border controls will be adopted. The World Customs Organization principles of integrated border management, single windows and risk management will be adopted and enshrined in the activities of border officials and agencies to minimise time and associated cost spent at borders. It also includes training of border control officials and sensitisation of users.

*Source:* OECD (2014).

The second most important recipient of aid-for-trade facilitation is Latin America. For instance, an international transit tool (TIM), in the form of an electronic system that efficiently manages goods in transit from Mexico to Panama, was implemented under the Mesoamerican Project and supported by the IDB (see Box 6.7). In Brazil, business and government co-operated to implement a foreign trade mapping process project to reduce behind-the-border barriers affecting trade in goods. The project, considered as a successful case of public-private partnership (see World Economic Forum "Enabling trade - catalysing trade facilitation agreement implementation in Brazil"), laid the basis for the implementation of Brazil´s single window. Brazil also intends to help undertake similar projects in Uruguay and Paraguay, providing technical and finance assistance.

**BOX 6.6 Brazil's foreign trade mapping**

Brazil's foreign trade mapping project was developed through a partnership of the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) and Aliança PROCOMEX (an alliance that involves companies and business associations to help modernise customs procedures in Brazil), with the Ministry of Finance (where the customs authority is located) and the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. The project involved undertaking a diagnosis of bottlenecks and elaborating recommendations to improve the import and export process. The results of the mapping were used by the government as a basis for the construction of Brazil´s single window.

The project set out to produce for the government a map of the import and export processes as implemented by customs, identifying systems, rules and opportunities to make clearance and release processes in Brazil more efficient. It also resulted in a list of recommendations from the private sector based on the above map and a blueprint of the areas that should be better designed and rules that should be changed, elaborated jointly between the government authorities and the private sector.

The project unfolded through 59 meetings between the administration and the private sector, which included 118 big companies involved in the trade process, as well as business associations of the most important sectors. The mapping of four processes has already been completed: land, sea and air transport export processes and temporary admission procedures. The mapping of sea, land and air transport import processes and of specific regimes' export processes is still ongoing..

*Source: OECD-WTO case studies, 2015*

On the other hand, South Asia hosted few assistance projects focusing on narrow trade facilitation, although it is an important beneficiary of infrastructure for trade facilitation. Nevertheless, the trade facilitation reforms introduced at the Attari-Wagah border point have played an important role in improving trade between India and Pakistan and changed the livelihoods of people living in the border areas (see Box 6.3).

## REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

As described above, regional aid for trade can significantly contribute to production networks and deepen involvement in value chains. The section below reviews regional actors and initiatives in favour of lowering barriers to the creation and expansion of production networks and of facilitating participation in value chains.

### In Asia

Through various waves of unilateral liberalisation and regional co-operation, East Asia has become more outward oriented and linked to global production networks. This success is the result of co-operation in the framework of ASEAN. The transitional ASEAN economics tend to place more value on regional co-operation and have received more national aid for trade funds, which has facilitated the improvement of trade and foreign direct investment links. The blueprint for the Asean Economic Community (AEC), adopted in 2007, was designed to mobilise resources needed to achieve its goals, which could also be translated into the post-2015 development agenda.

Effective implementation of programmes under the AEC blueprint is needed to keep ASEAN vibrantly integrated into the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. As a major facilitator of production networks in the region, the AEC will help link the region to global markets and thus provide employment in a context of open regionalism. This market-driven integration is now being fast-tracked by the intergovernmental decision to adopt an ASEAN charter, which has moved the association to a higher level of expected deliverables. However, some members are hesitant to pursue regional customs reforms (ASEAN single window, ASEAN customs declaration document and certificates of origin are slowly progressing); national-level aid for trade seems more effective and border administration across members is improving unequally.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been supporting trade-related activities since even prior to the aid-for-trade initiative, including cross-border infrastructural projects, trade facilitation and customs modernisation, export promotion and diversification and policy and institutional support for trade regimes. Until the AEC was launched in 2007, however, the ADB did not take a regional approach in its operations regarding transport and energy. Now it is aligning them closely with the implementation of the AEC, including stepped-up regional co-operation initiatives in diverse areas such as logistics, trade and economic corridors. The ADB supports also various ASEAN activities which are central to the programme-wide strategies of the sub-regional programmes (like the GSM project detailed above).

### In Latin America and the Caribbean

LAC countries have been incorporating trade facilitation measures through their regional initiatives and free trade agreements. Three-quarters of LACs preferential trade agreements (PTAs) include trade facilitation commitments. There is not one unique initiative grouping all countries as is the case with East Asia.

The framework agreement of the Pacific Alliance initiative includes a chapter on trade facilitation and customs co-operation, which contains trade facilitation provisions on the publication of information, advance rulings and procedures for appeal and review of administrative decisions, separation of the time of release of goods from the final assessment of customs duties and other fees and charges and the adoption of risk management systems. Moreover, the Pacific Alliance has been working closely with the private sector to incorporate the issues most important to Latin American businesses operating in the region.

Central American countries have put emphasis on harmonising customs processes and establishing the Central American Uniform Customs Code (CAUCC) and its regulations (RECAUCC), presently in their fourth version. This emphasis has accompanied notable advances at the domestic level, such as the foreign-trade single windows established in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama. These single windows link all agencies and government institutions responsible for foreign trade through a single point of contact and have boosted the facilitation of formalities for exports by reducing timeframes and costs.

The Mesoamerican Project focuses on trade facilitation and competitiveness and has developed initiatives like the International Customs Transfer for Merchandise (TIM) to facilitate the border crossing of goods by simplifying customs procedures, improving fiscal controls and traceability of commercial operations and implementing modern risk analysis systems (see Box 6.7). Similarly, in the Caribbean region the heads of state of the Association of Caribbean States created a working group on trade facilitation in 2014, and country customs offices in the region agreed to link their information systems and expand the TIM system.

**BOX 6.7 The TIM project**

The pilot programme, implemented in El Salvador, is ready for a large number of routes, customs posts and transit operations. However, according to the technical operations co-ordinator of the project in El Salvador, "not all countries implement the tool at the same pace." By December 2012, TIM operated from the southern border of Mexico to Panama and in some ports.

This TIM, launched in 2008 by the Inter-American Development Bank, also showcases how aid has been used to promote harmonisation of border processes. The project, which targets the El Amatillo border crossing between Honduras and El Salvador, implemented an electronic system with a single document for border transit used to simplify and harmonise time-consuming processes. An 87% reduction in El Amatillo border crossing times has been reported, achieving an average of eight minutes from 62 minutes previously, in addition to decreases in required paperwork. TIM has also improved the traceability of goods through the border, collection of tax revenues and risk analysis estimates. The project's success led to the initiation of similar projects at other border crossings within the region through additional funding of USD 950 000 to Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama.

The next phase of TIM, the Multimodal International Merchandise Transit (Pacific Corridor), includes Belize, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and the Colón Free Trade Zone in Panama. Co-operation for the project, supported by the IDB, started in 2012. The project is in its early stages as experts in the transit of goods are being contacted and hired. Co-ordination among various projects is important to achieve significant effects in integrating markets and, ultimately, in boosting exports and raising competitiveness. This is particularly true in this case as the latter project connects with the single-window interoperability project, whose purpose is to implement a single window to simplify trade procedures in Mesoamerican countries. The latter is in its early stages, at approximately 20% implementation.

*Source:* OECD-WTO Case studies, 2015.

The Inter-American Development Bank has supported integration since its inception, and through the Ninth General Capital Increase of the Bank (GCI-9) has strengthened this institutional priority by establishing a financial goal for 2015 of investing 15% of its loans in integration projects. This important mandate to stimulate the global and regional integration of LAC requires more creative and dynamic solutions. The IDB fund is the major aid contributor to the infrastructure sector in Latin America. Hence, the estimated cost for all investment in the Mesoamerican Project in energy, commercial facilitation and transport is approximately USD 3 billion. The aid-for-trade resources directly devoted to the Mesoamerican Project represent USD 13.3 million, including USD 10.8 million managed by the IDB.

## In Africa

There are a number of ongoing and planned multi-country and regional aid-for-trade projects in Africa. The projects are concentrated on the development of the transport networks, as well as facilitating movement of persons, goods and transport across countries of the sub-region. Many African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and governments have in recent years implemented trade-facilitation initiatives. Most of their efforts are focused on removing non-physical transport barriers along major transit corridors, especially those connecting landlocked countries to seaports.

COMESA put in place the Trade and Transit Transport Facilitation Programme – including customs modernisation and automatisation – and the Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS), an integrated transport logistics management tool for tracking transport equipment and cargo on railways, through ports (port tracker), on roads (road tracker), etc.

ECOWAS and UEMOA have a number of programmes in place, including the West Africa Road Transport and Transit Facilitation programme, aiming to improve the access of Burkina Faso and Malian to Ghanaian ports, and the Abidjan–Lagos Transport and Trade Facilitation programme, a joint UEMOA–ECOWAS programme. Its objective is to reduce trade and transport barriers in the ports and on the roads along the corridor by defining a mechanism that grants positive discrimination for compliant operators.

EAC, together with its partner states, is implementing the East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTF under the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordinating Authority). Its main objective is to reduce non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and the uncertainty of transit time along the key corridors.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has developed a Model Customs Act and has identified new trade corridors, some of which are already in the first pilot phase. In addition to the one-stop border post at Chirundu, efforts are under way to establish other posts between South Africa and Mozambique at Ressano Garcia/Lebombo and between South Africa and Zimbabwe at Beitbridge.

The AfDB has been closely involved in trade-facilitation activities. In March 2012 the AfDb established the Trade Fund (AfTra). AfTra is a trade-related, multi-million dollar technical assistance facility with the objective of accelerating the integration of Regional Member Countries (RMCs) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in regional and global trading systems. AfTra will notably focus on improving trade facilitation in RMCs and RECs: The fund will leverage technical assistance to support implementation of RMCs and RECs trade action plans. AfTra is currently one of the largest trade-related technical assistance financing facilities on the continent.

## CONCLUSIONS

As testified by the increasing involvement in GVCs of many developing countries, fragmentation of production and formation of GVCs offer new opportunities for their firms and workers. While the extent and nature of GVC integration as well as benefits deriving from it depend on several factors such as endowments, size and geographical location of an economy, they also depend on a number of trade and trade-related policy factors. In particular, low import tariffs, both at home and in export markets, engagement in RTAs and inward FDI openness can all facilitate GVC engagement.

Several other areas of economic and institutional development which matter for GVCs fall within the purview of the aid-for-trade initiative. Trade facilitation and quality of infrastructure, as well as other trade facilitation-related components (property rights, for instance), in particular, are estimated to have strong impacts on GVC integration, which in some cases can actually dwarf those associated with conventional forms of trade policy. The important estimated role of trade facilitation in particular is consistent with the responses to the 2015 WTO-OECD surveys and underscores the rising awareness among partners and RECs about the need to address trade facilitation issues to decrease trade costs and raise participation in GVCs.

There is room for improvement in this area. Africa, South Asia and Latin America are significantly lagging behind in terms of trade costs due to poor quality of infrastructure and also slow reform progress in improving trade facilitation aspects, such as border procedures.

Regional co-operation can be an effective strategy to promote integration into value chains and enhance regional integration, particularly by addressing bottlenecks that are regional rather than national in character. The responses to the 2015 WTO-OECD surveys confirm that actions have been taken in the key areas. The analysis of multi-country and regional aid-for-trade initiatives shows that some of the projects are yielding good results, while others have not seen as much progress.

One major challenge for the future is the need for better co-ordination at the regional level of infrastructure projects with narrow trade facilitation projects, as is done in GSM or CAREC. For instance, in SSA narrow trade facilitation projects are presently and significantly funded but transport and communication infrastructures are missing to make those trade facilitation projects really efficient and cut trade costs. Conversely, East Asia has been very efficient in trade facilitation programmes, supported in parallel by important hard infrastructure projects to increase not only the quantity but the quality of transport and communications.

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## ANNEX 6A.1 Drivers of participation by income group using EORA

**BACKWARD**

| | Total | | High-income | | Middle-income | | Low-income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I | II | I | II | I | II | I | II |
| Tariffs charged (weighted average) | -0.095[3] | -0.054[1] | -0.046 | -0.019 | -0.132[2] | -0.135[3] | -0.071 | -0.069 |
| | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.037) | (0.041) | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.047) | (0.052) |
| Tariffs faced (weighted average) | 0.084[3] | 0.082[3] | -0.266[3] | -0.251[3] | -0.004 | -0.005 | 0.067[1] | 0.066[1] |
| | (0.029) | (0.028) | (0.081) | (0.082) | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| Share of imports covered by PTA | 0.115[1] | 0.065 | -0.210[3] | -0.260[3] | 0.089 | 0.088 | 0.206[3] | 0.206[3] |
| | (0.061) | (0.058) | (0.063) | (0.069) | (0.185) | (0.185) | (0.063) | (0.063) |
| Share of exports covered by PTA | -0.088 | -0.086 | 0.018 | 0.092 | -0.044 | -0.041 | -0.06 | -0.061 |
| | (0.067) | (0.066) | (0.074) | (0.089) | (0.184) | (0.183) | (0.064) | (0.063) |
| Revealed FDI openess | 0.489[3] | 0.484[3] | 0.852[3] | 0.842[3] | 0.680[3] | 0.678[3] | 0.161[3] | 0.162[3] |
| | (0.053) | (0.052) | (0.056) | (0.055) | (0.162) | (0.163) | (0.050) | (0.050) |
| Share of manufacturing in GDP | 0.228[3] | 0.303[3] | 0.652[3] | 0.658[3] | 0.559[3] | 0.558[3] | -0.006 | -0.007 |
| | (0.070) | (0.075) | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.164) | (0.164) | (0.063) | (0.063) |
| Distance to closest manufacturing hub (log) | -0.07 | -0.121[1] | 0.449[3] | 0.391[3] | 0.05 | 0.078 | -0.292[3] | -0.290[3] |
| | (0.070) | (0.065) | (0.102) | (0.106) | (0.191) | (0.213) | (0.077) | (0.078) |
| Distance to economic activity (log) | -0.146 | -0.106 | -0.524[3] | -0.465[3] | -0.271 | -0.298 | 0.126 | 0.124 |
| | (0.094) | (0.089) | (0.084) | (0.091) | (0.261) | (0.281) | (0.115) | (0.115) |
| GDP (log) | -0.149[3] | -0.112[3] | -0.106[3] | -0.021 | -0.747[3] | -0.897[3] | -1.039[3] | -0.871 |
| | (0.012) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.043) | (0.133) | (0.274) | (0.219) | (1.061) |
| Population (log) | | -0.134[3] | | -0.438[2] | | 0.046 | | -0.019 |
| | | (0.018) | | (0.216) | | (0.058) | | (0.104) |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered standard errors (country and year) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 834 | 834 | 202 | 202 | 325 | 325 | 307 | 307 |
| R-squared | 0.336 | 0.368 | 0.859 | 0.862 | 0.338 | 0.338 | 0.315 | 0.315 |

*Note: 1, 2, 3 footnoted figures indicate countries in the first, second and third percentile of world GDP per capita distribution each year.*
*Source:* EORA Database.

## ANNEX 6A.1 Drivers of participation by income group using EORA

**FORWARD**

| | Total | | High-income | | Middle-income | | Low-income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I | II | I | II | I | II | I | II |
| Tariffs charged (weighted average) | -0.126[3] (0.030) | -0.116[3] (0.032) | -0.316[3] (0.060) | -0.206[3] (0.070) | 0.031 (0.042) | 0.036 (0.042) | -0.135[2] (0.065) | -0.107 (0.065) |
| Tariffs faced (weighted average) | -0.196[3] (0.033) | -0.196[3] (0.033) | -0.438[3] (0.107) | -0.380[3] (0.103) | -0.292[3] (0.056) | -0.291[3] (0.056) | -0.124[2] (0.049) | -0.129[3] (0.048) |
| Share of imports covered by PTA | 0.203[3] (0.060) | 0.191[3] (0.059) | 0.360[1] (0.188) | 0.159 (0.190) | 0.532[3] (0.131) | 0.533[3] (0.130) | 0.019 (0.076) | 0.012 (0.076) |
| Share of exports covered by PTA | -0.094 (0.064) | -0.093 (0.064) | -0.29 (0.198) | 0.009 (0.208) | -0.581[3] (0.133) | -0.586[3] (0.133) | 0.134 (0.097) | 0.121 (0.098) |
| Revealed FDI openess | 0.015 (0.047) | 0.014 (0.047) | -0.017 (0.056) | -0.058 (0.046) | 0.021 (0.138) | 0.025 (0.138) | 0.043 (0.186) | 0.05 (0.185) |
| Share of manufacturing in GDP | -0.173[3] (0.049) | -0.156[3] (0.054) | -0.189[1] (0.097) | -0.164[1] (0.085) | -0.059 (0.095) | -0.058 (0.095) | -0.259[3] (0.097) | -0.264[3] (0.097) |
| Distance to closest manufacturing hub (log) | -0.170[3] (0.061) | -0.182[3] (0.061) | -0.106 (0.126) | -0.340[3] (0.124) | 0.041 (0.141) | -0.011 (0.155) | -0.347[3] (0.091) | -0.329[3] (0.092) |
| Distance to economic activity (log) | 0.195[3] (0.069) | 0.205[3] (0.068) | 0.057 (0.118) | 0.293[2] (0.116) | 0.035 (0.173) | 0.085 (0.185) | 0.627[3] (0.124) | 0.607[3] (0.127) |
| GDP (log) | -0.056[3] (0.012) | -0.047[3] (0.012) | -0.069[3] (0.016) | 0.272[3] (0.054) | -0.119 (0.082) | 0.156 (0.195) | 0 (0.224) | 1.807[1] (0.971) |
| Population (log) | | -0.032[2] (0.014) | | -1.762[3] (0.288) | | -0.085[1] (0.048) | | -0.204[2] (0.097) |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Clustered standard errors (country and year) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 834 | 834 | 202 | 202 | 325 | 325 | 307 | 307 |
| R-squared | 0.147 | 0.149 | 0.315 | 0.389 | 0.24 | 0.244 | 0.147 | 0.153 |

*Note: 1, 2, 3 footnoted figures indicate countries in the first, second and third percentile of world GDP per capita distribution each year.*

*Source:* EORA Database.

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## ANNEX 6A.2 Policy-related drivers of value-added flows in a gravity setting

| | | Value-added flow | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Total** | **High income** | **Developing** |
| Unit Labour Costs (OECD) | Coefficient | -0.007 | -0.002 | |
| | Std Error | (0.007) | (0.012) | |
| | Coefficient partner | -0.033[3] | -0.039[3] | |
| | Std Error partner | (0.007) | (0.012) | |
| | Observations | 54 360 | 44 352 | 2 070 |
| | R-square | 0.156 | 0.161 | 0.417 |
| Product Market Regulation (OECD) | Coefficient | -0.031[3] | -0.107[3] | -0.038 |
| | Std Error | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.054) |
| | Coefficient partner | -0.005 | 0.023[2] | -0.049 |
| | Std Error partner | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.033) |
| | Observations | 36 072 | 21 456 | 6 660 |
| | R-square | 0.119 | 0.163 | 0.107 |
| Logistics Performance Index (customs) (World Bank) | Coefficient | 0.076[3] | 0.081[3] | 0.070[3] |
| | Std Error | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.012) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.030[3] | 0.017[3] | 0.038[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.008) |
| | Observations | 109 314 | 68 472 | 40 842 |
| | R-square | 0.097 | 0.147 | 0.09 |
| Tax rate (total) (World Development Indicators) | Coefficient | 0.055[3] | -0.007 | 0.01 |
| | Std Error | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.009) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.010[2] | 0.012[3] | 0.005 |
| | Std Error partner | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| | Observations | 108 522 | 68 022 | 40 500 |
| | R-square | 0.099 | 0.146 | 0.09 |
| Access to loans (index) (World Economic Forum) | Coefficient | -0.004 | -0.001 | 0.031[1] |
| | Std Error | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.017) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.004 | -0.005 | 0.016 |
| | Std Error partner | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.011) |
| | Observations | 73 746 | 46 854 | 26 892 |
| | R-square | 0.096 | 0.147 | 0.09 |
| Intellectual property protection (index) (World Economic Forum) | Coefficient | 0.065[3] | 0.079[3] | 0.098[3] |
| | Std Error | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.018) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.031[3] | 0.018[3] | 0.043[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.011) |
| | Observations | 73 746 | 46 854 | 26 892 |
| | R-square | 0.098 | 0.15 | 0.092 |
| Quality of Electricity supply (index) (World Economic Forum) | Coefficient | 0.048[3] | 0.103[3] | 0.050[3] |
| | Std Error | (0.005) | (0.010) | (0.014) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.045[3] | 0.030[3] | 0.065[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.011) |
| | Observations | 73 746 | 46 854 | 26 892 |
| | R-square | 0.098 | 0.15 | 0.092 |
| Broadband subscription (per '000) (ITU) | Coefficient | 0.056[3] | 0.069[3] | 0.062[3] |
| | Std Error | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.019) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.027[3] | 0.012[2] | 0.043[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| | Observations | 136 782 | 88 416 | 48 366 |
| | R-square | 0.104 | 0.139 | 0.095 |

## ANNEX 6A.2 Policy-related drivers of value-added flows in a gravity setting

| | | Value-added flow | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Total** | **High income** | **Developing** |
| Technical occupations (share) (ILO) | Coefficient | -0.017[3] | -0.029[3] | 0.011[2] |
| | Std Error | (0.003) | (0.008) | (0.005) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0 |
| | Std Error partner | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| | Observations | 104 940 | 59 778 | 28 440 |
| | R-square | 0.104 | 0.131 | 0.09 |
| R&D expenditure (World Development Indicators) | Coefficient | 0.031[3] | 0.022[3] | 0.046 |
| | Std Error | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.047) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.021[3] | 0.004 | 0.052[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.009) |
| | Observations | 103 608 | 72 234 | 31 374 |
| | R-square | 0.109 | 0.146 | 0.098 |
| Tertiary graduates (share of workforce) (World Development Indicators) | Coefficient | 0.018[3] | 0.027[3] | 0.003[1] |
| | Std Error | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.029[3] | 0.036[3] | 0.023[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| | Observations | 93 366 | 64 926 | 20 970 |
| | R-square | 0.112 | 0.127 | 0.122 |
| Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (World Bank) | Coefficient | -0.037[3] | -0.001 | -0.018 |
| | Std Error | (0.012) | (0.026) | (0.021) |
| | Coefficient partner | -0.028[3] | -0.012 | -0.054[2] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.023) |
| | Observations | 23 886 | 14 256 | 9 630 |
| | R-square | 0.117 | 0.198 | 0.105 |
| Infrastructure, availability and quality (Composite Index based on World Development Indicators) | Coefficient | 0.062[3] | 0.090[3] | 0.087[3] |
| | Std Error | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.015) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.033[3] | 0.020[3] | 0.045[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.011) |
| | Observations | 73 746 | 46 854 | 26 892 |
| | R-square | 0.098 | 0.151 | 0.092 |
| Institutional quality (Composite Index based on World Development Indicators) | Coefficient | 0.028[3] | 0.047[3] | 0.080[3] |
| | Std Error | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.011) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.015[3] | 0 | 0.032[3] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| | Observations | 189 432 | 102 924 | 55 926 |
| | R-square | 0.093 | 0.135 | 0.086 |
| FDI restrictiveness Index (OECD) | Coefficient | 0.031[3] | 0.101[3] | -0.046[3] |
| | Std Error | (0.004) | (0.009) | (0.014) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.013[3] | 0.037[3] | -0.027[2] |
| | Std Error partner | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.011) |
| | Observations | 127 728 | 74 592 | 34 704 |
| | R-square | 0.105 | 0.145 | 0.094 |
| FDI restrictiveness Index *without FDI openess in the main specification (OECD) | Coefficient | 0.039[3] | 0.015[3] | -0.003 |
| | Std Error | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.009) |
| | Coefficient partner | 0.029[3] | 0.035[3] | 0.008 |
| | Std Error partner | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.009) |
| | Observations | 135 522 | 98 046 | 37 476 |
| | R-square | 0.102 | 0.13 | 0.104 |

*Note: 1, 2, 3 footnoted figures indicate countries in the first, second and third percentile of world GDP per capita distribution each year.*

*Source:* OECD TiVA database.

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# CHAPTER 7

# HOW AID FOR TRADE HELPS REDUCE THE BURDEN OF TRADE COSTS ON SMEs

*Contributed by the International Trade Centre*

***Abstract:*** *Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent the backbone of economic activity in both developed and developing country economies. SMEs tend to be less productive than large firms, and the productivity gap is particularly pronounced in developing countries. Evidence shows that SMEs that are integrated in global markets – whether directly or indirectly – are more productive than those that do not participate in trade. Integration into global and regional markets is thus likely to contribute to closing the productivity gap between SMEs and large enterprises, with positive repercussions on the inclusiveness of growth.*

*SMEs suffer disproportionally from trade-related fixed costs, which create a bias in favour of large firms that find it easier to overcome fixed costs. A reduction of fixed costs to trade can therefore contribute to making trade more inclusive. Survey evidence reported in this chapter shows that costs related to access to information, access to trade finance or regulatory burdens are particularly important for private sector activity. In order to design effective solutions to reduce relevant costs, in particular those occurring at the border, collaboration between the public and the private sector is useful.*

## INTRODUCTION

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are integral to economic development, particularly in LDCs, and are an essential component of inclusive, sustainable development. In most countries, SMEs represent well above 90% of all private enterprises and over 60% of employment. As such it is fair to say that they represent the backbone of economic activity in most economies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the health of an economy's SME sector is a good barometer of the well-being of a country's economy.

Evidence shows that SMEs are in general less productive than large firms and pay lower wages. But the size of the productivity gap between SMEs and large firms differs across countries and tends to be larger in the developing world. This productivity gap is likely to be a determinant of economic and social cohesion within an economy, which is likely to determine income distribution and the probability of SMEs to grow.

SMEs are by definition small, yet how small they are differs across countries, with the overwhelming bulk of firms being micro-firms in much of the developing world. Some countries, especially LDCs are characterised by a so-called missing middle, i.e. the absence of a healthy segment of middle-sized enterprises. This again may imply that large firms remain largely unchallenged by internal competitors, which may open the door to inefficiencies and non-competitive behaviour.

SMEs that are either indirectly or directly integrated into regional or global markets tend to be more productive and larger in size than SMEs that do not trade. The relationship between trade on the one hand and productivity and firm size on the other hand is multifaceted and multidirectional, with more productive firms finding it easier to trade, which in turn contributes to productivity increases. Lower trade costs can therefore contribute to higher integration of SMEs in regional and global markets and to productivity increases among SMEs, with positive effects on inclusive growth.

### What is an SME?

The term SME encompasses a broad spectrum of definitions which vary across countries and regions. International organisations and financial institutions use their own guidelines for defining an SME. However, almost all definitions are based on some combination of the number of employees, turnover and assets. Regarding the maximum number of employees, the World Bank applies a cut-off value of 300 employees per firm, the Inter-American Development Bank a value of 100 employees and the Asian and African Development Banks a value of 50 employees.

Definitions also vary widely across countries and do not necessarily follow the expected pattern that richer countries allow for higher maximum numbers of employees. This is, for instance, reflected in the following Table 7.1 based on Gibson and van der Vaart (2008). It shows that In Viet Nam, companies with up to 300 employees qualify as small and medium sized, whereas in Norway firms with more than 100 employees are considered large.

**TABLE 7.1 Maximum number of employees according to national SME definitions, selected countries.**

| Country (ordered by per capita GNI) | Maximum no. of employees to meet SME definition | Country (ordered by per capita GNI) | Maximum no. of employees to meet SME definition |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Norway** | 100 | **Viet Nam** | 300 |
| **Switzerland** | 250 | **Bangladesh** | 100 |
| **Brazil** | 100 | **Ghana** | 100 |
| **Thailand** | 200 | **Tanzania** | 20 |
| **Moldova** | 250 | **Malawi** | 50 |
| **Egypt** | 50 | | |

*Source:* Gibson and van der Vaart (2008).

## How do SMEs perform?

The literature suggests that SMEs tend to be less productive than large companies, partly because they tend to be engaged in more labour-intensive sectors and do not benefit from economies of scale (Wymenga et al. 2011). This is especially true in developing countries, where advanced manufacturing techniques may not be used due to insufficient financing, a poor regulatory environment or other market failures. Lower productivity is born out in the statistics presented in Table 7.2, where the share of employment and the contribution to GDP are shown for a select number of countries. In most cases, the share of employment is higher than the share of GDP, implying the average productivity of an employee working for an SME is lower than that found for large firms. An exception is the United States, where employees working for SMEs appear to be as productive as those working for large firms.

**TABLE 7.2 The importance of SMEs for trade and economic activity**

| Country | Share of firms (%) | Share of employment (%) | GDP Value Added (%) | Share of SMEs Exporting (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Brazil** | 99.9 | 77 | 61 | 11 (S) |
| **Canada** | 99.7 | 60 | - | - |
| **Chile** | 98.9 | 80 | 25 | 15 |
| **China** | 99.0 | 73 | 60 | 40-60 (M) |
| **Columbia** | 96.4 | 84 | - | 20 |
| **EU** | 99.8 | 70 | 61 | - |
| **India** | 95.0 | 80 | 40 | 32 (M) |
| **Japan** | 99.0 | 72 | 52 | 14 (M) |
| **Mexico** | 99.8 | 74 | 52 | - |
| **New Zealand** | 99.8 | 75 | - | - |
| **Sweden** | 96.3 | 60 | 57 | 24 (M) |
| **Taiwan** | 96.3 | 80 | - | 56 (M) |
| **US** | 99.9 | 50 | 50 | 31 (M) |

*Note: SME share of firms, employment and GDP; fraction of SMEs engaged in export activities (M) and (S) denote data for manufacturing and services data only.*

*Source:* OECD (2014).

The productivity differences between small and large firms tend to be more pronounced in developing countries than in industrialised countries. OECD-ECLAC (2013) reports that in Germany the productivity of small firms is around 70% of the productivity of large firms. In Argentina, in contrast, the productivity of small firms is less than 40% that of large firms, and in Brazil that percentage is below 30%. In some countries, the productivity gap between small and large companies is substantial. In India, for instance, enterprises with more than 200 employees are ten times more productive than enterprises with five to 49 employees (Abe et al., 2014). SME productivity also differs widely across Asian countries, with labour productivity in Indonesia being double that of India and Thailand being more than double that of Indonesia (Abe et al., 2014).

Smaller and less productive firms may find it harder to connect to global markets. The heat charts in Figure 7.1 below reveal that small firms with high turnover and high exports exist (notably in the services industry), but that it is much more frequent for exporters to have a size of around 100 employees (red dots are at a value of two on the horizontal axis). This evidence based on data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys is in line with findings from more sophisticated empirical studies showing that exporters tend to be larger in size and more productive than firms that do not trade (e.g. Bernard et al., 2007).

**Figure 7.1 Firm level turnover versus number of employees: densities according to export status**




*Source:* ITC calculations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey data.

## Why trade-related fixed costs matter more for SMEs

The existence of trade-related fixed costs is likely to be one of the main reasons why smaller, less productive firms find it difficult to export. Indeed, in Melitz's (2003) seminal paper, trade-related fixed costs create a wedge between larger and smaller firms, as only the former manage to make profits while paying the fixed costs to export. Those firms that manage to export are more productive at the outset but become even more productive thanks to their ability to export.

The finding that fixed costs disproportionally affect SMEs is also reflected in case studies and business literature. Lattimore et al. (1998) cite evidence indicating that, in 1994-95, SMEs bore around 85 % of the regulatory compliance burden, while their share in GDP was only around 30%. Unlike large companies, most SMEs do not possess in-house trade or international departments with experts who know how to efficiently overcome relevant trade costs. SMEs tend to have limited resources and a lower threshold to absorbing risks, especially when operating in intensely competitive markets (OECD, 2006). In addition, the fact that SMEs tend to trade smaller quantities implies that fixed trade costs often make up a larger share of the unit cost of their goods and services when compared to rivals exporting larger volumes.

Trade-related fixed costs therefore greatly matter for SMEs and may hamper their opportunities to increase productivity through trade. SMEs are therefore likely to be among the main beneficiaries of efforts to address such costs in the context of aid for trade.

## THE PRIVATE SECTOR VIEW ON TRADE COSTS

As part of the monitoring and evaluation exercise conducted under the Fifth Global Review of Aid for Trade, private companies were asked about their experience with trade costs and about their priorities for future trade costs reductions, notably in the area of border procedures. Responses were received from 521 firms, of which 103 were large firms (>250 employees), 94 medium sized (between 50 and 250 employees), 161 small (between 10 and 50 employees) and 158 were micro firms (less than 10 employees).

When asked about their experience with trade costs over the past five years, a relatively positive picture arises, in the sense that few respondents had observed a deterioration of the situation. The responses were similar for companies of different sizes.

**Figure 7.2 How have the following aspects of trade costs evolved over the past five years?**




*Source:* ITC Monitoring Survey (2015).

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In this survey, a distinction was made between the costs firms have to incur to gain information on procedures and regulations and costs they have to incur to overcome non-tariff measures and regulatory burdens. The latter refers to costs to actually meet standards and regulations and costs incurred to prove that those standards and regulations are met, i.e. so-called certification costs.

Companies were also asked in which aspects of trade costs they would most value improvement. Respondents were asked to indicate the three factors of highest priority. Findings are reflected in Figure 7.3 and are grouped by respondents' size, with SMEs and large firms being reflected separately.

The following results are worth highlighting:

- The top priority for improvement for both large firms and SMEs is access to information about export opportunities. This reflects that exporters first need to be able to identify potential buyers before concerns about bottlenecks for the delivery of goods or services enter into the picture.
- The need for improvements in access to information on export opportunities has a significantly higher weight for SMEs (over 60% of responses) than for large firms (over 40%). More generally, the responses of large firms are relatively equally distributed across different aspects of trade costs, while the responses of SMEs are clearly concentrated around three top priorities.
- For SMEs, access to trade finance is the second most important priority for improvement and access to information about procedures and regulations is priority number three. For large firms, access to information about procedures and regulations weights second and improvements in tariffs fees and other charges weights third.

**Figure 7.3 What are the three factors in which you would most value improvements: SMEs versus large firms**




Note: SMEs are defined as firms with less than 250 employees. The chart reflects responses of 418 SMEs and 103 large firms.
*Source:* ITC Monitoring Survey (2015).

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- For both SMEs and large firms, costs related to access to information on processes and regulations are highlighted more frequently in the survey than costs to actually overcome regulatory burdens. This is in line with findings from more in-depth surveys on non-tariff measures conducted by the International Trade Centre [ITC] in recent years as described in the following section.

Exporters were also asked about the relevance of different aspects of border procedure facilitation for their performance. Questions and related explanations followed closely the terminology of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Figure 7.4 illustrates the findings, again decomposed in findings for SMEs and findings for large firms. When it comes to border procedures, differences in views between SMEs and large firms are less apparent than in the case of the more general trade costs reported in Figure 7.4.

Large firms and SMEs identify the same four priorities when it comes to improvements in border procedures:

i. Publication and availability of information regarding clearance for exporting and importing is ranked first by SMEs and second by large firms.

ii. Transparency of controls and inspections ranks second for SMEs and first for large firms.

iii. Consultations on new regulation regarding border processes and rules ranks third for SMEs and fourth for large firms

iv. The efficient release and clearance of goods ranks fourth for SMEs and second for large firms (with same number of responses for large firms as the option "publication and availability of information regarding clearance for exporting and importing").

It is also worth noting that strengthening the business voice in the design and implementation of border procedures ranks as a fifth priority for SMEs.

**Figure 7.4 What are the three factors related to border procedures in which you would most value improvements?**




Note: SMEs are defined as firms with less than 250 employees. The chart reflects responses of 418 SMEs and 103 large firms.
*Source:* ITC Monitoring Survey (2015).

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## Non-tariff measures as obstacles to trade: a private-sector perspective

Recent decades have witnessed a significant reduction in tariff barriers to trade, notably thanks to different multilateral trade negotiation rounds and a multitude of regional and bilateral trade agreements. Trade barriers for manufactured goods, for instance, have decreased from an average of 40% at the end of the 1940s to an average of 4% in 2009 (Love and Lattimore, 2009).

Obstacles to trade, however, continue to exist but now take more frequently the form of non-tariff measures (NTMs). While some NTMs have been suspected of being of a protectionist nature, many of them are motivated by the increasing demand for protection of consumer health and safety and the environment, which translate into sanitary and phytosanitary measures, traceability requirements and other regulations. Some are also the consequence of the increased number of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, which, in the absence of a proper customs union, may lead to challenging rules of origin frameworks.

While NTMs are usually the same for all exporters, their impact can vary significantly across businesses. Compliance with regulations and certifications require specific suppliers and services (for instance, suppliers of non-toxic inputs and testing laboratories) that may not exist in close vicinity of some companies. In addition NTM-related costs often take the form of fixed costs and are therefore likely to affect SMEs disproportionally. It may even happen that standards increase the exports of large companies at the expense of exports of smaller companies, as shown by Anders and Caswell (2007) when assessing the effect of the adoption by the United States of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) standard on food imports.

**TABLE 7.3 List of surveyed countries**

| Sub-Saharan Africa | Middle East and North Africa | Asia | Latin America and Caribbean |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Egypt | Bangladesh* | Colombia* |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Morocco | Cambodia | Jamaica |
| Guinea | State of Palestine | Indonesia | Paraguay |
| Kenya | Tunisia | Kazakhstan | Peru |
| Madagascar | | Sri Lanka | Trinidad and Tobago |
| Malawi | | Thailand* | Uruguay |
| Mauritius | | | |
| Rwanda | | | |
| Senegal | | | |
| Tanzania | | | |

*Note: *Results for Colombia, Thailand and Bangladesh are not reflected in the analysis.*
*Source:* ITC (2015).

Assessing the trade effects of NTMs with traditional empirical methods and using trade statistics is notoriously difficult. To complement ongoing efforts in this direction, ITC has in recent years undertaken a series of comprehensive surveys to collect information about NTMs as perceived by companies in developing countries.

Information about NTMs has been classified based on the international taxonomy of NTMs jointly developed by a Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) with minor adaptation to the context of a business survey. In addition to identifying the type of measure that is perceived as an obstacle, the survey identifies the institution that applies the problematic measure and whether the problem stems from the measure itself or from the procedure to demonstrate that the company complies with it. In the latter case, the NTM is classified as a procedural obstacle. The analysis below is based on data for 23 of the 26 countries for which data have been collected and processed (see Table 7.3). In total, 11 567 companies agreed to participate in phone screen interviews.

**Figure 7.5 Exporters affected by Non-Tariff Measures-related obstacles, by sector**




*Source:* How companies experience non-tariff measures – Survey-based evidence from developing countries, ITC (2015).

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The evidence reported in Figure 7.5 suggests that fresh food and agriculture is the most affected sector on average in the 23 countries covered by the surveys, followed by the sector of processed food and agro-based products. Manufacturing sectors, notably electronic-related sectors, are less affected. The count of NTMs is based on the number of NTM cases reported by companies where issues related to different products or different measures reported by one single company have been considered as different NTM cases. When aggregating or averaging, individual countries have been given the same weight.

The type of burdensome NTMs also differs across sectors, as illustrated in Figure 7.6. Burdensome NTMs applied at the destination and reported by exporters of food and agro-based products primarily concern conformity assessments and technical requirements, while exporters of manufactured products are mostly affected by rules of origin.

**Figure 7.6. Types of burdensome Non-Tariff Measures applied by partner countries by sector**




*Source:* How companies experience non-tariff measures – Survey-based evidence from developing countries, ITC (2015).

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Figure 7.7 illustrates how the perceptions of NTMs differ according to firm size. The figure shows the percentage of firms of different size categories that reports at least one NTM as a trade obstacle. The left-hand panel illustrates that 48% of SMEs report that their business suffers from at least one NTM. This percentage stands at 42% for large firms. The higher figure for SMEs turns out to be mainly driven by micro and small firms as illustrated in the right-hand panel of the figure. A full 54% of micro-firms report they suffer from at least one NTM, and 48% of small firms do so.

**Figure 7.7 Exporters affected by Non-Tariff Measure-related obstacles, by company size**




*Source:* How companies experience non-tariff measures – Survey-based evidence from developing countries (a company is affected by NTMs if it reports at least one NTM-related obstacle), ITC (2015).

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The survey responses of medium-sized firms, instead, are similar to those of large firms: 42% of medium-sized firms indicate that their business suffers from at least one NTM. In this context it needs to be highlighted, though, that the definition of medium sized applied in the chart does not necessarily correspond to what national definitions consider medium-sized. Indeed, in some of the survey countries – like Egypt, Malawi and Tanzania – companies with over 50 employees would be considered large.

Comparing the distribution of NTM cases by destination markets provides insights into the difficulty to comply with such measures in different markets. Figure 7.8 illustrates that the frequency of burdensome NTMs is highest for agricultural exports to OECD countries. This, however, partly reflects that OECD countries are also the main destinations of agricultural exports from the surveyed countries.

**Figure 7.8 Share of cases of burdensome non-tariff measures versus share of exports across trading partners, by sector**




Note: The bar chart plots for both the agriculture and the manufacturing sector the share of NTM cases for measures applied by partner countries against the estimated share of exports of the surveyed countries to their regional partners and the rest of the world (developing and OECD countries). Export shares are calculated excluding minerals and arms. Only NTMs reported by exporters are considered.

*Source:* How companies experience non-tariff measures – Survey-based evidence from developing countries (a company is affected by NTMs if it reports at least one NTM-related obstacle), ITC (2015).

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The most surprising finding in Figure 7.8 is probably the high incidence of burdensome NTMs among partners within RTAs. When taken proportionally to trade flows, NTMs are more frequently reported as a burden for exports to an RTA partner than for exports to an OECD partner. The difference is even more striking when comparing exports to RTA partner with exports to other developing partners. Trade with other developing partners is higher, but the incidence of burdensome NTMs is lower. These findings call for a deeper analysis of the design of NTM-related aspects of RTAs involving developing countries and of the implementation of those RTAs.

Implementation is indeed an issue as evidenced when looking into procedural aspects related to NTMs. When asked whether burdens from NTMs arise mainly because measures are too strict or because of procedural obstacles related to proving conformance with the NTM, procedural obstacles turn out to be more important than the design of NTMs. This is in particular the case in the manufacturing sector where 58% of firms report that NTM-related costs arise from procedural obstacles (Figure 7.9).

**Figure 7.9 Reasons making Non-Tariff Measures burdensome for exporters, by sector**




Note: The charts present the types of NTM-related obstacles faced by exporters of surveyed countries for agricultural and manufacturing products. It shows that 65% of NTMs on agriculture (left panel) and 77% of those on manufacturing products (right panel) are considered burdensome because of procedural obstacles.

*Source:* How companies experience non-tariff measures – Survey-based evidence from developing countries, ITC (2015).

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Survey answers make it possible to distinguish between NTM-related burdens originating within the exporting country and those originating in the partner country. Most procedural obstacles appear to originate in the exporting country as illustrated in Figure 7.10. Such obstacles are most frequently associated with time issues, payments and the administrative burden associated with NTMs.

**Figure 7.10 Procedural obstacles related to Non-Tariff Measures**




Note: The bar chart presents the types of procedural obstacles associated with the NTMs reported by surveyed countries' exporters (including both measures applied by the home country and those imposed by partner countries).

*Source:* How companies experience non-tariff measures – Survey-based evidence from developing countries, ITC technical paper (2015).

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## ADDRESSING OBSTACLES TO TRADE FOR SMEs: FINDING THE BUYER

The discussion above has shown that exporters face a multi-stage challenge when trying to serve customers abroad. First of all, they need to be able to find buyers and to understand their demand. Indeed, access to information about export opportunities figures first as the most prominent factor in which exporters would value improvement. Only once hypothetical buyers have been identified, the challenge of actually delivering goods and services to those buyers becomes an issue.

The survey discussed below revealed that access to information about export opportunities is the factor in which enterprises most value improvement. This is in particular the case for small and medium-sized enterprises, as over 60% of SMEs indicated that improved access to information about export opportunities is their top priority.

Different private and public sector institutions have traditionally taken responsibility for providing access to export related information to producers. They will be referred to in the following as Trade Support Institutions. Their role is particularly important for pioneer exporters.

### Trade Support Institutions: A myriad of different set-ups

Trade Support Institutions enable and encourage firms to engage with and survive in international markets. These institutions are typically export orientated, but as importation has become a key ingredient of successful trading the focus of TSIs has grown to cover all aspects of global trade including investment. The definition of TSIs covers many institutions which may differ immensely in function, form and funding. However, TSIs can be easily placed into one of three categories: general, sector-specific or function-specific (See Figure 7.11; Skidmore, 2013).

**Figure 7.11 Description of Trade Support Institutions**


*Source:* ITC (2013).

General TSIs include trade promotion organisations, investment promotion organisations, trade-related government ministries, chambers of commerce and economic development agencies. As such, they are some of the largest TSIs, with some of the widest mandates for promoting trade, and often derive their funding from public sources, even if the management of those funds are administered in partnership with the private sector. General TSIs are often portals for the latest market intelligence and also run technical assistance programmes. For example the International Trade Centre's Market Analysis Tools, which offers the latest information on standards and certification requirements, tariff and non-tariff measures, as well as trade flow data, helped to generate an additional USD 126 million dollars of exports in 2014 (See the aid-for-trade case story No. 54, "Market intelligence: ITC market analysis tools help generation of over USD 126 million dollars in goods and services exports").

Sector-specific bodies include exporter associations, trade associations, sector chambers and other sector-based bodies. They are typically smaller in size and scope than general TSIs but often provide highly specialised information and know-how on the sector concerned.

Finally, function-specific TSIs provide services which facilitate the actual process of exporting (or importing) for firms. Function-specific TSIs include export and credit financing bodies, standard and quality agencies, export packaging institutes, training institutions and trade and law arbitration bodies. In short, these TSIs may be seen as supplying services to the firm, or trust to foreign consumers and intermediaries, who may have little knowledge of the exporting firm or its product.

In a recent survey, carried out by the ITC for the Fifth Global Review of Aid for Trade, 24 TSIs were asked which three areas they would most value improvements in for their clients (Figure 7.12). The results show that access to information about export opportunities came top, followed by access to trade finance and access to information about procedures and regulations. In addition, TSIs were asked to identify the three most important articles in the Trade Facilitation Agreement (Figure 7.13). Publication and availability of information regarding clearance for import and export came first, with business voice and transparency coming second and third respectively.

**Figure 7.12 Components of trade costs in which trade support institutions would most value improvements**




Note: TSIs were asked ask to identify up to three factors they would most value improvements in.

*Source:* ITC Monitoring Survey (2015).

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From these results, it is clear that TSIs are most concerned about market failures to do with lack of information. These findings are in line with those of a similar survey conducted by ITC among TSIs during its WTPO-conference in Dubai in October 2014. Since providing access to information is widely accepted as a public good, these results stress the importance of efforts by TSIs and technical assistance efforts trying to strengthen TSIs.

It is also striking that the answers provided by TSIs in this survey are very well aligned with the answers provided by private enterprises. This suggests that TSIs may well play a useful role as an intermediary between the private and the public sector, notably when it comes to contributing to the reduction of trade costs.

**Figure 7.13 Factors related to border procedures in which trade support institutions would most value improvements.**




Note: TSIs were asked ask to identify up to three factors they would most value improvements in. Roman numerals indicate the relevant Trade Facilitation Agreement article.

*Source:* ITC Monitoring Survey (2015).

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## Providing access to information and assisting pioneer exporters

The economic justification for TSIs rests in the theory of asymmetric information, sunk costs for pioneer exporters and other market failures. Problems of asymmetric information arise from a firm's need to identify partners, suppliers and distributors. TSIs can help address this problem by facilitating forums and networks in which firms can easily identify suitable counterparts. Sunk costs in the context of pioneer exporters are costs associated with the gathering of foreign market information related to consumer preferences, business opportunities and quality and technical requirements, among other things. These activities require substantial investment, and the possibility of competitors acquiring this information directly or indirectly with little or no investment of their own acts as a deterrent to new entrants into export markets (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997). Therefore, TSIs often provide market intelligence as a public good, as well as providing a host of other services (see Figure 7.14 for an overview).

Since TSIs cover a wide range of institutions, it is difficult to assess their effectiveness. However, over the last decade, a number of studies have investigated the effectiveness of TSIs (e.g. Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton, 2006; Copeland, 2008; Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton 2009; Martincus et al. 2010). These studies tend to focus on a subset of trade support institutions, the so-called Trade Promotion Organisations (see Figure 7.11). A related branch of literature assesses the effect of foreign embassies and consulates (e.g. Rose 2005; Creusen and Lejour, 2013) on exports and finds significantly positive effects of the establishment of a first foreign mission in a country on bilateral trade.

**Figure 7.14 A list of services a Trade Support Institutions might offer**




*Source:* http://www.intracen.org/itc/trade-support/developing-a-service-portfolio/

The study by Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton (2006) reveals a positive relation between the size of TPO budgets and exports (see Figure 7.15). Controlling for other effects that could drive the relation (e.g. per capita GDP), Lederman (2009) finds an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the size of TPO budgets and the marginal increase in exports. At the sample median, a USD 1 increase in TPO budgets is found to result in a USD 200 increase in exports.

**Figure 7.15 Log of exports of goods and services per capita versus the log of TPO budgets per capita**




Note: A simple linear trendline was used to indicate the positive reaction between the two variables.

*Source:* Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton (2006).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241524

A study of six Latin American countries between 2000-07 revealed that opening an export promotion agency office abroad translates into a an increase in exports that is approximately 5.5 times larger than enlisting a new embassy or consulate tasked with the same duty (IDB, 2010). The study also found that TPOs are far more effective when supporting the whole export process (see Figure 7.15).

Two challenges for TSIs that have been highlighted in the literature are the administrative set-up of the institutions and their decisions regarding firm level targeting.

The administrative structure of TPOs has been investigated in Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton (2006). TPOs, whose members share a large number of executive board positions with the private sector despite the organisations' public-sector funding, are associated with higher national exports than other combinations. In addition, a single and strong TPO seems to be more effective than multiple agencies with overlapping responsibilities (Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton 2006). The ITC's Assess, Improve and Measure (AIM) programme is designed to support TSIs, and in particular TPOs, to reform in order to boost their effectiveness (see the aid-for-trade case story No. 49, "Helping trade and investment support institutions AIM higher"). Over a five-year period, AIM will assist some 50 TSIs in better serving the needs of their clients.

Trade Support Institutions often have diverging approaches when it comes to what type of firm support is offered too. Some TSIs target small firms that are most in need of assistance, while others champion large firms to capture large profits. Small firms are typically responsible for the largest share of employment growth in most economies but often suffer from low productivity and poor product quality, among a host of other shortcomings. By contrast large firms are often the most productive. But they tend to be well financed, with ample resources and it can be considered questionable whether they are in need of public support.

A recent study on the long-term impact on exports of assistance from Tunisia's FAMEX matching-grant scheme by Fernandes and Mattoo (2014) points to a third way. When the firms which received assistance were divided into three categories – small (fewer than 20 employees), medium (20-99), and large (100 or more) – the results showed that after four years, exports of small firms declined by 65%, while exports of large firms were only 6% higher. However, the exports of medium-sized firms increased by 57%. This may be because medium-sized firms are often on the verge of breaking into foreign markets, requiring just a nudge to achieve their goal, which TSIs are well positioned to apply.

## ADDRESSING OBSTACLES TO TRADE FOR SMEs: DELIVERING TO THE BUYER

Once potential markets have been identified, producers need to identify and assess what it requires to actually deliver to those markets. This implies assessing challenges related to organising transport and possibly to organising trade finance, two aspects that are being assessed in aid-for-trade surveys enquiring about trade costs.

In the following, the focus will be on challenges related to NTMs, admittedly only a subset – albeit an important one – of trade costs. Not all of the NTM-related trade costs captured by the surveys discussed fall under the standard concept of border costs. In order to adjust production processes to specific NTMs, costs falling on the producer, for instance, do not occur at the border. Yet they are costs that are incurred in order to trade, as they form part of a chain of challenges producers have to overcome to comply with NTMs abroad. Addressing such costs, therefore, forms an important component of trade-related technical assistance.

NTM-related challenges will be discussed following the order in which producers face these challenges when attempting to bring a good or services to a foreign market:

- They need to find out about requirements to be met in order to export to consumers abroad. This is an information challenge and has been highlighted in the survey responses as the third most important factor in which firms would value improvement.

- They need to adapt products and processes in order to comply with requirements, be they government imposed regulations or private standards.
- They need to demonstrate compliance, which typically implies that products need to be certified by recognised bodies and processes (e.g. inspection, testing and certification), and certification needs to be proven at the border, which may lead to procedural obstacles of the type highlighted in the survey evidence discussed in section 3.

At each stage of this process, exporters may face obstacles either with respect to their own capacity to handle the obstacle or with respect to the relevant institutional or policy environment. When it comes to NTMs, the relevant institutional environment is not only situated at the border but consists to a large extent of the technical infrastructure required to test and prove compliance with regulatory measures.

The nature of different types of obstacles is described below, together with the types of policies or interventions that exist to address these obstacles.

## Access to information about product and service requirements

Important efforts exist at national and international levels to collect and disseminate information on NTMs. As mentioned previously, a major inter-agency initiative titled MAST has led to the creation of an international taxonomy of NTMs and has facilitated the publication of country-level data on non-tariff measures in the so-called TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) database. This database contains information on relevant national legislations and is publicly accessible. In parallel, data are being collected and disseminated on firm level perceptions of NTMs. Those initiatives involve major and often costly data collection exercises. They are supported by the international donor community and contribute greatly on increasing transparency on the nature of NTMs.

**Figure 7.16 Voluntary sustainability standards: a snapshot**

*Source:* ITC.

Similar exercises now also exist in the context of voluntary standards. NTMs are generally associated with compulsory regulations imposed by authorities in destination markets and by exporting countries. In addition to those official regulations, companies often have to comply with other standards if they want to reach markets. Voluntary standards are issued by governments, international private bodies (i.e. companies, NGOs, etc.) and sector associations. Complying with some voluntary standards may often be a *de facto* requirement to actually sell to some large retailers, while other standards cater to niche markets. Given the high number of private standards currently relevant for international trade, they can significantly add to the trade costs caused by national regulatory measures. Figure 7.16 provides a snapshot of a subset of voluntary standards, so-called voluntary sustainability standards and gives an impression of the incidence of voluntary standards

The role relatively straight-forward information tools can play in enhancing transparency in the jungle of voluntary standards illustrated in Figure 7.16 is explained here with reference to an ITC online tool – Standards Map (www.standardsmap.org) – that is dedicated to this transparency objective and provides information on over 160 voluntary sustainability standards (VSS). In addition to being a platform providing detailed information about standards, certification bodies, certification cost and countries where such standards operate and are recognised by companies and consumers, the tool also allows exporting companies to self-assess their performance in relation to various standards' requirements (see Figure 7.17). The Standards Map can also be used by buying and selling companies interested in comparing levels of VSS requirements of across several dimensions: the environment, social aspects, management, quality and ethics.

**Figure 7.17 Comparison of cotton standards using ITC Standards Map**



*Source:* ITC Standards Map, 2015.

In a context of multiple and increasing VSSs that are often similar on a range of criteria, brands, retailers and standard organisations can also use the Standards Map to facilitate the convergence of criteria. Thus, suppliers and buyers can take advantage of these VSS commonalities to drive more rationality and cost and time savings via joint audits and certifications.

## Firm-level capacity to meet regulatory and standards-related requirements

Firms often need to build in-house capacity and/or to buy relevant equipment to meet regulatory or voluntary standards-related requirements. Such investments are costly and may also entail risks, notably the risk of building capacity in vain and not managing to export. Evidence exists that linking up to GVCs can reduce transaction costs and risks. Buyers within the chain often transmit know-how to suppliers and guarantee a certain level of sales if standards are met. Such assistance, however, does not come for free, as suppliers often end up accepting lower sales prices in return for reduced transaction costs (Iacovone et al., 2015).

Where private initiatives do not exist, technical assistance efforts are sometimes directed towards building relevant capacity. Such efforts often explicitly target SMEs and typically take the form of hands-on field projects directly working with SMEs. Numerous examples exist of aid-for-trade projects working directly with companies in developing countries to help them comply with NTMs and regulations. Frequently, such projects target the agricultural sector or the food processing industry, and in these cases the projects may take place under the umbrella of Standards and Trade Development Facility (SDTF).

With the Nigeria Export Promotion Council, the ITC implemented an STDF project to expand Nigeria's food exports of sesame seeds and shea nut butter through improved SPS capacity-building of private and public sector organisations and improved quality control along the supply chain.

Another project was financed by the European Development Fund and operated by the Horticultural Technical Center of Tamatave in Madagascar to develop the production of lychees and help them comply with European Union food safety regulations (see aid-for-trade case story No. 45, "Appui à la filière litchi de Madagascar"). This project started in 2001 and lasted for five years. Trade data reported by Madagascar reveal that lychee exports to Europe were strong throughout the duration of the project and then dropped. Exports started to rise again in 2010.

Yet another project, implemented by the ITC, focused on the cultivation of Sacha inchi, a native plant of Peru that can be used to produce comestible oil (see aid-for-trade case story No. 56, "US safety certificate could quintuple Peru's exports of indigenous food product"). The project, operated by the ITC trade and environment programme, was aimed at helping SMEs, as well as supporting biodiversity-based exports. Apart from providing technical support to producers, the ITC helped them prepare a submission to obtain Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) status from the US Food and Drug Administration. This status was obtained in 2014 and is expected to significantly increase demand for the product by US companies.

## The need for commensurate technical infrastructure at the national level

In order to export producers need to demonstrate compliance, which typically implies that products need to be certified by recognised bodies, often laboratories, and processes (e.g. inspection, testing and certification). An accredited laboratory is one that is recognised as being competent. Accreditation of laboratories is carried out by authorised national bodies in various countries by examining laboratories' competence with respect to requirements given in ISO/IEC 17025 (the general requirements for the competence of calibration and testing laboratories). The compliance of a laboratory with ISO/IEC 17025 provides assurance of its competence.

Lack of acceptance or recognition of foreign test reports can represent a very serious barrier to trade. Whether the test report furnished by an exporter/manufacturer will be accepted overseas depends on each market and each regulator. This must be determined by the exporter/manufacturer prior to seeking entry to a particular market and forms part of the procedural obstacles captured in the NTM surveys.

Through Swiss-financed projects implemented by the ITC, laboratories for testing food and agricultural products in Tajikistan have be accredited to ISO/IEC 17025, and the Kyrgyz Centre of Accreditation (KCA) has become a signatory to the International Laboratory Accreditation Co-operation (ILAC) Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA). KCA is now a full member of ILAC in terms of accreditation of testing laboratories for compliance with ISO/IEC 17025. ILAC accreditation helps SMEs to reduce costs as it removes the need for repeated tests in another country by allowing selection of competent certification services that can save them both time and money.

While accreditation is sufficient for the recognition of competence at national level, MRAs are necessary to achieve recognition across borders. Mutual recognition agreements/arrangements (MRAs/MLAs) are formal agreements between accreditation bodies that acknowledge that the accreditation of laboratories and certification bodies granted by all parties to the particular agreement is equivalent. This is one of the areas in which international collaborative efforts can contribute to facilitating trade. Another area concerns collaboration on reducing procedural obstacles to trade as discussed below.

### Addressing non-tariff barriers and procedural obstacles for more efficient cross-border processes

NTM business surveys discussed above highlight the relevance of procedural obstacles in the context of NTMs. Solutions to reduce such obstacles can be found through improved inter-agency co-ordination, simplified documents and procedures, enhanced transparency and predictability and by reducing charges and fees. Evidence suggests that these reforms are most impactful when designed, implemented and monitored in co-ordination with business through public-private mechanisms. It is important to include SMEs in the dialogue process for making the process inclusive and results comprehensive. Indeed, SMEs expressed the importance they attach to their voice being heard in the private sector survey.

It is not a coincidence that these principles and reforms are embedded in the WTO TFA. By imposing binding obligations on all WTO members to improve efficiency of border procedures, the TFA provides a unique opportunity to reduce trade transaction time and costs and increase SMEs' participation in global trade. Facilitating trade procedures, especially in developing and LDCs, will enhance SMEs' international competitiveness in regional and international markets and increase their integration in GVCs.

### Promoting inter-agency co-ordination

The lack of co-ordination among agencies involved in the end-to-end trading process has been one of the most common causes of delays in administrative and compliance procedures. As traders need to work individually with a high number of different border agencies, their lack of co-ordination means applications and documents must be submitted and follow up ensured with each one separately. These human and financial resource-intensive procedures are costly for the government agencies as well as for traders, particularly SMEs, and result in increased international transaction costs.

Several measures that aim at improving border agencies co-ordination may be introduced. In addition to the establishment of a national trade facilitation committee (NTFC), the TFA drafters have included the requirement for co-operation among border regulatory agencies at a national level and co-ordination with neighbouring countries' border agencies to synchronise and harmonise activities with one another to facilitate completion of cross-border transactions. Co-ordination includes nominating a single-lead implementation agency, aligning procedures, formalities, working days and hours and developing and sharing common facilities (including joint border controls), also known as one-stop border posts.

## Enhancing transparency and predictability

Lack of transparency and predictability on cross-border regulations and requirements leads to additional delays and costs for traders. The absence of updated information on trade processes, frequent changes in regulations or requirements different to what is published are common burdensome issues faced by SMEs. This becomes more pronounced in cases where enterprises operate in geographically-dispersed locations, without regular access to customs and border-control officials.

The TFA provides for more transparency and predictability for the benefit of traders. Exporting and importing businesses can obtain all trade-related information via multiple channels (e.g. print and online). Additionally, members are required to maintain enquiry points to enable traders to obtain documents and forms, understand procedures and get their queries answered. In this context it may be possible to gather spillovers from the international data collection efforts described above. The introduction of advance rulings, providing binding customs decisions prior to goods arrival at the border on tariff classification and origin, is a key tool in enhancing the predictability in customs procedures and ensuring uniform treatment of traded goods at the border.

## Simplifying documents and procedures and reducing charges and fees

Complex documentation requirements and procedures involved in the trading process impose a significant burden on exporters. In some cases, traders and particularly SMEs lacking the human resources capacity have no other option than incurring the additional costs of hiring customs brokers to complete the complex requirements and reduce the occurrence of delays due to incorrect documentation. Furthermore, unusually high fees and charges and delays associated with receiving certificates and licenses is another common complaint by traders and prevents many SMEs from entering export markets. There is a perceived lack of transparency on the fees being charged and often informal payments are included in the final amounts.

These problems may be addressed by introducing a number of trade facilitation reforms. WTO members are required to establish a single-window system, a unique entry point through which traders may submit information and documents for all agencies involved in the trading process. These agencies co-ordinate with one another and submit their responses back through the same system and at the same time, and they must accept copies of certificates and licenses issued by other national agencies. This reform makes it easier for the traders to follow up with a single entity and reduces the likelihood of delays due to arranging and filing of duplicate information.

Members are further required to periodically review their trade procedures and documents with a view to decreasing complexity and applying them uniformly at all border locations. Governments should also aim at aligning national cross-border procedures to international standards for harmonisation and implication purposes. WTO members must also publish all fees and charges and establish mechanisms to periodically review them to reduce the number and diversity and limit them to the costs of services rendered. Additionally, with the introduction of electronic payments, the TFA aims to create an environment that increases the transparency on the fees being charged and reduces the occurrence of informal payments.

The ITC's recently launched Trade Obstacle Alert Mechanism illustrates how modern information technologies can be used to identify complexities in trade procedures and address them. The mechanism follows on from NTM surveys and consists of an online platform allowing companies to report obstacles they face in their trading operations. A national focal point is in charge of validating reports and directing them to the appropriate public body and sending the answer back to the company. The existence of an external entity ensures that requests are addressed in a timely manner. The mechanism is currently operational in Côte d'Ivoire and has already led to a reduction in the time and costs of trading.

## CONCLUSIONS

Trade costs can take multiple forms and require different types of interventions to address them. Evidence obtained from private sector surveys and discussed in this chapter has led to the surprising finding that access to information and procedural obstacles represent among the most pressing obstacles to trade. This comes as a surprise in today's era of information technology and computerisation. Yet it also implies that addressing these obstacles is relatively straightforward and not overly costly.

The nature of the obstacles also suggests that addressing them may have strong impacts on SME integration in global markets. Access to information is more frequently mentioned as a priority obstacle by SMEs than by large firms. Indeed, the costs of information burdens may be relatively small in the view of most large enterprises but may be prohibitively large for SMEs.

Trade Support Institutions have traditionally played an important role in providing trade-related information, in particular information related to export opportunities. Given the relevance of informational obstacles, strengthening the capacity of TSIs to provide relevant and tailored information to their clients could become an important component of a future aid-for-trade agenda.

Modern technologies, in principle, also offer relatively cost-effective solutions to facilitating and streamlining border transition processes. The most suitable design of such solutions and their actual implementation may differ across countries. Strengthened communication and, where possible, collaboration between the private sector and the public sector can greatly contribute to finding the most suitable solutions and implementing them in a business-friendly way. The current international momentum arguably offers a unique opportunity for WTO member states to launch the relevant dialogues with the private sector in their countries and initiate the implementation processes of trade facilitation reforms.

In addition to the public sector, the private sector has an important role to play in the trade facilitation reforms implementation processes. Public-private dialogue (PPD) is particularly suited for identifying policy priorities, reducing regulatory costs and building consensus on the reforms needed. PPD helps to ensure reforms are demand-driven and in line with the needs and priorities of the main stakeholders, including SMEs. It is worth mentioning that private-sector involvement is required at all stages: needs assessment, priority identification, trade facilitation solution design, policy formulation and implementation and post-reform monitoring and evaluation.

Trade facilitation negotiators have chosen to retain this rationale by including a series of measures for involving private sector representatives in trade policy formulation. WTO members are obliged – and the private sector is expected to participate – to hold consultations before amending or introducing trade-related regulations, to provide the opportunity to comment on draft legislation, and to provide for a notice period between publication and entry into force of new or amended regulations in order to allow stakeholders to become acquainted with them. In addition to holding regular consultations between traders, government agencies and other stakeholders to achieve their common objectives, the Agreement includes a binding obligation for all WTO members to establish or maintain an NTFC, which aims to facilitate both domestic co-ordination and implementation of the provisions of the Agreement.

From the perspective of customs, SMEs are seldom a preferred client on account of the fact that their trade transactions are less frequent and their contributions lower. For this reason, they sometimes face specific difficulties and discriminations completing cross-border procedures. These discriminatory measures include, in certain countries, regulations that forbid SMEs to use the cross-border fast tracks or any other trade facilitation initiatives dedicated only to larger corporations. The TFA contributes to reducing discrimination towards SMEs, notably by forbidding the use of criteria that may be discriminatory towards SMEs (e.g. based on size of company or quantity of goods), which may prevent them from taking full benefit of all trade facilitation measures.

National efforts should also go in the direction of ensuring SMEs are fully included in the public-private dialogue mechanisms that are being set up under the auspices of the TFA. This would not only be fully in line with the spirit of the TFA but also with other policy initiatives at the global level, namely those taking place in the context of the B20 SME & Entrepreneurship Task Force, which was established in 2014.

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# CHAPTER 8

# DEEPENING PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT IN AID FOR TRADE

*Contributed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*

***Abstract:*** *This chapter looks at the engagement of the private sector in aid for trade and in particular the role donor agencies have played in promoting this through supporting an enabling environment for the private sector and addressing market failures in terms of information asymmetries and access to finance. After discussing the various models of public-private co-operation, the chapter concludes that engagement of the private sector in development offers opportunities but also challenges in terms of expectations, costs and benefits and time frames.*

## INTRODUCTION

The private sector is responsible for approximately 90% of employment in the developing world (both formal and informal jobs). Private entrepreneurs and their profit-making activities – whether large multinationals, medium- and small-scale local enterprises or informal farmers – provide critical goods and services that improve people's lives, generate domestic tax revenues and are key to stimulating economic growth (see IFC website). In many developing countries the private sector plays a vital role in producing goods and services for export markets, thereby generating foreign exchange (crucial for macroeconomic stability) and enabling firms to expand their production frontiers, achieve economies of scale and enhance their competitiveness. While donor agencies differ in their approaches and priorities to alleviating poverty, they all see economic growth as the requisite factor for meeting sustainable development goals and ending poverty – and they recognise that sustainable development solutions will require a role for the private sector. This is underscored by strong evidence that private investment and private sector-led productivity increases are the transformational force in development (Sida, 2014).

In view of the pivotal role played by business, finding the ways and means of leveraging private sector know-how, productive capacity and financial resources for development is high on the agenda of donor agencies. In order to develop a thriving private sector, donor agencies have played an important role in supporting partner countries to get the pre-conditions for private-sector growth right, including promoting a propitious business climate, investing in infrastructure and facilitating entrepreneurship through development finance and technical assistance. To promote private sector-led, inclusive and sustainable growth, developing countries need to prioritise reducing their trade and investment costs. While developing country governments are responsible for creating an environment conducive to private sector growth, development co-operation can help these governments steer private sector activities to contribute to more inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth.

This chapter reviews the background and current status of the debate on how to enhance the engagement of the private sector in aid for trade. It highlights lessons and challenges faced by donor agencies in deepening private sector engagement in development co-operation through using ODA to leverage private finance and investment. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The first section reviews the changing context for public-private co-operation on development. The second section discusses how OECD countries are promoting private sector investment. The third section focuses on the objective of inclusive and sustainable growth. The fourth section analyses the volume of ODA provided to building productive capacities. The fifth section describes how donors are working with and through the private sector, and the sixth section assesses emerging evidence about the effectiveness of these partnerships. The final section concludes by highlighting the opportunities and benefits implicit in a thriving private sector, and the role of donor agencies in promoting private sector development through development co-operation activities and resources. The chapter is based on academic work, findings from evaluations of donor programmes, responses to the OECD/WTO Survey and case stories submitted by donors, recipients, the private sector and NGOs.

## THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE CO-OPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

The process of globalisation, powered by innovative and widespread improvements in transportation and technology worldwide, has advanced rapidly over the past decade, intensifying the interconnectedness of all countries through communications, trade, financial flows and integrated production systems. OECD countries' engagement with developing regions, long viewed through the lens of ODA, is poised to increase and deepen through a large and growing network of trade, investment, and development partnerships. Furthermore, the support provided by other providers of development co-operation – including South-South co-operation – through mutually beneficial trade and investment linkages has rapidly accelerated over the past decade. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are the most public face of globalisation, and there is a reason why. There are 104 000 MNEs in the world, controlling about 790 000 subsidiaries. A full 71% of all MNEs are based in rich countries, and the 500 largest account for 25% of global output and 50% of world trade.

Moreover, MNEs receive 80% of all payments for technology royalties and fees. Despite the predominance of MNEs from advanced economies, a vibrant private sector is blossoming in many emerging economies. Some examples: for Brazil, JBS in food processing, Vale in mining, Braskem in bioplastics, Embraer in aerospace and Cosan in energy; for India, Bharat Forge in metals and Tata Communications in telecoms; and for China, Haier in household appliances, BYD in batteries, Lenovo in personal computers.

The changing nature of international business, in particular the expansion of global and regional value chains, provides new opportunities for developing countries. The liberalisation of trade was a critical factor for the expansion of global production over the past two decades. Trade is increasingly organised in value chains and characterised by fragmented production processes: 85% of global trade is linked to multinational enterprises and 60% is comprised of intermediate goods. International production is nothing new, but its magnitude and the degree of fragmentation in global GVCs is new. To an unprecedented degree, firms are now able to break up their value chains and locate discrete activities according to competitive advantage rather than geographical convenience. In today's globalised landscape for manufacturing and distribution, firms in developing countries can specialise in tasks and specific business services to connect to these value chains. This offers opportunities to both large and also small countries, provided that they find their areas of comparative advantage in terms of costs, productivity, skills and know-how (OECD, 2013).

GVCs provide the private sector in developing countries with unprecedented access to networks, new markets, capital, knowledge and technology, which in turn can offer a path to more diversified and robust economic growth and development. Governments in the developing world, most notably in East Asia, have relied on expanding international trade over the past two decades as the centrepiece of their national strategies for growth and development (OECD/WTO, 2013).

**BANGLADESH LINKING TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: RESULTS AT A GLANCE**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Bangladesh** | Netherlands Trust Fund (NTF) allowed Bangladesh to link its competitive IT companies to European markets, unleashing the country's potential. (CS 68) |
| **Bangladesh** | Thanks to an NTF matchmaking event, the Bangladeshi software company Nascenia got in contact with Better Collective, starting a successful business partnership. (CS 88) |
| **Bangladesh** | Delivering advertising support for the Windows 8 launch allowed Graphic People – a Bangladeshi company – to learn from Microsoft and to gain experience for other future big projects. (CS 87) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid-for-trade case story (2015).

The private sector has been responding to these opportunities with significant investment. An example is that of Unilever. By 2020 it expects developing markets to account for 70% of total sales. It is already using a rural sales force of 2 800 of the poorest women in Bangladesh, who now sell the products of seven major companies, including Unilever, and 12 000 more women were expected to be reached as sellers by the end of 2014. In addition to the reputational benefits of companies like Unilever, investing in emerging economies can lead to lower operating and production costs, new market opportunities, wider distribution options and an increased customer base. Beyond the potential of value chains, there are opportunities for private businesses in catering to the needs of those at the bottom of the pyramid (Prahalad, 2004) (in economic literature, the phrase bottom of the pyramid refers to the largest yet poorest segment of society: the three billion people who live on less that USD 2.5 per day).

With billions of people living in poverty, the poor represent enormous potential for companies who learn how to serve this market by providing the poor with what they need. For instance, the Interchange cable network connected Vanuatu to the world, reducing broadband internet costs by at least 70% and enhancing ICT connectivity with foreign suppliers and markets (OECD/WTO, 2015). This creates benefits on all sides: not only do corporations tap into the market, but the poor become empowered customers. Corporations who service this market help create jobs for the poor, ending the vicious cycle of poverty. In short, for broad-based and inclusive growth, the private sector needs to cater to the needs of those at the bottom of the pyramid.

Developing countries have many advantages such as access to raw materials, low absolute labour costs and growing domestic demand. The business environment is generally improving, with many countries registering progress in measures such as the Cost of Doing Business Index and the Logistics Performance Index (AfDB/OECD, 2014). Nevertheless, they are still disadvantaged in other respects, in particular as regards the high costs of doing business due to numerous factors including tariff and non-tariff barriers, logistics and transportation costs and unreliable and costly access to energy. In a world where GVCs are a dominant feature of global trade and investment, the speed and ease of trading goods and services across borders has a direct impact on the attractiveness of particular economies and industries to investors, particularly in the context of regional and global value chains (OECD/WTO, 2013).

| EASING TRADE ACROSS BORDERS: RESULTS AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Brazil** | Brazil's Foreign Trade Mapping Process, implemented jointly by business and government, has reduced time and costs to export and import (e.g. the single window project). (CS 95) |
| **South Africa** | Implementation of the new e-customs slashed processing time from four to eight hours to two hours and reduced paper from 16 million to 0.8 million pieces. (CS 96) |
| **India** | The integrated check post at the border between India and Pakistan increased the total import value from USD 161 million in 2011-12 to USD 292 million in 2012-13, while exports reached USD 509 million in 2012-13, up from USD 229 million in 2011-12. (CS 100). |
| **Rwanda** | After the introduction of the Rwanda Electronic Single Window, the average customs processing time decreased from 34 hours to 23 hours, driving down the cost of doing business and the retail prices. (CS 13) |
| **Gambia** | With the creation of the single-window business registration system, a business can be registered within seven days, with reduced costs associated with tax regulations' compliance. (CS 63) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid-for-trade case story (2015).

## HOW ARE OECD COUNTRIES PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT?

Theoretical arguments and motivations for private-sector support are generally well articulated in the literature. Non-market factors such as the rule of law (i.e. for contract enforcement, intellectual property rights and investor protection), corruption and political instability influence private sector behaviour everywhere, but they loom particularly large in poor countries where market and contracting failures play a much larger role. Market failures such as externalities, asymmetric information, imperfect competition and uncertainty lead to highly imperfect, underdeveloped or missing markets (Pietrobelli, 2007). Co-ordination and system failures represent a further justification for policy intervention. Individual firms' performance crucially depends on the behaviour of other actors, including production and investment decisions in upstream and downstream segments and investment in and provision of related infrastructure and public goods (Reiner and Staritz, 2013).

A sound business climate for investment, competitiveness and entrepreneurship is a pre-requisite for raising living standards and alleviating poverty. The premise for using ODA to promote the private sector is straightforward. The main objective of development co-operation is poverty reduction. Economic growth is a key vector for reducing poverty and promoting development – and it is best achieved through the private sector. Government has a central role to play in making it possible for the private sector to flourish and in ensuring that growth contributes to poverty reduction. In particular, while private sector development is crucial for increasing the pace of growth, the way the private sector develops also has a strong bearing on the pattern of growth, influencing whether growth is broad or narrowly based and whether it is more or less inclusive of the poor (OECD, 2006). The government of Canada is helping developing-country partners create the conditions for strong and sustainable private-sector-led growth through its sustainable economic growth strategy. The strategy's three paths – building economic foundations, growing businesses and investing in people – target the main prerequisites to achieving poverty alleviation through private-sector-led sustainable economic growth.

Donor agencies have traditionally focused their programmes on improving and strengthening the enabling environment for private initiative and business operations in developing countries – and thus achieving development goals by working through private sector growth (Davies, 2011). To help countries improve their business environment, development assistance agencies support interventions using ODA funding to upgrade the legal and regulatory environment, accelerate and rationalise administrative processes, lower the costs of investment, reduce risks, improve competition and develop capacity. The International Finance Corporation has backstopped Rwanda's policy reforms to accelerate trade-related procedures and reduce their cost: the country now ranks 46 out of 189 in the 2015 Doing Business Report and has been a top reformer in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005 (case story 29). And policy dialogue and targeted support provided by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) in Sierra Leone has helped to improve public debt management, which, in turn, has contributed to lower inflation and easier access to affordable finance for the private sector. It has also increased revenue collection and strengthened policies to ensure a sustainable fiscal position.

Donors have different rationales and a variety of policy approaches for supporting the private sector. Aid-for-trade policies and programmes are an important vector in this regard. For example, DFID works with the private sector in much of its aid-for-trade work to improve property rights and the investment climate, supporting private enterprise to increase productivity and the competitiveness of goods and services in domestic and international markets. Grants, loans or equity investments are provided where appropriate to encourage private sector involvement. DFID is co-financing the productive activities of major UK food and clothing retailers through the Trade and Global Value Chains Initiative, which is expected to support the long-term resilience of global supply chains and benefit over 700 000 workers and smallholder farmers working in Kenya, South Africa and Bangladesh. Similarly, the overall objective of Finland's aid-for-trade efforts is to create decent employment and opportunities for entrepreneurship for all through private sector development. One of Finland's four development co-operation goals addresses the need for a sound business enabling environment that promotes private sector activity: activities focus on inclusive business, women's entrepreneurship, the use of information technology for innovative economic activity and youth employment and entrepreneurship.

The multilateral development banks are long-standing supporters of private enterprise and financial markets. Today, many are expanding the range of programmes and instruments they provide in this regard. For example, direct engagement with business and the private sector is increasingly a feature of Asian Development Bank investments and interventions: support is extended through financial assistance, including loans without sovereign guarantees, equity investments, credit enhancement products and loan syndication activities. Private sector development is fully integrated into country and regional programmes: for example, in Indonesia support is being provided to improve smallholder agricultural productivity through value chain development and in the Philippines assistance to attract higher levels of investments in infrastructure is being facilitated through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Similarly, the Islamic Corporation for the Development of Private Sector (ICD), the private sector arm of the Islamic Development Bank Group, is providing financial support for the establishment, expansion and modernisation of private enterprises and the development of capital markets. ICD also provides advisory services to governments and private sector groups regarding policies for enhancing the role of the market economy and management practices.

Today, the donor community is increasingly seeking to engage with the private sector in development in order to harness private-sector expertise and leverage additional financing. This entails working with private-sector enterprises to make them direct actors in development and has led to a shift in the paradigm from a largely government-focused approach to a blend of aid, trade and investment activities and initiatives. Successive OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Reviews have borne witness to these trends in development co-operation over many years. A synthesis of peer reviews between 2012 and 2014 noted, "A new or increasing emphasis on private sector engagement and development from reviewed members" (DCR, 2014).

### BOX 8.1 CEO summit of the Americas

The Inter-American Development Bank has spearheaded an initiative to promote public-private dialogue between governments and the private sector in Latin America through special high-level summits organised in collaboration with host governments, where participants discuss the dynamics and future prospects of trade and investment opportunities within Latin America. The initial CEO Summit of the Americas, organised in collaboration with the Colombian government in Cartagena in 2012, attracted approximately 700 business leaders and 12 heads of state, who exchanged views and ideas with one another in a series of interactive panel discussions. The follow-up 2015 Summit in Panama City reinforced its role as a platform for high-level exchange on regional trade and investment issues, and broadened the scope of the dialogue to also include priorities for the social and economic development of the Americas.

For further information see www.ceosummitoftheamericas.com/en.

Donor responses to the questionnaire regarding the nature of assistance provided to private-sector development indicated unanimous support for technical assistance (see Figure 8.1). This support involves efforts to improve the enabling environment for business through policy development and reform, technology transfer and business development initiatives. Direct support for establishing or expanding businesses – through PPPs and concessional loans and grants – are also a key feature of donor efforts, accounting for more than 80% and 60% of responses, respectively. Many of these activities involve private companies based in donor countries, who receive support for establishing joint ventures or expanding business investment in the developing world: 88% of questionnaire respondents indicated their private sector was engaged in their programmes.

**Figure 8.1 Donor approaches for promoting private sector development (PSD)**




Note: 34 respondents - multiple responses were allowed.

*Source:* OECD/WTO Aid for trade monitoring exercise 2015

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Direct support for private companies in donor countries that invest in business opportunities in the developing world is a key feature of bilateral private-sector activities. Austria's Business Partnership Programme requires companies to carry out long-term investment at their own cost and risk, aiming to generate local value, transfer know-how and technology, create jobs, thus decreasing poverty. In most cases projects focus on setting up and/or strengthening value and supply chains, on improving vocational training and on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities.

The Austrian Development Agency provides know-how, contacts, business intelligence and up to EUR 200 000 in project finance for eligible companies. Germany has established the develoPPP.de programme to foster the involvement of the private sector at the point where business opportunities and development policy initiatives intersect. Through this programme, the German government provides financial support up to EUR 200 000 for projects e.g. providing vocational training, promoting climate-friendly technologies or improving social standards at production facilities and, if required, technical support to companies that invest in developing and emerging countries.

In the lead-up to the Fourth High-Level Forum in Busan in 2011, there was a growing focus on the role of the private sector and its contribution to the development process (the Paris Declaration [2005] and Accra Agenda for Action [2008] make limited reference to the private sector's role in development, focusing on all development actors working in more inclusive partnerships so that all efforts have greater impact on reducing poverty). The Busan Partnership agreement recognises the central role of the private sector, as well as the benefits of development finance modalities such as PPPs in advancing innovation, creating wealth, income and jobs, mobilising domestic resources, and, in turn, contributing to poverty reduction. The private sector is now an active constituency of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. The importance of engaging with the private sector is also a priority for partner countries, where almost 60% considers the private sector as pivotal.

From the perspective of donor agencies, collaboration with the private sector goes far beyond simply securing additional funding. Attracting FDI is important for developing countries because it has the potential to bring a package of benefits, including managerial and technical skills, intra-firm finance, technology spillovers and access to new markets. The private sector also has advantages over the public sector in terms of moving quickly and being adaptable. The benefits of skilled management in organising and training a local labour force, in setting standards for safety and health, in paying taxes to the local government and in raising the technological threshold of local industrial and service sectors contributes far more to the development of the local economy than the direct impact of the investment itself. In particular, the case stories (see the table below) highlight the importance of the private sector in satisfying international standards as a way to join GVCs and consequently spur growth.

| STANDARDS AS KEYS TO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: RESULTS AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Madagascar** | After complying with European regulations on litchi food safety, Madagascar increased export and improved relations between exporters and importers. (CS 45) |
| **Egypt** | Once Egyptian food companies obtained the certificates needed to export Halal products to Malaysia, their presence in the Asian country increased by 30%. (CS 61) |
| **Peru** | After the US Food and Drug Administration granted Peruvian sacha inchi oil the Generally Recognized as Safe status, sales forecasts increased fivefold (CS 56). |
| **Ethiopia** | The expansion and upgrading – according to international standards – of the Addis Ababa airport attracted foreign airlines and associated traffic. (CS35) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid-for-trade case story (2015).

Furthermore, for the world's leading corporations, investing in developing countries creates many opportunities to do 'good' while 'doing well' commercially (Warden, 2007). Many of these companies have integrated CSR in their business models, reasoning that their competitive position and the health of the local community are inextricably linked – and mutually dependent. Corporations who have adopted this Creating Shared Value (CSV) business concept have contributed to policy advocacy, using their influence to improve the policy environment for development in the host country or the home country. They have sourced materials, goods and services from developing countries, contributed

to standards compliance and trained and educated workers. They bring skills, ideas and ways of operating in the marketplace. Collaborative private sector ventures and value chain investments (for example, Danone and Walmart) are growing in number and impact, charting an innovative way forward for business involvement in development (OECD, 2011; World Bank, 2011).

In addition to economic development, the everyday operations of private sector firms can contribute to social objectives. For example, existing distribution systems of breweries have been used to deliver fertilisers to farmers and to disseminate condoms and information on HIV/AIDS (Davies, 2011). Coca-Cola is extending its distribution network and transporting medical supplies in Cola Life packing on its trucks (Greening, 2014). Most large corporations also pursue CSR and responsible business conduct, which can positively contribute to development. The UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are two of the foremost voluntary initiatives that promote corporate responsibility and sustainable business practices. The initiatives complement each other in the goal of creating a more responsible and accountable corporate sector, yet are also distinct and unique. They have complementary engagement and accountability mechanisms. Together they define and enhance the relationship between businesses and international standards, in addition to providing a comprehensive model for responsible business practices today. The UN Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption.

A growing number of companies are engaging in innovative approaches that combine business strategy with objectives that have an impact on society, including sourcing from small producers, payments for environmental services, employing marginalised populations or marketing products adapted to them. For instance, 'FairChain' wants to share the added value in the coffee chain with local economies. Thus, instead of exporting green beans, it supports local roasting thereby ensuring that more of the added value remains in the producing country allowing them coffee to move up from being just a primary growing economy into a secondary roasting economy (CS 117). France is supporting responsible projects of this nature implemented by private companies, sometimes at a significant scale. In 2013 the UK DFID launched the Trade and Global Value Chains Initiative (TGVCI) to create partnerships with businesses to improve working conditions and job opportunities for poor workers and smallholder farmers in the developing world and support the long-term resilience of global supply chains. TGVCI has just approved co-financing projects with major UK food and clothing retailers, which are expected benefit over 700 000 workers and smallholder farmers working in horticulture and garment sectors in Kenya, South Africa and Bangladesh. In 2014, Germany initiated the launch of the Partnership for Sustainable Textiles to foster social and environmental standards along the global textile and garment supply chain. The Textiles Partnership is designed as a multi-stakeholder platform and seeks to build on established sustainability standards and to co-operate with other national and international initiatives at G7, OECD and EU level.

## THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH

While overall growth is important, barriers for particularly vulnerable groups must be specifically addressed as part of private sector programmes to ensure all members of society can benefit. High inequality is detrimental to growth because it hampers investment in human capital and undermines the quality of institutions. Rising inequality also erodes the middle class – a foundation of modern democracy and a conduit for advancing social progress. Finally, the persistence of inequality could undermine social cohesion and trigger social and political unrest, thus threatening the sustainability of a country's growth and economic progress. Having said that, the poor are a heterogeneous group, and no aid policy can be successful merely by targeting growth. For example, women's participation in the economy is key to promoting inclusiveness, and this cannot happen without a strong role for the private sector, particularly SMEs, which are a significant source of employment for women in many developing countries. Women face many barriers in terms of access to finance, legal rights and employment discrimination: they will not benefit from programmes that do not support their basic right to participate in the economy with equal opportunity and access to the benefits created (World Bank, 2014).

For many years the World Bank group has been actively supporting the private sector all over the developing world. A distinguishing feature of the Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice in the World Bank Group is its ability to engage firms and entrepreneurs. Targeted start-up and SME support is a major focus of operations: catalytic support to firms and entrepreneurs – in particular, women entrepreneurs – is being scaled up through a more co-ordinated package of sovereign lending and risk management measures, embedded advisory services and direct grant support.

The bulk of aid provided for industrial development, which has totalled over USD 2 billion annually in recent years, is targeted at promoting SMEs, which constitute the bulk of the private sector in developing countries. However, they face serious challenges in expanding their businesses. The most common binding constraints are inefficient regulation, outdated technology and weak technical and entrepreneurial skills. In addition, most firms operate in informal markets, characterised by low productivity and substandard products. La Porta and Schleifer (2014) find that informal firms have low productivity and produce low-quality products: consequently, they do not pose a threat to formal firms. They tend to disappear as countries develop. The formal sector, characterised by firms run by educated entrepreneurs and exhibiting much higher levels of productivity, tend to be an engine of economic growth. Rapid growth of SMEs is a powerful engine for job creation in a wide range of economies, yet more than two-thirds of SMEs in developing countries have no access to finance from the formal financial sector. This market failure is a serious constraint on efforts to promote a strong and sustainable global recovery. The G20 has recently taken up this cause with the SME Finance Challenge in order to identify ways to enhance the effectiveness of governments and public institutions in catalysing private finance for SMEs in developing countries.

**SME PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY BUILDING: RESULTS AT A GLANCE**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Gambia** | The New Life for MP Farm – an overall re-engineering of the 100-hectare Gambian MP Farm – reduced irrigation costs, set up a research facility, increased efficiency and workers' wages. (CS 85) |
| **Peru** | A project to improve exporter readiness to produce organic mangoes and strengthen Canadian/ Peruvian trade links enabled the export of 12 containers of mangoes, with improved incomes for more than 200 families. (CS 101) |
| **Ethiopia** | Ethiopian trainees had the opportunity to take a 14 day-course at Czech Vítkovice Machinery Group, receiving practical training in machining and welding. (CS 83) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid-for-trade case story (2015).

Without effective technical, managerial, and marketing skills, SMEs are not likely to raise productivity, diversify products and expand their businesses. Some donors support the framework conditions for SMEs growth and employment. Others provide aid to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs (Japan, for instance, has promoted energy saving in SMEs in India). Other aid projects are targeted to specific sectors (OECD/WTO, 2013). The EU, for example, is aiding Jordan in its efforts to attract sustainable businesses that add value, thereby enhancing the services sector so it can become more productive and globally connected. Canada is helping to rebuild the private sector in Haiti by facilitating export growth and diversification. The main goal is to develop and promote artisans' craftwork in order to increase Haitian exports in the home decor and gift sectors. In addition to this, management development centres and business advisory services can help SMEs raise their productivity and extend their marketing reach. Local business advisory networks are helping SMEs with specific problems. The Italian government's support for SMEs in Iraq, including programmes for strengthening trade and investment policy capacity, has generated 60 partnership agreements, created more than 1 300 jobs and mobilised investment totalling USD 42 million (case story 22).

**Figure 8.2 Key focus areas of donor support for PSD**




Note: 33 respondents – multiple responses were allowed.

*Source:* OECD/WTO Aid for trade monitoring exercise 2015.

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SME development is a core focus of donor support: more than 90% of survey respondents noted that their private sector development programme was focused on supporting the development of the SME sector (see Figure 8.2). Furthermore, SMEs are often beneficiaries of other activities receiving widespread donor support – such as strengthening the capacity of business or trade institutions, improving market information and business services and enhancing access to credit.

Efforts to address the gaps and maximise the employment opportunities of people living at the bottom of the pyramid are expanding quickly. Several donors are focusing on the high win-win potential of promoting poor producers, entrepreneurs and consumers in supporting private sector development, and they have developed specialised institutional expertise in this type of initiative. UNDP's private sector strategy includes specific actions to promote bottom-of-the-pyramid business development, including advocacy to encourage the private sector to develop inclusive business models for poor markets, providing innovative finance and grants to stimulate sustainable private investments in pro-poor enterprise development, facilitating the integration of poor producers/other market actors in key value chains and economic sectors and improving the policy and institutional infrastructure for inclusive market development. UNDP's approach directly includes the poor on the demand side as clients and customers and on the supply side as employees, producers and business owners at various points along value chains.

## AID FOR BUILDING PRODUCTIVE CAPACITIES

Reflecting the increasing priority that donors attach to private sector development, aid dedicated to building productive capacity (BPC) – resources targeted at agriculture, industry, the financial sector and business services – more than doubled over the period 2003-12 from USD 10.7 billion to USD 21.5 billion (see Figure 8.3). While the PBC share of sector-allocable ODA has increased to approximately 14%, this is small relative to the priority attached to the private sector in the 1970s and the 80s, when routinely 30-40% of ODA was committed to private sector activities. The recent resurgence in support for the private sector has been driven by aid targeting agriculture, fisheries and forestry, which received almost 60% of total ODA targeted at building productive capacity. Many donors are keen to support small farmers – possibly the largest segment of the private sector in the developing world – who play a key role in rural economies by providing jobs, income and food security. For example, with financial support from Australia, the Indonesian

government's Agriculture, Forestry and Community Development Program has reached more than 21 000 households, enlarged cultivated areas, increased agricultural yields, raised the value of production and increased the profitability of farming enterprises (case story 51). And as a result of the Canadian government's Enhancing Arab Capacity for Trade (EnACT) programme, the number of halal-certified companies has more than doubled from 21 to 52, and the presence of the Egyptian food-processing sector in the Malaysian market has increased by 30% (case story 61).

**Figure 8.3 ODA Committed to Building Productive Capacity (BPC)**




*Source:* OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System.

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The share of sector-allocable ODA for agriculture fell from about 25% in the 1970s to a low of 5.8% in 2004. In light of the food crisis in 2007-08, however, donors have responded by increasing their support for the agricultural sector (OECD, 2010): in 2012 the corresponding figure for support to agriculture had risen to close to 9%. A recurring feature of aid projects in agriculture is an emphasis on rural poverty and food security. For example, in one of the largest projects reported recently, the World Bank committed USD 1 billion in loans to India for agricultural development through a national rural livelihoods project. The United States government provided support to Afghanistan for improvements in technology and management practices to increase organisational and market efficiency to promote resilience in production and livelihood systems. The EU is addressing food security with USD 139 million for the poor and vulnerable in fragile circumstances in countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pakistan and Sudan. Following implementation of the Gambian government's programme to improve mango production, productivity and sales in rural zones increased, and 250 farmers exported 352 tonnes of mangoes, generating total revenue of USD 77 million (case story 62).

For the private sector to grow, access to finance is essential. Aid supporting banking and financial services has progressively increased its share of total BPC since emerging in the mid-1980s, and since 2000 as grown exponentially from USD 896 million to USD 5 billion in 2013 – effectively quintupling over the period. Today, banking and financial services account for fully 25% of total BPC. These resources are channelled to central banks, formal sector financial intermediaries, credit lines, and microcredit and credit co-operatives.

| BANKING AND ACCESS TO CREDIT FOR GROWTH: RESULTS AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Africa and Mekong countries** | The ITC/OIF project facilitated the establishment of direct interbank co-operation between 14 African nations and three Mekong countries, contributing to a sharp rise in trade. (CS 57) |
| **Gambia** | The ITFC extended USD 14 million in favour of the Gambia Groundnut Corporation in order to finance the groundnut commodity, benefitting thousands of local farmers. (CS 69) |
| **Papua New Guinea** | By expanding rural access to banking through 15 000 ATMs, EFTPOS (Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale) machines, agents and mobile phone payments services, more than 500 000 people can now carry out rapid and secure financial transactions. (CS 52) |
| **Pacific Island countries** | The Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme allowed more than 150 000 people to access new savings accounts and more than 450 000 people to use mobile telecommunications to store and transfer money. (CS 53) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid-for-trade case story (2015).

In Papua New Guinea, an ambitious micro-banking programme has significantly expanded rural access to banking through 15 000 ATMs, EFTPOS machines, agents and mobile phone payments services: more than 500 000 people can now carry out rapid and secure financial transactions for both personal and professional purposes (case story 52). In addition to credit, a healthy business and investment environment requires trade and business associations, legal and regulatory reform, private sector institutional capacity-building and advice, trade information and public-private sector networking at trade fairs. These business services received funding averaging approximately USD 1.9 billion per annum over 2010–13, roughly in line with trends over the past decade (for example, the United States provides grants to improve the capacity of businesses to integrate into domestic and international markets through increases in productivity, improvements in corporate governance, and the development and application of modern technology and marketing practices). Business capacity development programmes include activities that help firms and associations to respond to international market opportunities.

## WORKING WITH AND THROUGH THE PRIVATE SECTOR

As discussed above, donor agencies are seeking new ways of using development resources and tools to strategically leverage the private sector role in contributing to positive development outcomes. Recent trends suggest growing ODA volumes supporting private sector investments and new types of partnerships to engage business as a core partner in development. Costs might be shared in order to reduce risks for private investors to acceptable levels or compensate a private investor for the provision of public benefits. Competitive challenge funds are a popular format, channelling resources to the private sector to bring about investments and activities that advance development. It is generally expected that such donor support triggers private activities that would otherwise not happen, or that it enhances their development impact by improving their viability or pro-poor focus, or that it helps make them happen significantly sooner. In other words, donor support should be both catalytic and additional.

Te Velde et al. (2008) highlights the different approaches of development agencies. Bilateral donor agencies such as the DFID are more closely aligned with the view that support for the enabling environment is the most effective approach for promoting private sector development, while others such as GIZ and DANIDA are more engaged at the business services and financing and/or investment levels. These two approaches have characterised donor support for decades and are today commonly referred to as the donor-led model. The UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) believes that more directive policies (e.g. industrial policy) may also be appropriate.

A partnership that is industry-led and targets transformations across global supply chains – what the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) defines as the coalition model, reaching a broad number of beneficiaries and engaging with key economic actors within the supply chain – is considered to be ideally suited for mainstreaming market transformation. However, a key challenge to this approach is ensuring that the coalition initiatives involve a sufficient number of key players within the value chain willing to change their core business practices in ways that result in transformational change. Donor-funded global initiatives of this nature face challenges when transformation is required in developed countries. Both the donor-led and the coalition models have clear funding strategies that are based on harnessing private sector funding and innovations. In most donor-led projects, private sector operators are providing up to 50% of the funding. Some coalition models use fees and match-making schemes to secure private sector contributions.

In practice, aid for the private sector encompasses many types of activities. The most common area of work among bilateral and multilateral donors is in creating propitious business-enabling environments, including providing infrastructure, improving the skill-set and well-being of workers and enhancing economic reform and governance (details of the private sector development strategies of donor agencies can be found here: http://www.enterprise-development.org/page/psdstrategies). SME development is a cornerstone of private sector promotion for the majority of donor agencies. In addition to project support, DAC members such as the UK and Sweden offer advisory support. They also contribute expertise and promote knowledge-sharing. Business engagement – where the private sector is involved in direct dialogue with government and plays a constructive role in national policy-making – is an emerging area of work for many DAC members. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation is engaging the private sector to foster more effective development co-operation. To that end, OECD and UNDP are developing an indicator that measures the private sector contribution to development via public-private dialogue).

For many OECD members, a primary area of engagement with the private sector is through development finance institutions (DFIs). DFIs commonly organise their investment facilities and lending operations as blended mechanisms, bringing together ODA grants, concessional loans and investment guarantees with private resources from the corporate and financial sector, benefiting from the fundraising capacity of the latter (Miyamoto and Biousse, 2014). Overall, guarantees have proven a valuable instrument that makes it possible to undertake desirable investments in high-risk countries and sectors. If poorly managed, however, they generate low financial and economic additionality and may become an instrument of political control and patronage. DFI operations have been increasing dramatically, with estimates of around USD 40 billion in DFI investments in 2010. They are projected to reach USD 100 billion by this year (Reality of Aid, 2012). In the EU, DFIs have established a forum for discussion on development policy among member governments through the Association of European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI), in addition to traditional ones such as the DAC.

DFIs are a key vehicle for donors who wish to encourage the direct involvement of their own private sector in programmes and projects promoting business development in partner countries: almost three-quarters of survey respondents provide support of this nature. Advisory services and match-making initiatives – often managed and delivered in-country by development co-operation and embassy staff – are provided by almost 90% of the donors responding to the questionnaire (see Figure 8.4). Direct financial support, including loans and guarantees, are a common feature of programmes promoting direct investment operations: donor DFIS are important actors in delivering these resources.

**Figure 8.4 Types of support provided by donors to encourage donor company investment**




Note: 25 respondents – multiple responses were allowed.
*Source:* OECD/WTO Aid for trade monitoring exercise 2015

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241565

Many of the European donors have established DFIs. As an example, the Finnish Fund for Industrial Co-operation Ltd. (Finnfund) is a Finnish DFI that provides long-term risk capital for private projects in developing countries. Apart from co-investing with Finnish companies, Finnfund can finance ventures that use Finnish technology, co-operate with Finnish partners on a long-term basis or generate major environmental or social benefits. The Dutch Good Growth Fund supports small- and medium-sized Dutch businesses and entrepreneurs in emerging markets and developing countries by facilitating financing for development-based local investments and exports.

Among the various approaches to private sector engagement, there is an interest in leveraging ODA to facilitate PPPs that can encourage investment, not least in the infrastructure sector. PPPs are increasingly considered to be an attractive development finance option as they are generally perceived to be an efficient tool for financial resource mobilisation, with higher initial costs but lower risk levels. Responding to the OECD/WTO survey, 44 partner countries noted that they were involved in PPPs at the national level and 30 at the regional level.

PPPs can allow the public sector to harness the expertise and efficiencies that the private sector can bring to the delivery of public services and can also be a good way to provide sub-contracting opportunities for local firms. The Australian government's support for the Philippine Public Private Partnerships Centre has supported six infrastructure projects worth USD 1 billion since 2011, increasing private sector participation in PPPs and improving procurement co-ordination (case story 50). Another example of a successful PPP arrangement is Dubai Ports World in Senegal, which has resulted in a significant upgrading and expansion of the container terminal (from 300 000 to 600 000 units), creation of more than 200 jobs, and specialised training in line with global standards for all terminal employees (case story 94).

Japan provides a variety of schemes to support the private sector in investing in developing countries. Results from preparatory surveys conducted through Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) schemes based on private sector proposals encourage private entities to resolve the development issues of developing countries. Investment in infrastructure projects, such as the construction, operation and maintenance of power plants, railways, airports, industrial parks, water and sanitation and hospitals, are considered based on the results of the above feasibility studies. If feasible, JICA may support the proposals of the PPP infrastructure projects through the Private Sector Investment Fund (via equity and/or concessional and non-concessional loans).

While PPPs hold promise as a means of bringing together public and private – as well as local and international – resources and expertise, much is required from all involved to realise their potential (OECD, 2005). As EURODAD (2013) and others have argued, the efficacy and effectiveness of PPPs should not be assumed. Moreover, there are still few diagnostic tools available to determine when and how PPPs represent a preferred financing arrangement, and evidence regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of PPPs is scarce. PPPs can, for example, benefit private firms that already have sufficient access to finance at the expense of domestic micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises

| EMERGING APPROACHES ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: RESULTS AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| **Uruguay** | Creation of a national trade intelligence platform to support SMEs in their international expansion. (CS 103) |
| **Viet Nam** | An online portal has been established allowing exporters to submit electronic invoices to their buyers, accelerating payments and increasing transparency. (CS 32) |
| **Asia** | ASEAN TMview provides companies with a reliable, efficient and cost-saving database of 2.2 million trademark filings to facilitate national and international trademark protection. (CS 59) |
| **Global** | ITC's suite of market intelligence – particularly important for LDCs that lack sources of trade intelligence – contributed to USD 126 million in exports in 2014. (CS 54) |
| **Pacific ACP countries** | The Pacific Islands Microenterprise e-Marketing Support is providing local companies with training to access the Internet for online sales and bookings. (CS 76) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO aid-for-trade case story (2015)

## ASSESSING DONOR SUPPORT FOR PROMOTING THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Pressures are rising to demonstrate that partnerships with business are a good use of public resources, not least as media attention focuses on donors' funding decisions There is a need for more effective measurement of the private sector's contribution to development and in turn the impact that providers of development co-operation have in leveraging and mobilising this contribution. Agencies struggle to make a credible and convincing arguments for the additionality of their support, for example, by empirically demonstrating that aid is channelled to the companies and sectors that have least access to private capital markets and provide the best development outcomes for poor people.

A growing number of evaluations of private sector approaches and programmes suggest mixed results. For example, an independent evaluation from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) found good evidence that policies to improve the investment climate and human capital boost growth. However, identifying priorities and the correct sequencing of reforms remains a challenge, calling for more contextual research that takes account not only of the binding constraints but also the feasibility and timescale of implementation. For example, while Sida's interventions monitored outputs effectively, few of them had evaluated the outcomes and impacts that had resulted. It also found that evidence substantiating results as a consequence of industrial policies is weak, especially as regards addressing regional income disparities and job creation (SIDA, 2014).

Providing non-financial business development services results in modest gains that are strengthened if they are combined with access to financial services and targeted at transformative enterprises. More systematic approaches to business development services, such as supply-side stimulation and embedded services, achieve both stronger impacts and are more sustainable. Market-based approaches – such as the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P), which has been adopted by several DAC members (e.g. DFID, Sida, SDC and ADA) – have the potential to address many of the weaknesses of traditional private sector development programmes by addressing the underlying causes rather than symptoms of market failures and delivering system-wide sustainable impacts. In conflict-affected environments, a combination of restoring macroeconomic stability, building infrastructure to create employment and addressing binding constraints to growth, promoting entrepreneurship and improving the functioning of value chains that matter for the poor has proven to be effective.

Evaluations tend to be critical of direct support to individual private enterprises, including support through business-to-business partnership models, which have not proved to have strong development spillover effects. There is a danger that new instruments will lead to an increase in tied aid and be mainly supply-driven. This in turn risks a skewing of activity from low to middle income countries and from sectors and local partners which are strategic for recipient countries to those that are strategic for donor countries. Schulpen and Gibbon (2002) critically reviewed private sector development

policies, for example, arguing that they were shaped mostly by the nature and interests of the private sector in donor countries themselves, incorporated a high proportion of tied aid and failed basic tests of coherence. Moss (2010) claims that donor attempts to address the investment constraints that hinder private sector growth, while constructive and positive, have been inefficient and sometimes haphazardly deployed. The lack of selectivity, prioritisation or strategic focus has hampered the effectiveness of aid. There is also the latent danger of supporting enterprises that are not competitive and/or repeating the industrial policy failures that were widespread in many countries in previous decades.

ODA used to leverage private finance is often channelled through financial intermediaries, which are bound by commercial confidentiality and limitations to public disclosure of information. This has highlighted the importance of private sector accountability but more broadly of strong institutional co-ordination and coherence between agencies and authorities (e.g. DFIs) when public money is being used to leverage private finance. While DFIs have played a role in channelling funds from multilateral and bilateral lenders to selected enterprises and industrial sectors, their performance has often been questioned (Kwakkenbos, 2012; Spratt and Collins, 2011). They are ultimately investment banks as well and need to remain attractive to investors from the private sector as well earn income from the risk-taking activities they engage in (e.g. equity, loans and guarantees). This will tend to lead to DFI support for companies that are already somewhat established and ready to export rather than small local enterprises or businesses in the informal sector – from which the poor might derive more benefit. Risks associated with supporting a company where capital was not otherwise available must be balanced with likely returns for the private investors and for the continued financial viability of DFIs.

In recent years, some DFIs have reformed their systems and begun according a higher priority to development impact in their operations, as illustrated by the increasing amount of data they are collecting. DFIs such as CDC and Norfund now have extensive reporting systems for tracking social and environmental aspects of their operations (Norwegian Church Aid, 2011). However, there are problems remaining in terms of what the data tells us about development impact, particularly how much change can be attributed to the contribution of the DFIs. In current DFI statistical systems the numbers are complex, their significance is opaque and the influence that the results have on actual investment decision-making is unclear.

Reporting on the development impact from public-private partnerships tends to focus on factors such as improvements in productivity, capacity development, project reach (e.g. number of participants) and environmental impact. Information on the rate of return for private sector partners has not been readily available. From a development perspective, there is need for longer-term assessments of what these partnerships mean for employment across the income spectrum in developing countries.

Although many multinational enterprises demonstrate a respect for high standards of business conduct, some may neglect the appropriate principles and standards of conduct in an attempt to gain undue competitive advantage. This may be particularly true in environments where regulatory, legal, and institutional frameworks are underdeveloped or fragile (OECD, 2013). Against this backdrop, responsible business conduct (RBC) has become a priority in the global economic agenda. The Dutch government, for example, has made adherence to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises mandatory for every company receiving ODA funding.

## CONCLUSIONS

The private sector plays a pivotal role in economic development, generating jobs, growth, technology diffusion and incomes. It is the motor for expanding trade opportunities, which augment the production frontiers of national businesses, generate foreign exchange reserves, and facilitate entry in GVCs. The donor community has been a strong advocate of private sector development, working to improve the enabling environment for business through policy development and reform, technology transfer and business information and development initiatives. Donors have also provided direct support for establishing or enlarging businesses – through twinning arrangements, joint ventures, PPPs and concessional loans and grants. And they have played a supportive role in developing financial markets, supporting productive activities of those living at the bottom of the pyramid and encouraging responsible business conduct by multilateral enterprises.

Challenges remain: connections between trade and enterprise development could be deepened, more empirical information is needed assessing what works and what doesn't work, systemic approaches that identify and address root causes of private sector development blockages are needed and a stronger focus on results and impacts could be more broadly mainstreamed throughout private sector support efforts. The development assistance community has learned much over the past 50 years about how to best support private enterprise in the developing world, and there is strong momentum for deepening this knowledge going forward and sharing it more broadly with other development actors across the world.

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# CHAPTER 9

# TRADE IN THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

*Contributed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*

***Abstract:*** *"Sustainable development must be an integrated agenda for economic, environmental and social solutions. Its strength lies in the interweaving of its dimensions. This integration provides the basis for economic models that benefit people and the environment; for environmental solutions that contribute to progress; for social approaches that add to economic dynamism and allow for the preservation and sustainable use of the environmental common; and for reinforcing human rights, equality, and sustainability. Responding to all goals as a cohesive and integrated whole will be critical to ensuring the transformation needed at scale." (Paragraph 84 of the UN Secretary-General's Synthesis Report on the Post-2015 Agenda).*

## INTRODUCTION

The year 2015 may witness a significant directional shift in the development paradigm. In July, the member states of the United Nations (UN) will present a new development agenda for the 2015-30 timeframe, the primary focus of which is to achieve development that is sustainable in the social, economic and environmental dimensions. Also in July, at the third international conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Addis Ababa, the international community is expected to present its collective position towards mobilising public and private financial resources and other means of implementation needed when implementing the new development agenda (See paragraph 4, United Nations, 2014a).

Following the official adoption of the post-2015 development agenda at the UN Summit in September 2015, the 21st annual session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21/CMP11) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place from 30 November to 11 December 2015 in Paris (the conference also serves as the 11th session of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol). It is hoped that the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda generates strong momentum to achieving a new universal climate change agreement, which will put the world on track to a low-carbon, sustainable future (UN Climate Change Newsroom).

International trade has been the engine of rapid economic growth achieved by many developing countries in the past 15 years, which coincided with the implementation years of the Millennium Development Goals or the MDGs. For least developed countries (LDCs), much of the growth stemmed from rising revenues from commodities such as fuels and minerals, which did not necessarily benefit the majority of the populations in exporting countries (UNCTAD, 2014). But the ongoing negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda, with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) at its core, suggest that the world should transform its natural resource-dependent growth pattern to a more inclusive, sustained and sustainable one (United Nations, 2014b). How will this influence the way international trade contributes to a country's socioeconomic development in developing countries, particularly in LDCs?

Against the above background, this chapter discusses: 1) the expected framework and contents of the post-2015 development agenda; 2) the role of international trade as a financial and non-financial means to achieve development; and 3) possible new challenges to the global partnership, including aid for trade, to ensure the development-enabling power of trade in the post-2015 development paradigm.

## TRADE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

### How the post-2015 development agenda is being set

The idea of what a development agenda in the wake of the MDGs could be took form around the turn of the century through various consultations and surveys involving governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the business sector, as well as millions of interested citizens.

Some common views arose from these national, regional and thematic consultations (for more details on the outcomes of these consultations, see the 2014 report by the United Nations Development Group, "Delivering the post-2015 development agenda: opportunities at the national and local levels"). Most consultation outcomes indicated the need for the future agenda to build on the achievements made under the MDGs while addressing work left undone. At the same time, many consultations stressed the new agenda should not be a simple extension of the same set of development goals. They highlighted the importance of it tackling emerging global challenges, which included, among other things, a worldwide increase in economic inequality and the potentially colossal impact of conventional growth on the planetary ecosystem and the problem of climate change.

The gap between the rich and poor countries widened substantially from 2001-15: while many developing countries exhibited remarkably rapid economic growth, the poorest 20% of the world's population (in 2008 this represented 1.4 billion people who lived on less than USD 1.3 a day) received less than 1% of the additional income this growth generated (UNCTAD, 2013a).

With regard to possible interlinkages between socioeconomic development and environmental sustainability, the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (also known as Rio+20) achieved a breakthrough agreement among the UN member states. It reaffirmed that "integration of environment and development concerns [. . .] will lead to the fulfilment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future" (Agenda 21, 1992 Earth Summit). Moreover, its outcome (titled The Future We Want) elaborated that integrating environmental and development concerns would mean promoting sustainable development in all three dimensions, i.e. socially, economically and environmentally (United Nations, 2012). The outcome also led to an establishment of an, an inclusive multi-stakeholder consultative process whose mandate is to identify a set of SDGs open working group (paragraphs 246-248, United Nations, 2012,).

Having conducted 13 sessions of multi-stakeholder consultations since January 2013, the open working group agreed on a set of 17 SDGs (Box 9.1) and linked them to 169 targets to be taken as "an integrated, indivisible set of global priorities for sustainable development" (United Nations, 2014d).

**BOX 9.1 Sustainable development goals (SDGs) as proposed by the open working group**

**Goal 1.** End poverty in all its forms everywhere

**Goal 2.** End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture

**Goal 3.** Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

**Goal 4.** Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all

**Goal 5.** Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

**Goal 6.** Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

**Goal 7.** Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all

**Goal 8.** Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

**Goal 9.** Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

**Goal 10.** Reduce inequality within and among countries

**Goal 11.** Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

**Goal 12.** Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

**Goal 13.** Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

**Goal 14.** Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

**Goal 15.** Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

**Goal 16.** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

**Goal 17.** Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

*Source:* United Nations (2014d).

The proposed SDGs incorporate all of the eight goals listed in the MDGs and further extend its scope to include those related to economic development (e.g. inequalities, economic growth, decent jobs, industrialisation and energy) and an institutional framework required for peace and justice. The SDGs also expand and clarify the goals related to environmental sustainability, which includes climate change, cities and human settlements, ocean and marine resources and sustainable consumption and production patterns. The proposed SDGs was adopted by the 68th session of the UN General Assembly as "the basis for integrating sustainable development goals into the post-2015 development agenda" in the intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda (United Nations, 2014e).

## The post-2015 development agenda will be universal, transformative and integrated

In December 2014, just a month before the start of the intergovernmental negotiations, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released his Synthesis Report on the Post-2015 Agenda as a substantive input to the above-mentioned intergovernmental negotiations.

The Synthesis Report provides his own summary of the discussions on the post-2015 development agenda and demonstrates what may be the overarching principles of the post-2015 development agenda, namely the agenda should be: 1) universal; 2) transformative; 3) and integrated across the three dimensions of sustainable development.

Universal agenda means that they are applicable to all countries, not only to developing countries, as was the case with the MDGs. The universality also implies that all stakeholders, not only the governments, should be involved in such a way that we achieve the SDGs relying on a "shared responsibility for a shared future".

Transformative agenda means that it should transform our economies, environment and society in a way that will make "our patterns of growth more inclusive, sustained and sustainable" (paragraph 54, United Nations, 2014b). The concept of a transformative agenda was first elaborated by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLPE) on the post-2015 development agenda, which was been convened by the UN Secretary-General in 2012. The HLPE's final report recommends that the post-2015 development agenda should be driven by five major transformative shifts, including in the way we incorporate environmental and climate change concerns into social and economic development (United Nations, 2013a). Many of the illustrative goals and targets presented in the report have been incorporated in the open working group's proposal on the SDGs.

A major implication of a transformative agenda is that in addition to meeting the quantitative targets within a given time frame – as was the case with the MDGs – the process of implementing the agenda should also reinforce sustainability in all three dimensions.

Finally, the agenda should be integrated. On this point the synthesis report stipulates that: "Sustainable development must be an integrated agenda for economic, environmental and social solutions. [. . .] This integration provides the basis for economic models that benefit people and the environment; for environmental solutions that contribute to progress; for social approaches that add to economic dynamism and allow for the preservation and sustainable use of the environmental common; and for reinforcing human rights, equality, and sustainability" (paragraph 82, United Nations, 2014b).

The emphasis on the interlinkages between social, economic and environmental aspects of development may have resulted directly from the difficult experiences many LDCs had in their efforts to attain the MDGs. The difficulty stemmed from the fact that the MDG framework, while effectively addressing what should be achieved as mostly social development goals, did not indicate how they could be achieved.

During the MDG implementation phase, it became clear that pursuing social development goals requires addressing the root cause of the problems, which was found in most cases in the underlying fragility of countries' economy. Poor economic performance constrained countries' resource bases required for eliminating poverty or promoting health and education. Continuing undernourishment, poor health and low educational attainment prevented many households and workers in LDCs from improving their productive capacity, hence prolonged their poor economic performance. Few LDCs managed to escape this vicious circle in the MDG years (UNCTAD, 2014).

With a view to integrating goals, targets and the means of implementation into one cohesive and integrated whole, the UN Secretary-General's Synthesis Report suggests that the 17 SDGs be framed into six essential elements comprising: 1) dignity, to end poverty and fight inequality; 2) people, to ensure healthy lives, knowledge and the inclusion of women and children; 3) prosperity, to grow a strong, inclusive and transformative economy; 4) planet, to protect our ecosystems for all societies and our children; 5) justice, to promote safe and peaceful societies and strong institutions; and 6) partnership, to catalyse global solidarity for sustainable development. (see Figure 9.1).

**Figure 9.1 Six essential elements of the SDGs**


*Source:* The UN Secretary-General's Synthesis Report (2014)

## How trade is treated in the SDGs ?

Increasing synergies across different goals may also be achieved by clustering targets under different goals according to a common issue that different target address, that are closely related to international trade.

International trade can significantly increase a country's income-generating capacity. As such, trade has been treated as an engine for economic growth and development in the global partnerships, including the previous FfD Conferences in Monterrey (2002) and in Doha (2008). With respect to the SDGs, the Rio+20 outcome reaffirmed that trade was one of essential means of implementation of a sustainable development strategy (paragraph 281, United Nations, 2012).

### BOX 9.2.1 Trade-related targets and how they relate to the WTO provisions

**Goal 2.** End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture

**2.b:** Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortion in world agricultural markets, including by the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round

**Goal 3.** Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

**3.b:** Support research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the TRIPS agreement regarding flexibilities to protect public health and, in particular provides access to medicines for all

**Goal 10.** Reduce inequality within and among countries

**10.b:** Implement the principle of special and differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with WTO agreement

**Goal 14.** Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

**14.6:** By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing, and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations (taking into account ongoing WTO negotiations and WTO Doha Development Agenda and Hong Kong Ministerial Mandate)

**Goal 17.** Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

**17.10:** Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the WTO including through the conclusion of negotiations within its Doha Development Agenda (DDA)

**17.12:** Realise timely implementation of duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) market access on a lasting basis for all least developed countries consistent with WTO decisions, including, through ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from LDCs are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access

*Source:* United Nations (2014d).

There are about 20 targets in different SDGs that are related to international trade (see Box 9.2). These trade-related targets can be classified into two groups: one that addresses an institutional framework, i.e. the multilateral trade rules under the World Trade Organization and one that is related to trade in its functional form, i.e. importing and exporting goods and services.

Box 9.2.2 lists only selected targets (the list is non-exhaustive) which include those targets that are interlinked with a country's capacity to increase gains from trade. The outcome of these trade-related targets will positively influence a country's supply capacity and the competitiveness of its goods and services in the international market.

**BOX 9.2.2 Targets related to the functional nature of trade (non-exhaustive)**

**Goal 8.** Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

- **8.2:** Achieve higher levels of productivity in economies through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high value added and labour-intensive sectors
- **8.3:** Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation and encourage formalisation and growth of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services
- **8.9:** Devise and implement policies by 2030 to promote sustainable tourism which creates jobs, promotes local culture and products
- **8.a:** Increase aid-for-trade support for developing countries, particularly LDCs, including through the Enhanced Integrated Framework for LDCs

**Goal 9.** Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation

- **9.1:** Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-border infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all
- **9.3:** Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, particularly in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and foster their integration into value chains and markets
- **9.b:** Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a policy environment conducive to, among other things, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities

**Goal 10.** Reduce inequality within and among countries

- **10.c:** By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%

**Goal 14.** Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

- **14.7:** By 2030, increase the economic benefits to SIDS and LDCs of the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism

**Goal 15.** Protect, restore and promote the sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems [. . .] and halt biodiversity loss

- **15.7:** Take urgent action to end the poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both the demand and supply of illegal wildlife products
- **15.c:** Enhance global support of efforts to combat the poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities

**Goal 17.** Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

- **17.11:** Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the LDC share of global exports by 2020

*Source:* United Nations (2014d).

## TRADE AS A MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

As seen in the previous section, the SDG framework as it stands today treats international trade as a means to achieving inclusive and sustainable development in the coming decades. Trade is considered one of the non-financial means of implementation because of the positive impact that trade-related actions can generate upon a country's socioeconomic developmental capacity (UNCTAD, 2014e).

The SDG framework also suggests certain actions to be taken by the global partnership with a view to enhancing the development-enabling power of trade. These are presented as targets under goal 17 (i.e. targets 17.10-17.12). The upcoming conference on FfD in Addis Ababa in July 2015 may further detail what the international community can do to help developing countries make the best use of international trade in their efforts to achieve SDGs (UN, 2015).

This section maps out two specific channels – public and private financing – through which importing and exporting of goods and services can generate or mobilise financial resources and non-financial economic dynamism.

International trade could be the single most important external source of development financing, particularly to small developing countries and LDCs. On average, the value of these countries' total trade (i.e. imports plus exports) amounted to 60% of their GDP in the years 2008-12, having increased significantly from an average 27% of GDP in the years 1986–90. This increase in the trade-to-GDP ratio occurred against GDP growth of around 7% during the period 2000–11, compared to 3% for developing countries as a whole (see the World Bank, World Development Indicator and UNCTAD Globestat).

**Figure 9.2 Trade - Financing paths**




*Source:* UNCTAD

**Figure 9.3 Estimated Tariff revenues as % of GDP**




*Source:* UNCTAD

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241571

## Trade as a source of public domestic finance

A government can raise public revenues from international trade in three major ways: 1) via tax on goods (and services) imported (i.e. tariff revenues); 2) via tax on goods (and services) exported (e.g. export tax); and 3) proceedings from exports, such as commodities (services are in parentheses because taxes on services involve various regulatory channels, such as licencing fees, and they are also indirectly taxed when they are integrated in goods).

On average the magnitude of tariff revenue in LDCs can be as large as 5% or more of their GDP, as compared to around 1% in the case of non-LDC developing countries. Moreover, the relative size of tariff revenues in LDCs has remained significant in the past 10-15 years, compared to a clear downward trend in non-LDC developing countries. This has been due to a massive increase in LDCs' imports during the period, which grew at the annual average of 17% between 2000 and 2010. During the same period, the average applied rate of import duties was only slightly reduced over the period, from 8% in 2002 to 7% in 2012.

Assuming that a high level of economic growth and associated import growth continues in LDCs, tariff revenues are likely to remain a significant source of public revenues. Measure such as customs automation e.g. via the UNCTAD Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) would help LDCs improve efficiency in customs revenue collection and substantially reduce trade costs. The ASYCUDA, an integrated customs management system for international trade and transport operations, is designed and developed for customs administrations, helping the trade community comply with international standards when fulfilling import-, export- and transit-related procedures and streamline procedures of cargo control and the transit and clearance of goods. The ASYCUDA has improved trade facilitation in over 90 countries, territories and regions.

Export taxes are levies on the value or quantity of products exported. They are most frequently applied to extractive commodities, such as ores, minerals other base metals and fossil fuels, and agricultural commodities. Export taxes have been increasing since the 2008-09 financial crises. Recent research based on a cross-country dataset for the years 2000-11 suggests that on average the ad valorem export tax rate on unprocessed commodities is around 20 % and on semi-processed and finished products it ranges between 13% and 17% (Solleder, 2013). Information on total export tax receipts in proportion to total public revenue is hard to obtain as export taxes are collected through various channels.

Governments can also raise a significant amount of public revenue from commodity exports, e.g. via contractual schemes such as production sharing and/or state equity (UNCTAD, 2014). Revenue raised through commodity exports may be pooled as a fund. An example would Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), which are state-owned investment funds that direct exporting countries' windfall gains into international bond and stock markets. SWFs bourgeoned during the recent commodity boom years: of an estimated USD 4.7 trillion held in SWFs by the end of 2011, over 40 % – USD 2 trillion – was from commodities and owned by developing countries (Ibid.). In certain cases, revenue from commodity exports is used for fiscal stabilisation when overall tax revenue falls below the expected level. Such a measure can insulate the domestic economy from external shocks arising from commodity price volatility (UNCTAD, 2013b).

International trade is thus an important source of public revenue to LDCs, many of which are highly specialised in the export of commodity ores, metals and fossil fuels. As shown in Table 9.1, when all the trade-related revenue (i.e. the aggregate revenue from import and export duties, tax on exports and other trade-related revenue) are put together, it accounts for a significant portion of the total public revenue in low income countries (World Bank World Development Indicator, 2013). Another estimate by Cage and Gadenne (2014) suggests that trade-related revenue for sub-Saharan African countries, many of which are LDCs, may make up around a quarter of their total public revenue.

**TABLE 9.1 Trade-related revenue (as % of total public revenue)**

| | 2000 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|
| **High income** | 1 | 1 |
| **Middle income** | 7 | 5 |
| **Low & middle income** | 8 | 6 |
| East Asia & Pacific | 9 | 8 |
| Europe & Central Asia | 6 | 3 |
| Latin America & Caribbean | 7 | 5 |
| Middle East & North Africa | 10 | 5 |
| South Asia | 15 | 14 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | ... | 25* |

*Source:* World Bank World Development Indicator (2013); Cagé and Gadenne (2014).

## Trade as a source of private domestic finance

In addition to the above-mentioned direct revenue-generating paths, participation in international trade can mobilise a significant amount of private-sector financial resources by encouraging domestic or foreign investment in the productive capacity for trade-related goods and services. International trade can also boost the income-generating capacity of domestic businesses by fostering a vent for surplus, creating jobs and improving the overall economic prospects of a country, which are essential requirements for the eradication of absolute poverty.

Foreign direct investment remains the most stable and long-term source of international private financing for developing countries. FDI flows to developing countries reached USD 778 billion in 2013, exceeding the total FDI flows to developed countries. For LDCs, FDI is a relatively important source of finance, accounting for around 21% of the total external sources of finance received in 2012. Moreover, while FDI amounts to less than 10% of the value of gross fixed capital formation in developing countries, in LDCs it reaches around 15% (UNCTAD, 2014b).

The link between trade and FDI flows has been tightened in recent years as a result of the rise of GVCs (United Nations, 2014f). Today, roughly 60% of goods and services traded are intermediate and capital goods, suggesting the evolving nature of production-sharing schemes across the globe. Over the past 20 years, FDI flows and trade flows have expanded significantly. In the years between 1990 and 2010, there was a strong positive relationship between FDI from OECD countries to developing countries and the improvement of the latter's market access conditions to international markets (Fugazza and Trentini, 2014). The predominant portion of FDI from OECD countries to non-OECD countries during the same period was used for the creation of an export platform. This explains well the recent parallel growth of FDI and trade via networks of GVCs, i.e. South-South exports of intermediate goods and South-North exports of final goods through bilateral and regional trade agreements.

Remittances are a significant source of income to developing countries, particularly to LDCs, growing by an estimated 6.0% to reach USD 414 billion in 2013, well above total ODA (World Bank, 2012). In 2013, remittances received by LDCs reached USD 31 billion, compared to USD 28 billion in FDI and USD 43 billion in ODA. Remittances directly boost the level of disposable income of private households in LDCs and can make a significant impact on the household's investment decisions, including investment in education and training. A study of 77 developing countries found that a 10.% rise in remittances led to a 3.1% reduction in the percentage of the population living on less than USD 1.3 a day (UNCTAD, 2011).

**TABLE 9.2 Composition of external sources of finance, 2012**

| | LDCs | Developing and Transition Economies |
|---|---|---|
| **ODA** | 38 | 6 |
| **Remittances** | 26 | 20 |
| **FDI** | 21 | 40 |
| **Other investments** | 13 | 11 |
| **Portfolio investments** | 1 | 23 |
| **TOTAL** | 100% | 100% |

*Source:* UNCTAD World Investment Report (2014).

## Trade as a non-financial means of enhancing economic viability

Trade also plays a key role as a non-financial means to development by improving the economy's income-generating capacity and bolstering its economic viability from the bottom up, which in turn reduces the overall financing needs for achieving development goals such as poverty alleviation.

In the simplest cases, trade improves a developing country's access to goods and services that are essential to providing a life of dignity for all, such as essential medicines, vaccines, medical equipment and certain health care services. Access to these essential goods and services via trade – and by further reducing trade costs for acquiring them – can improve the cost-effectiveness of a country's public expenditure in areas such as healthcare when the availability of such goods and services are still limited in the domestic market. For example, there is evidence that improving international trade logistics – which reduces trade costs – can help increase vaccination rates in developing countries as specific handling procedures are required for such products (United Nations, 2013b).

Trade can contribute to inclusive development, especially when trade results in job creation for economically disadvantaged segments of the society, such as women. In Lesotho, trade-led expansion of the apparel industry generated over 30 000 new jobs between 1999 and 2004, most of which have been filled by women. Lesotho's clothing industry has grown to be the country's single largest employer, with some 48 000 jobs in 2004, which confirms that trade policy – in this case, preferential access to the US markets under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – can play a catalytic role in generating formal jobs for people, including underprivileged and relatively unskilled women (UNCTAD, 2012a). Beyond job creation, however, there are still major challenges in terms of vulnerability and inequality. The jobs that were made available to women in the apparel industry were concentrated in the low-wage segment, with limited opportunities to develop skills. And the stability of the jobs very much depends on the continuation of the preferential market access.

The catalytic impact of trade is maximised when business linkages connect the trade sector with the non-trade sector. In this way increased trade generates jobs not only in export sectors but also in sectors that facilitate imports and exports, such as transport, packaging, marketing and financial services.

As regards impacting social development, economic opportunities arising from trade can provide people with a greater incentive to obtain a higher education or skills training. In India, for example, growth in services exports based on IT, such as call centres and offshore administrative services, increased the demand for female workers, which in turn increased the enrolment of girls, particularly in English-language schools (Oster and Millet, 2013).

## Trade in the post-2015 development paradigm

> Progress in sustainable development will depend on vibrant economies and inclusive growth to keep pace with growing populations and longer life expectancies, and to generate employment, wages, and revenues for social programmes. (Paragraph 133, Synthesis Report of the UN Secretary-General)

This section examines how the new development paradigm under the post-2015 development agenda will affect the possible contribution of international trade to LDCs' capability to achieve inclusive and sustainable development.

This question can be approached by examining: 1) if the current international trade trend would facilitate or impede the role of trade as a means for development; 2) if and how the global focus on sustainable development would influence LDCs' capacity to use trade for sustainable development purposes ; and 3) a possible new approach of international development co-operation, in particular aid for trade, to meet new challenges.

The focus is placed on LDCs because they face a relatively greater challenge in achieving the SDGs, which are in general more ambitious than the MDGs. Moreover, as discussed above, the qualitative as well as quantitative contribution of international trade to their socioeconomic development can be much greater than to other countries.

### HOW DOES TRADE HELP LDCs ACHIEVE THE SDGs?

The global market is fast moving towards a tariff-free environment through a proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTA) at bilateral, regional and inter-regional levels. By mid-2014, there were 585 PTAs notified to the WTO, of which 379 are currently in force. However, most PTAs bypassed LDCs, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa.

The proliferation of RTAs can reduce the value of preferential market access that is enjoyed by LDCs. Imagine that the EU, which provides LDCs with the "Everything-but-Arms (EBA)" arrangement, forms a RTA with non-LDC countries. This will reduce if not eliminate the gap between the EBA rate (i.e. zero per cent) and the tariff rate that applies to the RTA member countries. That is, the "relative" preferential margin (RPM) of LDCs is eroded. An UNCTAD study, which looked into the impact of RPM erosion on exports from sub-Saharan African countries (many of which are LDCs), estimated that one unit fall in the RPM would reduce these countries' exports on average by 0.30 percentage point (Nicita and Rollo, 2013). The study concluded that any erosion of preferential margins due to the proliferation of RTAs outside sub-Saharan Africa would imply a reduction in the probability of exports from sub-Saharan Africa, both for existing flows and for potential flows.

The proliferation of PTAs outside LDCs may have a serious implications for the usefulness of the SDG target 17.12, which calls for a "timely implementation of duty-free, quota-free market access [. . .] for all LDCs". Even if this target is achieved, i.e. all the exports from LDCs face zero tariffs in major importing markets, its impact upon the promotion of LDCs' exports may be limited in face of continuing tariff liberalisation by developed and non-LDC developing countries on a bilateral, regional and global basis. This calls for additional action by the international community if the aim is to provide LDCs with significantly improved exporting opportunities.

## How the transformative agenda affects the use of trade as a means of implementation

As discussed in section A.2, the post-2015 development agenda is intended to be a transformative agenda, placing a strong emphasis on reshaping the way we live to make it more environmentally sustainable. It stresses that today's economic development should not undermine the opportunities of future generations' development.

For instance, under SDG 12 (Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns), countries are expected to "achieve sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources by 2030" (target 12.1) and "rationalise inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption" (target 12.c). SDG 7 (Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy) suggests that countries "increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030" (target 7.2).

A "transformative" agenda may have significant impacts on the trading environment surrounding LDCs, directly or indirectly.

First, an increase in environmental sensitivity for instance can reduce the demand for natural resource-based commodities, especially fossil energy-related products. This can gradually reduce export-related public revenue of commodity-dependent LDCs, at the time when they will be facing rising financing needs for achieving sustainable development. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014 estimates the total investment needs of LDCs in the sectors related to sustainable development amounts to nearly USD120 billion a year, while the current investments in LDCs in these sectors are around USD40 billion a year. The "key SDG sectors" include transport, water and sanitation, climate change mitigation and adaptation, bio-diversity, and biodiversity maintenance, among others. Separately, the final report from the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing indicated that the financing need to meet SDGs could amount to US$ 200 billion annually, which exceeds even the highest-ever level of ODA in the year 2013, at USD 134.8 billion in net terms (United Nations, 2014f)

To meet these financing needs, LDCs need special and targeted support from the international community, with a view to attracting the required resources from domestic and foreign investors. They must leverage ODA for additional private funds, provide technical assistance to improve productive capacity and reduce trade costs (UNCTAD, 2014b). Such support is crucial for commodity-dependent LDCs to broaden and deepen horizontal and vertical linkages between the commodity sectors and other sectors of the economy, while improving efficiency by ensuring the best use of windfall revenue from commodity exports (UNCTAD, 2014c).

Second, a transformative agenda can influence trade in the framework of the post-2015 development agenda through non-tariff measures (NTMs). NTMs are measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that can make a quantitative impact upon the import flows of the country applying such measures (UNCTAD, 2010). The majority of NTMs identified today are so-called technical measures, which set the quality standard of the products concerned to ensure sound socioeconomic and environmental living conditions (e.g. food safety and environmental protection measures). More than 50 % of exported products of developing countries face some types of technical NTMs (UNCTAD, 2012b).

The overarching objective of most of the technical measures is to protect, among others, human safety, and the environmental sustainability. That is, they closely resonate with the SDGs, in particular Goal 2, 3, 12, 13 and 15 that cover food security, healthy lives and actions to achieve sustainable ecosystems. In this context, it is most likely that, in attempt to achieve SDGs, countries across the globe are likely to increase such technical measures in the coming years.

The problem is that an increased use of such measures in one country implies an increased cost in other countries' exports. The aggregate impact of SPS and TBT measures on trade costs is high, particularly for LDCs, both in terms of the entry costs and the transaction costs. A recent UNCTAD study provides estimates of average *ad valorem* equivalents (AVEs) of selected NTMs at the sectoral level (Cadot et al., 2015). The results are relevant: on average, NTMs in the livestock and agricultural sectors impose import barriers equal to around a 26-27% tariff. Over 20 % stem from SPS and TBT measures in these sectors. Various other sectors that developing countries export in have AVEs higher than 15%. This is overwhelmingly the result of technical measures (see Figure 9.5).

Another UNCTAD study investigated the effect of the EU's SPS measures for 21 broad categories of agricultural goods. It found that the potential trade-distorting effect imposed by such measures was asymmetric across different exporting countries. More precisely, the EU's SPS measures generate higher burdens to exporters from low income countries than other countries (Murina and Nicita, 2014). Overall, the trade distortionary impact of the SPS measures on lower income countries' agricultural exports was about USD 3 billion – roughly equal to 14% of their total agricultural exports to the EU – in addition to the reduction in exports due to competing exporters. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that while many middle and high income countries have the internal capacity to comply with SPS measures, lower income countries do not.

**Figure 9.4 Ad valorem equivalents of SPS, TBT and other NTMs, by sector**




*Source:* Cadot et al. (2015).

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## Can the global partnership help LDCs overcome potential rise in trade costs?

What could be done to lessen the negative impact of technical and regulatory measures in the international market – whose incidence is likely to increase in the coming years – upon exports of LDCs? The difficulty of the issue is that the problem arises as a side-effect of other countries' policy measures aiming at improving the well-being of their people and protecting the environment. The solution for such problems would require actions from the global partnership, including the Aid-for-Trade Initiative.

Unlike tariffs or non-tariff barriers such as quotas, eliminating SPS and TBT measures for the sake of LDCs' export promotion is not an option. Here, the global partnership can redress the root causes of trade costs upon LDCs' exports incurred from NTMs while at the same time help LDCs themselves develop the capacity to effectively use such policy measures for meeting their own SDGs linked to food security, health and environmental protection.

One of the sources of trade costs arising from NTMs is the cost of acquiring information on NTMs, particularly on SPS/TBT measures in importing countries. The challenge multiplies when different importing countries apply different SPS and TBT measures on the same product. Furthermore, information on such measures is scattered across various regulatory agencies in a country, which makes gathering the relevant data difficult and costly. One existing action by the global partnership to address the information deficit of LDCs and other developing countries is the Transparency in Trade (TNT) initiative. TNT is an inter-agency programme of UNCTAD, the World Bank, the International Trade Centre

and the African Development Bank. It facilitates the international effort to collect official data and information on NTMs applied in different countries and improves transparency by classifying different measures under a common taxonomy jointly developed by different international agencies (UNCTAD, 2012c). To date, data for 51 countries has been collected and coverage of over 90 % of world trade is envisaged for 2015.

Another source of trade costs, closely related to the above, is the disparity across countries of the targeted level of product quality standards or required processing methods of a given SPS or TBT measure. The global partnership may encourage increased harmonisation of national standards based on the international standards (e.g. those that are internationally agreed on and scientifically proven), which will remove many of the restrictions to trade, as production processes do not need to be customised to meet requirements particular to each export market.

Harmonisation can be attempted multilaterally, but an increasing number of bilateral, regional and mega-regional agreements incorporates an ambition to mutually recognise or harmonise SPS and TBT requirements. Potential benefit of bilateral or regional harmonisation on reducing trade costs of developing countries has been debated. Shepherd (2007) presents empirical evidence that the harmonisation towards international standards increases export diversification into new markets, while bilateral harmonisation does not. The study estimates that a 1.0% increase in country-specific standards leads to a 0.7% decrease in partner-country export variety, while a 1% increase in internationally harmonised standards actually increases export variety by 0.3%. Both effects are larger in absolute value terms for low-income countries than for high-income countries, thus highlighting the importance of the international harmonisation of standards from a development point of view. Disdier, Cadot and Fontagné (2012) indicate that the effect of technical requirements contained in North-South trade agreements results in developing countries adopting the more stringent requirements of the developed markets, thereby increasing the sellability of their products. However, these higher standards also lead to higher costs in the South, thereby reducing the competitiveness of the markets in the South.

Another source of trade costs is the lack of technical, financial and administrative capacity of LDCs in designing and implementing the technical measures necessary to achieve their own SDGs. As discussed, the measures that are seen as NTMs are policy measures that are pertinent to achieve goals related to health, safety and the protection of the ecosystem. The global partnership, such as the Aid-for-Trade Initiative, could provide support to LDCs designing their own policy measures, in a way that it will improve LDCs' administrative and technical capacity in dealing with these measures, which in turn will reduce the compliance costs they are facing with the NTMs in their export markets.

## WHAT WILL BE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AID FOR TRADE INITIATIVE?

At the time of the second FfD Conference (the Doha Declaration), a critical aim of aid for trade was considered to be to "help developing countries, particularly LDCs, with trade policy and regulations; trade development; building productive capacities; trade related infrastructure; trade-related adjustment and other trade-related needs." These elements will no doubt remain relevant as the expected outcome of aid for trade.

However, the new development paradigm under the post-2015 development agenda may require aid for trade to adopt a new approach – an integrated approach. This is about ensuring the achievements made under aid for trade lead to an inclusive and sustainable development outcome. Perhaps more importantly, the design and the implementation framework of aid for trade projects must be inclusive and sustainable. In this respect, what is the Aid for Trade Initiative expected to contribute to the post-2015 development agenda?

The aid-for-trade monitoring exercise indicated that many partner countries, as well as donor countries, have high hopes that aid-for-trade can contribute to improving a country's capacity to achieve the goals of the post-2015 development agenda. Expectations are particularly high regarding aid for trade's contribution to economic growth and poverty eradication through inclusive and sustainable development and financing for development. This confirms that countries themselves see trade as an effective enabler, or a means of implementation, of the post-2015 development agenda (see Figure 9.5).

The response also indicates that countries – particularly partner countries – are yet to be convinced that economic development and social and environmental outcomes, such as improving women's economic empowerment or achieving green growth, are bolstered by aid for trade.

What would be key contribution of reduction in trade costs to achieving inclusive and sustainable development? To this question, both partner and donor countries responded that a direct contribution would be upon increase in exports and employment, and diversification in export markets. Interestingly, only partner countries associate a reduction in trade costs with diversification in export products and increasing domestic private sector investment, which are closely associated with structural transformation of their economies (Figure 9.6).

The above responses also reconfirm the importance of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative designed and implemented with an integrated approach. Trade policy in the post-2015 development paradigm will be a part of a holistic development strategy. The expected outcome of a trade policy would not only promote trade but also make trade bring the country closer to achieving inclusive and sustainable development. That is, the Aid-for-Trade Initiative is expected to help countries achieve policy coherence between trade promotion and economic development on the one hand and social and environmental development objectives on the other.

The United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity may provide a useful example on how to achieve policy coherence at the national level (see United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity: Delivering Aid for Trade, 2014). Launched in April 2008, fifteen UN entities are collaborating in this inter-agency mechanism which creates an integrated approach for delivering joint programmes and operations related to trade and productive capacity improvement (current members of the cluster are UNCTAD, UNIDO, FAO, ILO, UNCITRAL, ITC, WTO, UNDP, the five UN Regional Commissions, UNEP and UNOPS). Being a unique UN-wide effort, the cluster co-ordinates the trade-related development contributions of different entities to the global agendas of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative, the MDGs, the upcoming SDGs and the post-2015 development agenda.

**Figure 9.5 Contribution of the Aid for Trade Initiative to the post-2015 development agenda**




Source: Joint OECD/WTO monitoring exercise (2015)

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**Figure 9.6 Contribution of a reduction in trade costs to inclusive and sustainable development**




Source: Joint OECD/WTO monitoring exercise (2015)

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## CONCLUSIONS

Trade has been an engine of economic growth and a source of financial and non-financial means for development. In particular to LDCs, international trade has been an essential source public revenue, domestic private sector investment and capital formation required for improving productive capacities and structural transformation.

The post-2015 development agenda, which aim at inclusive and sustainable development in all three (social, economic and environmental) dimensions, requires a significantly increased amount of financing needs. This would increase the importance of international trade as a source of public/private financing for development for developing countries particularly LDCs. However, the "transformative" nature of the post-2015 development agenda may affect the future trade flows in such a way that increase trade costs facing LDCs exports via, *inter alia*, a rising number of NTMs in LDCs' market countries.

For the Aid-for-Trade Initiative to help LDCs use international trade in their effort to achieve inclusive and sustainable development, it needs to be designed and implemented with an "integrated" approach. That is, in addition to achieving trade promotion and diversification via, e.g. strengthening productive capacities, the Aid-for-Trade Initiative may aim at helping countries reinforce the channels through which trade "outcomes" can exert positive influence over social, economic and environmental outcomes.

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# CHAPTER 10

# BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES ON BOOSTING TRADE AND INVESTMENT

*Contributed by the World Economic Forum*

***Abstract:*** *Business is a strong proponent of reducing frictional barriers to trade and investment. Partnership between the public and private sectors is needed to ensure that efforts in implementation address value chain needs and reach tipping points for growth. To that end, it is important to integrate the private sector at the beginning of aid-for-trade planning. Constant dialogue between government and the private sector can help adapt reforms to meet the needs of users and enhance impact. While the first priority of business is implementing the Trade Facilitation Agreement, measures to streamline border administration should not stop there. A comprehensive and co-ordinated approach beyond encouraging trade is also required. For example, enabling trade should go hand in hand with facilitating investment. This chapter addresses these issues from the business viewpoint, reviews ongoing efforts and suggests options for enhanced collaboration between business and donors in driving and implementing trade facilitation.*

## INTRODUCTION

Trade facilitation enables workers and consumers around the world to access not only specific product markets but also global value chains (GVCs). In these, production processes are split into smaller tasks, allowing countries to take on previously unavailable niche roles. However, both low and high income countries have concerns about value concentration within these chains. To compete for high value-added activities and maximise the developmental value of contributing to GVCs, countries need high-quality trade facilitation and an appreciation of the strong services component of today's value chains.

Information gaps, administrative inefficiencies and infrastructural inadequacies are key barriers to enhanced participation in GVCs. Improving access to them will require not only procedural and institutional reform as well as investment in infrastructure, but also the upgrading of domestic capabilities through better information exchanges, coaching and certification.

The path to high-quality trade facilitation requires a number of steps, several of which are well under way around the world.

- Implementing the Section I articles of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) is a basic necessity. Countries should work to align with global value chain needs in prioritising domestic reforms and donor support in line with TFA Section II or broader aid-for-trade objectives. This requires a greater consideration of private-sector expertise. National trade facilitation committees should draw on industry bodies as sources of supply chain knowledge and experience. Furthermore, a greater role for private-sector value chain experience is needed within the World Trade Organization (WTO) itself to inform trade policy reviews and other exercises. This can be supplemented by deeper analytical insights from the Trade in Value-Added database.
- More ambitiously, agreement and implementation of the Doha Round, the services and information technology negotiations and, eventually, an agreement on investment, would provide multilateral or plurilateral support for high-quality trade facilitation.
- Against this background, an essential first step is to identify the most important bottlenecks to trade and supply chain connectivity (see Box 10.1, Figure 10.2); this is the aim of The Global Enabling Trade Report 2014, introduced below. Published every two years, the report informs policy-makers, partners and donors about priority areas and helps monitor progress.
- The subsequent sections highlight the private sector's role in directing support to the areas of greatest need and ensuring commercial tipping points are reached. For scale as well as implementation in the poorest countries, stronger co-operation is needed between official donor and private-sector efforts, with recipient countries always being the ultimate owners.

**Figure 10.1 Public-Private Patnerships**



## BOX 10.1 Business perspective: the most problematic factors for trade

The Executive Opinion Survey (EOS), conducted by the World Economic Forum (see also Box 10.2), sheds additional light on the obstacles businesses face at the national level when exporting and importing.

One of the survey's 140 questions asks participants to select from a list of 19 factors the five most problematic ones for their economy; the lists consists of 12 factors for exporting and seven for importing. Respondents were further asked to rank the five factors from 1 (the most problematic) to 5 (the least problematic). A score was assigned for each answer based on the rank, from five points for the first-ranked factor to one point for the fifth-ranked factor. A weighted score was computed by summing the points of each factor and dividing the sum by the total points of all factors.

Figure 10.2 reports the weighted scores by income group for the factors associated with exporting and importing.* The results underline not only the importance of trade facilitation at multilateral and bilateral levels but also the potential for countries to facilitate trade through practical measures within their government's purview.

### Figure 10.2 The most problematic factors for exporting and importing, by income group
Weighted scores in points, 2014




Notes

* Aggregate scores correspond to the average scores of each factor across all economies belonging to the income group.

Classification adapted from the World Bank's income-group classification (situation as of July 2014). Number of economies by income group: high (50), upper-middle (37), lower-middle (35) and low (21). Factors sorted in descending order according to global average.

*Source:* World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey (2014); see Browne et al. (2014) for more detail.

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**BOX 10.1 Business perspective: the most problematic factors for trade** *(continued)*




Notes

* Aggregate scores correspond to the average scores of each factor across all economies belonging to the income group.

Classification adapted from the World Bank's income-group classification (situation as of July 2014). Number of economies by income group: high (50), upper-middle (37), lower-middle (35) and low (21). Factors sorted in descending order according to global average.

*Source:* World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey (2014); see Browne et al. (2014) for more detail.

*Source:* World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey (2014); see Browne et al. (2014) for more detail.

- More generally, the trade community suffers from a schism between those involved in policy development and those in implementation and capacity building. The private sector typically has fewer isolated groups in this regard and can help bridge the two. Where trade facilitation efforts can link into a future-oriented agenda for the digital economy and services policy, among other things, the trade community's full strength can be applied to driving progress.

*The Global Enabling Trade Report 2014* aims to shed light on the obstacles that businesses face in specific countries when exporting and importing.

## MONITORING PROGRESS: THE ENABLING TRADE INDEX

Published initially by the World Economic Forum in 2008 and biennially since 2010, the Enabling Trade Index (ETI) is a composite indicator that assesses to what extent economies have the institutions, policies, infrastructures and services in place to facilitate the free flow of goods over borders and to their destinations.

The index covers not only factors related to market access, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, but also those that facilitate trade at the more practical level: more efficient border administration, better infrastructure and telecommunications and improved regulatory and security regimes that secure property rights and reduce transaction costs.

The focus on trade facilitation is particularly relevant in the wake of the WTO's Ninth Ministerial Conference held in Bali in 2013 and the decisions adopted subsequently by the General Council in November 2014. Governments, businesses and development partners have had trade facilitation high on their agendas since the Bali agreement. The heightened interest represents an opportunity for policy makers, especially in developing countries, to push through trade-enabling measures. As the conclusion of the full Doha Development Agenda remains a distant prospect, and in absence of real progress in market-access negotiations, the measures represent a way of reaping trade's important benefits.

## BOX 10.2 The enabling trade index

The ETI is a compilation of individual indicators into a single index on the basis of the underlying ETI framework. Since its inception, the framework's evolution has been driven by the availability of new indicators, feedback collected over the years and evidence from theoretical and empirical literature. Results for 2010 and 2014 in this chapter have been recalculated using the same methodology (elaborated in 2014) to ensure they are fully comparable. As a diagnostic tool, the index focuses on measuring the outcome and, purposely, does not inform about potential solutions.

### Figure 10.3 The Enabling Trade Index framework: by type of market, subindex and pillar


*Source:* World Economic Forum

The ETI framework captures the various dimensions of enabling trade, breaking them into four overall issue areas or subindices as follows:

- **Market access** – measures the extent and complexity of a country's tariff regime, as well as tariff barriers faced and preferences enjoyed by a country's exporters in foreign markets
- **Border administration** – assesses the quality, transparency and efficiency of a country's border administration
- **Infrastructure** – assesses the availability and quality of a country's transport infrastructure, associated services and communications infrastructure necessary to facilitate the movement of goods within the country and across the border
- **Operating environment** – measures the quality of key institutional factors impacting the business of importers and exporters active in a country.

These four areas are in turn subdivided into parts, or pillars, that capture more specific aspects within their respective broad-issue areas. Each pillar is composed of a number of indicators. The ETI's 56 indicators are sourced from various organisations, several of which provided guidance and support in designing the index's framework, creating new indicators or providing privileged or advanced access to their proprietary data sets. The International Trade Centre, Global Express Association, World Bank, WTO and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development are among the project's long-standing partners. In addition, 23 indicators, accounting for 36% of the ETI score, are derived from the World Economic Forum's EOS. The Forum has conducted the EOS annually for over 30 years, making it one of the longest-running and most extensive global surveys on the business environment. The 2014 edition gathered opinions from 13 000 respondents in 148 economies.

In this context, the ETI provides a tool for the international trade community to monitor progress on implementing these measures. In the context of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative, it helps identify topical and geographic areas of priority.

In addition, the importance of these factors is borne out through ample evidence in the empirical literature. For instance, research suggests that the quality of logistics, connectivity and border administration plays a role equal to, if not more important than, tariffs in determining bilateral trade costs (World Economic Forum, 2014a).

Box 10.2 briefly describes the ETI's structure, as well as the methodology and data used for computing the index, and Figure 10.3 illustrates the index's framework. The performance of different income-group countries across the ETI's seven pillars and against the average of the five best-performing economies (Ibid.) is plotted in Figure 10.4.

**Figure 10.4. The Enabling Trade Index 2014: Income group averages and best performers**




Note: Based on World Bank classification. See Table 1.

*Source:* World Economic Forum 2014.

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The ETI results reveal that low income countries perform consistently worse than others across most pillars. The gap is particularly large in areas where improvements require large financial efforts, such as the availability and quality of transport infrastructure and availability and use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). However, large gaps persist in the efficiency and transparency of border administration, an area at the core of the trade facilitation agenda. This aspect is often perceived as a quick win for boosting trade, as the benefits significantly outweigh the cost of necessary reforms. Modernising border administration is relatively less costly and less time-consuming and is politically easier because it is less controversial, as attested by the Bali agreement, which was adopted at a tumultuous time for international governance.

Realising trade's importance to development, the international community dedicates significant effort to addressing the bottlenecks and obstacles to trade. In 2005, the WTO launched the Aid-for-Trade Initiative to help "developing countries, and particularly least developed countries, trade", recognising that "many developing countries face a range of supply-side and trade-related infrastructure obstacles which constrain their ability to engage in international trade".

In 2012, the aid for trade of the OECD Development Assistance Committee accounted for 31% of total aid to the 23 low income countries included in the ETI of 2014. In addition, although this share remained stable, aid-for-trade disbursements increased by 126% between 2005 and 2012. Aid for trade to low income countries in sectors and areas within the scope of the ETI represented 0.7% of their combined GDP (following the OECD Creditor Reporting System, only funds classified under the following codes were included: 21010-21081; 22010-22040; 33110-33140; 33181; 24010-24081; and 25010-25020).This represents 44% of all aid for trade to these countries, with transport infrastructure alone accounting for 32%. The remaining aid for trade went to productive capacity building and specific economic infrastructure, such as energy generation and supply.

In this context, we use the ETI to assess whether in the past decade aid reached the countries that needed it most and targeted the areas where they lagged most behind. Figure 10.5 plots the average disbursements of aid for trade from 2005-12 within the scope of the ETI (expressed as a percentage of the recipient country's GDP) against the ETI overall scores for 2010 and 2014 (in blue and red, respectively). Only countries that received some aid for trade between 2005 and 2012 were included in the graph. This corresponds to 75 countries covered by the ETI of 2010 and 2014. Aid-for-trade data include official development assistance and other official flows. The linear fit is based on the ETI 2010 score.

**Figure 10.5 ETI score 2010 and 2014, and average aid-for-trade disbursements 2005-12 (% of GDP)**




*Source:* World Economic Forum; OECD (2015).

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Figure 10.5 shows that aid generally has benefited countries with the weakest performance across the ETI's seven pillars. In particular, Burundi, Mozambique, Gambia and Madagascar received, on average, 2-3% of their GDP every year in aid for trade – the highest proportion among countries analysed by the ETI. While Burundi's overall performance in the ETI improved significantly, the other three countries' performance was mostly stable. At the other end of the spectrum, countries such as Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire and Chad received relatively small amounts of aid given their performance in the ETI. Chad's performance, already the weakest within the sample, further deteriorated between 2010 and 2014, while the situation in Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire improved over the same period, though most likely helped by the end of political crises that affected the two countries around 2010.

**Figure 10.6 ETI score 2014 by pillar and aid-for-trade recipient group**




Note: see text for details.
*Source:* World Economic Forum.

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The ETI 2014 covers a total of 118 economies. Among them, 43 did not receive any aid for trade between 2005 and 2012. The remaining 75 countries were divided into three equal groups according to the average amount of aid for trade received: top-tier recipients correspond to the 67th percentile and higher, second-tier recipients correspond to the 34-66th percentile, and third-tier recipients to the 33rd percentile and lower. The performance of four sets of countries, compared across the seven pillars and grouped according to the amount of aid received from 2005-12, is shown in Figure 10.6. Top-tier aid-for-trade recipients – those that received, on average, more than 1.3% of their GDP in aid every year – perform consistently worse than other countries across all pillars, except for in foreign market access. In this pillar, they benefit from preferential access granted to least developed countries and other developing nations.

The gap between top-tier aid-for-trade recipients and the rest of the world is widest in the availability and use of ICTs (pillar 6), availability and quality of transport infrastructure (pillar 4), and efficiency and transparency of border administration (pillar 3). In the case of transport infrastructure, aid-for-trade disbursements have been largely aligned with countries' performance in pillar 4, as countries performing relatively poorly received more funds to address these weaknesses (Figure 10.6) (aid-for-trade disbursements include CRS codes 21010-21081; the linear fit is based on the ETI 2010 score). In particular, Mozambique and Burundi were again leading receivers of aid for trade, together with Madagascar, Benin and Gambia. Among these countries, Mali's infrastructure improved the most from 2010-14, while the performance of the other countries remained stable or slightly deteriorated.

Countries' aid-for-trade receipts for trade facilitation and the efficiency and transparency of their border administration (pillar 3) are plotted in Figure 10.8 (Aid-for-trade disbursements include CRS codes 33110-33120; the linear fit is based on the ETI 2010 score). Most countries have received little or no aid to address the hurdles and bottlenecks they face in this area, regardless of their performance. Burundi, and Jordan to a lesser extent, stand out as the countries that have received relatively more aid targeted at trade facilitation (Burundi's performance deteriorated and Jordan's improved between 2010 and 2014). Yet, countries with severe challenges, such as Chad, have received very little assistance over the last decade.

**Figure 10.7 ETI pillar-4 score 2010 and 2014 and average infrastructure aid-for-trade disbursements 2005-12**




*Source:* World Economic Forum; OECD (2015).

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**Figure 10.8 ETI pillar-3 score 2010 and 2014 and average infrastructure aid-for-trade disbursements 2005-12**




*Source:* World Economic Forum; OECD (2015).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241662

As revealed in Figure 10.6, ICTs and transport infrastructure are the main weaknesses faced by aid-for-trade-recipient countries taking part in international trade. Yet, few funds go to improving telecommunications and ICTs (Figure 10.8). The vast majority of developing countries receive little aid, if any at all, to improve their ICT infrastructure and bridge the wide gap – the largest of all ETI pillars – with developed economies. Gambia has received the most aid directed towards ICTs (as a proportion of GDP), with an average of about 0.4% annually between 2005 and 2012, followed by Mongolia and Mozambique. Once again, Chad stands out as one of the countries receiving the least, despite the challenges it faces in this area.

**Figure 10.9 ETI pillar-6 Score 2010 and 2014, and average ICT aid-for-trade disbursements 2005-12**




*Source:* World Economic Forum; OECD (2015).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org//10.1787/888933241673

The ETI diagnoses the extent to which a country's system enables trade. This represents an important first step in the decision making process, notably in the context of aid-for-trade activities. A diagnostic tool, the ETI neither informs on possible solutions nor makes specific recommendations. Yet, the results can be used to identify success stories across the development ladder, from the best performers to those less advanced economies that perform beyond their capabilities. Good practices can be identified by subsequently analysing the factors behind such achievements.

## EXAMPLES OF COMPANY-LED EFFORTS TO REACH TRADE TIPPING POINTS

Moving from the macro to the micro perspective, consideration should be given to how private-sector efforts, driven by a need to grow business, tackle critical choke points. Broader debottlenecking can occur where these combine, particularly with public sector initiatives.

### Building human capacity and port infrastructure

Since taking over management of the Dakar, Senegal port in 2008, Dubai Ports World (DP World), the container-handling company, has made a major contribution to Senegal's economy. By supporting the development of the terminal and local community, DP World created more than 200 jobs for local people, with specialised training given to terminal employees, expanding their skills and bringing operational efficiencies in line with global standards. Expansion raised capacity from less than 300 000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) to more than 600 000 TEUs. Outcomes include a significant reduction in ship dwell time and a dramatic increase in merchandise imports and exports, with benefits both to intra-African trade and Senegal's economy. Upgrading was supported by financing from the African Development Bank.

### Improving road safety

The high accident rate along Africa's roads is an obstacle to trade as well as a leading cause of injury and death. Improving safety in trade corridors is a cost-efficient way to facilitate trade on the continent. Against this background, TOTAL Group has partnered with the World Bank to improve safety along priority transport corridors in Africa, which by extension has improved the efficiency of key international trade and transit corridors (TOTAL & World Bank, see http://www.oecd.org/aidfortrade/48368666.pdf).

### Engaging smallholders and achieving critical volumes

Cassava is one of six target crops identified by the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture for special consideration, given its many industrial end uses. Current production, however, is used only for traditional foodstuffs, aside from a few first movers into value-added products such as high-quality cassava flour. Achieving profitability in these nascent value chains will require overcoming the logistical challenges of smallholder production networks and cassava's extremely low value-to-bulk ratio, along with obstacles in transport infrastructure. The public-private Cassava Development Corporation has been formed to drive progress in the industry by creating collection points that allow smallholders to consolidate loads for long-distance transport. Improving underlying infrastructure and adapting business models can help spur private investment in Nigeria's agricultural sector (World Economic Forum, 2014b).

### Packaging, storage and processing to cut loss and add value

Although India is the world's second-leading tomato producer, the supply chain is extremely fragmented. A number of supply chain-related hurdles contribute to losses of 25-30% during harvest, transport and at mandis (local marketplaces). CHEP and Unilever are collaborating on a pilot to improve transport packaging, allowing cost reductions and value upgrading (World Economic Forum, 2014c).

### Encouraging trade among small- and medium-sized enterprises

As a source of jobs and growth, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are important in domestic economies. These firms traditionally do limited exporting; a study of French firms (excluding internet-based companies) found that 65% of the largest companies export, as opposed to only 3% of the smallest. The internet helps SMEs participate in global business. eBay and the web, for example, have had a major impact on shifting the dynamic by providing SMEs with easier access to international markets. Through a pilot programme, eBay worked with small-business users to eliminate barriers for international buyers and sellers, providing transparency on fully landed costs and delivery dates by facilitating communication, handling and shipping. Preliminary results suggest that addressing barriers such as these can result in increases of cross-border activity by small-business sellers of 60-80% (World Economic Forum, 2013).

These examples show that trade facilitation does not exist in a vacuum. A broad set of stakeholders, many of whom may not see themselves as directly connected to trade flows, needs to see the benefits from working together to allow supply chains to operate. The more value that is added to supply chains, the more incentive there is to ensure snags in trade facilitation are ironed out.

## COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS AT IMPLEMENTATION: LESSONS LEARNT

While Brazil has had high growth rates in trade over the last ten years, companies still encounter some barriers. A perception survey conducted by the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) found that 44% of companies viewed customs bureaucracy as an issue of concern (Entraves às Exportações Brasileiras, CNI survey, 2014). In light of the results, Brazil began implementing *portal único*, the single-window facility.

Formally launched in April 2014 with the support of a presidential decree, portal único's focus is to make Brazil more competitive in trade procedures, increasing transparency for all stakeholders. The goal is to reduce the average time to export by 38% (from 13 days to eight) and the average time to import by 41% (from 17 days to ten). With one integrated system, Brazil could reduce bureaucracy and paper requirements, simplify procedures and make the process more user-friendly for trade operators.

The single window will require the co-ordination of different agencies with different priorities. The Secretariat of Foreign Trade (SECEX) and Secretariat of Customs (Receita Federal) are leading the project, with other agencies that participate in trade operations playing a role.

The lessons learnt are as follows:

- Appropriate presidential support is beneficial. During the preparation phase, the government created structures to serve as the project's foundation for the future. Support from key stakeholders up to the presidential level is helping to solidify the single-window project as one of the administration's top priorities. For example, the April 2014 presidential decree established a mechanism for co-operation among the relevant agencies as well as SECEX and Receita Federal, the two leading bodies managing the project. Moreover, the decree laid out the key features of a single-window operating model to be adopted.
- Designated co-ordinating bodies and governance help manage the process. To co-ordinate the different priorities and views of multiple stakeholders, Brazil created a managing committee with representatives from SECEX and Receita Federal. The committee articulates inter-agency issues and co-ordinates work streams, working groups and other participating agencies. In addition to the managing committee, the government formed a management body that is open to participation by members of other relevant agencies. Finally, the project designated the Foreign Trade Council (CAMEX) to arbitrate and articulate the inter-ministerial issues. Effective co-ordination requires a clear decision-making process that starts with identifying all the key roles and decision points and then assigns decision owners. This process allows all parties involved to clearly understand their role in important decisions and the level of involvement required. Although the managing committee oversees the entire process, it lacks executive power, a situation that could slow implementation if agencies' priorities change in the future.
- Private-sector involvement is important to a project's success. Brazil's government signed a co-operation agreement with Procomex, an alliance of associations and large Brazilian companies. Representatives from the private sector participate in Procomex-led meetings and workshops to map the current business processes, identify existing bottlenecks in border procedures and discuss ways to improve processes. Private-sector representatives also help define and validate the redesigned procedures. Separately, the government has worked directly with companies to discuss their views on trade barriers and solicit recommendations for refining the single-window project. Attracting support and input from the private sector is extremely important to the project's success; it helps Brazil create a collective view of the point of arrival it hopes to achieve. The country has succeeded in creating a vision for specific steps of the processes.
- A diagnosis can lead to improvements, identify risks and suggest ways to mitigate them. The initial diagnosis focused on the existing export procedures. Brazil studied approximately 48 processes that involved about 16 government bodies (figures estimated from Brazilian government materials). Receita Federal conducted studies on the time requirements for import phases, and customs mapped the time required from berthing to the receipt of goods by maritime importers in eight important Brazilian ports. The time requirement for each step was measured, with the goal of identifying the steps that had the biggest potential for improvement. Additionally, it was possible to measure the variability of time in each of the steps. SECEX and Receita Federal also identified 30 potential risks that could affect a project's successful implementation, ranking them on their likelihood and possible impact. The agencies suggested measures for mitigating those risks, which covered areas such as technology, redesign complexity, public stakeholder support, and risks stemming from the private sector and international organisations.

The communications approach, the key messages and their frequency can be adjusted by identifying each stakeholder's interest and level of impact in the project. As a result, resources can be deployed efficiently and more precisely. Private sector involvement is important to effective design of processes and appropriate diagnosis. The private sector applies pressure for short-term implementation; in response, the government prioritises export procedures.

Government is also aware of items that have an equal impact on trade operations and that should be tackled beyond the single-window project. One interesting example concerned the wide range of agency interactions required for import/export in the automotive sector, including such non-obvious requirements as phyto-sanitary inspection of the wooden pallets on which automotive components are transported. The Brazilian government, along with the automobile companies, has been improving import procedures in the automotive industry and results have already appeared. Import processes in Brazil begin with the licence certification, which, in most cases, should be issued prior to shipment (interviews with automobile companies in Brazil; see http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/manuaisweb/importacao/topicos/procedimentos_preliminares/licenciamento_da_importacao/pedido_de_licenciamento.htm). After this first step, cargo is shipped to the country, handled, scanned, released by customs, inspected by the agricultural ministry and finally loaded for delivery. Previously, additional steps delayed cargo from leaving port. For example, for cargo imported for re-export, additional duty-exemption procedures could add four days to the process. The Brazilian government and automobile companies worked closely to streamline border administration and re-export procedures and collected good results, reducing lead time to three days for some companies (interviews with automobile companies in Brazil).

### Two measures led to this improvement:

- Procedures for tax exemption (drawback) – Exemption is important because tax adds 25% to international freight value (see http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2004/lei/l10.893.htm). Because the exemption process took four days and could interfere with production, companies sometimes preferred to pay the tax instead of waiting for the process to be completed. The process was streamlined by the government and now occurs without delay. Additionally, exemption criteria have been simplified. For example, companies previously had to declare an estimate of the part of the freight to be re-exported and of the actual quantity at the time of shipment in order to ensure an exemption. Today, the decision is based only on the actual quantity of products re-exported, a change that simplifies a company's internal processes. Impact: reduction in lead time of four to five days.
- Faster clearance processes through a special regime – Blue Line, an initiative established in 2004 (Receita Federal do Brasil, http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/aduana/linhaazul/emphab.htm), is a special regime providing priority in the clearance process and little intervention in clearance inspections. The government has increased the number of enrolled companies to 49, with 14 of them in the automotive sector (Receita Federal do Brasil, http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/aduana/linhaazul/emphab.htm). Therefore, more automobile makers can benefit from the regime and move nearly 100% of their imports (interviews with automobile companies in Brazil) without physical inspection, making the clearance process faster and reliable. Impact: reduction in lead time of one day.

Brazil worked to address the top priorities identified by automobile companies and was able to make immediate strides. Yet despite these recent improvements, the companies could benefit from even more efficient processes. For instance, import lead time could be reduced to two days through changes in the agricultural licensing and by advancing custom-clearance processes. Clearly, trade outcomes are affected by a broad set of competitiveness issues and scare resources for reform need to be allocated wisely. Business involvement in reform prioritisation and implementation can help achieve an effective balance. Moreover, several tax and infrastructure issues undermine Brazilian companies' competitiveness in trade.

## CONCLUSIONS

Significant scope exists for greater co-ordination of trade facilitation funding and expertise, building on public and private sector experience, to effectively support implementation of the TFA.

The primary objective of such a public-private coalition is accelerated and targeted delivery at scale. Implementing broader, better, more co-ordinated and more transparent trade facilitation would serve the interests of developing country governments, businesses and donors.

The examples of implementation cited earlier from enabling trade reports are limited to one or two countries and projects per year. A broader exercise would have greater regional reach for best-practice sharing and would integrate more closely with other development activities. Deep and demand-driven involvement from the private sector would provide donor agencies with greater confidence in the impact of their funding.

A public-private coalition could build upon existing enabling trade implementation work and similar efforts via a process including the following:

- recipient government assessment of needs and request for support
- multinational and local private-sector assessment of barriers and viable commercial opportunities
- donor assessment of funding needs
- collaborative multi-stakeholder prioritisation of reform packages and implementation mechanisms
- provision of technical expertise, funding and project management
- ongoing monitoring via regional and/or sectoral supply chain councils, reporting of key performance indicators and proactive sharing of best practices
- regular oversight and steering at a global level.

To conclude, there are encouraging signs of increased coalition-building for trade facilitation implementation. Flexible co operation among donors, international institutions, recipient governments and the private sector will enhance the work of each. The World Economic Forum has significant leeway to exploit synergies at different stages of its Enabling Trade implementation work thus providing a mechanism to facilitate public-private co operation.

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# CHAPTER 11
# THE WAY FORWARD

*Contributed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization*

***Abstract:*** *Much has been achieved since the Aid for Trade Initiative became operational in 2006. The initiative has succeeded in raising awareness among developing countries and donor agencies about the positive role that trade can play in promoting economic growth and development. Since 2006, a total of USD 246.5 billion in official development assistance and USD 190.7 billion in trade-related other official flows has been disbursed to contribute to financing aid-for-trade programmes. There is now ample empirical evidence suggesting that aid for trade is broadly correlated with increases in trade. Despite these achievements, a number of challenges loom as the Aid-for-Trade Initiative needs to adapt to the 2015 development agenda, with its focus on Sustainable Development Goals, such as maintaining focus, scaling up, ensuring poverty impact, enhancing effectiveness, ensuring sustainability, expanding partnerships. Embedding a trade cost perspective at the centre of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative would provide an operational focal point for action among a broad collation of stakeholders.*

## INTRODUCTION

After ten years during which the global economy has changed dramatically, it is time to assess whether the Aid for Trade Initiative is still fit for purpose "to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade" (WTO, 2006). In the run-up to United Nation's Third International Conference on Financing for Development, which aims to support the post-2015 development agenda, and the Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, the trade and development community have a unique opportunity to ensure the continued relevance and effectiveness of aid for trade. This concluding chapter highlights some of the main achievements and challenges of the initiative. It suggests that a focus on reducing trade costs could serve as a rallying point for integrated approaches to achieve inclusive and sustainable development outcomes.

## ACHIEVEMENTS

The 2006 Task Force recommendations on aid for trade established the WTO-led global and country-based monitoring framework (i.e. the global review and the aid for trade section in the trade policy review). The framework is built around transparency, accountability and dialogue to create incentives for more and better aid for trade. The biennial global review has shown that the Aid-for Trade Initiative has indeed worked as expected and is broadly considered a success. In particular, the following holds true:

- The Initiative has succeeded in raising awareness among developing countries and donor agencies about the positive role that trade can play in promoting economic growth and development. Successive global reviews have shown that developing countries – notably the LDCs through the help of the Enhanced Integrated Framework – are getting better at articulating, mainstreaming and communicating their trade-related objectives and strategies.
- Since the Initiative was launched in 2006, a total of USD 246.5 billion in official development assistance (ODA) and USD 190.7 billion in trade-related other official flows (OOF) has been disbursed to contribute to financing aid-for-trade programmes and projects. In 2013, ODA commitments for trade-related programmes stood at USD 55 billion, with an additional USD 49 billion in OOF. Since the 2002-05 baseline, commitments have more than doubled, while the share of aid for trade in country-programmable aid has increased from an average 31% to 38% in 2013.
- There is now ample empirical evidence suggesting that aid for trade is broadly correlated with increases in trade. For instance, OECD/WTO (2013) found that one dollar invested in aid for trade is on average associated with an increase of nearly eight dollars in exports from all developing countries – and with an increase of twenty dollars for the poorest countries. A number of other studies, using a variety of different methodologies, found similarly strong associations between aid for trade and export growth. Furthermore, it is now widely accepted that trade generates economic growth which – depending on its pace and patterns – reduces poverty.
- The empirical evidence is buttressed by anecdotal findings from a large number of case stories submitted in the context of the 2011 and 2015 monitoring exercises. The sheer quantity of activities reported by the public and private sector suggest that aid-for-trade efforts are substantial, that they have taken root across a wide spectrum of countries and that they are becoming central to development strategies. Although not always easy to attribute cause and effect, the stories provide tangible evidence ranging from increased trade volumes, diversified products and markets, faster customs clearance times, reduced trade costs and additional domestic and foreign investments to more employment – including for women – and poverty reduction.

- In addition, the Initiative has proven to be flexible in addressing a broad set of issues on the evolving trade and development agendas. These include the need to maintain momentum (2009), manage aid for trade and development results (2011), link to value chains (2013) and reduce trade costs for inclusive, sustainable growth (2015). Beyond these objectives, the Initiative also engaged a broad community, including providers of South-South co-operation, the private sector and civil society.

## CHALLENGES

Despite these achievements, a number of challenges loom as the Aid-for-Trade Initiative needs to adapt to the 2015 development agenda, with its focus on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The following challenges are particularly salient:

- **Maintaining focus** – The 2013 Bali Package refocused attention on the possibilities offered by multilateral approaches to agreeing on trade rules. This publication has underscored how progress in border modernisation can be further advanced and locked in through ratification of the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Trade facilitation is a policy area that is central to today's interconnected markets and production processes. The TFA highlights how trade agreements can be tailored to individual development circumstances, with built-in flexibilities, and backed by aid-for-trade support. Part of the Bali Package, the TFA was a so-called early harvest on the broader Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiation. The challenge now is to agree on a work programme that can be used as a springboard to concluding the DDA. Research suggests that delivering a substantive DDA deal could advance progress towards the SDGs and could be considered as a down payment on financing the post-2015 development agenda.
- **The right emphasis** – The definition of aid for trade as "projects and programmes [. . .] that have been identified as trade-related development priorities in the recipient country's national development strategies" is based on the 2005 principles for aid effectiveness found in the Paris Declaration. Such a broad definition allows for operational flexibility to tackle any type of trade-related binding constraints at the country level. This also reflects the reality of trade measures, particularly as they concern non-tariff measures (NTMs), which at first sight might not appear to be trade policy measures (e.g. measures related to health, the environment and certification) but which can still exert powerful trade effects. At the same time, the absence of a precise aid-for-trade definition has complicated global and local debates on the effectiveness of aid for trade. In this regard, the TFA provides a specific focal point, both in a narrow sense of border modernisation efforts and in a broader sense of the complementary investments in network and transport infrastructure that are needed to maximise the benefits of the agreement.
- **Targeting the needs of MICs and LDCs**– Despite the obvious needs of least developed countries (LDCs), two-thirds of the aid-for-trade funds are destined for middle income countries (MICs), with an additional nine-tenths of trade-related to OOF. Assuming that donors are aligning their support, this distribution reflects that LDCs have other more pressing development priorities for which they want support from external development finance. It may also point to their difficulties in formulating bankable projects for trade-related assistance – a key constraint the Enhanced Integrated Framework is helping with. By the same token, with South-South trade being the most dynamic segment of global trade, improving the economic growth prospects of MICs also helps LDCs on the condition that MIC markets are open to LDC exports. Indeed, it may in fact be easier for LDCs to meet the import requirements of MICs – particularly with regards to NTMs – rather than those of high income countries.

- **Enhancing effectiveness** – Only USD 7 billion is committed to regional and global aid-for-trade programmes. However, these programmes are often more effective in reducing trade-related binding constraints, especially for landlocked countries where transport corridors are lifelines for trade. Global and regional programmes are also particularly effective in helping countries comply with standards in highly technical policy areas, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Such support requires scarce technical expertise. While global and regional programmes offer great potential as a catalyst for growth, development and poverty reduction, they face many practical implementation challenges that necessitate better advocacy, careful project formulation and prioritisation on the part of policy makers.
- **Expanding partnerships** – Although the Aid-for-Trade Initiative is inclusive and encompasses a broad coalition of stakeholders from the public sector, providers of South-South trade-related assistance are only slowly becoming more engaged in the initiative despite their increasing financial support to build trade capacities. Further work is needed to nurture their emerging engagement, especially at the country level. The main omission though is that of the private sector. So far, its involvement tends to be mainly issue driven. Yet the private sector should be a key advocate of aid for trade and a principal dialogue partner. Outreach with different business groups, such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the World Economic Forum, needs to be stepped up and made more consistent and structured. But these efforts should not only target global business groups alone. They also need to involve business groups in developing countries – the key beneficiaries of the initiative. The growing emphasis on the private sector in development policy and programming offers a window of opportunity in this regard.
- **Ensuring poverty impact** – Keeping global markets open is a necessary precondition for progress on poverty. An open trading system and trade-led growth has helped contribute to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of those living in extreme poverty by 2015. The emerging post-2015 development agenda has placed the elimination of extreme poverty as a core objective. Development organisations are likely to follow the lead of the World Bank and place this target at the core of their programming. Trade and the multilateral trading system have a major contribution to make – and one that extends to financing for development. The challenge is that much of the aid-for-trade activities are aimed at creating a favourable environment for private sector-led economic growth (i.e. getting the business, investment and regulatory climates right). This is both time-consuming and may not be a linear process, with direct links between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts.
- **Scaling up** – Impact assessment and other evaluation tools are allowing a better understanding of results at the project level. This should translate into better policy. The challenge is to ensure that the research results are shared among a community of people involved with projects on the ground and do not remain an exclusive academic topic. A higher level risk is the focus on micro-results and attribution jeopardises the importance of macro trends at the level of the regional or global economy. This in turn carries the danger that an absence of micro-level results leads to neglecting the all-important macro-economic enabling measures. A focus on gender might offer a way out of this conundrum. Research in the nascent, but rapidly expanding, field of gender and trade is unambiguous in pointing to the positive effects achieved by increasing women's participation in markets at all levels of the economy. The disproportionate burden of poverty carried by women and girls in the developing world means successful aid-for-trade interventions, be they micro-interventions or actions to improve the macro-enabling environment are likely to have positive empowerment effects too.

- **Ensuring sustainability** – Research on aid-for-trade financing highlights that a growing share is also contributing to the sustainable component of the SDGs. Assuming a positive outcome of the 21st Session Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, this proportion is set to rise further. This presents an opportunity for the Aid-for-Trade Initiative and should contribute to greening aid for trade. However, the objective has consistently been ranked low in partner countries surveys on the future of the initiative. Other objectives, notably investing in trade-related infrastructure, building productive capacity and trade facilitation have consistently outranked green growth. In practice though, these objectives should be pursued together rather than in isolation. Far from being incompatible, the SDGs and aid for trade should be seen as mutually reinforcing.
- **Guaranteeing policy coherence for development** – An important perspective emerging from the universal and transformative post-2015 development agenda is that it could lead to a potential increase in the number and range of NTMs. Research suggests that the burden of NTM compliance falls most heavily on SMEs and on LDCs. Efforts to support compliance and reduce the burden may need to be expanded if the desired transformation is to be both smooth and not engender important adjustment costs for exporters in developing and, in particular, LDCs.

## STRENGTHENING THE INITIATIVE

The starting premise of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative was that enshrining market access in trade agreements is an essential, but not a sufficient step, to achieving market presence – other factors need be addressed too. Past global reviews and publications have sought to galvanise attention and action on this issue. This report underlines that this strategy is working, but that high trade costs remain a significant impediment for developing countries. In the worst cases, prohibitive trade costs can price the poorest countries out of global markets altogether, leaving them locked into low-value regional trade where growth possibilities are stymied. At the factory or farm-gate level, products can be competitively priced but still fail in export markets due to excessive trade costs – and also in domestic markets too if domestic trade costs are too high. High trade costs effectively nullify comparative advantage by rendering exports uncompetitive. High trade costs deny firms access to technology and intermediate inputs, preventing their entry into, or movement up, global value chains (GVCs). High trade costs also erode consumer welfare, narrowing the range of good and services on offer and pushing up prices. While trade costs do not alone explain the development pathways of economies, they are a major factor in explaining why some countries are unable to grow and diversify. The same is also true for many often disadvantaged regions within countries.

Embedding a trade cost perspective at the centre of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative would provide an operational focal point for action among a broad collation of stakeholders. Advantages of a trade-cost reduction target are that lowering trade costs is neutral in the sense of benefiting not just exporters but also importers and households. It should be left to governments in dialogue with stakeholders to identify which costs are most distorting, how best to reduce them, and how to use the varied forms of development finance provided by different providers. Such an approach would also allow for a critical assessment of the domestic regulatory framework, which often stifles growth of the service sector. Finally, such an action-focused approach would allow for greater accountability of outcomes and even the introduction of innovative donor approaches, such as cash-on-delivery and other forms of impact programming.

The emerging development paradigm in the proposed post-2015 development agenda will require aid for trade to adopt an integrated approach to ensure that aid for trade achieves inclusive and sustainable development outcomes. More importantly, the processes for achieving the expected outcomes – i.e. the design and the implementation framework of projects – should be inclusive in that they engage economically disadvantaged groups and sustainable in that they encourage climate-adaptation and mitigation activities.

The Aid for Trade Initiative is an essential component of the post-2015 development policy agenda. This report has highlighted that this would be further advanced – and namely the goal of eradicating extreme poverty would be attained – through a better understanding of how high trade costs undermine connectivity and hamper economic growth and development. Well-designed aid-for-trade interventions can be effective in reducing trade costs in areas partner countries and donors prioritise, such as infrastructure, trade facilitation and non-tariff measures like product standards. Furthermore, this need not contradict with overarching green-growth objectives; on the contrary, aid-for-trade may actually promote these objectives. There are positive reasons to believe that developing countries and their partners are taking trade costs seriously, that action in this area builds from solid practical and theoretical foundations and, most importantly, that it will be of service to attaining the proposed SDGs.

## REFERENCE

WTO (2006), "Recommendations of the task force on aid for trade", WT/AFT/1, WTO, Geneva.

# AID-FOR-TRADE COUNTRY PROFILES

# EXPLANATORY NOTES ON AID-FOR-TRADE COUNTRY PROFILES

The aid-for-trade country profiles provide factual information to stimulate a debate on trends of aid for trade, trade costs, trade performance and development at the country level. The aim is to compare a country's performance in four categories of indicators from 2006 to 2013 and, for selected indicators, against country group benchmarks.

The country profiles are structured according to the results chain framework normally used in project-based development interventions. The results chain framework describes the causal sequence of development interventions based on four main elements: i) inputs and activities produce ii) direct outputs, which in turn lead to iii) intermediate outcomes that contribute to iv) long-term impacts.

The country profiles transpose the idea behind this project-based analytical tool to the macro level and trace a possible causal sequence of aid-for-trade interventions to achieve trade and development objectives. The country profiles therefore present indicators in four sections: A. Development Finance; B. Trade Costs; C. Trade Performance; and D. Development Indicators. Much of aid for trade is aimed at reducing trade costs; lower trade costs lead to better trade performance in terms of value, export diversification or entry of new firms; better trade performance can help improve long-term development indicators, notably through employment creation and poverty alleviation.

The country profiles do not posit a causal link; they do not attempt to test or estimate the causal impact of aid for trade at the macro level. Instead, they give a dynamic perspective on a country's development. In this sense, the sequence traced is one of contribution, not attribution. Where such contribution can be discerned, the country profiles provide ground for further in-depth, country-based research. In this sense, the country profiles contribute to a greater understanding of the important role that aid-for-trade flows play in a country's achievement of the trade and development objectives targeted by these flows.

Most indicators in the country profiles provide a comparison between 2006 and 2013. However, the year coverage is adapted to data availability at the level of both indicators and countries. For a selected number of indicators, comparisons against benchmark groups are shown. The country groups used as benchmarks are least developed countries (LDCs), lower middle income countries (LMICs), upper middle income countries (UMICs) and high income countries (HICs). The country groups are non-overlapping, which means that LDCs are not included in income groups. Zimbabwe, which is a low income country but not an LDC, is benchmarked against LMICs. The country composition of the four country groups differs among indicators according to data availability. The number of countries included in the four groups for a given indicator is provided in the indicator descriptions below.

The choice of indicators has been influenced by the availability of time series data. New indicators are appearing which may, in some cases, be more fitting for the purpose of this analysis. However, the absence of historical data and geographic coverage means they are not ripe for inclusion. As such, the indicators in the country profiles will be updated and refined in future editions.

The country profiles are divided into the following four sections:

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

Development finance constitutes a vital source of external financing for many developing countries as it comprises inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances, official development assistance (ODA), and other official flows (OOF). Development finance is used to finance capital investment as well as private and public consumption, which thereby forms the basis for economic growth and development.

This section illustrates how aid-for-trade flows have developed over time, how important they are compared to other flows of development finance and the importance of aid-for-trade for a country compared to other countries. Furthermore, the section shows trends in aid-for-trade disbursements over time at the aggregate level and at the level of sectors and donors. Development finance flows are presented for the periods 2006/08 and 2010/12 (three year averages) and for the year 2013.

### Indicators and sources:

**FDI** is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest in and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) of an enterprise resident in a different economy (foreign affiliate). FDI inflows measure the net capital (equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans) provided by a foreign direct investor to a foreign affiliate. Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat.

**Remittances** comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of transfers in cash or in kind received by resident households from non-resident households. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by non-resident entities. Compensation of employees tends to account for a high share of remittances in the case of developing countries which are close to a bigger economy (e.g. Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, which border South Africa) or which are characterised by the presence of non-resident institutions (e.g. Afghanistan). Source: World Bank (WB), World Development Indicators.

**Official development assistance (ODA)** are grants and loans provided by the official sector with the main objective to promote economic development and welfare of developing countries. ODA is concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a discount rate of 10%). Aid-for-trade flows are a subset of ODA that fall under the four categories trade policy and regulations, economic infrastructure, building productive capacity and trade-related adjustment. Source: OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database.

**Other official flows (OOF)** are transactions by the official sector which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as ODA, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25%. Trade-related OOF are a subset of OOF that fall under the four categories trade policy and regulations, economic infrastructure, building productive capacity and trade-related adjustment. Source: OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database.

The top three **aid-for-trade priorities** are based on a ranking of aid-for-trade categories given by countries in self-assessment questionnaires. Source: OECD/WTO Partner Country Questionnaire.

**Share of aid for trade in development finance** indicates a country's dependence on aid for trade in comparison to other development finance flows. Development finance corresponds to the sum of FDI inflows, remittances, OOF and ODA. For the periods 2006-08 and 2010-12, development finance is calculated as the sum of the three year averages of these four flows. Number of countries included in benchmark groups: LDCs (38), LMICs (29), UMICs (44), HICs (7). Sources: OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database; UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators.

**Share of aid for trade in gross fixed capital formation** indicates the importance of aid for trade for the financing of gross fixed capital formation. Gross fixed capital formation includes land improvements; plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Number of countries included in benchmark groups: LDCs (37), LMICs (29), UMICs (42), HICs (6). Sources: OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database; WB, World Development Indicators.

## B. TRADE COSTS

In the results chain, inputs and accompanying activities result in outputs. One of the main objectives of aid-for-trade projects is to reduce trade costs. The trade costs section covers indicators that allow assessing how a country's infrastructure and policy-related trade costs have evolved over time and how high trade costs are in comparison to a benchmark country group.

### Indicators and sources:

**Tariffs:** Simple and weighted averages of applied import tariffs measure most-favoured-nation (MFN) applied duties calculated either as simple average or as weighted average using import flows at the Harmonized System (HS) six-digit level as weights. The weighted average export tariff faced takes into account preferences and measures the weighted average tariff faced by the country in its top five export markets for agricultural and non-agricultural products, respectively. The share of duty-free exports measures the share of exports reaching these top export markets for agricultural and non-agricultural products duty-free. Source: WTO, World Tariff Profiles.

**Internet connectivity (% of population):** Mobile (fixed) broadband subscriptions refer to the percentage of inhabitants with an active mobile-broadband (fixed-broadband) subscription. Individuals using the internet refer to the percentage of the population using the internet.

**Cost and time required to export (import)** measure the cost in USD and the time in number of days required to export a full 20-foot container from the warehouse to the departure of the container ship; or vice versa in the case of imports. The cost and time indicators take into account four components associated with trading, i.e. document preparation, customs clearance and inspections, inland transport and handling, and port and terminal handling. In the case of landlocked countries, the cost and time required for passing the inland border and transit to the next seaport are also included. The cost measure does not include costs related to tariffs, sea transport or bribes. The time measure takes into account waiting times. Number of countries included in benchmark groups: LDCs (45), LMICs (32), UMICs (49), HICs (47). Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Logistics performance index (LPI) (1-5)**: The "Overall LPI" is a perception-based composite indicator of a country's logistics based on six components. These components are efficiency and border clearance ("Customs"), quality of trade and transport infrastructure ("Infrastructure"), ease of arranging competitively priced shipments ("International shipments"), competence and quality of logistics services ("Logistics competence"), ability to track and trace consignments ("Tracking and tracing") and frequency with which shipments reach consignees within scheduled or expected delivery times ("Timeliness"). The index and its components range from 1 to 5, with a higher score representing better performance. Number of countries included in benchmark groups: LDCs (41), LMICs (28), UMICs (40), HICs (48). Source: WB, Logistics Performance Index (LPI).

**Competitiveness indicators (1-7):** The competitiveness indicators measure the perceptions of business executives regarding the ease of access to loans, the quality of electricity supply, the quality of roads, the quality of port infrastructure and the quality of air transport infrastructure. The ratings range from 1 (low) to 7 (best). Number of countries included in benchmark groups: LDCs (27), LMICs (27), UMICs (35), HICs (50). Source: World Economic Forum (WEF).

**Trade costs (ad valorem, %):** These indicators capture a country's total, intra-regional and extra-regional ad-valorem trade costs in percent. The trade costs measures are calculated as simple averages of bilateral ad valorem trade costs. Given the limited data availability, the number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs differs across countries. Therefore, the measure is informative regarding a country's evolution of trade costs over time but comparisons between countries should be avoided or undertaken with much caution. The bilateral trade costs are derived from observable trade flows representing the geometric mean of international trade costs between two countries relative to domestic trade costs within each country. The intuition of the measure is that if bilateral trade increases relative to domestic trade flows, bilateral trade costs have declined. The database and the bilateral trade cost measure are described in Arvis et al. (2013). To calculate intra- and extra-regional trade costs, trading partners are grouped according to the WTO classification into the following regions: Africa, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Europe, Middle East, North America, South and Central America (including the Caribbean). Source: Author's calculations based on the ESCAP/World Bank Trade Cost Database.

**Trade facilitation indicators (0-2):** The trade facilitation indicators are composite indicators that measure various dimensions of trade facilitation, most of them closely related to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, on a range from 0 (low) to 2 (best). The country profiles show the following six indicators (out of a total of eleven) for which data coverage is best: Information availability (publication of trade information, including on Internet; enquiry points), Advance rulings (prior statements by the administration to requesting traders concerning the classification, origin, valuation method, etc., applied to specific goods at the time of importation; the rules and process applied to such statements), Appeal procedures (the possibility and modalities to appeal administrative decisions by border agencies), Automation (electronic exchange of data; automated border procedures; use of risk management), Procedures (streamlining of border controls; single windows; post-clearance audits; authorised economic operators), Governance and impartiality (customs structures and functions; accountability; ethics policy). Number of countries included in benchmark groups: LDCs (30), LMICs (28), UMICs (40), HICs (51). Indicators reflect data collected up to mid-May 2015. Source: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators.

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

Aid for trade interventions aim at improving the trade performance of firms and countries by addressing national supply side constraints to either lower trade costs or improve the productive capacity of firms. This section covers indicators that allow assessing the trade performance of countries in terms of value, growth, structure and diversification.

### Indicators and sources:

**Trade to GDP ratio** is estimated as an economy's total trade of goods and commercial services (exports + imports, balance of payments basis) divided by its GDP. Source: WTO Secretariat.

**Commercial services as % of total exports (imports)** refers to the share of commercial services in world exports (imports) of commercial services and goods. Trade flows are measured by balance of payments statistics according to the principles of the fifth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5). Source: WTO Secretariat.

**Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports [imports])** refers to the share of non-fuel intermediate goods in merchandise exports (imports) as measured by customs statistics. Intermediates are classified according to the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification. Fuel products are not classified as intermediates but are included in total merchandise exports. Source: UN Comtrade.

**Trade flows (billion current US$)** provide exports and imports of goods and commercial services as measured by balance of payment statistics according to the principles of BPM5. Balance of payment statistics cover transactions between residents of a country and non-residents involving a change of ownership. Source: WTO Secretariat.

**Number of products and markets:** The numbers of exported and imported products and the numbers of export and import markets provide simple measures of product and market diversification, respectively. The maximum number of markets is 233 while the maximum number of products, defined at the Harmonized System (HS) 2002 4-digit level, is 1,246. Source: Author's calculations based on UN Comtrade data.

**Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) concentration indices:** The HH concentration indices measure the concentration, or diversification, of a country's trade in terms of either products or markets. The HH export (import) product concentration index is calculated as the sum of squared product shares in a country's exports (import) and then normalised to lie between zero and one. HH market concentration indices are calculated analogously. HH export and import product concentration indices with scores close to zero indicate a diversified, i.e. equally distributed, product portfolio and scores close to one indicate high concentration on a few products. Analogously, in the case of HH indices of export and import market concentration scores close to zero indicate that trade is diversified, i.e. equally distributed, across markets and scores close concentration on a few markets. It should be noted that the HH indices inform only about the distribution of trade but not about the underlying numbers of products and markets. The assessment of, for instance, export diversification should therefore take into account both the number of exported products and export markets and the HH indices indicating how equally distributed trade is across these products and markets. Source: Author's calculations based on UN Comtrade data.

**Structure of merchandise trade** provides a breakdown of merchandise exports and imports by main commodity groups according to the WTO International Trade Statistics (ITS) definitions: agricultural products refer to food (SITC Rev. 3 sections 0, 1, 4 and division 22) and raw materials (SITC Rev. 3 divisions 21, 23, 24, 25 and 26). Fuels and mining products include ores and other minerals; fuels and non-ferrous metals. Manufactures refer to iron and steel, chemicals, other semi-manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, textiles, clothing and other consumer goods. Shares sum up to 100% since trade flows that are not classified in any product group are not taken into account in the calculation. Source: WTO Secretariat.

**Structure of services trade** shows the shares of travel services, transport services and other commercial services in commercial services exports and imports. Other commercial services refer to communication, construction, insurance, financial, computer, information, other business, and cultural and recreational services, and royalties and license fees. Services trade is measured by balance of payments statistics according to the principles of BPM5. Source: WTO Secretariat.

**Top 5 markets for merchandise exports and imports (%**) indicate a country's top five export and import markets as recorded by customs-based statistics. Trade shares with EU member states are shown at the national level according to the national concept, which can deviate from data harmonized according to the community concept. Unspecified origins or destinations (areas n.e.s., bunkers and free zones) are not shown if they are among the top 5 markets. Source: UN Comtrade.

**Top 5 merchandise imports and exports (%)** refer to the percentage shares of a country's top five export and import products as recorded by customs-based statistics. Products are measured in terms of the Standard International Trade Classification, Rev.3 (SITC Rev. 3). Source: UN Comtrade.

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Aid for trade eventually aims to achieve long-term development impacts through increased participation of countries in international trade. This section describes trends in development indicators related to human and economic development, including poverty and inequality.

### Indicators and sources:

**Unemployment (% of total labour force)** refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Female labour force (% of total labour force)** shows the extent to which women are active in the labour force. Labour force comprises people aged 15 and older who meet the International Labour Organization's (ILO) definition of the economically active population. Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Net ODA received (% of GNI):** The share of ODA in gross national income (GNI) indicates to what extent a country is dependent on development assistance. Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Import duties collected (% of tax revenue):** The share of import duties in tax revenue indicates to what extent a country is dependent on import duties in order to finance its government budget. Source: WTO, Trade Profiles.

**Total debt service (% of total exports):** Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest paid on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF. Both public and private external debt is included. External indebtedness affects a country's creditworthiness and investor perceptions. The share of total debt service to total exports helps assess the sustainability of a country's debt service obligations, in particular regarding a countries' ability to obtain foreign exchange through exports. Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Human Development Index (HDI):** The HDI ranges from zero (minimum level of development) to one (maximum level of development) summarising the three basic development dimensions health, education and living standard. Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Human Development Indicators: Human development index.

**GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $):** GDP per capita is converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. Number of countries included in benchmark groups: LDCs (45), LMICs (32), UMICs (50), HICs (50). Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Economic structure:** The development of a country´s economic structure is captured by the shares of agriculture, industry and services in GDP in 2006 and 2013. Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Poverty:** Population living below $1.25 ($2) a day measures the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 ($2) a day at 2005 international prices. Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

**Inequality:** Income held by lowest 20% (40%) is the percentage share of income that accrues to the subgroups of population indicated by the respective quintiles. Source: WB, World Development Indicators.

### Legend:

"-" Not applicable

"…" Data not available or not reported

## REFERENCES:

Arvis, J. F., Y. Duval, B. Shepherd and C. Utoktham (2013), "Trade costs in the developing world: 1995-2010", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6309.

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Afghanistan*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 173.7 | 129.5 | 69.3 | -60% |
| Remittances | 104.2 | 321.0 | 537.5 | 416% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 14.2 | 58.9 | 24.7 | 74% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 14.2 | 13.4 | 8.8 | -38% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 3633.4 | 6513.7 | 5191.8 | 43% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 944.0 | 1612.7 | 1214.1 | 29% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade policy | 2 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 3 | Regional integration |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 699.3 | 74 | United States | 611.7 | 50 |
| IDA | 85.8 | 9 | AsDB Special Funds | 158.7 | 13 |
| Canada | 32.4 | 3 | Japan | 128.9 | 11 |
| United Kingdom | 30.4 | 3 | IDA | 94.4 | 8 |
| Germany | 24.5 | 3 | United Kingdom | 64.8 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 5.7 | 5.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 13.5 | 6.6 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 36.6 | 74.2 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 1.2 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 2.1 | 5.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | ... | 74 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | ... | 83 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | ... | 19 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | ... | 2 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | ... | 12 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | ... | | 0.745 | | |
| | Commercial services | ... | 2.998 | | | |
| **Imports** | Goods | ... | | 9.040 | | |
| | Commercial services | ... | 2.185 | | | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 5 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 15 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.443 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.466 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | 6 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | 7 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.248 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.235 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pakistan | 49 | Pakistan | 39 |
| India | 24 | India | 20 |
| Russian Federation | 7 | Iran | 8 |
| United Arab Emirates | 3 | China | 4 |
| Iran | 3 | Germany | 2 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pakistan | 16 | Pakistan | 10 |
| China | 14 | Iran | 8 |
| Japan | 12 | Germany | 2 |
| Iran | 6 | China | 2 |
| Uzbekistan | 6 | India | 1 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 51 | Special transactions not classified | 72 |
| Floor coverings, etc. | 28 | Floor coverings, etc. | 14 |
| Special transactions not classified | 8 | Spices | 12 |
| Works of art, antique etc. | 6 | Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 2 |
| Crude veg. materials, n.e.s. | 4 | Crude animal materials, n.e.s. | 0 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Special transactions not classified | 49 | Special transactions not classified | 68 |
| Works of art, antique etc. | 14 | Briquettes, lignite, peat | 17 |
| Animal, veg. fats, oils, n.e.s. | 5 | Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 5 |
| Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 5 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 3 |
| Rubber tyres, tubes, etc. | 4 | Tulle, lace, embroidery, etc. | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 8.3 | 8.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 14.5 | 16.4 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 41.7 | 32.6 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 47.1 | 36.1 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2008-2013) | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.40 | 0.47 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241683

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Antigua and Barbuda*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 287.5 | 101.1 | 138.3 | -52% |
| Remittances | 20.6 | 20.4 | 21.1 | 2% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 6.0 | 1.5 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 3.4 | 12.8 | 2.4 | -31% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 0.9 | 6.1 | 0.3 | -71% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Competitiveness | 3 | Regional integration |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 0.9 | 98 | Japan | 0.2 | 93 |
| World Trade Organization | 0.0 | 2 | EU Institutions | 0.0 | 7 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 9.7 | 10.5 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 17.3 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.8 | 52.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 96.7 | 41.3 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 30.4 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.8 | 4.6 |
| Individuals using the internet | 30.0 | 63.4 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 118 | 94 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 86 | 88 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 31 | 35 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2007-2013) | 10 | 22 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 24 | 19 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.074 | 0.062 | | -17% ▼ |
| | Commercial services | 0.462 | 0.466 | +1% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.560 | 0.412 | | -26% ▼ |
| | Commercial services | 0.249 | 0.221 | | -11% ▼ |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 139 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 630 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.108 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.113 |
| *Market diversification (2007-2013)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 46 | 40 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 89 | 91 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.151 | 0.116 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.225 | 0.278 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neth. Antilles | 31 | United States | 27 |
| United States | 24 | United Kingdom | 21 |
| Barbados | 8 | Curaçao | 7 |
| Dominica | 6 | New Zealand | 5 |
| United Kingdom | 4 | Montserrat | 3 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 41 | United States | 35 |
| Neth. Antilles | 23 | China | 4 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 9 | Trinidad and Tobago | 3 |
| United Kingdom | 3 | United Kingdom | 3 |
| Japan | 3 | Japan | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 58 | Textile articles, n.e.s. | 29 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 8 | Petroleum products | 13 |
| Rotating electric plant | 4 | Ship, boat, floating structures | 7 |
| Gold, silverware, jewel, n.e.s. | 3 | Manufactures base metals, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Textile articles, n.e.s. | 3 | Ferrous waste and scrap | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 36 | Petroleum products | 33 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |
| Internal combustion piston engine | 2 | Other meat, meat offal | 3 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 | Alcoholic beverages | 2 |
| Furniture, cushions, etc. | 2 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 14.5 | 13.4 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | ... | ... |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | ... | 0.77 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241691

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Bangladesh*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 848.4 | 1114.1 | 1599.1 | 88% |
| Remittances | 7384.3 | 12826.1 | 13857.1 | 88% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 14.9 | 233.4 | 396.0 | 2566% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 14.0 | 200.9 | 384.7 | 2657% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 2031.2 | 2418.3 | 3443.2 | 70% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 376.0 | 623.9 | 901.1 | 140% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Export diversification | 2 | Trade facilitation | 3 | Transport infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 233.8 | 62 | Japan | 327.9 | 36 |
| United Kingdom | 40.1 | 11 | IDA | 194.8 | 22 |
| Germany | 21.5 | 6 | AsDB Special Funds | 193.0 | 21 |
| Denmark | 16.6 | 4 | United States | 37.2 | 4 |
| Japan | 14.1 | 4 | United Kingdom | 31.3 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 15.2 | 13.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 4.9 | 3.8 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 69.3 | 75.7 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 1.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | ... | 1.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.0 | 6.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 46 | 56 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 5 | 6 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 13 | 15 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2011) | 17 | 10 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2011) | 60 | 67 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 11.554 | 28.951 | **+151%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.603 | 1.876 | **+211%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 14.443 | 35.861 | **+148%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.111 | 6.200 | **+194%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.; 2006-2011)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 502 | 575 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1035 | 1096 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.082 | 0.101 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.024 | 0.020 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2011)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 160 | 173 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 172 | 165 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.116 | 0.091 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.064 | 0.085 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 27 | United States | 21 |
| Germany | 15 | Germany | 16 |
| United Kingdom | 9 | United Kingdom | 9 |
| China | 7 | France | 6 |
| France | 6 | Spain | 4 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 16 | Thailand | 23 |
| India | 12 | India | 11 |
| Kuwait | 9 | China | 9 |
| Japan | 6 | Indonesia | 6 |
| Korea, Republic of | 4 | Singapore | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 28 | Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 32 |
| Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 24 | Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 27 |
| Women, girl clothng, excl. knit/crocheted | 10 | Women, girl clothng, excl. knit/crocheted | 10 |
| Cotton fabrics, woven | 7 | Mens, boys clothing, knit | 6 |
| Mens, boys clothing, knit | 5 | Textile articles, n.e.s. | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 11 | Cotton fabrics, woven | 7 |
| Cotton | 5 | Petroleum products | 7 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 5 | Cotton | 6 |
| Textile, leather machines | 5 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 6 |
| Fabrics, man-made fibres | 5 | Textile yarn | 5 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 4.2 | 4.3 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 38.5 | 40.2 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.6 | 1.5 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2011) | 39.9 | 30.3 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 5.4 | 5.2 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.49 | 0.56 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241703

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Belize*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 140.5 | 128.9 | 89.3 | -36% |
| Remittances | 71.1 | 76.5 | 74.4 | 5% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 4.7 | 10.9 | 13.7 | 193% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 5.0 | 5.9 | 97632% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 13.8 | 25.8 | 49.4 | 258% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 6.1 | 12.2 | 17.9 | 194% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Transport infrastructure | **2** | Export diversification | **3** | Trade policy |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 5.8 | 95 | EU Institutions | 10.1 | 57 |
| Japan | 0.2 | 4 | OFID | 4.7 | 26 |
| Canada | 0.0 | 1 | Kuwait (KFAED) | 1.8 | 10 |
| Korea, Republic of | 0.0 | 0 | IDB Sp.Fund | 0.6 | 3 |
| Austria | 0.0 | 0 | Korea, Republic of | 0.4 | 2 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 10.8 | | 11.1 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | | 14.6 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 16.2 | | 1.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 63.5 | | 89.4 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | | 2.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 2.6 | 3.1 | |
| Individuals using the internet | 10.4 | | 31.7 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 125 | 131 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 44 | 41 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 19 | 18 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 21 | 23 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 25 | 28 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.427 | 0.609 | **+43%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.339 | 0.421 | **+24%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.612 | 0.876 | **+43%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.143 | 0.195 | **+36%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 79 | 135 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 665 | 671 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.131 | 0.103 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.097 | 0.073 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 42 | 56 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 71 | 81 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.200 | 0.199 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.180 | 0.143 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 42 | United States | 39 |
| United Kingdom | 16 | United Kingdom | 21 |
| Costa Rica | 8 | Netherlands | 6 |
| Netherlands | 6 | India | 5 |
| Jamaica | 4 | Trinidad and Tobago | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 39 | United States | 32 |
| Neth. Antilles | 11 | Curaçao | 13 |
| Panama | 10 | Mexico | 11 |
| Mexico | 9 | China | 11 |
| Guatemala | 6 | Guatemala | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fruit, veg. juices | 20 | Petroleum oils, crude | 17 |
| Sugars, molasses, honey | 19 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 14 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 16 | Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 14 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 16 | Fruit, veg. juices | 13 |
| Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 15 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 13 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Special transactions not classified | 27 | Special transactions not classified | 23 |
| Petroleum products | 15 | Petroleum products | 14 |
| Alcoholic beverages | 2 | Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 2 |
| Articles, n.e.s., of plastics | 2 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 2 |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 2 | Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 9.4 | 14.6 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 36.3 | 37.8 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.8 | 1.7 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 16.7 | 12.7 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.71 | 0.73 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241715

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Benin*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 159.4 | 206.5 | 320.1 | 101% |
| Remittances | 214.3 | 173.1 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 1.4 | 6.8 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 862.2 | 642.8 | 675.0 | -22% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 116.6 | 199.9 | 189.6 | 63% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Trade facilitation | **3** | Regional integration |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 29.7 | 26 | IDA | 77.4 | 41 |
| IDA | 23.6 | 20 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 35.3 | 19 |
| Denmark | 19.0 | 16 | EU Institutions | 31.8 | 17 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 18.4 | 16 | Germany | 9.2 | 5 |
| France | 8.0 | 7 | Belgium | 9.0 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 12 | 12.3 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 24.3 | 2.8 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 24.7 | 48.9 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.5 | 4.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 49 | 59 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 21 | 22 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 25 | 22 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 74 | 70 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 33 | 24 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.735 | | 1.602 | **+118%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.196 | 0.414 | | **+111%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.046 | | 2.186 | **+109%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.342 | 67.0 | | **+67%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 120 | 191 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 580 | 705 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.194 | 0.154 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.050 | 0.100 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 64 | 76 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 99 | 136 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.078 | 0.069 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.054 | 0.107 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 24 | China | 19 |
| Nigeria | 9 | India | 11 |
| India | 9 | Nigeria | 11 |
| Niger | 7 | Chad | 7 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 6 | Indonesia | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 17 | United States | 28 |
| China | 9 | France | 9 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 7 | India | 9 |
| Ghana | 7 | Togo | 8 |
| United Kingdom | 6 | China | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cotton | 40 | Cotton | 37 |
| Tobacco, manufactured | 16 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 12 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 7 | Iron, steel bar, shapes, etc. | 9 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 4 | Ship, boat, floating structures | 6 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, soft | 4 | Petroleum products | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 15 | Ship, boat, floating structures | 26 |
| Rice | 11 | Rice | 16 |
| Electric current | 6 | Petroleum products | 7 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 5 | Other meat, meat offal | 6 |
| Worn clothing, textile articles | 4 | Electric current | 4 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 46.8 | 47.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 8.5 | 6.8 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 26.5 | 27.2 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 4.2 | 4.3 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.43 | 0.48 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241721

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Bhutan*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 31.7 | 26.2 | 21.3 | -33% |
| Remittances | 2.9 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 306% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 14.0 | 0.9 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 14.0 | 0.9 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 79.3 | 149.0 | 138.6 | 75% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 24.4 | 79.9 | 56.3 | 131% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Export diversification | 3 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 10.7 | 44 | AsDB Special Funds | 36.4 | 65 |
| IDA | 5.5 | 23 | Japan | 12.2 | 22 |
| Switzerland | 1.7 | 7 | Austria | 2.7 | 5 |
| Austria | 1.5 | 6 | IDA | 1.6 | 3 |
| EU Institutions | 1.5 | 6 | Norway | 1.2 | 2 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 22.1 | ... |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 9.3 | ... |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 40.3 | ... |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 15.6 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 2.7 |
| Individuals using the internet | 4.5 | 29.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 99 | 75 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 12 | 18 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 11 | 23 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2012) | 48 | 60 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2012) | 55 | 54 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.312 | 0.544 | **+74%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.042 | 0.123 | **+192%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.480 | 0.580 | **+21%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.058 | 0.171 | **+197%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.; 2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 108 | 117 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 618 | 703 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.111 | 0.168 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.027 | 0.026 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 14 | 19 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 41 | 49 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.592 | 0.873 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.470 | 0.627 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| India | 77 | India | 94 |
| Hong Kong, China | 15 | Bangladesh | 4 |
| Singapore | 3 | Italy | 0 |
| Bangladesh | 3 | Japan | 0 |
| Thailand | 2 | Nepal | 0 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| India | 69 | India | 79 |
| Indonesia | 7 | Korea, Republic of | 3 |
| Russian Federation | 5 | China | 3 |
| Singapore | 3 | Japan | 2 |
| Korea, Republic of | 2 | Austria | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electric current | 27 | Electric current | 32 |
| Musical instruments, etc. | 19 | Pig iron, spiegeleisn, etc. | 24 |
| Copper | 8 | Other chemical compounds | 6 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 7 | Iron, steel bar, shapes, etc. | 5 |
| Wire products excl. electrical wiring | 6 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 13 | Petroleum products | 13 |
| Copper | 9 | Pig iron, spiegeleisn, etc. | 4 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 7 | Civil engineering equipment | 4 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Metallic structures, n.e.s. | 3 |
| Iron, steel bar, shapes, etc. | 3 | Copper | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.1 | 2.1 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 40.8 | 41.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 11.4 | 9.6 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | 4.3 | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 2.8 | 11.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | ... | 0.58 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241734

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Botswana*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 500.6 | 458.6 | 188.2 | -62% |
| Remittances | 80.9 | 20.3 | 36.0 | -55% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 7.7 | 219.8 | 27.6 | 256% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 2.4 | 34.3 | 14.9 | 514% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 311.9 | 131.2 | 126.6 | -59% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 11.4 | 18.4 | 10.7 | -6% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Export diversification | **2** | Competitiveness | **3** | Transport infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 5.8 | 51 | Japan | 5.6 | 52 |
| France | 3.0 | 26 | Sweden | 1.9 | 18 |
| Japan | 0.9 | 8 | BADEA | 1.5 | 14 |
| United States | 0.5 | 4 | AfDB (African Dev. Bank) | 0.5 | 5 |
| Denmark | 0.4 | 4 | Canada | 0.5 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 8.0 | 7.6 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 6.6 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.8 | 0.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 98.9 | 98.9 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 74.1 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 1.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 4.3 | 15.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 86 | 109 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | ... | 4 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | ... | 7 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 92 | 95 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 39 | 52 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 4.522 | 7.600 | **+68%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | ... | 0.351 | | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 2.619 | 7.570 | **+189%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | ... | 0.569 | | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 478 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 1015 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.691 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.096 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 63 | 61 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 77 | 78 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.532 | 0.265 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.737 | 0.441 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 72 | United Kingdom | 49 |
| Norway | 9 | Belgium | 13 |
| South Africa | 6 | South Africa | 11 |
| Zimbabwe | 6 | Israel | 6 |
| United States | 2 | Norway | 4 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 86 | South Africa | 66 |
| Zimbabwe | 2 | United Kingdom | 7 |
| China | 1 | Namibia | 7 |
| United Kingdom | 1 | Belgium | 5 |
| United States | 1 | Canada | 3 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pearls, precious stones | 72 | Pearls, precious stones | 82 |
| Copper ores, concentrates | 15 | Nickel ores, concentrates, mattes | 6 |
| Bovine meat | 2 | Copper ores, concentrates | 2 |
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 1 | Bovine meat | 2 |
| Natural abrasives, n.e.s. | 1 | Natural abrasives, n.e.s. | 1 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 15 | Pearls, precious stones | 27 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Petroleum products | 14 |
| Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | Electric current | 3 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 3 |
| Nickel ores, concentrates, mattes | 2 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 17.6 | 18.4 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 47.3 | 46.7 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 41.5 | 47.3 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 1.0 | 2.2 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.61 | 0.68 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241741

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Burkina Faso*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 161.0 | 169.2 | 374.3 | 133% |
| Remittances | 83.9 | 120.3 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 4.2 | 3.2 | 2.7 | -35% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1347.8 | 1104.9 | 1088.5 | -19% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 195.8 | 257.3 | 330.5 | 69% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 2 | Trade facilitation | 3 | Transport infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 62.0 | 32 | United States | 109.7 | 33 |
| IDA | 48.3 | 25 | IDA | 79.0 | 24 |
| France | 35.6 | 18 | EU Institutions | 33.5 | 10 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 12.6 | 6 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 25.4 | 8 |
| Denmark | 8.3 | 4 | Germany | 11.0 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 12 | 10.4 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 26.8 | 1.3 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 25.2 | 53.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 9.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.6 | 4.4 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 36 | 66 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 9 | 13 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 24 | 30 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2007-2013) | 92 | 85 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2007-2013) | 39 | 38 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.607 | | 2.833 | **+367%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.059 | 0.413 | | **+603%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.094 | | 3.000 | **+174%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.346 | 1.160 | | **+235%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.; 2007-2013)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 193 | 263 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 724 | 792 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.462 | 0.353 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.049 | 0.068 |
| *Market diversification (2007-2013)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 50 | 75 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 101 | 108 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.114 | 0.280 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.067 | 0.041 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Switzerland | 28 | Switzerland | 52 |
| France | 14 | Mali | 7 |
| Belgium | 10 | South Africa | 5 |
| Ghana | 9 | China | 5 |
| Singapore | 7 | Singapore | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Côte d'Ivoire | 17 | China | 10 |
| France | 15 | Côte d'Ivoire | 9 |
| China | 8 | France | 9 |
| United States | 7 | Netherlands | 9 |
| India | 6 | United States | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cotton | 67 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 56 |
| Oilseed (other fixed veg. oil) | 8 | Cotton | 17 |
| Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 6 | Petroleum products | 9 |
| Live animals | 2 | Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 6 |
| Tobacco, manufactured | 2 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 20 | Petroleum products | 25 |
| Rice | 4 | Civil engineering equipment | 4 |
| Medicaments | 4 | Medicaments | 4 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 4 | Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 3 |
| Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 3 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2005 | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | | 2.3 | | 3.1 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | | 47.8 | | 47.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | | 15.4 | | 10.8 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | | 17.5 | 16.6 | |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | | 6.1 | 2.0 | |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1) | 0.32 | | | 0.39 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241753

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Cambodia*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 721.9 | 1014.5 | 1396.0 | 93% |
| Remittances | 185.8 | 161.7 | 176.0 | -5% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 10.2 | 30.6 | 118.0 | 1062% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 5.2 | 28.4 | 99.1 | 1799% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 574.4 | 828.3 | 862.2 | 50% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 121.7 | 245.6 | 285.7 | 135% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Export diversification | 3 | Competitiveness |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 50.7 | 42 | AsDB Special Funds | 81.2 | 28 |
| Korea, Republic of | 11.8 | 10 | Japan | 70.2 | 25 |
| Germany | 9.6 | 8 | Korea, Republic of | 27.8 | 10 |
| Australia | 9.5 | 8 | Australia | 24.4 | 9 |
| IDA | 7.9 | 7 | Norway | 21.9 | 8 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2006-2012)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 14.3 | 10.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 11 | 8.9 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 10.6 | 6.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 35.0 | 60.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 9.6 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.5 | 6.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)


*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 144 | 136 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 25 | 28 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 14 | 16 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 22 | 32 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 62 | 63 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 3.692 | 6.974 | **+89%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.244 | 2.700 | **+117%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 4.771 | 9.344 | **+96%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.760 | 1.743 | **+129%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 238 | 352 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 759 | 826 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.139 | 0.105 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.059 | 0.044 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 101 | 127 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 86 | 108 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.312 | 0.105 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.122 | 0.169 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 53 | United States | 24 |
| Hong Kong, China | 15 | Hong Kong, China | 17 |
| Germany | 7 | Singapore | 9 |
| United Kingdom | 4 | United Kingdom | 8 |
| Singapore | 4 | Germany | 7 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong, China | 18 | China | 33 |
| China | 18 | United States | 12 |
| Thailand | 14 | Thailand | 12 |
| Other Asia, nes | 13 | Viet Nam | 11 |
| Viet Nam | 9 | Hong Kong, China | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 28 | Printed matter | 24 |
| Women, girls clothing knitted | 26 | Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 22 |
| Printed matter | 18 | Women, girls clothing knitted | 18 |
| Mens, boys clothing, knit | 16 | Mens, boys clothing, knit | 12 |
| Women, girl clothng, excl. knit/crocheted | 2 | Cycles, motorcycles, etc. | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Knit, crochet, fabric, n.e.s. | 19 | Knit, crochet, fabric, n.e.s. | 17 |
| Fabrics, man-made fibres | 13 | Printed matter | 11 |
| Petroleum products | 7 | Petroleum products | 10 |
| Cycles, motorcycles, etc. | 4 | Fabrics, man-made fibres | 7 |
| Tobacco, manufactured | 3 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 0.8 | 0.3 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 50.1 | 49.9 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 7.6 | 6.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | 25.2 | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 0.6 | 1.5 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.54 | 0.58 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241764

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Cameroon*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 89.8 | 572.0 | 572.0 | 537% |
| Remittances | 153.1 | 181.5 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 32.4 | 49.3 | 34.0 | 5% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 17.4 | 48.4 | 32.4 | 86% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 2210.6 | 676.5 | 765.6 | -65% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 132.0 | 171.7 | 291.5 | 121% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ... | 2 | ... | 3 | ... |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 48.2 | 37 | IDA | 127.8 | 44 |
| France | 25.0 | 19 | EU Institutions | 56.2 | 19 |
| IDA | 22.8 | 17 | France | 41.9 | 14 |
| Germany | 12.1 | 9 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 33.6 | 12 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 8.6 | 6 | Japan | 11.4 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 18.0 | 18.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 0 | 13.3 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 5.7 | 0.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 79.6 | 95.1 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 2.0 | 6.4 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 52 | 58 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%) | 19 | 21 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%) | 31 | 26 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 33 | 37 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 36 | 35 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 3.849 | | 5.656 | **+47%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.900 | 1.548 | | **+72%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 3.179 | | 6.480 | **+104%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.416 | 2.067 | | **+46%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.; 2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 273 | 400 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 831 | 919 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.277 | 0.215 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.093 | 0.055 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 95 | 105 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 105 | 123 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.144 | 0.072 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.091 | 0.063 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | 26 | China | 15 |
| Italy | 23 | Portugal | 12 |
| France | 11 | Netherlands | 11 |
| United States | 6 | Spain | 11 |
| Netherlands | 6 | France | 9 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria | 23 | Nigeria | 18 |
| France | 17 | France | 12 |
| China | 6 | China | 10 |
| Belgium | 4 | Netherlands | 4 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 3 | India | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 50 | Petroleum oils, crude | 43 |
| Petroleum products | 12 | Petroleum products | 12 |
| Wood, simply worked | 10 | Cocoa | 11 |
| Cocoa | 7 | Wood, simply worked | 7 |
| Aluminium | 5 | Cotton | 3 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 29 | Petroleum oils, crude | 20 |
| Rice | 4 | Petroleum products | 9 |
| Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 3 | Rice | 5 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 4 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 2 | Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 45.4 | 45.7 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 9.7 | 2.3 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 10.1 | 2.6 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.46 | 0.50 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241775

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Central African Republic*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 69.5 | 56.5 | 0.8 | -99% |
| Remittances | ... | ... | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 20.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -100% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 231.5 | 259.2 | 194.8 | -16% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 33.8 | 61.3 | 18.0 | -47% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transport infrastructure | 2 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms | 3 | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 11.8 | 35 | EU Institutions | 9.1 | 51 |
| France | 9.8 | 29 | IDA | 6.4 | 36 |
| United States | 7.6 | 22 | France | 2.1 | 11 |
| Germany | 2.4 | 7 | UNDP | 0.2 | 1 |
| EU Institutions | 1.8 | 5 | Italy | 0.1 | 1 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 18.0 | 18.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 0 | 16.4 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 98.2 | 88.4 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.3 | 3.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 34 | 32 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 12 | 14 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 37 | 38 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 91 | 93 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 93 | 45 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.158 | | 0.138 | | -13% ▼ |
| | Commercial services | 0.022 | 0.030 | | +34% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.203 | | 0.231 | +14% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.120 | 0.178 | | +48% ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 17 | 30 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 19 | 271 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.412 | 0.288 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.308 | 0.039 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 32 | 27 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 34 | 69 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.157 | 0.167 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.153 | 0.084 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE


*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 27 | Belgium | 33 |
| Germany | 9 | China | 18 |
| Israel | 8 | Germany | 15 |
| Cameroon | 6 | United Arab Emirates | 13 |
| France | 6 | France | 11 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 21 | France | 25 |
| Germany | 8 | United States | 10 |
| Israel | 7 | Netherlands | 9 |
| France | 5 | China | 7 |
| Cameroon | 5 | Cameroon | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pearls, precious stones | 48 | Natural abrasives, n.e.s. | 46 |
| Natural abrasives, n.e.s. | 16 | Wood rough, rough squared | 29 |
| Wood, simply worked | 15 | Wood, simply worked | 11 |
| Wood rough, rough squared | 12 | Cotton | 6 |
| Special transactions not classified | 9 | Civil engineering equipment | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pearls, precious stones | 38 | Medicaments | 15 |
| Wood rough, rough squared | 23 | Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 8 |
| Wood, simply worked | 19 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 5 |
| Natural abrasives, n.e.s. | 12 | Medicines, etc., excl. group 542 | 5 |
| Special transactions not classified | 7 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 4 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 7.0 | 7.6 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 46.9 | 47.3 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 9.1 | 10.5 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2008-2012) | 16.7 | 39.1 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | ... | ... |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.33 | 0.34 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241789

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Chad*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | -44.6 | 312.5 | 538.4 | - |
| Remittances | ... | ... | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 5.1 | 11.1 | 0.5 | -90% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 5.1 | 0.4 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 392.0 | 510.9 | 445.5 | 14% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 50.2 | 43.7 | 50.4 | 0% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transport infrastructure | 2 | Trade facilitation | 3 | Export diversification |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 29.9 | 60 | EU Institutions | 21.2 | 42 |
| IDA | 11.6 | 23 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 10.6 | 21 |
| Switzerland | 3.0 | 6 | IDA | 9.7 | 19 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 2.7 | 5 | Switzerland | 3.4 | 7 |
| France | 1.6 | 3 | France | 3.0 | 6 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 18.0 | 18.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 94.7 | 98.1 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.6 | 2.3 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 94 | 76 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 2 | 5 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 60 | 46 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | ... | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 3.375 | | 3.922 | **+16%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.080 | 0.212 | | **+165%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.429 | | 2.711 | **+90%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.124 | 2.434 | | **+15%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE

**Exports** 2006 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE
2013 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE
**Imports** 2006 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE
2013 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE

Other commercial services
Travel
Transport

*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE

**Exports** 2006 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE
2013 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE
**Imports** 2006 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE
2013 — DATA NOT AVAILABLE

Agriculture
Fuels and mining
Manufacturing

*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 7.1 | 7.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 45.1 | 45.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | ... | ... |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.32 | 0.37 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241794

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Colombia*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 8767.0 | 11893.5 | 16771.7 | 91% |
| Remittances | 4395.4 | 4050.3 | 4119.5 | -6% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 814.2 | 1326.0 | 1868.4 | 129% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 314.1 | 346.0 | 463.3 | 48% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 918.7 | 940.9 | 897.2 | -2% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 123.7 | 177.7 | 178.2 | 44% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Competitiveness | 2 | Trade policy | 3 | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 89.3 | 72 | United States | 81.4 | 46 |
| Spain | 11.6 | 9 | France | 48.5 | 27 |
| Netherlands | 7.3 | 6 | OFID | 6.4 | 4 |
| EU Institutions | 3.4 | 3 | Germany | 5.9 | 3 |
| France | 3.3 | 3 | Canada | 5.5 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.5 | 8.8 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 11 | 9.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 5.7 | 0.3 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 91.0 | 57.9 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 25.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.4 | 9.3 |
| Individuals using the internet | 15.3 | 51.7 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)


*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 36 | 35 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 12 | 9 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 18 | 16 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 34 | 19 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 53 | 43 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 25.181 | 59.992 | **+138%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 3.301 | 5.675 | **+72%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 24.859 | 57.160 | **+130%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 5.428 | 11.113 | **+105%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 946 | 970 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1143 | 1151 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.063 | 0.241 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.010 | 0.019 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 157 | 162 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 151 | 163 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.191 | 0.124 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.100 | 0.124 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 41 | United States | 32 |
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 11 | China | 9 |
| Ecuador | 5 | Panama | 5 |
| Peru | 3 | India | 5 |
| Dominican Republic | 2 | Spain | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 27 | United States | 28 |
| Mexico | 9 | China | 17 |
| China | 8 | Mexico | 9 |
| Brazil | 7 | Brazil | 4 |
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 6 | Germany | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 19 | Petroleum oils, crude | 47 |
| Coal, not agglomerated | 12 | Coal, not agglomerated | 11 |
| Petroleum products | 7 | Petroleum products | 7 |
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 7 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 4 |
| Pig iron, spiegeleisn, etc. | 5 | Coffee, coffee substitute | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 6 | Petroleum products | 11 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 5 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 5 |
| Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Hydrocarbons, n.e.s., derivatives | 3 | Aircraft, associated equipment | 4 |
| Automatic data processing equipment | 3 | Automatic data processing equipment | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 11.7 | 10.5 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 41.1 | 42.7 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2008-2012) | 7.3 | 4.0 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 33.3 | 14.1 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.68 | 0.71 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241814

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Côte d'Ivoire*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 397.3 | 320.9 | 371.0 | -7% |
| Remittances | 183.5 | 373.5 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 86.9 | 19.2 | 50.4 | -42% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 1.7 | 4.6 | 41.2 | 2371% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 479.5 | 2396.4 | 2090.5 | 336% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 96.0 | 132.1 | 110.3 | 15% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Trade facilitation | **3** | Export diversification |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 76.2 | 79 | IDA | 62.1 | 56 |
| EU Institutions | 12.2 | 13 | EU Institutions | 24.5 | 22 |
| France | 3.8 | 4 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 5.1 | 5 |
| Belgium | 1.1 | 1 | OFID | 3.8 | 3 |
| Japan | 0.7 | 1 | Germany | 3.7 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 7.1 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 3.5 | 0.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 87.0 | 97.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | ... |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.5 | 2.6 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 96 | 90 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 8 | 7 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 28 | 25 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 42 | 50 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 28 | 26 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 8.477 | | 12.372 | **+46%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.706 | 0.841 | | **+19%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 5.368 | | 10.157 | **+89%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.087 | 2.620 | | **+26%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 465 | 552 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 905 | 958 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.103 | 0.087 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.101 | 0.105 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 128 | 136 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 122 | 142 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.063 | 0.051 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.144 | 0.093 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 18 | Ghana | 15 |
| Netherlands | 10 | Netherlands | 8 |
| United States | 9 | Nigeria | 7 |
| Nigeria | 7 | France | 7 |
| Germany | 4 | Germany | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria | 28 | Nigeria | 23 |
| France | 26 | Bahamas | 12 |
| China | 4 | China | 11 |
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 3 | France | 10 |
| Germany | 3 | Angola | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cocoa | 24 | Cocoa | 26 |
| Petroleum products | 20 | Petroleum products | 15 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 16 | Ship, boat, floating structures | 14 |
| Arms and ammunition | 4 | Petroleum oils, crude | 8 |
| Natural rubber, etc. | 4 | Natural rubber, etc. | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 30 | Petroleum oils, crude | 23 |
| Arms and ammunition | 5 | Ship, boat, floating structures | 22 |
| Rice | 5 | Rice | 4 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 4 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 3 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 4.1 | 4.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 36.4 | 37.8 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.4 | 10.1 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2011) | 2.8 | 5.2 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.41 | 0.45 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241804

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Comoros*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 4.4 | 13.9 | 13.9 | 218% |
| Remittances | 79.3 | 101.8 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 40.0 | 80.8 | 178.1 | 345% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 3.8 | 7.4 | 12.4 | 224% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | WTO accession | **2** | Competitiveness | **3** | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 2.0 | 52 | EU Institutions | 6.9 | 56 |
| EU Institutions | 0.9 | 22 | France | 2.3 | 19 |
| IDA | 0.5 | 14 | IDA | 1.8 | 15 |
| GEF | 0.2 | 6 | Japan | 1.2 | 9 |
| Belgium | 0.1 | 3 | United States | 0.1 | 1 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 28.9 | | 15.3 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.6 | | 2.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 82.5 | | 88.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 | |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | | 0.2 |
| Individuals using the internet | 2.2 | | 6.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 52 | 67 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 76 | 75 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 35 | 32 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | ... | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.013 | | 0.020 | **+47%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.043 | 0.058 | | **+37%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.101 | | 0.227 | **+125%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.054 | 0.105 | | **+94%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 9 | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 44 | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.258 | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.142 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 53 | | |
| India | 17 | | |
| Germany | 11 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| United Arab Emirates | 7 | | |
| Singapore | 7 | | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Arab Emirates | 31 | | |
| France | 21 | | |
| South Africa | 9 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| India | 6 | | |
| China | 5 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spices | 86 | | |
| Essential oil, perfume, flavour | 8 | | |
| Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 3 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 1 | | |
| Special transactions not classified | 0 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trailers, semi-trailers, etc | 14 | | |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 7 | | |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 7 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Rice | 6 | | |
| Petroleum products | 6 | | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 6.7 | 6.5 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 29.3 | 30.6 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 7.9 | 12.1 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 5.9 | 12.8 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.46 | 0.49 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241823

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Democratic Republic of the Congo*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 1263.7 | 2646.1 | 2098.2 | 66% |
| Remittances | 12.1 | 47.5 | 33.1 | 174% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 2.8 | 8.6 | 2.5 | -13% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 6.8 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1869.6 | 5410.7 | 2605.4 | 39% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 200.5 | 399.3 | 616.5 | 207% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Export diversification | 3 | Transport infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 120.6 | 60 | IDA | 348.9 | 57 |
| EU Institutions | 36.5 | 18 | EU Institutions | 107.0 | 17 |
| Belgium | 15.5 | 8 | AfDF (African Dev. Fund) | 41.4 | 7 |
| United Kingdom | 8.8 | 4 | Belgium | 38.2 | 6 |
| Germany | 6.3 | 3 | United Kingdom | 33.6 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2006-2010)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 98.7 | 97.8 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 3.2 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.3 | 2.2 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 46 | 69 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 6 | 3 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 21 | 19 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | ... | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 2.705 | | 8.534 | **+216%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.169 | 0.225 | | **+33%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 2.892 | | 8.630 | **+198%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.762 | 1.933 | | **+154%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE


*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 8.2 | 8.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 50.1 | 49.9 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 15.9 | 10.3 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | 33.3 | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 9.2 | 3.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.29 | 0.34 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241839

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Costa Rica*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 1814.5 | 1991.3 | 2652.0 | 46% |
| Remittances | 578.6 | 537.8 | 596.4 | 3% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 22.6 | 357.9 | 237.1 | 950% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 20.2 | 216.9 | 201.4 | 899% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 95.5 | 101.1 | 75.1 | -21% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 41.5 | 37.0 | 16.0 | -61% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Regional integration | 3 | Trade policy |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 19.0 | 46 | Norway | 7.0 | 44 |
| Germany | 9.9 | 24 | EU Institutions | 3.2 | 20 |
| France | 7.0 | 17 | France | 2.0 | 12 |
| EU Institutions | 1.8 | 4 | IDB Sp.Fund | 1.8 | 11 |
| Spain | 1.2 | 3 | Japan | 0.8 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*SECTORS WITH NO DATA ARE NOT INCLUDED.*

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 5.9 | 5.6 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 0 | 4.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 7.3 | 0.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 86.7 | 99.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 72.7 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.9 | 9.7 |
| Individuals using the internet | 25.1 | 46.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 104 | 74 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 27 | 34 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 13 | 10 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 59 | 55 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 59 | 49 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 8.102 | 11.506 | **+42%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.933 | 5.952 | **+103%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 10.829 | 17.161 | **+58%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.617 | 1.949 | **+21%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 736 | 819 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1042 | 1078 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.056 | 0.067 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.039 | 0.028 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 110 | 144 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 126 | 140 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.200 | 0.164 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.175 | 0.266 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 42 | United States | 38 |
| China | 8 | Netherlands | 7 |
| Hong Kong, China | 7 | Hong Kong, China | 6 |
| Netherlands | 7 | Panama | 5 |
| Panama | 3 | Nicaragua | 4 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 40 | United States | 50 |
| Japan | 5 | China | 10 |
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 5 | Mexico | 6 |
| Mexico | 5 | Japan | 3 |
| China | 5 | Guatemala | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transistors, valves, etc. | 17 | Transistors, valves, etc. | 21 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 16 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 15 |
| Parts, for office machines | 9 | Medical instruments, n.e.s. | 10 |
| Medical instruments, n.e.s. | 8 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 3 | Coffee, coffee substitute | 3 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transistors, valves, etc. | 17 | Petroleum products | 12 |
| Petroleum products | 9 | Transistors, valves, etc. | 10 |
| Electric switch relay circuit | 4 | Electric switch relay circuit | 4 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 |
| Paper and paperboard | 3 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 5.9 | 7.6 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 34.8 | 36.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2008-2012) | 6.3 | 4.8 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 9.2 | 22.3 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.72 | 0.76 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241848

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Dominica*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 44.5 | 20.8 | 17.9 | -60% |
| Remittances | 22.4 | 23.0 | 23.6 | 5% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 0.8 | 3.3 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.8 | 3.3 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 21.0 | 28.5 | 23.5 | 12% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 9.2 | 15.3 | 11.9 | 29% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Regional integration | **2** | Trade policy | **3** | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 8.6 | 94 | France | 8.8 | 74 |
| Japan | 0.3 | 4 | EU Institutions | 2.3 | 20 |
| IDA | 0.1 | 2 | IDA | 0.6 | 5 |
| France | 0.1 | 1 | Japan | 0.1 | 1 |
| World Trade Organization | 0.0 | 0 | UNDP | 0.0 | 0 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 9.9 | 10.3 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 13.5 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 16.8 | 1.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 50.0 | 81.4 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 6.1 | 14.8 |
| Individuals using the internet | 39.4 | 59.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 89 | 86 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 69 | 77 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 26 | 27 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2012) | 19 | 32 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2012) | 39 | 35 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.044 | 0.043 | | -2% ▼ |
| | Commercial services | 0.099 | 0.148 | +50% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.147 | 0.178 | +21% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.050 | 0.065 | +29% ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.; 2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 49 | 79 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 504 | 517 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.124 | 0.219 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.025 | 0.046 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 25 | 30 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 63 | 66 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.072 | 0.090 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.181 | 0.193 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 18 | Trinidad and Tobago | 19 |
| Jamaica | 15 | Jamaica | 16 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 13 | Saint Kitts and Nevis | 14 |
| France | 8 | Guyana | 10 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 8 | France | 9 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 36 | United States | 37 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 22 | Trinidad and Tobago | 17 |
| United Kingdom | 6 | United Kingdom | 4 |
| Japan | 4 | China | 2 |
| China | 4 | Japan | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Soap, cleaners, polish, etc. | 30 | Soap, cleaners, polish, etc. | 45 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 26 | Printed matter | 12 |
| Perfumery, cosmetics, etc. | 14 | Stone, sand and gravel | 9 |
| Pigments, paints, etc. | 7 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 5 |
| Stone, sand and gravel | 7 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 14 | Petroleum products | 20 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | Other meat, meat offal | 3 |
| Paper, paperboard, cut etc. | 3 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 2 |
| Other meat, meat offal | 2 | Paper, paperboard, cut etc. | 2 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 2 | Milk and cream | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 5.1 | 5.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 16.7 | 15.5 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 12.7 | 10.7 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.71 | 0.72 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241859

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Dominican Republic*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 1874.0 | 2437.9 | 1990.5 | 6% |
| Remittances | 3352.1 | 4129.9 | 4485.5 | 34% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 80.4 | 471.4 | 671.1 | 734% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 45.6 | 195.1 | 92.1 | 102% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 228.2 | 304.7 | 213.4 | -6% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 52.8 | 125.4 | 27.8 | -47% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Competitiveness | **2** | Export diversification | **3** | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 15.2 | 29 | OFID | 10.7 | 39 |
| Germany | 7.3 | 14 | EU Institutions | 3.8 | 14 |
| United States | 6.0 | 11 | United States | 3.6 | 13 |
| Japan | 5.9 | 11 | IDB Sp.Fund | 3.2 | 11 |
| France | 5.6 | 11 | Spain | 2.1 | 8 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 8.5 | 7.3 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 6.4 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 9.0 | 1.3 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 54.1 | 88.4 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 25.4 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.1 | 4.6 |
| Individuals using the internet | 14.8 | 45.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 69 | 57 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 40 | 38 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 11 | 11 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 35 | 52 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 53 | 40 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 6.610 | 9.662 | **+46%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 4.496 | 6.036 | **+34%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 12.174 | 16.891 | **+39%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.510 | 2.128 | **+41%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 478 | 746 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1043 | 1064 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.048 | 0.044 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.009 | 0.036 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 106 | 134 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 141 | 140 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.562 | 0.292 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.293 | 0.173 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 67 | United States | 51 |
| Haiti | 5 | Haiti | 13 |
| Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of | 3 | Canada | 12 |
| Netherlands | 2 | China | 3 |
| Canada | 2 | Netherlands | 2 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 53 | United States | 38 |
| China | 7 | China | 10 |
| Brazil | 4 | Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 7 |
| Japan | 3 | Mexico | 6 |
| Spain | 3 | Trinidad and Tobago | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 13 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 16 |
| Pig iron, spiegeleisn, etc. | 12 | Medical instruments, n.e.s. | 9 |
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 9 | Tobacco, manufactured | 7 |
| Medical instruments, n.e.s. | 9 | Cotton fabrics, woven | 5 |
| Gold, silverware, jewel, n.e.s. | 8 | Electric switch relay circuit | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 6 | Petroleum products | 16 |
| Cotton fabrics, woven | 4 | Petroleum oils, crude | 7 |
| Electric switch relay circuit | 3 | Articles, n.e.s., of plastics | 3 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 2 | Liquefied propane, butane | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 16.4 | 14.9 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 38.4 | 39.8 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2011) | 9.9 | 6.9 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 15.2 | 16.8 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.67 | 0.70 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241864

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for El Salvador*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 898.3 | 156.7 | 140.1 | -84% |
| Remittances | 3648.8 | 3675.3 | 3971.1 | 9% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 43.7 | 399.1 | 245.2 | 461% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 7.7 | 55.2 | 159.4 | 1968% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 228.7 | 350.8 | 235.8 | 3% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 51.0 | 137.8 | 52.7 | 3% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 2 | Regional integration | 3 | Competitiveness |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 27.8 | 54 | United States | 17.3 | 33 |
| Spain | 9.9 | 19 | Germany | 12.2 | 23 |
| United States | 3.7 | 7 | EU Institutions | 10.9 | 21 |
| EU Institutions | 3.1 | 6 | Japan | 4.9 | 9 |
| Germany | 2.7 | 5 | Spain | 2.0 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 5.9 | 6.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 0 | 7.0 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 10.1 | 1.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 43.2 | 92.2 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 6.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.0 | 4.5 |
| Individuals using the internet | 5.5 | 23.1 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 72 | 71 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 21 | 23 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 13 | 12 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 30 | 34 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 46 | 44 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 3.783 | 4.897 | **+29%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.976 | 1.435 | **+47%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 7.419 | 9.672 | **+30%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.153 | 1.277 | **+11%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 659 | 685 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1019 | 1023 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.044 | 0.035 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.015 | 0.032 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 90 | 96 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 105 | 115 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.309 | 0.252 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.145 | 0.174 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 53 | United States | 46 |
| Guatemala | 13 | Honduras | 14 |
| Honduras | 11 | Guatemala | 13 |
| Nicaragua | 5 | Nicaragua | 6 |
| Costa Rica | 3 | Costa Rica | 4 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 36 | United States | 39 |
| Guatemala | 8 | Guatemala | 9 |
| Mexico | 7 | Mexico | 7 |
| China | 4 | China | 7 |
| Brazil | 4 | Honduras | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 25 | Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 21 |
| Women, girls clothing knitted | 5 | Mens, boys clothing, knit | 5 |
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 5 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 5 |
| Mens, boys clothing, knit | 5 | Clothing accessories, fabric | 4 |
| Alcohol, phenol, etc. | 4 | Articles, n.e.s., of plastics | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 8 | Petroleum products | 17 |
| Knit, crochet, fabric, n.e.s. | 6 | Textile yarn | 4 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 5 | Knit, crochet, fabric, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Special transactions not classified | 3 | Medicaments | 2 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 6.6 | 6.3 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 40.6 | 41.7 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 7.8 | 4.9 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 30.9 | 17.1 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.64 | 0.66 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241879

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Gambia*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 72.6 | 32.8 | 25.3 | -65% |
| Remittances | 61.4 | 121.5 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 4.7 | 14.5 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 2.3 | 14.5 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 218.8 | 128.8 | 114.8 | -48% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 14.8 | 48.0 | 40.2 | 172% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transport infrastructure | 2 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 3 | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 4.4 | 30 | EU Institutions | 11.5 | 29 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 4.0 | 27 | IDA | 6.6 | 16 |
| IDA | 3.3 | 22 | United Arab Emirates | 5.8 | 14 |
| Japan | 1.6 | 11 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 5.3 | 13 |
| Belgium | 0.5 | 4 | BADEA | 5.2 | 13 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | ... | 14.1 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 12.9 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 15.1 | 0.8 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 36.7 | 90.8 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 1.2 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 5.2 | 14.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 79 | 78 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 46 | 59 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 30 | 24 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 56 | 76 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 37 | 33 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.109 | 0.147 | +35% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.092 | 0.211 | +129% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.222 | 0.269 | +21% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.094 | 0.083 | | -12% ▼ |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 108 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 454 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.407 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.080 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 21 | 42 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 53 | 88 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.313 | 0.251 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.063 | 0.078 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 49 | Mali | 36 |
| Senegal | 32 | Guinea | 32 |
| France | 5 | Senegal | 17 |
| Germany | 3 | India | 4 |
| Morocco | 2 | Guinea-Bissau | 3 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | 17 | Côte d'Ivoire | 23 |
| United States | 12 | Brazil | 11 |
| China | 9 | China | 7 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 9 | Senegal | 6 |
| Germany | 8 | Belgium | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 48 | Fabrics, man-made fibres | 63 |
| Veg. | 22 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 5 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 7 | Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 3 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 6 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 3 |
| Worn clothing, textile articles | 2 | Milk and cream | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 17 | Petroleum products | 24 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 10 | Rice | 9 |
| Sugars, molasses, honey | 6 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 8 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 5 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 6 |
| Rice | 4 | Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 5 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 7.1 | 7.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 47.4 | 48.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 11.9 | 15.7 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | 33.5 | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 14.8 | 7.1 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.41 | 0.44 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241883

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Grenada*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 136.2 | 47.7 | 77.6 | -43% |
| Remittances | 28.6 | 28.9 | 29.6 | 4% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 4.6 | 1.8 | 0.4 | -90% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 15.2 | 17.8 | 13.4 | -12% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 1.0 | 6.6 | 3.5 | 238% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Competitiveness | **2** | Export diversification | **3** | Trade policy |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 0.7 | 68 | Kuwait (KFAED) | 2.2 | 62 |
| Japan | 0.2 | 17 | IDA | 1.2 | 35 |
| IDA | 0.1 | 6 | Japan | 0.1 | 2 |
| Canada | 0.1 | 5 | Austria | 0.0 | 1 |
| World Trade Organization | 0.0 | 2 | EU Institutions | 0.0 | 0 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 10.2 | 10.4 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 12.3 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 92.9 | 100.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.8 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 5.4 | 17.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 21.4 | 35.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 79 | 73 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 80 | 77 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 25 | 23 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 36 | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 38 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.032 | 0.044 | +36% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.129 | 0.150 | +17% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.297 | 0.321 | +8% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.101 | 0.095 | | -6% ▼ |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 28 | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 85 | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.094 | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.194 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 28 | | |
| Saint Lucia | 13 | | |
| Dominica | 10 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 7 | | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 7 | | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 39 | | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 19 | | |
| United Kingdom | 6 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| China | 5 | | |
| Japan | 4 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 16 | | |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 14 | | |
| Spices | 11 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Paper, paperboard, cut etc. | 9 | | |
| Animal feed stuff | 7 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Printed matter | 8 | | |
| Petroleum products | 6 | | |
| Medicaments | 3 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Metallic structures, n.e.s. | 3 | | |
| Wood, simply worked | 3 | | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 4.0 | 1.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 24.3 | 20.8 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 8.8 | 16.5 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | ... | 0.74 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241895

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Guatemala*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 696.9 | 1025.5 | 1308.9 | 88% |
| Remittances | 4132.0 | 4595.4 | 5370.6 | 30% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 156.8 | 418.0 | 572.3 | 265% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 73.3 | 61.8 | 203.7 | 178% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 538.5 | 409.4 | 544.7 | 1% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 26.8 | 68.8 | 135.5 | 406% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Competitiveness | 3 | Trade policy |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | 5.0 | 19 | United Kingdom | 76.3 | 56 |
| EU Institutions | 4.7 | 18 | United States | 19.6 | 14 |
| Japan | 4.4 | 16 | Sweden | 10.3 | 8 |
| Netherlands | 3.1 | 11 | Japan | 9.2 | 7 |
| United States | 2.3 | 9 | EU Institutions | 4.5 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*SECTORS WITH NO DATA ARE NOT INCLUDED.*

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 5.6 | 5.6 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 0 | 5.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 8.6 | 1.6 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 54.3 | 93.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 4.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.3 | 2.3 |
| Individuals using the internet | 6.5 | 19.7 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)


*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 67 | 59 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 19 | 19 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 14 | 14 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 53 | 47 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 40 | 44 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 6.082 | 10.190 | **+68%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.410 | 2.406 | **+71%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 10.934 | 16.356 | **+50%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.756 | 2.561 | **+46%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 856 | 890 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1075 | 1084 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.043 | 0.028 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.035 | 0.031 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 109 | 134 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 102 | 108 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.136 | 0.173 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.166 | 0.163 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 31 | United States | 38 |
| El Salvador | 15 | El Salvador | 11 |
| Honduras | 10 | Honduras | 8 |
| Mexico | 5 | Nicaragua | 5 |
| Nicaragua | 4 | Mexico | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 39 | United States | 37 |
| Mexico | 9 | Mexico | 11 |
| China | 5 | China | 8 |
| Brazil | 4 | El Salvador | 5 |
| Panama | 4 | Colombia | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 15 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 10 |
| Sugars, molasses, honey | 11 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 9 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 8 | Coffee, coffee substitute | 7 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 7 | Women, girls clothing knitted | 5 |
| Natural rubber, etc. | 3 | Precious metal ores, concentrates | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 17 | Petroleum products | 16 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 5 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 | Medicaments | 3 |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | Paper and paperboard | 2 |
| Paper and paperboard | 2 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 1.8 | 2.8 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 37.3 | 38.3 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.6 | 0.6 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 9.6 | 5.4 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 15.8 | 9.5 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.58 | 0.63 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241909

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Guinea*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 297.6 | 554.6 | 24.8 | -92% |
| Remittances | 35.4 | 59.0 | 93.0 | 163% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 93% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 321.8 | 791.3 | 671.6 | 109% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 42.6 | 69.2 | 83.7 | 97% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 2 | Transport infrastructure | 3 | Export diversification |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 14.6 | 34 | United Arab Emirates | 20.4 | 24 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 6.8 | 16 | IDA | 17.4 | 21 |
| France | 6.7 | 16 | EU Institutions | 12.7 | 15 |
| IDA | 6.2 | 15 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 9.8 | 12 |
| Japan | 3.4 | 8 | BADEA | 8.0 | 10 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2012)* | | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 11.9 | | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | | 11.3 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 1.6 | | 2.0 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 60.8 | | 64.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 | |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.6 | | 1.6 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 80 | 90 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 4 | 7 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 20 | 25 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 73 | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 37 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.033 | 1.928 | **+87%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.038 | 0.156 | **+313%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.956 | 2.254 | **+136%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.233 | 0.762 | **+227%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 73 | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 630 | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.373 | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.080 | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 51 | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 90 | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.102 | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.058 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other Europe, nes | 13 | | |
| Spain | 12 | | |
| United States | 10 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Ireland | 9 | | |
| Germany | 8 | | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Côte d'Ivoire | 16 | | |
| France | 10 | | |
| India | 8 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| China | 8 | | |
| Belgium | 7 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aluminium ores and concentrates | 56 | | |
| Special transactions not classified | 25 | | |
| Cocoa | 6 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 2 | | |
| Wood, simply worked | 2 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 24 | | |
| Rice | 13 | | |
| Civil engineering equipment | 5 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Tobacco, manufactured | 4 | | |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 3 | | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 45.3 | 45.7 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 6.8 | 6.5 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 13.6 | 3.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.37 | 0.39 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241919

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Guinea-Bissau*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 13.7 | 21.6 | 14.5 | 6% |
| Remittances | 39.3 | 47.9 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.6 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 125.1 | 240.6 | 105.0 | -16% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 33.1 | 18.4 | 9.4 | -72% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 2 | Transport infrastructure | 3 | WTO accession |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 23.5 | 71 | EU Institutions | 4.0 | 43 |
| IDA | 5.1 | 16 | IDA | 3.9 | 41 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 1.5 | 4 | Spain | 0.7 | 8 |
| Spain | 1.4 | 4 | Portugal | 0.4 | 4 |
| Portugal | 0.5 | 1 | Belgium | 0.2 | 2 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | ... | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | ... | 1.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | ... | 84.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 2.1 | 3.1 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 42 | 49 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 4 | 13 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 24 | 28 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2005-2013) | 1 | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2005-2013) | 21 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.074 | | 0.193 | **+160%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.003 | 0.021 | | **+500%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.127 | | 0.200 | **+58%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.040 | 0.070 | | **+77%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2005 | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 6 | | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 22 | | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.720 | | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.284 | | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 6.9 | 7.1 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 46.4 | 47.1 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 14.8 | 8.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 12.6 | 4.4 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.39 | 0.40 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241926

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Haiti*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 88.1 | 151.0 | 190.0 | 116% |
| Remittances | 1218.2 | 1545.8 | 1781.0 | 46% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | -0.1 | 5.5 | 6.9 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | -0.1 | 5.5 | 5.7 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 643.0 | 2286.2 | 1160.7 | 81% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 56.6 | 307.8 | 251.2 | 344% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transport infrastructure | 2 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 3 | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Canada | 22.9 | 40 | IDB Sp.Fund | 118.3 | 47 |
| EU Institutions | 18.1 | 32 | United States | 59.9 | 24 |
| IDA | 7.3 | 13 | IDA | 23.4 | 9 |
| United States | 3.0 | 5 | EU Institutions | 18.4 | 7 |
| Spain | 2.2 | 4 | Canada | 11.6 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 2.8 | 4.8 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 8.4 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 16.2 | 0.6 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 16.5 | 98.1 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | ... |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | ... |
| Individuals using the internet | 6.8 | 10.6 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 56 | 66 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 22 | 40 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 27 | 19 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | ... | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.495 | 0.884 | **+78%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.136 | 0.595 | **+338%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.548 | 3.329 | **+115%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.562 | 0.792 | **+41%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 7.3 | 7.0 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 47.2 | 47.6 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 11.9 | 16.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 8.5 | 0.6 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.45 | 0.47 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241931

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Honduras*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 867.7 | 1014.0 | 1059.7 | 22% |
| Remittances | 2590.7 | 2783.0 | 3136.0 | 21% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 11.9 | 24.3 | 81.0 | 580% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 3.9 | 23.8 | 65.0 | 1559% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 917.4 | 639.2 | 658.3 | -28% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 73.2 | 195.0 | 274.0 | 274% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ... | 2 | ... | 3 | ... |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 26.7 | 37 | IDB Sp.Fund | 82.8 | 30 |
| United States | 18.5 | 25 | EU Institutions | 73.1 | 27 |
| Japan | 10.1 | 14 | IDA | 51.3 | 19 |
| Spain | 6.5 | 9 | United States | 15.6 | 6 |
| Germany | 3.3 | 5 | Norway | 12.6 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 5.6 | 5.7 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 5.8 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 11.5 | 0.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 38.9 | 99.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 11.7 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.9 |
| Individuals using the internet | 7.8 | 17.8 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 132 | 116 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 12 | 12 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 12 | 13 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2012) | 64 | 71 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2012) | 40 | 35 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 5.277 | 7.833 | **+48%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.727 | 1.097 | **+51%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 7.303 | 11.026 | **+51%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.027 | 1.602 | **+56%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 548 | 588 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 999 | 988 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.079 | 0.103 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.045 | 0.064 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 82 | 99 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 103 | 103 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.284 | 0.224 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.216 | 0.188 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 52 | United States | 45 |
| Germany | 8 | Germany | 10 |
| Belgium | 6 | Belgium | 6 |
| Mexico | 5 | El Salvador | 4 |
| El Salvador | 4 | Guatemala | 4 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 45 | United States | 41 |
| Guatemala | 7 | China | 9 |
| Mexico | 5 | Mexico | 8 |
| Panama | 5 | Guatemala | 7 |
| El Salvador | 4 | El Salvador | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 21 | Coffee, coffee substitute | 29 |
| Electric distribution equipment, n.e.s. | 14 | Electric distribution equipment, n.e.s. | 11 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 10 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 7 |
| Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 9 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 4 |
| Tobacco, manufactured | 3 | Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 20 | Petroleum products | 24 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Medicaments | 5 |
| Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 3 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 2 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.1 | 4.2 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 33.2 | 34.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 5.8 | 3.3 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 7.2 | 5.3 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 7.9 | 14.4 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.58 | 0.62 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241944

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Indonesia*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 7053.3 | 17383.3 | 18444.0 | 161% |
| Remittances | 6230.3 | 7017.4 | 7614.4 | 22% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 1261.4 | 2957.8 | 2711.8 | 115% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 662.6 | 1371.7 | 1844.7 | 178% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 2953.4 | 2810.6 | 2419.1 | -18% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 755.0 | 907.8 | 610.1 | -19% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Competitiveness | 2 | Transport infrastructure | 3 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 524.6 | 69 | Japan | 398.3 | 65 |
| Germany | 55.9 | 7 | Australia | 55.0 | 9 |
| Australia | 38.8 | 5 | Germany | 42.7 | 7 |
| IDA | 34.9 | 5 | United States | 23.7 | 4 |
| United Kingdom | 25.2 | 3 | Norway | 17.6 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 6.9 | 6.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 5 | 4.7 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 2.5 | 5.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 71.3 | 71.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 24.2 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 1.3 |
| Individuals using the internet | 4.8 | 15.8 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 58 | 48 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 10 | 11 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 22 | 16 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 50 | 48 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | 48 | 53 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 103.528 | 182.861 | **+77%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 11.093 | 21.733 | **+96%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 73.868 | 177.448 | **+140%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 21.175 | 34.266 | **+62%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 1055 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 1173 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.040 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.031 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 211 | 210 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 177 | 194 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.087 | 0.070 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.066 | 0.073 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 22 | Japan | 15 |
| United States | 11 | China | 12 |
| Singapore | 9 | Singapore | 9 |
| China | 8 | United States | 9 |
| Korea, Republic of | 8 | India | 7 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore | 16 | China | 16 |
| China | 11 | Singapore | 14 |
| Japan | 9 | Japan | 10 |
| United States | 7 | Malaysia | 7 |
| Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of | 6 | Korea, Republic of | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural gas | 10 | Coal, not agglomerated | 12 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 8 | Natural gas | 10 |
| Coal, not agglomerated | 6 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 10 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 6 | Petroleum oils, crude | 6 |
| Copper ores, concentrates | 5 | Natural rubber, etc. | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 18 | Petroleum products | 15 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 13 | Petroleum oils, crude | 7 |
| Hydrocarbons, n.e.s., derivatives | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Ship, boat, floating structures | 2 | Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 2 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 | Liquefied propane, butane | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 10.3 | 6.3 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 37.4 | 38.1 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | ... | 2.6 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 25.2 | 19.4 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.64 | 0.68 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241957

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Lao PDR*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 246.2 | 291.3 | 296.0 | 20% |
| Remittances | 9.4 | 70.2 | 59.6 | 534% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 23.3 | 24.1 | 1.7 | -93% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 12.5 | 19.3 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 302.8 | 452.4 | 462.8 | 53% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 113.3 | 155.9 | 143.3 | 26% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade policy | 2 | Regional integration | 3 | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 32.2 | 28 | AsDB Special Funds | 37.3 | 26 |
| IDA | 21.4 | 19 | Japan | 35.4 | 25 |
| France | 12.4 | 11 | IDA | 24.1 | 17 |
| Sweden | 10.5 | 9 | Germany | 14.2 | 10 |
| Germany | 10.4 | 9 | Korea, Republic of | 10.5 | 7 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 9.7 | ... |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 2.2 | 0.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 60.7 | 96.3 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 2.5 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.2 | 12.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 63 | 66 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 19 | 20 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 3 | 10 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | ... | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.882 | | 2.264 | **+157%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.203 | 0.553 | | **+173%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.060 | | 3.020 | **+185%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.031 | 0.335 | | **+987%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE


*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 50.7 | 50.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 11.1 | 4.7 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 14.0 | 9.4 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 16.2 | 9.7 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.51 | 0.57 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241963

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Lesotho*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 118.9 | 51.5 | 44.1 | -63% |
| Remittances | 609.3 | 604.5 | 462.5 | -24% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | -0.4 | 19.0 | 20.5 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 118.9 | 288.9 | 343.2 | 189% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 17.4 | 27.3 | 20.0 | 15% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Trade facilitation | **3** | Competitiveness |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 6.7 | 39 | IDA | 13.9 | 70 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 6.1 | 35 | EU Institutions | 2.2 | 11 |
| EU Institutions | 3.1 | 18 | United States | 1.3 | 6 |
| Germany | 0.7 | 4 | OFID | 0.9 | 4 |
| United States | 0.2 | 1 | BADEA | 0.7 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 7.9 | 7.6 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 99.9 | 99.3 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 7.4 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 3.0 | 5.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 171 | 141 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 5 | 6 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 20 | 16 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | ... | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports)) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.718 | 0.847 | **+18%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.038 | 0.057 | **+51%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.359 | 1.884 | **+39%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.332 | 0.355 | **+7%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 83 | | |
| United States | 15 | | |
| Madagascar | 1 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Kenya | 1 | | |
| Canada | 0 | | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 95 | | |
| Japan | 2 | | |
| Germany | 1 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| United States | 1 | | |
| United Kingdom | 0 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Television receivers etc. | 21 | | |
| Electric switch relay circuit | 18 | | |
| Footwear | 7 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Wool, other animal hair | 6 | | |
| Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 6 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2008 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Special transactions not classified | 13 | | |
| Petroleum products | 7 | | |
| Perfumery, cosmetics, etc. | 4 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Misc. manufactured goods n.e.s. | 4 | | |
| Road motor vehicles n.e.s. | 4 | | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 32.5 | 24.7 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 47.1 | 45.8 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 3.8 | 9.9 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.44 | 0.49 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241977

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Madagascar*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 745.7 | 810.1 | 837.5 | 12% |
| Remittances | ... | ... | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 165.2 | 162.5 | 2.2 | -99% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 164.9 | 162.5 | 0.7 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1665.6 | 450.7 | 667.4 | -60% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 279.4 | 122.9 | 101.3 | -64% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Competitiveness | **2** | Trade facilitation | **3** | Adjustment costs |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 118.6 | 42 | IDA | 52.5 | 52 |
| EU Institutions | 81.0 | 29 | EU Institutions | 13.8 | 14 |
| France | 32.7 | 12 | France | 9.7 | 10 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 12.0 | 4 | BADEA | 6.1 | 6 |
| United States | 10.4 | 4 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 5.4 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 13.3 | 11.7 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 9 | 8.1 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.3 | 2.0 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 99.3 | 86.8 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 3.1 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.6 | 2.2 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 66 | 68 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 37 | 47 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 28 | 32 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 25 | 49 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 50 | 45 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.968 | | 1.900 | **+96%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.558 | 1.352 | | **+142%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.533 | | 2.715 | **+77%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.600 | 1.243 | | **+107%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 427 | 444 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 870 | 882 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.046 | 0.061 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.037 | 0.058 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 108 | 114 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 117 | 123 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.212 | 0.092 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.089 | 0.091 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 40 | France | 25 |
| United States | 15 | United States | 7 |
| Germany | 6 | China | 7 |
| Italy | 4 | Netherlands | 6 |
| United Kingdom | 3 | Germany | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 18 | United Arab Emirates | 21 |
| Bahrain, Kingdom of | 16 | China | 15 |
| France | 13 | France | 6 |
| South Africa | 6 | Other Europe, nes | 6 |
| United States | 4 | India | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 13 | Nickel | 20 |
| Special transactions not classified | 10 | Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 10 |
| Petroleum products | 8 | Spices | 9 |
| Spices | 8 | Ore, concentrate base metals | 6 |
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 8 | Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 18 | Petroleum products | 22 |
| Textile yarn | 6 | Rice | 6 |
| Cotton fabrics, woven | 4 | Cotton fabrics, woven | 3 |
| Knit, crochet, fabric, n.e.s. | 3 | Textile yarn | 2 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.9 | 3.6 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 49.1 | 49.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 14.4 | 3.9 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2011) | 49.9 | 49.3 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2011) | 3.6 | 2.1 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.47 | 0.50 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241980

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Malawi*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 118.5 | 118.4 | 118.4 | 0% |
| Remittances | 17.5 | 25.1 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 1.7 | 0.9 | 0.0 | -100% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1912.2 | 1007.6 | 1161.9 | -39% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 99.1 | 196.7 | 220.6 | 123% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Competitiveness | 2 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 3 | Export diversification |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 24.4 | 25 | IDA | 75.3 | 34 |
| EU Institutions | 23.5 | 24 | EU Institutions | 42.7 | 19 |
| Japan | 12.4 | 13 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 19.4 | 9 |
| Norway | 11.2 | 11 | Norway | 17.8 | 8 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 9.6 | 10 | United Kingdom | 13.6 | 6 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 13.5 | 12.4 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 7.8 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 14.7 | 0.4 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 85.7 | 98.2 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 3.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.4 | 5.4 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 67 | 92 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 8 | 7 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 11 | 8 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 77 | 84 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 49 | 55 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.721 | | 1.312 | **+82%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.062 | 0.104 | | **+67%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.161 | | 2.775 | **+139%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.142 | 0.205 | | **+44%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 253 | 279 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 798 | 885 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.387 | 0.245 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.028 | 0.034 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 96 | 101 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 98 | 110 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.086 | 0.040 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.156 | 0.081 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 22 | Canada | 12 |
| United Kingdom | 13 | Belgium | 8 |
| Germany | 10 | South Africa | 8 |
| United States | 8 | United States | 6 |
| Egypt | 5 | United Kingdom | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 36 | South Africa | 22 |
| Mozambique | 13 | Mozambique | 12 |
| United Arab Emirates | 6 | China | 9 |
| United Kingdom | 6 | India | 8 |
| India | 4 | United Arab Emirates | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tobacco, unmanufactured | 61 | Tobacco, unmanufactured | 47 |
| Tea and mate | 7 | Uranium, thorium ores, etc. | 11 |
| Sugars, molasses, honey | 6 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 9 |
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 2 | Tea and mate | 7 |
| Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 2 | Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 11 | Petroleum products | 14 |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 11 | Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 12 |
| Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 6 | Medicaments | 6 |
| Tobacco, unmanufactured | 4 | Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 3 |
| Printed matter | 4 | Tobacco, unmanufactured | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 7.8 | 7.6 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 49.9 | 51.2 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 23.5 | 28.6 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | ... | 8.9 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 8.9 | 2.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.37 | 0.41 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933241997

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Mali*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 112.2 | 453.3 | 410.3 | 266% |
| Remittances | 328.9 | 628.4 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 2.3 | 1.1 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1589.3 | 1146.2 | 1432.9 | -10% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 236.8 | 378.5 | 251.1 | 6% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Trade policy | 3 | Export diversification |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 79.8 | 34 | IDA | 96.9 | 39 |
| EU Institutions | 76.0 | 32 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 30.4 | 12 |
| France | 15.8 | 7 | Germany | 18.6 | 7 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 13.8 | 6 | United States | 18.2 | 7 |
| Germany | 11.3 | 5 | EU Institutions | 13.3 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 9.8 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 17.1 | 2.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 51.3 | 32.9 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 1.8 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.7 | 2.3 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 65 | 70 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%) | 16 | 9 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%) | 31 | 26 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 97 | 92 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 40 | 40 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.550 | | 2.691 | **+74%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.291 | 0.307 | | **+5%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.475 | | 3.272 | **+122%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.672 | 1.044 | | **+55%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 200 | 282 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 733 | 770 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.577 | 0.451 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.063 | 0.086 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 71 | 82 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 100 | 117 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.516 | 0.287 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.064 | 0.094 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 71 | South Africa | 52 |
| China | 6 | Switzerland | 12 |
| Senegal | 3 | China | 8 |
| Viet Nam | 2 | Malaysia | 5 |
| Thailand | 2 | Côte d'Ivoire | 4 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 15 | Senegal | 25 |
| Senegal | 12 | France | 11 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 11 | China | 11 |
| Benin | 9 | Côte d'Ivoire | 8 |
| China | 6 | Benin | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 74 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 65 |
| Cotton | 17 | Cotton | 15 |
| Live animals | 3 | Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 6 |
| Other cereals, unmilled | 1 | Live animals | 4 |
| Petroleum products | 1 | Civil engineering equipment | 1 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 23 | Petroleum products | 28 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 5 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 5 |
| Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 5 | Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 5 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Medicaments | 4 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | Civil engineering equipment | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 8.3 | 8.2 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 36.3 | 38.6 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 14.8 | 10.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | 12.4 | 13.1 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 4.4 | 1.5 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.36 | 0.41 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242001

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Mauritius*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 275.8 | 484.1 | 258.6 | -6% |
| Remittances | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | -15% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 44.6 | 170.6 | 276.6 | 520% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 9.1 | 87.4 | 69.0 | 662% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 103.8 | 185.9 | 179.4 | 73% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 6.6 | 31.3 | 93.5 | 1308% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Competitiveness | **2** | Export diversification | **3** | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 6.5 | 98 | France | 56.8 | 61 |
| Greece | 0.3 | 4 | EU Institutions | 30.6 | 33 |
| Japan | 0.2 | 4 | BADEA | 3.9 | 4 |
| World Trade Organization | 0.2 | 2 | United Kingdom | 1.2 | 1 |
| Germany | 0.1 | 1 | Japan | 0.5 | 1 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 3.5 | 1.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 2 | 0.9 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 1.6 | 0.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 95.3 | 99.2 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 28.7 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 2.3 | 12.5 |
| Individuals using the internet | 16.7 | 39.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 129 | 117 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 42 | 53 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 28 | 34 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 29 | 23 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 35 | 34 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 2.329 | 2.872 | **+23%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.663 | 3.302 | **+99%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 3.409 | 5.141 | **+51%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.312 | 2.635 | **+101%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 594 | 622 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 991 | 1006 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.078 | 0.063 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.036 | 0.043 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 126 | 120 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 130 | 145 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.154 | 0.080 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.059 | 0.096 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 30 | United Kingdom | 17 |
| France | 14 | France | 15 |
| United Arab Emirates | 11 | United States | 10 |
| United States | 8 | Italy | 9 |
| Madagascar | 4 | South Africa | 8 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 14 | India | 24 |
| India | 14 | China | 15 |
| China | 9 | France | 8 |
| South Africa | 7 | South Africa | 6 |
| Germany | 4 | Spain | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 21 | Fish etc. prepared, preserved, n.e.s. | 16 |
| Sugars, molasses, honey | 15 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 13 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 11 | Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 13 |
| Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 7 | Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 12 |
| Special transactions not classified | 7 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 15 | Petroleum products | 19 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 9 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 6 |
| Aircraft, associated equipment | 6 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 5 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 |
| Textile yarn | 4 | Pearls, precious stones | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 9.1 | 8.3 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 36.0 | 37.9 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.3 | 1.5 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | ... | 2.3 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 5.9 | 42.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.72 | 0.77 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242012

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Mexico*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 27143.0 | 21445.2 | 38285.7 | 41% |
| Remittances | 26488.1 | 23011.6 | 23022.5 | -13% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 1517.8 | 3939.3 | 2976.5 | 96% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 549.2 | 1397.1 | 1242.5 | 126% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 280.7 | 756.0 | 795.8 | 184% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 26.0 | 131.8 | 312.2 | 1100% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Competitiveness | 3 | Export diversification |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 5.7 | 22 | France | 164.5 | 53 |
| United States | 5.4 | 21 | Germany | 118.8 | 38 |
| Japan | 4.5 | 17 | United States | 9.4 | 3 |
| France | 2.9 | 11 | IDB Sp.Fund | 6.7 | 2 |
| Germany | 2.4 | 9 | Japan | 6.4 | 2 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 14.0 | 7.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 12 | 5.4 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 98.6 | 98.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 13.5 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 2.7 | 10.9 |
| Individuals using the internet | 19.5 | 43.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 56 | 64 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 6 | 5 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 8 | 7 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 37 | 38 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 61 | 59 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 250.319 | 381.000 | +52% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 15.807 | 19.586 | +24% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 256.776 | 382.000 | +49% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 21.611 | 28.803 | +33% ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 1120 | 1134 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1222 | 1195 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.037 | 0.033 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.011 | 0.014 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 182 | 183 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 200 | 207 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.723 | 0.625 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.287 | 0.282 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 85 | United States | 79 |
| Canada | 2 | Canada | 3 |
| Spain | 1 | Spain | 2 |
| Germany | 1 | China | 2 |
| Colombia | 1 | Brazil | 1 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 51 | United States | 49 |
| China | 10 | China | 16 |
| Japan | 6 | Japan | 4 |
| Korea, Republic of | 4 | Korea, Republic of | 4 |
| Germany | 4 | Germany | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 14 | Petroleum oils, crude | 11 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 7 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 9 |
| Television receivers etc. | 7 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 6 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 5 | Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 5 |
| Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 5 | Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 6 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 7 |
| Transistors, valves, etc. | 5 | Petroleum products | 7 |
| Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 5 | Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 5 |
| Electric switch relay circuit | 4 | Transistors, valves, etc. | 4 |
| Petroleum products | 4 | Electric switch relay circuit | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.2 | 4.9 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 36.9 | 38.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 20.1 | 10.3 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.72 | 0.76 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242027

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Mongolia*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 487.6 | 3619.3 | 2046.8 | 320% |
| Remittances | 194.7 | 288.7 | 255.7 | 31% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 169.7 | 190.1 | 2.7E+06% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 169.6 | 171.1 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 201.5 | 408.1 | 479.9 | 138% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 65.5 | 160.5 | 268.7 | 310% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Trade facilitation | **3** | Cross-border infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 25.0 | 38 | Japan | 133.0 | 50 |
| Germany | 10.9 | 17 | AsDB Special Funds | 42.6 | 16 |
| IDA | 10.4 | 16 | United States | 40.6 | 15 |
| Korea, Republic of | 6.1 | 9 | Germany | 18.6 | 7 |
| United States | 5.2 | 8 | IDA | 8.0 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 4.5 | | 5.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 4 | | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 4.0 | | 0.6 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 71.1 | | 93.1 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 18.2 | |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | | 4.9 |
| Individuals using the internet | ... | | 17.7 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 114 | 109 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 24 | 14 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 27 | 26 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 88 | 59 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 34 | 30 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.545 | 4.269 | **+176%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.483 | 0.707 | **+46%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.357 | 5.590 | **+312%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.514 | 2.004 | **+290%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 242 | 240 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 770 | 883 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.209 | 0.161 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.088 | 0.059 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 55 | 51 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 72 | 100 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.471 | 0.750 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.211 | 0.153 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 68 | China | 87 |
| Canada | 11 | United Kingdom | 5 |
| United States | 8 | Canada | 3 |
| Russian Federation | 3 | Russian Federation | 1 |
| Italy | 3 | Italy | 1 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Federation | 37 | China | 28 |
| China | 27 | Russian Federation | 25 |
| Japan | 7 | United States | 8 |
| Korea, Republic of | 6 | Korea, Republic of | 8 |
| Kazakhstan | 3 | Japan | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Copper ores, concentrates | 41 | Coal, not agglomerated | 26 |
| Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 18 | Copper ores, concentrates | 22 |
| Wool, other animal hair | 10 | Iron ore, concentrates | 15 |
| Ore, concentrate base metals | 9 | Petroleum oils, crude | 12 |
| Coal, not agglomerated | 3 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 28 | Petroleum products | 22 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 5 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 6 |
| Printed matter | 4 | Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 6 |
| Civil engineering equipment | 3 | Civil engineering equipment | 5 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 | Iron, steel bar, shapes, etc. | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 5.9 | 4.9 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 46.5 | 45.8 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 6.1 | 4.8 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 5.3 | 10.9 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 2.5 | 27.9 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.64 | 0.70 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242031

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Nepal*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 0.1 | 91.4 | 73.6 | 87264% |
| Remittances | 1971.4 | 4159.7 | 5551.5 | 182% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.3 | -7% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 588.5 | 967.9 | 1032.7 | 75% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 125.4 | 265.8 | 320.4 | 156% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Competitiveness | 2 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 3 | Transport infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 31.1 | 25 | IDA | 111.5 | 35 |
| United Kingdom | 24.6 | 20 | AsDB Special Funds | 69.7 | 22 |
| Germany | 21.4 | 17 | Japan | 29.8 | 9 |
| Japan | 16.4 | 13 | Switzerland | 23.5 | 7 |
| Norway | 10.4 | 8 | United Kingdom | 22.4 | 7 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2005-2013)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 13.9 | 12.2 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 13.6 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 11.8 | 0.3 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 37.8 | 96.7 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 10.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 1.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.1 | 13.3 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 45 | 49 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 23 | 49 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 17 | 13 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | ... | 53 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | ... | 56 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.849 | 0.992 | **+17%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.252 | 0.962 | **+282%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 2.441 | 6.502 | **+166%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.488 | 0.964 | **+97%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 324 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 994 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.034 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.029 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | 100 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | 101 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.455 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.418 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | India | 67 |
| | | United States | 8 |
| *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | | Germany | 4 |
| | | China | 2 |
| | | United Kingdom | 2 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | India | 64 |
| | | China | 9 |
| *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | | United Arab Emirates | 6 |
| | | Indonesia | 3 |
| | | Argentina | 3 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Floor coverings, etc. | 8 |
| | | Flat-rolled plated iron | 8 |
| *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | | Textile yarn | 7 |
| | | Fabrics, man-made fibres | 7 |
| | | Fruit, veg. juices | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Petroleum products | 13 |
| | | Fixed veg. fat, oils, soft | 5 |
| *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | | Ingots etc. iron or steel | 5 |
| | | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 4 |
| | | Flat-rolled iron etc. | 4 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 2.6 | 2.7 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 49.4 | 50.9 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 5.8 | 4.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | 25.4 | 21.7 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 10.2 | 8.7 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.48 | 0.54 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242043

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Nigeria*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 6411.0 | 7380.4 | 5609.0 | -13% |
| Remittances | 18049.9 | 20356.7 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 157.5 | 128.8 | 392.8 | 149% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 28.1 | 125.1 | 382.8 | 1260% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 5282.0 | 1998.8 | 2670.8 | -49% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 242.1 | 384.5 | 557.1 | 130% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Competitiveness | 2 | Trade facilitation | 3 | Trade policy |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 126.0 | 52 | IDA | 247.3 | 44 |
| United Kingdom | 81.6 | 34 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 142.8 | 26 |
| United States | 8.4 | 3 | United Kingdom | 62.0 | 11 |
| Japan | 7.5 | 3 | France | 38.6 | 7 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 6.0 | 2 | United States | 26.7 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.7 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 10.1 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 97.5 | 98.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 10.1 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | 5.5 | 38.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 64 | 32 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 3 | 2 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 36 | 29 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 1 | 11 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 53 | 45 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 56.935 | 94.766 | **+66%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.057 | 1.928 | | **-6%** ▼ |
| **Imports** | Goods | 21.988 | 51.161 | **+133%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 12.115 | 20.513 | **+69%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 154 | 493 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 964 | 1118 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.862 | 0.687 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.014 | 0.043 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 67 | 131 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 194 | 164 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.218 | 0.060 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.071 | 0.077 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 45 | India | 13 |
| India | 9 | Netherlands | 11 |
| Spain | 8 | Brazil | 9 |
| France | 6 | United States | 8 |
| Brazil | 4 | Spain | 7 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 16 | China | 22 |
| China | 14 | United States | 9 |
| United Kingdom | 12 | Netherlands | 5 |
| Germany | 6 | United Kingdom | 5 |
| Belgium | 5 | Belgium | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 93 | Petroleum oils, crude | 83 |
| Petroleum products | 5 | Natural rubber, etc. | 3 |
| Ship, boat, floating structures | 1 | Petroleum products | 3 |
| Crude veg. materials, n.e.s. | 0 | Cocoa | 2 |
| Leather | 0 | Natural gas | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 6 | Petroleum products | 19 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 5 | Tobacco, manufactured | 3 |
| Arms and ammunition | 4 | Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 3 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 | Cycles, motorcycles, etc. | 3 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 3 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 7.6 | 7.5 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 42.9 | 42.4 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 8.1 | 0.4 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 11.0 | 0.5 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.47 | 0.50 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242053

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Pakistan*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 5100.3 | 1402.3 | 1307.0 | -74% |
| Remittances | 6052.7 | 11986.3 | 14626.0 | 142% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 163.7 | 636.7 | 572.3 | 250% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 138.2 | 423.8 | 475.7 | 244% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1900.3 | 3551.4 | 2992.6 | 57% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 338.5 | 522.9 | 772.3 | 128% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Competitiveness | 2 | Trade facilitation | 3 | Export diversification |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 190.0 | 56 | United States | 232.0 | 30 |
| United States | 47.1 | 14 | Japan | 169.1 | 22 |
| Japan | 37.3 | 11 | IDA | 160.3 | 21 |
| Germany | 29.6 | 9 | AsDB Special Funds | 80.6 | 10 |
| United Kingdom | 12.5 | 4 | United Arab Emirates | 43.5 | 6 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 14.3 | 13.5 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 13 | 10.0 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 7.6 | 7.6 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 19.0 | 21.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.5 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.6 |
| Individuals using the internet | 6.5 | 10.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 39 | 32 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 12 | 12 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 23 | 15 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 35 | 41 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 42 | 48 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 17.049 | 25.172 | +48% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.245 | 3.284 | +46% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 26.696 | 41.070 | +54% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 8.093 | 7.099 | | -12% ▼ |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 827 | 848 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1092 | 1084 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.050 | 0.038 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.039 | 0.065 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 196 | 184 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 186 | 187 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.084 | 0.052 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.050 | 0.079 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 26 | United States | 15 |
| United Arab Emirates | 7 | China | 11 |
| Afghanistan | 6 | Afghanistan | 8 |
| United Kingdom | 6 | United Arab Emirates | 7 |
| Germany | 4 | United Kingdom | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Arab Emirates | 11 | United Arab Emirates | 18 |
| Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of | 10 | China | 15 |
| China | 10 | Kuwait | 9 |
| United States | 6 | Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of | 9 |
| Kuwait | 6 | Japan | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Textile articles, n.e.s. | 19 | Textile articles, n.e.s. | 15 |
| Cotton fabrics, woven | 12 | Cotton fabrics, woven | 11 |
| Textile yarn | 9 | Textile yarn | 9 |
| Rice | 7 | Rice | 8 |
| Mens, boys clothing, knit | 5 | Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 13 | Petroleum products | 21 |
| Petroleum products | 12 | Petroleum oils, crude | 13 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 7 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 4 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 3 | Ship, boat, floating structures | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 6.1 | 5.1 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 19.0 | 22.1 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.6 | 0.9 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2005-2013) | 18.8 | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 10.9 | 26.3 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.50 | 0.54 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242066

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Panama*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 2156.9 | 2914.4 | 4651.3 | 116% |
| Remittances | 194.0 | 396.4 | 451.9 | 133% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 70.2 | 414.9 | 1222.2 | 1641% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 19.1 | 174.8 | 786.3 | 4014% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 48.1 | 114.5 | 51.7 | 7% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 7.7 | 15.9 | 6.5 | -16% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 3.4 | 44 | Japan | 2.4 | 37 |
| Spain | 2.5 | 33 | Norway | 2.0 | 31 |
| Korea, Republic of | 0.8 | 10 | IDB Sp.Fund | 0.7 | 11 |
| United States | 0.6 | 8 | Canada | 0.5 | 8 |
| Germany | 0.1 | 2 | United States | 0.4 | 7 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ... | 2 | ... | 3 | ... |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 7.3 | 6.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 5.4 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 16.7 | 6.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 64.1 | 55.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 25.2 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 3.3 | 7.7 |
| Individuals using the internet | 17.3 | 42.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 142 | 131 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 32 | 35 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 14 | 16 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 15 | 45 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 23 | 30 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 8.475 | 17.505 | **+107%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 3.957 | 9.624 | **+143%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 10.190 | 24.256 | **+138%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.673 | 4.642 | **+178%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 769 | 187 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1025 | 1019 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.025 | 0.041 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.017 | 0.045 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 100 | 79 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 95 | 89 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.080 | 0.062 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.102 | 0.121 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 20 | United States | 19 |
| Colombia | 16 | Canada | 8 |
| United States | 9 | China | 6 |
| Guatemala | 6 | Costa Rica | 6 |
| Dominican Republic | 5 | Germany | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 20 | United States | 24 |
| United States | 19 | Panama | 18 |
| Hong Kong, China | 12 | China | 8 |
| Other Asia, nes | 7 | Mexico | 4 |
| Neth. Antilles | 5 | Costa Rica | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Medicaments | 10 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 19 |
| Footwear | 9 | Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 9 |
| Women, girl clothng, excl. knit/crocheted | 7 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 9 |
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 5 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 8 |
| Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 5 | Ferrous waste and scrap | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Footwear | 7 | Petroleum products | 19 |
| Medicaments | 6 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 6 |
| Petroleum products | 6 | Medicaments | 3 |
| Women, girl clothng, excl. knit/crocheted | 5 | Civil engineering equipment | 2 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 8.7 | 4.1 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 36.2 | 37.2 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 21.3 | 5.7 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.73 | 0.77 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242072

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Papua New Guinea*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 19.5 | -85.2 | 18.2 | -7% |
| Remittances | 6.5 | 11.6 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 15.8 | 31.1 | 93.1 | 490% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 10.1 | 19.7 | 86.0 | 750% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 352.7 | 640.3 | 700.3 | 99% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 87.7 | 146.8 | 198.5 | 126% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ... | 2 | ... | 3 | ... |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 67.5 | 77 | AsDB Special Funds | 86.2 | 43 |
| EU Institutions | 12.3 | 14 | Australia | 70.4 | 35 |
| Japan | 4.7 | 5 | IDA | 23.0 | 12 |
| New Zealand | 1.6 | 2 | OFID | 6.9 | 3 |
| IDA | 0.7 | 1 | Japan | 5.8 | 3 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 5.5 | 4.7 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 2 | 2.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 92.5 | 96.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | ... |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.8 | 6.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators







*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 144 | 97 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 7 | 6 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 44 | 42 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2012) | ... | 92 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2012) | ... | 38 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 4.204 | 5.604 | **+33%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.305 | 0.366 | **+20%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.991 | 5.137 | **+158%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.584 | 3.684 | **+133%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 273 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 1014 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.143 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.022 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | 76 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | 119 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.154 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.156 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Australia | 36 |
| | | Japan | 12 |
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | Germany | 7 |
| | | China | 7 |
| | | Singapore | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Australia | 34 |
| | | Singapore | 14 |
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | China | 7 |
| | | Japan | 6 |
| | | Malaysia | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Silver, platinum, etc. | 33 |
| | | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 13 |
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | Copper ores, concentrates | 9 |
| | | Precious metal ores, concentrates | 7 |
| | | Coffee, coffee substitute | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Petroleum oils, crude | 10 |
| | | Petroleum products | 7 |
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | Civil engineering equipment | 5 |
| | | Heating, cooling equipment, part | 5 |
| | | Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 4 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 2.7 | 2.1 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 48.4 | 48.3 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 5.7 | 4.4 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 7.1 | 7.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.44 | 0.49 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242082

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Paraguay*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 175.1 | 417.5 | 382.4 | 118% |
| Remittances | 346.5 | 528.2 | 591.0 | 71% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 33.4 | 202.7 | 173.7 | 420% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 20.9 | 123.9 | 120.5 | 476% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 150.8 | 172.3 | 186.3 | 24% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 34.6 | 41.5 | 31.4 | -9% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 3 | Transport infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 23.4 | 68 | IDB Sp.Fund | 10.1 | 32 |
| EU Institutions | 3.7 | 11 | Japan | 7.2 | 23 |
| Korea, Republic of | 2.0 | 6 | Korea, Republic of | 4.2 | 13 |
| Spain | 1.7 | 5 | EU Institutions | 3.1 | 10 |
| Germany | 1.3 | 4 | Germany | 2.3 | 7 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 9.9 | 10.1 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 6 | 6.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.4 | 2.9 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 93.2 | 85.7 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 4.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 1.7 |
| Individuals using the internet | 8.0 | 36.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 99 | 91 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 14 | 5 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 7 | 8 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 70 | 60 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 35 | 33 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 4.401 | 13.605 | **+209%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.726 | 0.686 | | **-5%** ▼ |
| **Imports** | Goods | 5.022 | 11.942 | **+138%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.365 | 1.049 | **+188%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 341 | 415 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 900 | 992 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.095 | 0.148 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.044 | 0.029 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 99 | 111 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 79 | 102 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.109 | 0.110 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.145 | 0.170 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2014 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uruguay | 22 | Brazil | 31 |
| Brazil | 17 | Russian Federation | 11 |
| Russian Federation | 12 | Argentina | 8 |
| Cayman Islands | 10 | Chile | 7 |
| Argentina | 8 | Netherlands | 4 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2014 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 27 | Brazil | 28 |
| Brazil | 21 | China | 25 |
| Argentina | 15 | Argentina | 15 |
| United States | 7 | United States | 8 |
| Japan | 4 | Germany | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2014 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 25 | Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 25 |
| Bovine meat | 22 | Electric current | 23 |
| Maize unmilled | 9 | Bovine meat | 13 |
| Animal feed stuff | 8 | Animal feed stuff | 12 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, soft | 6 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, soft | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2014 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 15 | Petroleum products | 15 |
| Automatic data processing equipment | 11 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 6 |
| Parts, for office machines | 7 | Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 5 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 |
| Sound recorder, phonograph | 4 | Baby carriage, toys, games | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 6.7 | 5.2 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 38.9 | 39.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 13.9 | 11.2 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 6.5 | 12.9 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.65 | 0.68 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242095

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Peru*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 5293.7 | 9642.3 | 10172.3 | 92% |
| Remittances | 2137.3 | 2672.9 | 2707.2 | 27% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 316.5 | 663.6 | 412.7 | 30% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 160.3 | 424.9 | 223.3 | 39% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 681.3 | 721.3 | 533.6 | -22% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 179.9 | 163.7 | 127.9 | -29% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norway | 45.3 | 25 | Germany | 32.9 | 26 |
| United States | 44.4 | 25 | United States | 31.0 | 24 |
| EU Institutions | 27.4 | 15 | Japan | 17.0 | 13 |
| Spain | 21.4 | 12 | Canada | 12.2 | 10 |
| Japan | 9.8 | 5 | EU Institutions | 6.1 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Cross-border infrastructure | **2** | Connecting to value chains | **3** | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 10.2 | 3.4 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 7 | 1.7 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 1.6 | 0.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 84.0 | 95.3 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 2.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.7 | 5.2 |
| Individuals using the internet | 20.7 | 39.2 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 51 | 48 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 10 | 12 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 18 | 15 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 79 | 72 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 46 | 42 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 23.830 | 41.783 | **+75%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.532 | 5.929 | **+134%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 14.844 | 42.194 | **+184%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 3.266 | 7.512 | **+130%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 845 | 925 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1086 | 1124 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.074 | 0.084 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.027 | 0.018 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 157 | 164 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 128 | 141 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.089 | 0.081 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.065 | 0.091 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 24 | United States | 18 |
| China | 10 | China | 18 |
| Switzerland | 7 | Switzerland | 7 |
| Canada | 7 | Canada | 7 |
| Chile | 6 | Japan | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 16 | United States | 20 |
| Brazil | 10 | China | 19 |
| China | 10 | Brazil | 5 |
| Ecuador | 7 | Ecuador | 4 |
| Colombia | 6 | Mexico | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 17 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 19 |
| Copper | 15 | Copper ores, concentrates | 18 |
| Ore, concentrate base metals | 13 | Petroleum products | 8 |
| Copper ores, concentrates | 12 | Copper | 6 |
| Petroleum products | 6 | Ore, concentrate base metals | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 14 | Petroleum oils, crude | 8 |
| Petroleum products | 4 | Petroleum products | 7 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 2 | Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 4 |
| Civil engineering equipment | 2 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 4.6 | 3.9 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 41.8 | 44.9 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 5.1 | 1.8 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 13.1 | 14.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.69 | 0.74 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242102

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Rwanda*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 71.7 | 102.8 | 110.8 | 54% |
| Remittances | 72.8 | 154.4 | 170.1 | 134% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 4.0 | 13.1 | 51.4 | 1190% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.4 | 13.1 | 42.5 | 10348% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1158.0 | 1064.1 | 1083.0 | -6% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 101.1 | 233.5 | 226.4 | 124% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade policy | 2 | Regional integration | 3 | Cross-border infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 31.9 | 32 | EU Institutions | 54.2 | 24 |
| EU Institutions | 17.4 | 17 | IDA | 29.8 | 13 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 13.8 | 14 | United Kingdom | 28.3 | 12 |
| Belgium | 10.4 | 10 | Japan | 27.6 | 12 |
| Japan | 5.0 | 5 | United States | 23.3 | 10 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 18.7 | 12.8 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 14.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.9 | 0.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 90.5 | 92.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 5.8 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Individuals using the internet | ... | 8.7 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 30 | 47 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 34 | 35 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 30 | 19 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 73 | 59 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 46 | 45 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.145 | 0.703 | **+385%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.074 | 0.386 | **+420%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.488 | 1.959 | **+301%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.214 | 0.472 | **+121%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 134 | 268 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 654 | 776 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.182 | 0.084 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.022 | 0.020 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 47 | 51 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 97 | 118 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.119 | 0.241 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.055 | 0.065 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kenya | 21 | Tanzania | 41 |
| United Kingdom | 21 | Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 22 |
| Belgium | 16 | Uganda | 14 |
| Hong Kong, China | 10 | Kenya | 13 |
| Switzerland | 9 | Burundi | 3 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kenya | 14 | China | 16 |
| Uganda | 13 | Uganda | 12 |
| Belgium | 8 | Japan | 11 |
| United Arab Emirates | 7 | India | 7 |
| Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of | 6 | Kenya | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 34 | Ore, concentrate base metals | 36 |
| Ore, concentrate base metals | 33 | Tea and mate | 10 |
| Tea and mate | 18 | Coffee, coffee substitute | 8 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 2 | Petroleum products | 8 |
| Crude veg. materials, n.e.s. | 2 | Milk and cream | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 11 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 10 |
| Medicaments | 5 | Petroleum products | 5 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Textile articles, n.e.s. | 3 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 4 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 3 | Medicaments | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 52.6 | 52.4 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 19.6 | 12.3 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2008-2011) | 12.7 | 7.8 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 6.7 | 3.5 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.39 | 0.51 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242112

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Saint Lucia*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 227.1 | 102.3 | 87.9 | -61% |
| Remittances | 28.4 | 29.4 | 30.1 | 6% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 6.2 | 1.5 | 0.0 | -100% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 19.1 | 38.1 | 27.1 | 42% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 7.4 | 14.1 | 10.6 | 44% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Competitiveness | 3 | Regional integration |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 4.6 | 63 | EU Institutions | 6.8 | 64 |
| France | 1.7 | 23 | IDA | 2.4 | 22 |
| Japan | 0.9 | 12 | Kuwait (KFAED) | 0.9 | 8 |
| IDA | 0.1 | 1 | Japan | 0.4 | 4 |
| World Trade Organization | 0.1 | 1 | Canada | 0.1 | 1 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 8.9 | 10.3 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 12.3 | 0.4 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 56.7 | 100.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 8.2 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 4.3 | 13.7 |
| Individuals using the internet | 24.5 | 35.2 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 112 | 97 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 78 | 69 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 26 | 27 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 16 | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports) | 33 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.097 | 0.184 | +90% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.342 | 0.414 | +21% ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.521 | 0.508 | | -2% ▼ |
| | Commercial services | 0.182 | 0.189 | +4% ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 40 | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 83 | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.166 | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.188 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trinidad and Tobago | 30 | | |
| United Kingdom | 21 | | |
| United States | 21 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Barbados | 7 | | |
| Dominica | 5 | | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 39 | | |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 17 | | |
| United Kingdom | 7 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Japan | 6 | | |
| Barbados | 4 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 22 | | |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 19 | | |
| Alcoholic beverages | 15 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Gold, silverware, jewel, n.e.s. | 6 | | |
| Paper, paperboard, cut etc. | 5 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 12 | | |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 5 | | |
| Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | *DATA NOT AVAILABLE* | |
| Furniture, cushions, etc. | 2 | | |
| Other meat, meat offal | 2 | | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 46.7 | 46.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.8 | 2.1 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 24.7 | 21.1 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 7.5 | 5.9 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | ... | 0.71 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242122

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 130.0 | 99.5 | 126.8 | -3% |
| Remittances | 27.1 | 29.8 | 31.6 | 17% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 2.3 | 1.5 | 0.0 | -100% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.8 | 0.1 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 31.2 | 16.1 | 11.3 | -64% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 9.6 | 4.7 | 2.3 | -76% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transpsort infrastructure | 2 | Regional integration | 3 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 5.2 | 54 | EU Institutions | 1.3 | 56 |
| Japan | 4.0 | 42 | IDA | 0.8 | 36 |
| IDA | 0.2 | 2 | Japan | 0.1 | 6 |
| Germany | 0.1 | 1 | UNDP | 0.0 | 1 |
| Austria | 0.1 | 1 | Canada | 0.0 | 0 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 9.8 | 10.2 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 12.3 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 2.4 | 7.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 95.3 | 100.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 5.2 | 13.4 |
| Individuals using the internet | 12.0 | 52.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

# SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 86 | 85 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 80 | 72 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 25 | 21 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2012) | 33 | 63 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2012) | 37 | 30 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.041 | 0.054 | **+32%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.169 | 0.142 | **-16%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.238 | 0.333 | **+40%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.080 | 0.089 | **+10%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 101 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 621 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.108 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.077 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 25 | 33 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 74 | 84 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.101 | 0.114 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.178 | 0.199 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 25 | Saint Lucia | 26 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 15 | Trinidad and Tobago | 16 |
| Barbados | 14 | Barbados | 14 |
| Saint Lucia | 12 | Antigua and Barbuda | 12 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 8 | Dominica | 8 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 33 | United States | 36 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 26 | Trinidad and Tobago | 27 |
| United Kingdom | 7 | Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of | 6 |
| Japan | 4 | United Kingdom | 5 |
| Canada | 4 | China | 3 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 31 | Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 27 |
| Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 13 | Veg. | 12 |
| Veg. | 11 | Rice | 10 |
| Rice | 10 | Animal feed stuff | 9 |
| Animal feed stuff | 5 | Alcoholic beverages | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 13 | Petroleum products | 27 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 3 | Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 3 |
| Other meat, meat offal | 3 | Other meat, meat offal | 3 |
| Metallic structures, n.e.s. | 3 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 2 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 40.2 | 41.2 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.8 | 1.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 9.7 | 11.1 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 14.8 | 13.5 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | ... | 0.72 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242138

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Samoa*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 26.1 | 13.2 | 28.0 | 7% |
| Remittances | 97.6 | 139.7 | 158.0 | 62% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 56% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 42.8 | 130.7 | 127.0 | 197% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 8.6 | 33.2 | 20.1 | 134% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 2 | Trade policy | 3 | Adjustment costs |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 3.5 | 41 | AsDB Special Funds | 5.0 | 25 |
| IDA | 2.6 | 31 | Japan | 4.0 | 20 |
| Australia | 1.8 | 21 | Australia | 3.5 | 18 |
| New Zealand | 0.4 | 4 | New Zealand | 3.1 | 16 |
| GEF | 0.2 | 2 | IDA | 3.0 | 15 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | ... | 11.4 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 9.4 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | ... | 1.6 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | ... | 86.2 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | ... |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 4.5 | 15.3 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

**Samoa graduated from LDC status in January 2014.*

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 92 | 91 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 93 | 86 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 20 | 23 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 76 | 50 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 27 | 33 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.010 | | 0.025 | **+146%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.133 | 0.189 | | **+42%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.219 | | 0.328 | **+50%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.056 | 0.090 | | **+61%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 89 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 623 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.267 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.052 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 13 | 22 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 33 | 43 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.506 | 0.362 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.146 | 0.156 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 72 | Australia | 45 |
| American Samoa | 15 | American Samoa | 9 |
| United States | 4 | New Zealand | 9 |
| New Zealand | 4 | Tokelau | 5 |
| Tokelau | 3 | United States | 2 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| New Zealand | 33 | New Zealand | 30 |
| Australia | 16 | Singapore | 23 |
| United States | 12 | United States | 12 |
| Japan | 10 | China | 8 |
| Singapore | 9 | Australia | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electric distribution equipment, n.e.s. | 73 | Electric distribution equipment, n.e.s. | 45 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 12 | Petroleum products | 24 |
| Fruit, veg. juices | 3 | Alcoholic beverages | 8 |
| Alcoholic beverages | 3 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 7 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 2 | Fruit, veg. juices | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Special transactions not classified | 21 | Petroleum products | 21 |
| Petroleum products | 15 | Other meat, meat offal | 7 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 6 | Articles, n.e.s., of plastics | 3 |
| Wire products excl. electrical wiring | 5 | Cereal preparations | 3 |
| Other meat, meat offal | 4 | Wood, simply worked | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 27.6 | 27.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 9.9 | 15.8 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | ... | 9.7 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 4.6 | 6.1 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.68 | 0.69 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

**Samoa graduated from LDC status in January 2014.*

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242147

# SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for São Tomé and Príncipe*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 51.0 | 35.1 | 30.0 | -41% |
| Remittances | 2.2 | 6.5 | 26.5 | 1105% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | - |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 111.6 | 55.6 | 53.2 | -52% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 6.6 | 11.4 | 12.9 | 95% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transport infrastructure | 2 | Trade policy | 3 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Institutions | 3.0 | 46 | EU Institutions | 5.2 | 40 |
| Portugal | 1.4 | 21 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 4.6 | 36 |
| IDA | 0.7 | 10 | IDA | 2.1 | 16 |
| Belgium | 0.5 | 7 | France | 0.4 | 3 |
| Spain | 0.3 | 5 | Norway | 0.2 | 2 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | ... | 10.2 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | ... | 0.8 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | ... | 91.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 7.1 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 0.5 |
| Individuals using the internet | 14.2 | 23.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

# SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 68 | 64 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 52 | 59 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 21 | 17 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 93 | 86 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 31 | 27 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.008 | | 0.013 | **+67%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.008 | 0.017 | | **+108%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.059 | | 0.133 | **+125%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.016 | 0.023 | | **+44%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 25 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 463 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.622 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.075 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 10 | 17 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 31 | 38 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.173 | 0.114 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.455 | 0.401 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Portugal | 33 | Netherlands | 29 |
| Netherlands | 27 | Belgium | 21 |
| Belgium | 14 | France | 12 |
| France | 9 | Spain | 11 |
| Bahamas | 3 | Portugal | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Portugal | 65 | Portugal | 59 |
| Angola | 20 | Angola | 25 |
| Belgium | 4 | United States | 2 |
| Viet Nam | 1 | Belgium | 2 |
| Netherlands | 1 | China | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cocoa | 88 | Cocoa | 78 |
| Alcoholic beverages | 3 | Other nonelectrical machinery, tool, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 3 | Chocolate, other cocoa preparations | 3 |
| Chocolate, other cocoa preparations | 2 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 2 |
| Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 1 | Worn clothing, textile articles | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 20 | Petroleum products | 26 |
| Alcoholic beverages | 8 | Alcoholic beverages | 5 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 | Rice | 3 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 4 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |
| Rice | 3 | Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 37.3 | 38.1 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 16.6 | 18.7 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 22.0 | 24.5 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 31.1 | 11.0 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.52 | 0.56 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242152

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Senegal*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 305.1 | 293.5 | 298.3 | -2% |
| Remittances | 1197.7 | 1545.8 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 48.7 | 67.0 | 47.5 | -2% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 7.2 | 53.5 | 38.2 | 430% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 1715.5 | 1057.7 | 1037.9 | -39% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 218.0 | 274.6 | 317.6 | 46% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade policy | 2 | Trade facilitation | 3 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 62.6 | 29 | United States | 106.5 | 34 |
| EU Institutions | 45.3 | 21 | IDA | 56.8 | 18 |
| France | 44.9 | 21 | France | 28.2 | 9 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 10.6 | 5 | Canada | 23.9 | 8 |
| Germany | 10.6 | 5 | Italy | 17.7 | 6 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 9 | 8.7 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 3.4 | 3.0 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 75.7 | 61.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 14.1 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.2 | 0.8 |
| Individuals using the internet | 5.6 | 20.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 67 | 83 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 31 | 28 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 20 | 19 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 33 | 49 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 34 | 35 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.594 | | 3.114 | **+95%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.716 | 1.154 | | **+61%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 3.194 | | 6.369 | **+99%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.808 | 1.400 | | **+73%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 541 | 549 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 915 | 956 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.075 | 0.057 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.044 | 0.046 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 113 | 122 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 120 | 137 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.083 | 0.057 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.072 | 0.055 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mali | 20 | Mali | 16 |
| France | 8 | Switzerland | 9 |
| Gambia | 6 | India | 7 |
| India | 5 | Guinea | 5 |
| Spain | 5 | United Arab Emirates | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 24 | France | 15 |
| United Kingdom | 6 | Nigeria | 11 |
| China | 4 | Netherlands | 8 |
| Thailand | 4 | China | 8 |
| Spain | 4 | India | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 24 | Petroleum products | 16 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 10 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 12 |
| Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 7 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 8 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 5 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 6 |
| Inorganic chemical elements | 5 | Inorganic chemical elements | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 18 | Petroleum products | 16 |
| Rice | 6 | Petroleum oils, crude | 11 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 4 | Rice | 7 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 3 |
| Medicaments | 3 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 10.0 | 10.3 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 44.6 | 45.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 9.3 | 7.8 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | ... | 14.2 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 7.2 | 7.4 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.45 | 0.49 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242166

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Sierra Leone*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 71.0 | 579.1 | 579.1 | 716% |
| Remittances | 26.7 | 54.7 | 67.6 | 153% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.3 | 13.9 | 7.1 | 2347% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 13.9 | 6.9 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 735.8 | 437.0 | 523.7 | -29% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 54.0 | 106.6 | 106.2 | 97% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Export diversification | 2 | Competitiveness | 3 | Cross-border infrastructure |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 14.9 | 28 | IDA | 24.3 | 23 |
| EU Institutions | 12.3 | 23 | EU Institutions | 24.1 | 23 |
| United Kingdom | 11.1 | 20 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 21.5 | 20 |
| Italy | 5.5 | 10 | OFID | 8.5 | 8 |
| Germany | 2.7 | 5 | United Kingdom | 7.7 | 7 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2006-2012)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 13.6 | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 1.3 | 0.3 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 93.2 | 99.9 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | ... |
| Individuals using the internet | 0.2 | 1.7 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 39 | 103 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 14 | 13 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 18 | 21 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | ... | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.262 | | 1.990 | **+660%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.043 | 0.180 | | **+323%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.351 | | 2.243 | **+539%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.078 | 0.524 | | **+575%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | ... | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE


*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| DATA NOT AVAILABLE | | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.4 | 3.2 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 50.1 | 49.4 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 20.6 | 12.9 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 42.0 | 13.2 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 7.8 | 1.2 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.33 | 0.37 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242178

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Solomon Islands*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 64.5 | 150.8 | 105.3 | 63% |
| Remittances | 10.8 | 14.7 | 16.5 | 52% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 2.7 | 23.5 | 37.4 | 1274% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 221.1 | 330.2 | 291.4 | 32% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 15.4 | 41.8 | 43.3 | 181% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Transport infrastructure | **2** | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | **3** | Trade policy |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 9.7 | 63 | New Zealand | 14.1 | 33 |
| New Zealand | 4.0 | 26 | Australia | 13.4 | 31 |
| Australia | 1.0 | 6 | AsDB Special Funds | 9.3 | 22 |
| EU Institutions | 0.6 | 4 | IDA | 3.0 | 7 |
| Korea, Republic of | 0.1 | 0 | Japan | 1.6 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 14.5 | 10.0 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 90.5 | 91.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 8.0 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.6 | 8.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 94 | 112 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 31 | 23 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 25 | 30 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 76 | 59 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 44 | 12 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.114 | 0.440 | **+286%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.051 | 0.129 | **+152%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.196 | 0.465 | **+138%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.066 | 0.198 | **+199%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 31 | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 566 | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.423 | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.024 | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 27 | 35 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 34 | 61 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.232 | 0.256 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.154 | 0.180 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 42 | China | 45 |
| Japan | 10 | Australia | 23 |
| Korea, Republic of | 7 | Italy | 6 |
| Thailand | 6 | United Kingdom | 6 |
| Philippines | 4 | Thailand | 3 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 37 | Singapore | 31 |
| Singapore | 11 | Australia | 27 |
| Malaysia | 8 | China | 8 |
| New Zealand | 8 | Malaysia | 8 |
| Japan | 7 | Japan | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wood rough, rough squared | 65 | Wood rough, rough squared | 48 |
| Special transactions not classified | 11 | Special transactions not classified | 41 |
| Fish, dried, salted, smoked | 7 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 7 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 4 | Cocoa | 2 |
| Cocoa | 3 | Oilseed (other fixed veg. oil) | 1 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 11 | Special transactions not classified | 33 |
| Rice | 9 | Petroleum products | 29 |
| Civil engineering equipment | 5 | Rice | 7 |
| Printed matter | 5 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | Edible products and preparations, n.e.s. | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.9 | 3.8 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 40.0 | 40.1 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 44.4 | 34.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 2.5 | 7.4 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.48 | 0.49 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242186

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Swaziland*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 88.1 | 106.2 | 67.0 | -24% |
| Remittances | 93.5 | 41.4 | 30.0 | -68% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 15.6 | 2.8 | 4.0 | -74% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 9.4 | 2.3 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 50.4 | 110.6 | 125.2 | 148% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 11.6 | 21.2 | 38.0 | 229% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade facilitation | 2 | Export diversification | 3 | Connecting to value chains |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 5.2 | 45 | EU Institutions | 31.3 | 82 |
| EU Institutions | 4.3 | 37 | Kuwait (KFAED) | 2.3 | 6 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 1.0 | 9 | United Kingdom | 1.9 | 5 |
| Norway | 0.6 | 5 | BADEA | 1.2 | 3 |
| United States | 0.2 | 2 | Norway | 0.6 | 2 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 8.0 | 7.6 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | ... |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 1.9 | 4.5 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 59.6 | 67.3 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | ... |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| Individuals using the internet | 3.7 | 24.7 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 143 | 120 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 14 | 11 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 16 | 30 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 78 | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 44 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.663 | 1.889 | +14% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.274 | 0.242 | | -12% ▼ |
| **Imports** | Goods | 1.915 | 1.694 | | -12% ▼ |
| | Commercial services | 0.365 | 0.715 | +96% ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 32 | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 35 | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.190 | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.676 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 30 | | |
| Zimbabwe | 25 | | |
| Mozambique | 17 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Uganda | 17 | | |
| United States | 3 | | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 80 | | |
| Other Asia, nes | 3 | | |
| Japan | 2 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Germany | 2 | | |
| China | 2 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Essential oil, perfume, flavour | 24 | | |
| Sugars, molasses, honey | 19 | | |
| Misc. chemical products, n.e.s. | 13 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Pulp and waste paper | 6 | | |
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 4 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 12 | | |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | | |
| Knit, crochet, fabric, n.e.s. | 3 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | | |
| Essential oil, perfume, flavour | 2 | | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 22.9 | 22.5 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 39.8 | 39.3 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.2 | 2.4 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 77.1 | 62.4 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 1.8 | 1.3 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.50 | 0.53 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242191

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Tanzania*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 789.3 | 1614.1 | 1872.4 | 137% |
| Remittances | 25.9 | 66.9 | 59.4 | 130% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 20.1 | 7.6 | 64.8 | 223% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 17.4 | 5.9 | 58.7 | 237% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 3764.0 | 2762.7 | 3636.3 | -3% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 396.3 | 723.7 | 1113.1 | 181% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Competitiveness | **3** | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 153.7 | 39 | IDA | 397.4 | 36 |
| EU Institutions | 62.2 | 16 | United States | 296.2 | 27 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 33.8 | 9 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 81.2 | 7 |
| Denmark | 32.2 | 8 | Japan | 80.7 | 7 |
| Sweden | 23.8 | 6 | Norway | 50.7 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.7 | 12.8 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 10 | 9.7 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 5.0 | 2.0 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 81.6 | 89.7 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 2.7 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.3 | 4.4 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 59 | 66 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 43 | 36 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 24 | 18 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 76 | 74 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 44 | 37 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.918 | 5.370 | **+180%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.467 | 2.979 | **+103%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 3.864 | 11.035 | **+186%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.212 | 2.444 | **+102%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 527 | 685 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 958 | 996 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.132 | 0.136 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.064 | 0.143 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 118 | 132 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 131 | 138 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.076 | 0.079 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.052 | 0.079 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Switzerland | 19 | South Africa | 17 |
| South Africa | 15 | India | 17 |
| China | 8 | Switzerland | 9 |
| Germany | 6 | China | 7 |
| Netherlands | 6 | Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 13 | India | 18 |
| United Arab Emirates | 11 | Switzerland | 13 |
| Bahrain, Kingdom of | 9 | China | 13 |
| China | 7 | United Arab Emirates | 10 |
| Japan | 6 | South Africa | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 33 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 35 |
| Precious metal ores, concentrates | 10 | Precious metal ores, concentrates | 7 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 9 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 4 |
| Tobacco, unmanufactured | 5 | Coffee, coffee substitute | 4 |
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 4 | Oilseed (soft fixed veg. oil) | 3 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 23 | Petroleum products | 37 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 5 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 2 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 | Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 2 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 4 | Tubes, pipes, etc., iron, steel | 2 |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 4.3 | 3.5 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 50.0 | 49.8 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 13.3 | 10.3 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | ... | 14.4 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 2.5 | 1.9 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.42 | 0.49 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242200

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Thailand*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 9771.8 | 7853.9 | 12945.6 | 32% |
| Remittances | 1622.0 | 4282.6 | 5689.8 | 251% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 33.9 | 197.7 | 1164.1 | 3333% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 20.6 | 140.4 | 207.0 | 905% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 414.1 | 480.6 | 808.2 | 95% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 166.2 | 226.8 | 549.4 | 231% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Trade facilitation | **3** | Regional integration |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 120.3 | 72 | Japan | 538.1 | 98 |
| Germany | 16.9 | 10 | Germany | 4.1 | 1 |
| France | 11.6 | 7 | France | 3.3 | 1 |
| United States | 5.6 | 3 | Korea, Republic of | 0.9 | 0 |
| EU Institutions | 3.4 | 2 | Australia | 0.8 | 0 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 10.0 | 11.4 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 5 | 6.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 3.7 | 1.4 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 72.1 | 81.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 52.3 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.4 | 7.4 |
| Individuals using the internet | 17.2 | 28.9 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 144 | 144 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 16 | 21 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 22 | 20 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 49 | 50 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 57 | 54 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 127.929 | 225.408 | **+76%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 24.382 | 58.584 | **+140%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 114.265 | 218.972 | **+92%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 32.407 | 55.005 | **+70%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 1125 | 1158 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1208 | 1199 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.018 | 0.016 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.034 | 0.033 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 212 | 218 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 202 | 208 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.062 | 0.050 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.075 | 0.070 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 15 | China | 12 |
| Japan | 13 | United States | 10 |
| China | 9 | Japan | 10 |
| Singapore | 6 | Hong Kong, China | 6 |
| Hong Kong, China | 6 | Malaysia | 6 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 20 | Japan | 16 |
| China | 11 | China | 15 |
| United States | 7 | United Arab Emirates | 7 |
| Malaysia | 7 | United States | 6 |
| United Arab Emirates | 6 | Malaysia | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Automatic data processing equipment | 8 | Automatic data processing equipment | 5 |
| Transistors, valves, etc. | 6 | Petroleum products | 5 |
| Natural rubber, etc. | 4 | Goods, special-purpose transport vehicles | 5 |
| Petroleum products | 3 | Natural rubber, etc. | 4 |
| Parts, for office machines | 3 | Transistors, valves, etc. | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 16 | Petroleum oils, crude | 16 |
| Transistors, valves, etc. | 8 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 6 |
| Parts, for office machines | 3 | Transistors, valves, etc. | 4 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | Parts, tractors, motor vehicles | 3 |
| Electric switch relay circuit | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 46.0 | 45.8 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | -0.1 | -0.0 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 6.7 | 5.6 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 9.4 | 4.4 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.68 | 0.72 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242214

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Togo*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 50.1 | 302.5 | 84.2 | 68% |
| Remittances | 284.6 | 336.6 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 48.1 | 27.6 | 13.7 | -72% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 22.9 | 12.9 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 225.3 | 673.2 | 222.6 | -1% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 36.6 | 41.3 | 47.7 | 30% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 27.2 | 74 | IDA | 18.7 | 39 |
| United Kingdom | 2.9 | 8 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 8.4 | 18 |
| EU Institutions | 2.4 | 7 | Germany | 8.3 | 18 |
| France | 2.1 | 6 | Kuwait (KFAED) | 4.4 | 9 |
| Germany | 0.6 | 2 | Canada | 1.7 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Connecting to value chains | **2** | Export diversification | **3** | WTO accession |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.0 | 11.9 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 10 | 9.9 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 6.9 | 5.0 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 66.5 | 39.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 1.3 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 2.0 | 4.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2011) | 91 | 110 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2011) | 20 | 28 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2011) | 22 | 19 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2007-2013) | 89 | 69 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2007-2013) | 37 | 51 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2011 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.630 | | 1.355 | **+115%** | ▲ |
| | Commercial services | 0.159 | 0.460 | | **+189%** | ▲ |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.949 | | 2.257 | **+138%** | ▲ |
| | Commercial services | 0.261 | 0.464 | | **+78%** | ▲ |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2007 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 163 | 309 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 589 | 685 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.217 | 0.052 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.085 | 0.040 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 70 | 73 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 107 | 111 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.081 | 0.084 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.082 | 0.047 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Niger | 13 | Burkina Faso | 19 |
| Benin | 11 | Benin | 12 |
| India | 10 | Ghana | 11 |
| Burkina Faso | 10 | Niger | 11 |
| Mali | 7 | Nigeria | 11 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 19 | China | 16 |
| China | 16 | France | 8 |
| Netherlands | 11 | Netherlands | 7 |
| United States | 4 | United States | 5 |
| Belgium | 4 | Ghana | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 44 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 17 |
| Fertilizers, crude | 11 | Ship, boat, floating structures | 8 |
| Cotton | 9 | Articles, n.e.s., of plastics | 6 |
| Flat-rolled plated iron | 6 | Cotton | 6 |
| Iron, steel bar, shapes, etc. | 5 | Tubes, pipes, etc., iron, steel | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2007 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 27 | Petroleum products | 17 |
| Lime, cement, construction materials | 8 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 5 |
| Medicaments | 6 | Medicaments | 4 |
| Cotton fabrics, woven | 3 | Polymers of ethylene | 3 |
| Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 3 | Residual petrol products | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 7.1 | 6.9 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 51.6 | 51.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 3.7 | 7.2 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 21.3 | 23.5 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2011) | 3.0 | 0.7 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.44 | 0.47 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242221

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Tonga*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 14.8 | 14.4 | 11.6 | -22% |
| Remittances | 91.2 | 86.0 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 7% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 26.8 | 83.0 | 82.7 | 208% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 5.9 | 25.1 | 34.6 | 482% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade policy | 2 | Trade facilitation | 3 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 3.3 | 55 | IDA | 13.0 | 38 |
| New Zealand | 1.7 | 29 | AsDB Special Funds | 7.9 | 23 |
| Japan | 0.8 | 13 | New Zealand | 6.6 | 19 |
| United Kingdom | 0.2 | 3 | Australia | 5.3 | 15 |
| EU Institutions | 0.0 | 1 | Japan | 1.5 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 17.0 | 11.7 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 5.5 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 2.6 | 3.9 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 45.3 | 67.3 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | ... |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| Individuals using the internet | 5.9 | 35.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 60 | 73 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%) | 69 | 78 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%) | 21 | 26 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2012) | ... | 33 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2012) | ... | 27 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.010 | 0.018 | **+78%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.022 | 0.065 | **+189%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.115 | 0.189 | **+64%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.031 | 0.067 | **+119%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 50 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | ... | 546 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.068 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | ... | 0.058 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2012)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 12 | 14 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 30 | 46 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.196 | 0.087 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.194 | 0.161 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 41 | New Zealand | 26 |
| United States | 25 | United States | 13 |
| New Zealand | 15 | Hong Kong, China | 13 |
| Korea, Republic of | 9 | Japan | 13 |
| Australia | 4 | Australia | 12 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| New Zealand | 33 | New Zealand | 30 |
| Fiji | 28 | Singapore | 23 |
| Australia | 13 | United States | 13 |
| United States | 10 | Fiji | 8 |
| China | 5 | China | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Special transactions not classified | 45 | Veg. | 30 |
| Veg. | 41 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 16 |
| Crude veg. materials, n.e.s. | 6 | Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 13 |
| Fruit, veg. juices | 4 | Printed matter | 7 |
| Pigments, paints, etc. | 3 | Fruit, nuts excl. oil nuts | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2012 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Special transactions not classified | 34 | Petroleum products | 22 |
| Petroleum products | 26 | Other meat, meat offal | 8 |
| Other meat, meat offal | 8 | Cereal preparations | 3 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |
| Paper, paperboard, cut etc. | 2 | Meal, flour of wheat, meslin | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 42.5 | 42.6 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 7.1 | 16.1 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports, 2006-2012) | 10.3 | 5.6 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.70 | 0.70 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242232

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Trinidad and Tobago*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 1504.5 | 1611.1 | 1712.6 | 14% |
| Remittances | 98.4 | 108.5 | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 7.5 | 49.3 | 0.0 | -100% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 17.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 | -100% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 2.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | -100% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Export diversification | **3** | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 1.2 | 59 | | | |
| Japan | 0.4 | 21 | | | |
| EU Institutions | 0.2 | 10 | ... | | |
| World Trade Organization | 0.1 | 4 | | | |
| Canada | 0.1 | 4 | | | |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 7.8 | 10.7 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 5.7 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.2 | 0.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 97.9 | 87.5 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 18.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 1.6 | 14.6 |
| Individuals using the internet | 30.0 | 63.8 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2011) | ... | 151 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | ... | 28 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | ... | 37 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 20 | ... |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 35 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2011 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 14.086 | | 12.770 | | -9% ▼ |
| | Commercial services | ... | 5.808 | | | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 6.511 | | 8.871 | +36% ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | ... | 5.472 | | | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 581 | ... |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 995 | ... |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.221 | ... |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.114 | ... |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 98 | ... |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 123 | ... |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.350 | ... |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.109 | ... |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 58 | | |
| Jamaica | 6 | | |
| Spain | 5 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Barbados | 3 | | |
| France | 3 | | |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 28 | | |
| Brazil | 14 | | |
| Congo | 6 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Colombia | 6 | | |
| Nigeria | 6 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural gas | 31 | | |
| Petroleum products | 27 | | |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 15 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Alcohol, phenol, etc. | 7 | | |
| Inorganic chemical elements | 6 | | |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 33 | | |
| Iron ore, concentrates | 4 | | |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | DATA NOT AVAILABLE | |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 | | |
| Civil engineering equipment | 3 | | |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 6.3 | 5.8 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 42.1 | 42.1 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 0.1 | ... |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | 5.2 | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | ... | ... |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.75 | 0.77 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242248

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Tunisia*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 2561.0 | 1421.2 | 1095.6 | -57% |
| Remittances | 1734.3 | 2111.2 | 2290.5 | 32% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 630.0 | 1232.0 | 261.1 | -59% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 212.4 | 498.5 | 223.7 | 5% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 622.5 | 1150.7 | 1041.5 | 67% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 200.1 | 482.3 | 607.1 | 203% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 56.8 | 28 | EU Institutions | 397.0 | 65 |
| Japan | 50.0 | 25 | Arab Fund (AFESD) | 57.2 | 9 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 30.1 | 15 | France | 37.8 | 6 |
| Germany | 18.6 | 9 | Spain | 27.8 | 5 |
| Italy | 17.9 | 9 | Germany | 24.1 | 4 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Transport infrastructure | 2 | Competitiveness | 3 | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2006-2012)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 26.8 | 15.5 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 20 | 13.9 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 1.7 | 0.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 92.5 | 93.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 30.9 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.4 | 4.9 |
| Individuals using the internet | 13.0 | 43.8 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 94 | 102 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 26 | 22 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 14 | 12 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 34 | 40 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 58 | 56 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 11.689 | 17.054 | **+46%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 4.162 | 4.768 | **+15%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 14.202 | 22.988 | **+62%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 2.338 | 3.103 | **+33%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 798 | 836 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 1072 | 1076 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.029 | 0.031 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.014 | 0.016 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 140 | 147 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 142 | 140 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.173 | 0.128 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.102 | 0.072 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 32 | France | 26 |
| Italy | 22 | Italy | 18 |
| Germany | 8 | Germany | 9 |
| Spain | 6 | Libya | 5 |
| Libya | 5 | Spain | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 23 | France | 18 |
| Italy | 19 | Italy | 15 |
| Germany | 8 | Germany | 7 |
| Libya | 5 | China | 6 |
| Spain | 5 | Algeria | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 13 | Petroleum oils, crude | 10 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 10 | Electric distribution equipment, n.e.s. | 10 |
| Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 8 | Other textile apparel, n.e.s. | 9 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, soft | 7 | Petroleum products | 5 |
| Electric distribution equipment, n.e.s. | 5 | Mens, boys clothing, x-knit | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 8 | Petroleum products | 8 |
| Cotton fabrics, woven | 5 | Petroleum gases, n.e.s. | 4 |
| Electric switch relay circuit | 5 | Petroleum oils, crude | 4 |
| Petroleum oils, crude | 4 | Electric switch relay circuit | 4 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 12.5 | 13.3 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 26.7 | 26.9 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.3 | 2.4 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2008-2012) | 8.1 | 8.7 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 15.6 | 11.8 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.69 | 0.72 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242253

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Uganda*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 721.8 | 881.2 | 1145.9 | 59% |
| Remittances | 528.7 | 832.4 | 931.6 | 76% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 37.0 | 77.2 | 42.6 | 15% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 33.2 | 61.4 | 41.4 | 25% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 2802.3 | 1667.7 | 1821.3 | -35% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 384.9 | 426.4 | 570.8 | 48% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ... | 2 | ... | 3 | ... |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 169.5 | 44 | IDA | 158.0 | 28 |
| EU Institutions | 71.1 | 18 | AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 98.7 | 17 |
| AfDF (African Dev.Fund) | 47.8 | 12 | EU Institutions | 67.8 | 12 |
| United States | 16.3 | 4 | United Kingdom | 59.4 | 10 |
| Norway | 15.3 | 4 | Norway | 52.4 | 9 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 12.7 | 12.8 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | 12 | 9.6 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 1.1 | 0.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 96.8 | 100.0 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 7.4 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 2.5 | 16.2 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 47 | 59 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports | 28 | 43 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports | 25 | 34 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise exports) | 60 | 61 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merchandise imports | 42 | 37 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.188 | 2.893 | **+144%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.469 | 2.166 | **+362%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 2.216 | 4.986 | **+125%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.756 | 2.600 | **+244%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 392 | 648 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 875 | 930 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.085 | 0.047 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.050 | 0.057 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 101 | 120 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 120 | 134 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.071 | 0.065 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.060 | 0.101 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Arab Emirates | 19 | Kenya | 13 |
| Sudan | 10 | Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 11 |
| Kenya | 9 | Sudan | 10 |
| Netherlands | 6 | Rwanda | 9 |
| Switzerland | 5 | South Sudan | 7 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kenya | 16 | India | 27 |
| United Arab Emirates | 13 | China | 11 |
| India | 8 | Kenya | 10 |
| Japan | 7 | United Arab Emirates | 7 |
| South Africa | 6 | Japan | 6 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coffee, coffee substitute | 20 | Coffee, coffee substitute | 18 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 14 | Petroleum products | 6 |
| Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 13 | Tobacco, unmanufactured | 5 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 6 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 5 |
| Tea and mate | 5 | Lime, cement, construction materials | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 20 | Petroleum products | 22 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 5 | Medicaments | 5 |
| Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 4 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 4 |
| Medicaments | 4 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 | Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 3.7 | 3.8 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 49.2 | 49.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 16.4 | 8.5 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2008-2012) | 11.5 | 9.5 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 5.5 | 1.6 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.43 | 0.48 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242261

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Vanuatu*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 57.4 | 45.7 | 34.8 | -39% |
| Remittances | 6.5 | 18.5 | 23.7 | 266% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 1.3 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 37% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 66.5 | 102.9 | 94.3 | 42% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 21.7 | 24.7 | 14.8 | -32% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Trade policy | **2** | Cross-border infrastructure | **3** | Connecting to value chains |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 8.0 | 37 | Australia | 7.0 | 47 |
| Japan | 5.5 | 26 | New Zealand | 3.0 | 20 |
| France | 4.8 | 22 | Japan | 2.5 | 17 |
| EU Institutions | 1.5 | 7 | EU Institutions | 1.6 | 11 |
| Australia | 1.0 | 4 | France | 0.7 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2006-2012)* | | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 16.3 | | 9.1 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | | 11.7 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 3.1 | | 3.2 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 41.1 | | 74.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 7.4 | |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | | 0.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 5.9 | | 11.3 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%) | 90 | 93 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%) | 79 | 89 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%) | 31 | 35 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports, 2006-2011) | 50 | 72 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports, 2006-2011) | 31 | 27 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 0.038 | 0.040 | **+5%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.140 | 0.326 | **+133%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 0.148 | 0.262 | **+78%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.066 | 0.144 | **+118%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.; 2007-2011)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 54 | 77 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 598 | 616 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.146 | 0.119 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.036 | 0.038 |
| *Market diversification (2006-2011)* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 29 | 27 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 50 | 64 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.061 | 0.092 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.198 | 0.140 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fiji | 12 | Malaysia | 20 |
| Australia | 8 | Philippines | 18 |
| New Caledonia | 7 | New Zealand | 11 |
| Belgium | 5 | Australia | 11 |
| Singapore | 5 | Fiji | 8 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 41 | Australia | 30 |
| New Zealand | 16 | Singapore | 18 |
| Fiji | 9 | New Zealand | 13 |
| Singapore | 5 | Fiji | 8 |
| China | 5 | China | 7 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Special transactions not classified | 37 | Fixed veg. fat, oils, other | 27 |
| Veg. | 18 | Oilseed (other fixed veg. oil) | 18 |
| Bovine meat | 8 | Veg. | 12 |
| Oilseed (other fixed veg. oil) | 8 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 9 |
| Cocoa | 7 | Bovine meat | 9 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2011 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 11 | Petroleum products | 17 |
| Rice | 5 | Medicaments | 6 |
| Medicaments | 5 | Rice | 4 |
| Furniture, cushions, etc. | 3 | Cereal preparations | 3 |
| Telecomm. equipment parts, n.e.s. | 2 | Special transactions not classified | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | ... | ... |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 43.7 | 43.5 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 11.7 | 13.6 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue) | ... | ... |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | ... | 0.62 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242277

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Yemen*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 1197.6 | -286.9 | -133.6 | - |
| Remittances | 1338.2 | 2093.6 | 3342.5 | 150% |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 162.6 | 1.8 | 0.2 | -100% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 162.6 | 1.8 | 0.0 | -100% |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 417.1 | 725.2 | 1123.7 | 169% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 75.2 | 121.2 | 103.3 | 37% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

**1** Transport infrastructure **2** Cross-border infrastructure **3** Connecting to value chains

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDA | 32.0 | 43 | Arab Fund (AFESD) | 39.9 | 39 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 26.9 | 36 | IDA | 32.2 | 31 |
| Italy | 4.0 | 5 | United States | 11.4 | 11 |
| EU Institutions | 3.3 | 4 | Germany | 6.6 | 6 |
| Korea, Republic of | 2.7 | 4 | EU Institutions | 5.2 | 5 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%)* | | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | 7.1 | | 7.5 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | | 6.2 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | 0.5 | | 0.4 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | 83.2 | | 81.7 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 0.2 | |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.0 | | 1.1 |
| Individuals using the internet | 1.2 | | 20.0 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2007-2013) | 66 | 62 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2007-2013) | 8 | 16 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%) | 23 | 18 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 3 | 12 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 45 | 34 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2007 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 7.316 | | 7.730 | **+6%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | | 0.578 | 1.490 | **+158%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 5.926 | | 10.660 | **+80%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 1.800 | | 2.368 | **+32%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 342 | 288 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 922 | 905 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.722 | 0.301 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.058 | 0.110 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 81 | 94 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 104 | 118 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.136 | 0.119 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.043 | 0.058 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| India | 24 | China | 24 |
| China | 23 | Thailand | 19 |
| Thailand | 15 | Korea, Republic of | 13 |
| United States | 6 | India | 8 |
| United Kingdom | 6 | Bahrain, Kingdom of | 5 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Arab Emirates | 10 | United Arab Emirates | 17 |
| Japan | 9 | China | 8 |
| Switzerland | 8 | Netherlands | 8 |
| China | 7 | Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of | 6 |
| Kuwait | 6 | Switzerland | 5 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum oils, crude | 85 | Petroleum oils, crude | 46 |
| Petroleum products | 7 | Natural gas | 29 |
| Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 1 | Residual petrol products | 9 |
| Civil engineering equipment | 1 | Special transactions not classified | 7 |
| Crustaceans, molluscs etc | 1 | Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen | 2 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 21 | Special transactions not classified | 31 |
| Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 6 | Wheat, meslin, unmilled | 8 |
| Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 5 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 4 |
| Tubes, pipes, etc., iron, steel | 5 | Rice | 3 |
| Civil engineering equipment | 3 | Sugars, molasses, honey | 3 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 15.7 | 17.4 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 25.1 | 26.0 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 1.6 | 2.3 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | 13.6 | 15.1 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | 2.9 | 2.8 |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.46 | 0.50 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242284

*Aid, Trade and Development Indicators for Zimbabwe*

## A. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

| EXTERNAL FINANCING INFLOWS (million current USD) | 2006/08 | 2010/12 | 2013 | Δ:06/08-13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDI inflows | 53.5 | 317.5 | 400.0 | 648% |
| Remittances | ... | ... | ... | - |
| Other official flows (OOF) | 1.5 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 490% |
| of which trade-related OOF | 0.0 | 6.9 | 8.0 | - |
| Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 446.1 | 823.9 | 835.8 | 87% |
| of which Aid for Trade | 11.4 | 85.7 | 92.3 | 709% |

*Sources:* UNCTAD, UNCTADstat; WB, World Development Indicators; OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### TOP 3 AFT PRIORITIES

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Network infrastructure (power, water, telecomms) | 2 | Transport infrastructure | 3 | Trade facilitation |

*Source:* OECD/WTO Partner Questionnaire

### SHARE OF AFT IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database
*Note:* No benchmarks are calculated for 2013.

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS: TOP DONORS (million current USD)

| 2006/08 | value | % | 2013 | value | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 4.8 | 42 | EU Institutions | 28.7 | 31 |
| Germany | 1.6 | 14 | United Kingdom | 19.8 | 21 |
| EU Institutions | 1.4 | 12 | United States | 14.7 | 16 |
| Japan | 1.0 | 9 | Denmark | 9.2 | 10 |
| Ireland | 1.0 | 9 | Norway | 6.3 | 7 |

*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

### AFT DISBURSEMENTS BY SECTOR (million current USD)




*Source:* OECD, DAC-CRS Aid Activities Database

## B. TRADE COSTS

| INDICATORS | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Tariffs (%, 2006-2012)* | | |
| Imports: simple avg. MFN applied | ... | 16.8 |
| Imports: weighted avg. MFN applied | ... | 14.9 |
| Exports: weighted avg. faced | ... | 2.7 |
| Exports: duty free (value in %) | ... | 63.6 |
| *Internet connectivity (% of population)* | | |
| Mobile broadband subscriptions | ... | 37.8 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions | 0.1 | 0.7 |
| Individuals using the internet | 9.8 | 18.5 |

*Sources:* WTO, World Tariff Profiles; ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators




*Source:* WB, Doing Business

### LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDICES (LPI) (1-5)




*Source:* WB Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

### TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS, 2015 (0-2)




*Source:* OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators

### TRADE COSTS (ad-valorem, %)




*Source:* ESCAP-WB Trade Cost Database
*Note:* Number of partners used in the calculation of average trade costs: total (47), intra-regional (14), extra-regional (33)

### COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS (1-7)




*Source:* WEF Global Competitiveness Index

## C. TRADE PERFORMANCE

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| Trade to GDP ratio (%, 2006-2012) | 91 | 79 |
| Commercial services as % of total exports (%, 2006-2012) | 14 | 9 |
| Commercial services as % of total imports (%, 2006-2012) | 17 | 16 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. exports) | 34 | 93 |
| Non-fuel intermediates (% of merch. imports) | 46 | 44 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

| TRADE FLOWS (billion current US$) | | 2006 | 2012 | 2013 | Increase | Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Exports** | Goods | 1.874 | | 3.189 | **+70%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.294 | 0.359 | | **+22%** ▲ | |
| **Imports** | Goods | 2.319 | | 4.945 | **+113%** ▲ | |
| | Commercial services | 0.485 | 0.963 | | **+99%** ▲ | |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|
| *Product diversification (based on HS02, 4-dig.)* | | |
| Number of exported products (max. 1,246) | 504 | 468 |
| Number of imported products (max. 1,246) | 927 | 1006 |
| HH export product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.146 | 0.117 |
| HH import product concentration (0 to 1) | 0.055 | 0.059 |
| *Market diversification* | | |
| Number of export markets (max. 233) | 113 | 58 |
| Number of import markets (max. 233) | 94 | 107 |
| HH export market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.138 | 0.565 |
| HH import market concentration (0 to 1) | 0.228 | 0.261 |

*Sources:* WTO Secretariat; UN Comtrade

### STRUCTURE OF SERVICES TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat

### STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE TRADE




*Source:* WTO Secretariat
*Note:* Only classified products are included in the calculation.

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zambia | 26 | South Africa | 75 |
| South Africa | 17 | Mozambique | 11 |
| Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 15 | United Arab Emirates | 7 |
| Netherlands | 14 | Zambia | 3 |
| Mozambique | 6 | Botswana | 1 |

### TOP 5 MARKETS FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 45 | South Africa | 47 |
| United States | 9 | United Kingdom | 18 |
| Botswana | 8 | China | 6 |
| Mozambique | 8 | Zambia | 3 |
| China | 4 | Mozambique | 3 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coke, semi-coke, retort carbon | 35 | Tobacco, unmanufactured | 25 |
| Crude veg. materials, n.e.s. | 12 | Nickel ores, concentrates, mattes | 21 |
| Veg. | 7 | Gold, nonmontry excl. ores | 14 |
| Pig iron, spiegeleisn, etc. | 5 | Natural abrasives, n.e.s. | 5 |
| Nickel ores, concentrates, mattes | 5 | Pig iron, spiegeleisn, etc. | 4 |

### TOP 5 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (%)

| 2006 | % | 2013 | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petroleum products | 21 | Petroleum products | 20 |
| Fixed veg. fat, oils, soft | 7 | Fertilizer, except crude fertilizers | 14 |
| Copper ores, concentrates | 6 | Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 4 |
| Maize unmilled | 4 | Passenger motor vehicles, excl. buses | 3 |
| Goods, spec.-purpose transport vehicles | 3 | Medicaments | 2 |

*Source:* UN Comtrade

## D. DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

| INDICATOR | 2006 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Unemployment (% of total labour force) | 5.1 | 5.4 |
| Female labour force (% of total labour force) | 49.2 | 49.2 |
| Net ODA received (% of GNI) | 5.4 | 8.7 |
| Import duties collected (% of tax revenue, 2006-2012) | ... | 22.3 |
| Total debt service (% of total exports) | ... | ... |
| Human Development Index (0 to 1, 2005-2013) | 0.41 | 0.49 |

*Sources:* WB, World Development Indicators; WTO Secretariat; UNDP, International Human Development Indicators

### POVERTY INDICATORS




### INEQUALITY INDICATORS




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### ECONOMIC STRUCTURE




*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

### GDP PER CAPITA (constant 2011 international $)


*Source:* WB, World Development Indicators

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933242296

# STATISTICAL NOTES

According to the WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade, projects and programmes are part of aid for trade if these activities have been identified as trade related development priorities in the partner country's national development strategies. Furthermore, the WTO Task Force concluded that to measure aid for trade flows the following categories should be included:

a) Technical assistance for trade policy and regulations: for example, helping countries to develop trade strategies, negotiate trade agreements, and implement their outcomes;

b) Trade-related infrastructure: for example, building roads, ports, and telecommunications networks to connect domestic markets to the global economy;

c) Productive capacity building (including trade development): for example, supporting the private sector to exploit their comparative advantages and diversify their exports;

d) Trade-related adjustment: helping developing countries with the costs associated with trade liberalisation, such as tariff reductions, preference erosion, or declining terms of trade; and,

e) Other trade-related needs: if identified as trade-related development priorities in partner countries' national development strategies.

The OECD DAC aid activity database (CRS) – a database covering around 90% of all ODA - was recognised as the best available data source for tracking global aid-for-trade flows. The CRS was established in 1967 and collects information on official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF) to developing countries. It is the internationally recognised source of data on aid activities (geographical and sectoral breakdowns) and is widely used by governments, organisations and researchers active in the field of development. For the OECD, the CRS serves as a tool for monitoring specific policy issues, including aid for trade. The CRS enables the tracking of aid commitments and disbursements, and provides comparable data over time and across countries. The use of this existing database led to significant savings of time and resources to effectively track aid-for-trade flows. The policy and guidelines for CRS reporting are approved by DAC members as represented at the DAC Working Party on Statistics (WP-STAT). The OECD collects, collates and verifies the consistency of the data, and maintains the database.

It should be kept in mind that the CRS does not provide data that match exactly all of the above aid-for-trade categories. In fact, the CRS provides proxies under four headings:

- **Trade policy and regulations (TPR).** In the CRS, five purpose codes are used to cover trade policy and regulations activities. These five sub-categories are: trade policy and administrative management; trade facilitation; regional trade agreements; multilateral trade negotiations; and trade education/ training.
- **Economic infrastructure**. Aid commitments for trade-related infrastructure are proxied in the CRS by data under the heading "Economic Infrastructure and Services" This heading covers data on transport and storage, communications and energy generation and supply.
- **Building Productive capacity (BPC),** including trade development. The CRS captures full data on all activities in the productive and services sectors, such as agriculture; industry; mineral resources and mining; business; and banking. Note: Trade development activities are identified through the Trade Development policy marker and have been separately identified in the CRS data collection since

2007 flows. These activities are an "of which" of Building Productive Capacity and are scored as either principally or significantly contributing to trade development. However, some donors may have difficulty in identifying aid activities that have a defined trade component. This may reflect upon the accuracy of these data and, as such, amounts shown under trade development can only at best be used as approximations.

- **Trade-related adjustment.** Was introduced in the CRS as a separate data item in 2007 to track flows corresponding to trade-related adjustment. This category identifies contributions to developing country budgets to assist the implementation of trade reforms and adjustments to trade policy measures by other countries, and alleviate shortfalls in balance-of-payments due to changes in the world trading environment.

The CRS covers all ODA, but only those activities reported under the above four categories can be identified as aid for trade. It is not possible to distinguish activities in the context of 'Other trade-related needs'. To estimate the volume of such 'other' activities, donors would need to examine aid projects in sectors other than those considered so far – for example in health and education – and indicate what share, if any, of these activities have an important trade component. A health programme, for instance, might permit increased trade from localities where the disease burden was previously a constraint on trade. Consequently, accurate monitoring of aid for trade would require comparison of the CRS data with donor and partner countries' self-assessments of their aid for trade.

## FOOTNOTES TO TABLES IN ANNEX A

Most of the data shown in Annex A are sourced from the CRS. To view the full set of CRS data please visit: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline

Population data required in the compilation of certain tables originate from the World Bank (*World Development Indicators*).

All amounts are in US dollars 2013 constant prices. For commitments data the years range from 2002 to 2013 and for disbursements 2006 to 2013.

### Aid providers:

The list of aid providers is split into DAC member countries, other bilateral donors and multilateral organisations. The full names of organisations are listed under the Acronyms section.

**Korea** became a member of the DAC in 2010 and was joined in 2013 by the Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Data shown in previous years for these countries may be partial.

Data collected from the FAO, IMF, ITC UNESCAP, UNESCWA, WTO and Turkey comprise specialised reporting since 2007 on Aid for Trade flows and may not constitute the totality of their individual aid funding.

The **IADB** changed its reporting methodology to the CRS as from 2009 flows.

"**Other multilateral donors**" include small amounts from several multilateral agencies (GGGI, AITIC, Nordic Development Fund, UNPBF, UNICEF).

## Aid recipients:

The DAC List of ODA Recipients represents all countries and territories eligible to receive official development assistance (ODA). These ODA-eligible recipients consist of all low and middle income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as published by the World Bank, with the exception of G8 members, EU members, and countries with a firm date for entry into the EU. The low-income countries include the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations.

In the latest revision of the list, effective from 1 January 2015 for reporting on 2014, 2015 and 2016 flows, there remains a total of 146 ODA-eligible countries (52 low-income countries of which 48 least developed, 36 lower middle-income and 58 upper middle-income). The next review of the DAC List will take place in 2017.

For the DAC List of Aid Recipients see Annexes B and C. To view a full historic of graduations to and from the DAC List please visit: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm

## Channels of delivery:

The table on channels shown in Annex A is based on aggregate data separated by major channel headings. The category "Other" represents delivery channels such as: universities, colleges, or other teaching institutions, research institutes or think-tanks. A full list of channels of delivery is accessible at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/annex2.htm.

### Legend:

".." denotes no activities reported.

0.0 denotes amounts of less than USD 50 000 for tables in USD million and USD 0.5 million for tables in USD billion.

# ANNEX A
# AID-FOR-TRADE KEY DATA

## TABLE A.1 Aid for Trade by category

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **Trade Policy and Regulations** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy and Admin. Management | 616 | 714 | 717 | 598 | 633 | 512 | 581 | 650 | 545 |
| Trade Facilitation | 76 | 193 | 371 | 463 | 673 | 122 | 248 | 245 | 565 |
| Regional Trade Agreements | 80 | 130 | 266 | 230 | 303 | 72 | 144 | 145 | 191 |
| Multilateral Trade Negotiations | 16 | 45 | 20 | 11 | 11 | 27 | 37 | 27 | 19 |
| Trade Education/Training | 11 | 35 | 38 | 33 | 21 | 24 | 36 | 27 | 29 |
| **SUB-TOTAL** | **798** | **1 116** | **1 411** | **1 335** | **1 641** | **756** | **1 046** | **1 095** | **1 348** |
| **Economic Infrastructure** | | | | | | | | | |
| Transport and Storage | 6 997 | 10 112 | 13 251 | 15 533 | 18 657 | 6 441 | 9 516 | 11 610 | 13 091 |
| Communications | 647 | 518 | 662 | 760 | 1 044 | 501 | 606 | 620 | 880 |
| Energy Generation and Supply | 5 559 | 7 080 | 10 170 | 14 158 | 13 733 | 4 828 | 6 796 | 8 761 | 8 737 |
| **Sub-total** | **13 203** | **17 710** | **24 084** | **30 450** | **33 434** | **11 770** | **16 917** | **20 990** | **22 708** |
| **Building Productive Capacity** | | | | | | | | | |
| Business And Other Services | 1 428 | 2 100 | 2 060 | 1 463 | 1 818 | 1 890 | 1 634 | 1 590 | 1 714 |
| Banking & Financial Services | 1 810 | 2 594 | 3 412 | 5 031 | 5 120 | 2 244 | 3 539 | 4 075 | 4 128 |
| Agriculture | 4 302 | 6 208 | 8 651 | 10 265 | 9 128 | 4 248 | 6 507 | 6 200 | 6 662 |
| Forestry | 570 | 696 | 1 073 | 1 241 | 922 | 561 | 952 | 907 | 1 393 |
| Fishing | 284 | 373 | 476 | 318 | 448 | 297 | 365 | 292 | 335 |
| Industry | 1 927 | 1 724 | 2 170 | 2 567 | 2 293 | 1 302 | 1 793 | 2 505 | 1 594 |
| Mineral Resources and Mining | 849 | 408 | 458 | 848 | 418 | 438 | 301 | 493 | 1 517 |
| Tourism | 106 | 224 | 185 | 77 | 153 | 76 | 150 | 177 | 182 |
| **Sub-total** | **11 275** | **14 326** | **18 485** | **21 811** | **20 299** | **11 055** | **15 240** | **16 239** | **17 525** |
| **Trade-related adjustment** | .. | 2 | 36 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 41 | 6 | 15 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **2** | **36** | **0** | **4** | **9** | **41** | **6** | **15** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275** | **33 154** | **44 016** | **53 597** | **55 378** | **23 590** | **33 244** | **38 330** | **41 595** |
| **Focus on trade development** | | | | | | | | | |
| Principal objective | .. | 1 339 | 2 409 | 3 288 | 3 038 | 1 180 | 2 146 | 3 082 | 2 871 |
| Significant objective | .. | 2 074 | 2 676 | 1 621 | 2 343 | 909 | 1 979 | 1 515 | 2 028 |
| ***TOTAL*** | **..** | **3 413** | **5 084** | **4 908** | **5 382** | **2 088** | **4 124** | **4 596** | **4 899** |
| ***Share in total Aid for Trade*** | | | | | | | | | |
| *Trade Policy & Regulations* | *3.2%* | *3.4%* | *3.2%* | *2.5%* | *3.0%* | *3.2%* | *3.1%* | *2.9%* | *3.2%* |
| *Economic Infrastructure* | *52.2%* | *53.4%* | *54.7%* | *56.8%* | *60.4%* | *49.9%* | *50.9%* | *54.8%* | *54.6%* |
| *Building Productive Capacity* | *44.6%* | *43.2%* | *42.0%* | *40.7%* | *36.7%* | *46.9%* | *45.8%* | *42.4%* | *42.1%* |
| *Trade-related Adjustment* | .. | *0.0%* | *0.1%* | *0.0%* | *0.0%* | *0.0%* | *0.1%* | *0.0%* | *0.0%* |
| ***Share in total sector allocable ODA (%)*** | ***32.5%*** | ***31.5%*** | ***34.0%*** | ***39.6%*** | ***38.4%*** | ***28.7%*** | ***30.9%*** | ***34.4%*** | ***34.8%*** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240447

## TABLE A.2 Aid for Trade by category and region

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **Africa** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 379 | 374 | 461 | 586 | 534 | 221 | 344 | 331 | 493 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 3 887 | 6 598 | 9 029 | 13 624 | 10 433 | 3 986 | 5 916 | 7 518 | 8 475 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 3 625 | 4 997 | 6 779 | 7 671 | 8 376 | 3 686 | 5 565 | 5 691 | 6 826 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 2 | 5 | .. | 0 | 9 | 30 | 1 | 1 |
| **Sub-total** | **7 891** | **11 970** | **16 274** | **21 881** | **19 343** | **7 901** | **11 855** | **13 541** | **15 795** |
| **America** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 68 | 118 | 182 | 100 | 65 | 88 | 98 | 85 | 99 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 500 | 771 | 1 514 | 2 719 | 1 899 | 484 | 1 275 | 2 129 | 1 717 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 1 208 | 1 238 | 1 879 | 1 720 | 1 842 | 1 111 | 1 581 | 1 442 | 1 942 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 27 | 0 | .. | .. | 7 | 0 | 9 |
| **Sub-total** | **1 776** | **2 126** | **3 602** | **4 539** | **3 806** | **1 683** | **2 961** | **3 655** | **3 767** |
| **Asia** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 167 | 264 | 305 | 322 | 445 | 185 | 271 | 265 | 338 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 7 583 | 8 894 | 10 819 | 10 467 | 16 657 | 6 193 | 7 153 | 8 301 | 9 489 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 4 804 | 5 521 | 5 333 | 6 190 | 5 548 | 4 295 | 4 615 | 3 958 | 4 621 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| **Sub-total** | **12 555** | **14 679** | **16 461** | **16 979** | **22 651** | **10 672** | **12 042** | **12 527** | **14 451** |
| **Europe** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 30 | 88 | 61 | 31 | 123 | 29 | 52 | 43 | 54 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 864 | 925 | 1 666 | 2 792 | 3 523 | 757 | 1 699 | 2 303 | 2 322 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 671 | 776 | 1 349 | 3 404 | 2 055 | 576 | 1 244 | 2 739 | 1 986 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 4 | .. | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| **Sub-total** | **1 565** | **1 789** | **3 076** | **6 227** | **5 704** | **1 363** | **2 995** | **5 087** | **4 365** |
| **Oceania** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 4 | 5 | 37 | 14 | 26 | 3 | 11 | 27 | 20 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 150 | 243 | 320 | 252 | 468 | 158 | 224 | 281 | 333 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 120 | 150 | 174 | 117 | 187 | 131 | 123 | 122 | 144 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | .. | 0 | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **274** | **398** | **531** | **384** | **681** | **291** | **358** | **430** | **497** |
| **Non-region specific** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 150 | 267 | 366 | 281 | 449 | 231 | 270 | 346 | 344 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 218 | 279 | 736 | 596 | 454 | 192 | 651 | 458 | 372 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 847 | 1 646 | 2 972 | 2 710 | 2 291 | 1 257 | 2 113 | 2 287 | 2 006 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **1 215** | **2 192** | **4 074** | **3 587** | **3 193** | **1 680** | **3 033** | **3 090** | **2 722** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275** | **33 154** | **44 016** | **53 597** | **55 378** | **23 590** | **33 244** | **38 330** | **41 595** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240452

## TABLE A.3. Aid for Trade by category and income group

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **Least Developed Countries** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 92 | 216 | 226 | 493 | 368 | 128 | 148 | 212 | 358 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 3 788 | 5 547 | 7 612 | 7 502 | 11 627 | 3 318 | 4 764 | 5 508 | 6 209 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 3 001 | 3 699 | 5 447 | 5 141 | 6 195 | 2 842 | 4 102 | 3 861 | 4 364 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 28 | 3 | 2 |
| **Sub-total** | **6 881** | **9 464** | **13 288** | **13 135** | **18 191** | **6 297** | **9 042** | **9 584** | **10 933** |
| **Other Low-income Countries** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 22 | 4 | 4 | 28 | 27 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 23 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 274 | 418 | 1 023 | 2 328 | 477 | 179 | 346 | 638 | 1 049 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 181 | 243 | 453 | 400 | 474 | 187 | 286 | 357 | 410 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | .. | 2 | .. | 0 |
| **Sub-total** | **477** | **665** | **1 479** | **2 756** | **978** | **370** | **638** | **1 008** | **1 481** |
| **Lower Middle-income Countries** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 303 | 207 | 235 | 237 | 304 | 157 | 180 | 177 | 224 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 5 097 | 7 190 | 10 035 | 13 167 | 13 878 | 4 421 | 6 856 | 8 573 | 9 157 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 3 757 | 4 675 | 5 028 | 6 392 | 5 794 | 3 189 | 4 212 | 4 067 | 4 964 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| **Sub-total** | **9 156** | **12 072** | **15 300** | **19 796** | **19 979** | **7 767** | **11 251** | **12 818** | **14 348** |
| **Upper Middle-income Countries** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 107 | 162 | 123 | 88 | 103 | 99 | 110 | 102 | 105 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 3 493 | 3 557 | 3 584 | 5 417 | 5 967 | 3 331 | 3 572 | 4 861 | 4 964 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 2 790 | 2 658 | 2 855 | 5 410 | 3 460 | 2 410 | 2 643 | 4 121 | 4 104 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 10 |
| **Sub-total** | **6 389** | **6 377** | **6 589** | **10 915** | **9 530** | **5 840** | **6 333** | **9 084** | **9 183** |
| **Non-country Specific** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 274 | 528 | 823 | 488 | 840 | 369 | 603 | 592 | 639 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 552 | 996 | 1 830 | 2 037 | 1 485 | 521 | 1 380 | 1 410 | 1 329 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 1 547 | 3 052 | 4 703 | 4 468 | 4 376 | 2 427 | 3 997 | 3 833 | 3 683 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 4 | .. | 0 | 0 | 1 | .. | 0 |
| **Sub-total** | **2 372** | **4 576** | **7 360** | **6 993** | **6 701** | **3 317** | **5 981** | **5 835** | **5 651** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275** | **33 154** | **44 016** | **53 597** | **55 378** | **23 590** | **33 244** | **38 330** | **41 595** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240462

## TABLE A.4 Aid for Trade by individual provider

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 248.6 | 375.0 | 587.1 | 534.6 | 452.1 | 305.8 | 472.6 | 534.6 | 452.1 |
| Austria | 50.1 | 58.6 | 83.1 | 75.6 | 142.6 | 43.6 | 67.3 | 52.5 | 81.5 |
| Belgium | 262.5 | 288.7 | 491.5 | 144.9 | 200.8 | 199.4 | 435.9 | 211.1 | 224.0 |
| Canada | 397.6 | 435.8 | 584.7 | 582.2 | 759.6 | 330.4 | 602.8 | 616.2 | 579.8 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | 4.0 | 9.8 | 8.9 | .. | 3.8 | 10.2 | 8.9 |
| Denmark | 473.4 | 308.1 | 346.5 | 402.6 | 422.9 | 297.7 | 377.7 | 430.8 | 375.9 |
| Finland | 87.8 | 141.7 | 325.7 | 134.2 | 144.5 | 68.8 | 152.2 | 163.9 | 152.7 |
| France | 775.4 | 1 642.9 | 1 573.0 | 3 647.0 | 2 377.8 | 986.9 | 1 285.6 | 2 034.0 | 1 860.8 |
| Germany | 1 347.1 | 2 280.2 | 3 664.1 | 3 511.5 | 5 017.0 | 1 850.4 | 2 830.0 | 2 605.1 | 3 437.8 |
| Greece | 13.7 | 20.1 | 18.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 20.1 | 18.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Iceland | .. | .. | 2.6 | 8.7 | 10.5 | .. | 2.6 | 8.7 | 10.5 |
| Ireland | 30.2 | 47.9 | 65.1 | 54.3 | 54.0 | 47.9 | 65.1 | 54.3 | 54.0 |
| Italy | 287.7 | 262.0 | 188.8 | 198.6 | 94.0 | 276.1 | 163.6 | 94.3 | 116.6 |
| Japan | 4 889.8 | 6 199.9 | 6 675.9 | 7 041.9 | 10 340.0 | 4 425.9 | 5 233.2 | 5 890.1 | 6 850.4 |
| Korea | .. | 471.4 | 903.9 | 806.4 | 704.0 | 192.9 | 358.5 | 443.7 | 542.3 |
| Luxembourg | 18.9 | 35.4 | 37.9 | 43.0 | 43.6 | 35.4 | 37.9 | 43.0 | 43.6 |
| Netherlands | 607.3 | 787.5 | 799.1 | 1 153.7 | 764.1 | 546.8 | 542.9 | 716.2 | 737.3 |
| New Zealand | 23.9 | 48.3 | 103.8 | 86.1 | 109.5 | 32.8 | 56.9 | 95.9 | 91.8 |
| Norway | 361.7 | 596.2 | 1 023.7 | 1 007.4 | 1 253.0 | 539.6 | 715.9 | 1 044.1 | 1 458.9 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3.5 | .. | .. | .. | 3.5 |
| Portugal | 48.1 | 31.2 | 56.6 | 22.9 | 22.9 | 39.5 | 58.2 | 57.4 | 32.5 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | 2.4 | 1.3 | 1.0 | .. | 2.3 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Spain | 418.4 | 764.9 | 950.0 | 89.4 | 95.6 | 535.3 | 939.7 | 142.7 | 148.1 |
| Sweden | 274.3 | 397.3 | 401.4 | 393.5 | 507.7 | 399.4 | 420.8 | 497.5 | 503.3 |
| Switzerland | 320.9 | 288.2 | 298.9 | 288.4 | 505.9 | 266.3 | 235.9 | 271.7 | 293.6 |
| United Kingdom | 757.4 | 941.3 | 1 275.9 | 939.3 | 967.8 | 965.6 | 1 352.7 | 1 388.2 | 1 430.5 |
| United States | 4 039.6 | 5 736.0 | 4 887.3 | 4 018.5 | 3 836.5 | 4 149.4 | 4 086.0 | 3 544.9 | 3 402.6 |
| **Sub-total** | **15 734.1** | **22 158.5** | **25 351.6** | **25 196.1** | **28 841.0** | **16 555.9** | **20 518.8** | **20 951.9** | **22 895.3** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.6 | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 342.4 | 511.2 | 831.8 | .. | 276.7 | 337.1 | 265.4 |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 47.0 | .. | .. | .. | 47.0 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 282.8 | 236.8 | 1 821.8 | .. | 141.2 | 214.0 | 1 219.0 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **..** | **672.2** | **748.0** | **2 656.3** | **..** | **464.9** | **551.2** | **1 485.5** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 161.8 | 775.5 | 1 636.1 | 2 311.9 | 1 385.9 | 416.4 | 1 315.5 | 1 036.5 | 1 215.0 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 425.3 | 1 127.2 | 977.5 | 986.2 | 260.6 | 785.0 | 745.6 | 749.3 |
| AsDB | 819.0 | 571.8 | 1 307.8 | 1 404.4 | 2 259.0 | .. | 530.9 | 1 011.9 | 1 318.0 |
| BADEA | .. | .. | 27.1 | 112.0 | 113.0 | .. | 16.3 | 65.7 | 74.6 |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 102.0 |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.7 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| EU Institutions | 2 882.7 | 3 515.0 | 4 946.0 | 11 801.6 | 10 141.7 | 2 539.1 | 4 390.9 | 8 534.8 | 7 096.3 |
| FAO | .. | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 |
| GEF | .. | .. | 131.0 | 306.7 | 318.9 | 13.6 | 22.0 | 19.4 | 21.1 |
| IADB | 265.2 | 121.8 | 473.9 | 574.3 | 600.0 | .. | 388.0 | 520.1 | 550.3 |
| IFAD | 293.6 | 412.3 | 634.0 | 607.5 | 514.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | 11.3 | 14.8 | 15.9 | 15.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | 208.9 | 276.7 | 206.3 | 215.7 | 157.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | 33.0 | 59.1 | 69.3 | 71.5 | 32.5 | 56.6 | 59.5 | 64.1 |
| OFID | .. | .. | 378.7 | 533.3 | 477.1 | .. | 183.6 | 167.8 | 245.7 |
| UNDP | 13.1 | 26.4 | 36.6 | 33.0 | 34.1 | 25.7 | 36.5 | 33.0 | 34.1 |
| UNECE | .. | 1.4 | 4.6 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 1.4 | 4.6 | 2.9 | 4.5 |
| UNESCAP | .. | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| UNESCWA | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.7 |
| UNIDO | .. | 29.6 | 67.4 | 42.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| World Bank | 4 895.6 | 4 631.2 | 6 599.9 | 8 291.3 | 6 439.3 | 3 583.0 | 4 192.6 | 4 273.8 | 5 380.3 |
| WTO | .. | 14.5 | 17.1 | 13.3 | 13.2 | 14.5 | 17.1 | 13.3 | 13.2 |
| Other multilateral donors | 1.1 | 4.5 | 25.1 | 27.9 | 42.2 | 2.4 | 7.3 | 27.3 | 35.7 |
| **Sub-total** | **9 541.0** | **10 995.3** | **17 992.2** | **27 652.4** | **23 880.7** | **7 034.0** | **12 260.1** | **16 826.5** | **17 214.5** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275.1** | **33 153.8** | **44 015.9** | **53 596.5** | **55 378.0** | **23 589.9** | **33 243.8** | **38 329.6** | **41 595.3** |
| ***Share in total Aid for Trade*** | | | | | | | | | |
| *DAC countries* | *62.3%* | *66.8%* | *57.6%* | *47.0%* | *52.1%* | *70.2%* | *61.7%* | *54.7%* | *55.0%* |
| *Other bilateral* | *..* | *..* | *1.5%* | *1.4%* | *4.8%* | *..* | *1.4%* | *1.4%* | *3.6%* |
| *Multilateral* | *37.7%* | *33.2%* | *40.9%* | *51.6%* | *43.1%* | *29.8%* | *36.9%* | *43.9%* | *41.4%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

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## TABLE A.5 Top 20 providers of Aid for Trade in 2013

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **2002-05 avg.** | **2006-08 avg.** | **2009-11 avg.** | **2012** | **2013** |
| Japan | 4 889.8 | 6 199.9 | 6 675.9 | 7 041.9 | 10 340.0 |
| EU Institutions | 2 882.7 | 3 515.0 | 4 946.0 | 11 801.6 | 10 141.7 |
| World Bank | 4 895.6 | 4 631.2 | 6 599.9 | 8 291.3 | 6 439.3 |
| Germany | 1 347.1 | 2 280.2 | 3 664.1 | 3 511.5 | 5 017.0 |
| United States | 4 039.6 | 5 736.0 | 4 887.3 | 4 018.5 | 3 836.5 |
| France | 775.4 | 1 642.9 | 1 573.0 | 3 647.0 | 2 377.8 |
| AsDB | 819.0 | 571.8 | 1 307.8 | 1 404.4 | 2 259.0 |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 282.8 | 236.8 | 1 821.8 |
| AfDB | 161.8 | 775.5 | 1 636.1 | 2 311.9 | 1 385.9 |
| Norway | 361.7 | 596.2 | 1 023.7 | 1 007.4 | 1 253.0 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 0.0 | 425.3 | 1 127.2 | 977.5 | 986.2 |
| United Kingdom | 757.4 | 941.3 | 1 275.9 | 939.3 | 967.8 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 342.4 | 511.2 | 831.8 |
| Netherlands | 607.3 | 787.5 | 799.1 | 1 153.7 | 764.1 |
| Canada | 397.6 | 435.8 | 584.7 | 582.2 | 759.6 |
| Korea | .. | 471.4 | 903.9 | 806.4 | 704.0 |
| IADB | 265.2 | 121.8 | 473.9 | 574.3 | 600.0 |
| IFAD | 293.6 | 412.3 | 634.0 | 607.5 | 514.2 |
| Sweden | 274.3 | 397.3 | 401.4 | 393.5 | 507.7 |
| Switzerland | 320.9 | 288.2 | 298.9 | 288.4 | 505.9 |
| **Sub-total** | **23 088.8** | **30 229.5** | **39 437.9** | **50 106.3** | **52 013.3** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275.1** | **33 153.8** | **44 015.9** | **53 596.5** | **55 378.0** |
| *Top 20 share in total AFT* | *91.4%* | *91.2%* | *89.6%* | *93.5%* | *93.9%* |
| | **DISBURSEMENTS** | | | | |
| | **2002-05 avg.** | **2006-08 avg.** | **2009-11 avg.** | **2012** | **2013** |
| EU Institutions | 2 539.1 | 4 390.9 | 8 534.8 | 7 096.3 | 10 340.0 |
| Japan | 4 425.9 | 5 233.2 | 5 890.1 | 6 850.4 | 10 141.7 |
| World Bank | 3 583.0 | 4 192.6 | 4 273.8 | 5 380.3 | 6 439.3 |
| Germany | 1 850.4 | 2 830.0 | 2 605.1 | 3 437.8 | 5 017.0 |
| United States | 4 149.4 | 4 086.0 | 3 544.9 | 3 402.6 | 3 836.5 |
| France | 986.9 | 1 285.6 | 2 034.0 | 1 860.8 | 2 377.8 |
| Norway | 539.6 | 715.9 | 1 044.1 | 1 458.9 | 2 259.0 |
| United Kingdom | 965.6 | 1 352.7 | 1 388.2 | 1 430.5 | 1 821.8 |
| AsDB | .. | 530.9 | 1 011.9 | 1 318.0 | 1 385.9 |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 141.2 | 214.0 | 1 219.0 | 1 253.0 |
| AfDB | 416.4 | 1 315.5 | 1 036.5 | 1 215.0 | 986.2 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 260.6 | 785.0 | 745.6 | 749.3 | 967.8 |
| Netherlands | 546.8 | 542.9 | 716.2 | 737.3 | 831.8 |
| Canada | 330.4 | 602.8 | 616.2 | 579.8 | 764.1 |
| IADB | .. | 388.0 | 520.1 | 550.3 | 759.6 |
| Korea | 192.9 | 358.5 | 443.7 | 542.3 | 704.0 |
| Sweden | 399.4 | 420.8 | 497.5 | 503.3 | 600.0 |
| Australia | 305.8 | 472.6 | 534.6 | 452.1 | 514.2 |
| Denmark | 297.7 | 377.7 | 430.8 | 375.9 | 507.7 |
| FAO | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 | 505.9 |
| **Sub-total** | **21 934.4** | **30 321.5** | **36 392.9** | **39 465.7** | **52 013.3** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **23 589.9** | **33 243.8** | **38 329.6** | **41 595.3** | **55 378.0** |
| *Top 20 share in total AFT* | *93.0%* | *91.2%* | *94.9%* | *94.9%* | *93.9%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240484

## TABLE A.6 Aid for Trade by individual recipient country *(page 1 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Afghanistan | 791.1 | 1 556.7 | 1 863.4 | 1 830.4 | 2 267.3 | 1 027.9 | 1 734.8 | 1 489.0 | 1 214.1 |
| Albania | 142.0 | 135.6 | 157.2 | 28.0 | 76.7 | 95.4 | 161.5 | 153.3 | 123.3 |
| Algeria | 106.9 | 147.1 | 26.1 | 24.6 | 22.0 | 124.7 | 67.5 | 29.4 | 37.3 |
| Angola | 19.8 | 86.1 | 39.1 | 10.6 | 66.0 | 34.1 | 61.2 | 37.3 | 43.3 |
| Anguilla | 1.5 | 5.9 | 0.1 | .. | 0.0 | 2.8 | 3.2 | .. | 0.2 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 2.4 | 0.3 | 5.0 | 1.0 | 4.2 | 0.9 | 5.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Argentina | 47.5 | 26.5 | 41.0 | 125.9 | 10.3 | 33.7 | 37.9 | 116.7 | 11.9 |
| Armenia | 112.9 | 226.5 | 151.5 | 146.2 | 160.9 | 107.8 | 171.0 | 114.8 | 99.2 |
| Azerbaijan | 141.8 | 98.8 | 128.2 | 11.8 | 15.3 | 85.1 | 106.5 | 169.7 | 111.9 |
| Bangladesh | 813.3 | 839.8 | 1 271.9 | 1 062.4 | 1 690.4 | 396.4 | 413.4 | 866.8 | 902.7 |
| Barbados | 0.4 | 11.6 | 1.0 | .. | .. | 0.2 | 6.6 | .. | .. |
| Belarus | 0.6 | 8.6 | 29.0 | 6.5 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 17.4 | 5.7 | 14.1 |
| Belize | 9.3 | 9.9 | 19.6 | 36.1 | 28.7 | 6.2 | 10.4 | 15.0 | 17.9 |
| Benin | 118.3 | 204.8 | 226.5 | 116.4 | 117.5 | 123.0 | 217.6 | 143.0 | 189.6 |
| Bhutan | 44.3 | 42.7 | 55.6 | 39.8 | 84.7 | 27.0 | 61.5 | 78.2 | 56.3 |
| Bolivia | 261.9 | 165.7 | 338.4 | 257.1 | 238.3 | 149.1 | 233.2 | 211.2 | 232.8 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 120.5 | 174.5 | 237.4 | 231.0 | 498.4 | 98.5 | 182.3 | 330.5 | 286.2 |
| Botswana | 16.3 | 5.7 | 9.9 | 98.3 | 4.1 | 12.1 | 20.7 | 14.0 | 10.7 |
| Brazil | 52.9 | 70.4 | 403.8 | 1 338.5 | 456.0 | 78.8 | 276.5 | 926.0 | 902.7 |
| Burkina Faso | 258.7 | 203.6 | 430.5 | 326.6 | 449.8 | 210.1 | 239.0 | 292.6 | 330.5 |
| Burundi | 53.2 | 90.0 | 179.3 | 137.4 | 267.9 | 75.2 | 110.9 | 166.2 | 157.9 |
| Cabo Verde | 82.6 | 67.3 | 78.6 | 94.2 | 41.1 | 64.5 | 109.5 | 76.1 | 59.8 |
| Cambodia | 194.7 | 218.1 | 314.5 | 277.1 | 384.2 | 133.2 | 196.6 | 254.8 | 286.1 |
| Cameroon | 129.9 | 301.8 | 289.1 | 443.5 | 248.6 | 139.4 | 149.5 | 211.3 | 291.5 |
| Central African Republic | 35.6 | 62.2 | 66.4 | 137.2 | 7.6 | 36.9 | 51.9 | 57.2 | 18.0 |
| Chad | 105.7 | 43.1 | 98.9 | 69.7 | 56.0 | 53.6 | 54.7 | 46.3 | 50.4 |
| Chile | 40.0 | 34.8 | 64.4 | 11.1 | 212.9 | 59.0 | 83.7 | 64.4 | 24.8 |
| China (People's Republic of) | 791.9 | 581.3 | 467.9 | 324.7 | 426.5 | 819.0 | 568.0 | 549.7 | 367.1 |
| Colombia | 86.4 | 157.3 | 266.3 | 167.7 | 169.4 | 133.3 | 200.9 | 127.4 | 178.4 |
| Comoros | 3.8 | 6.5 | 15.4 | 28.1 | 50.2 | 4.1 | 5.7 | 9.4 | 12.4 |
| Congo | 40.5 | 39.2 | 55.6 | 64.0 | 20.7 | 30.4 | 29.7 | 54.2 | 30.7 |
| Cook Islands | 1.6 | 0.6 | 10.7 | 7.2 | 14.6 | 1.5 | 4.8 | 14.4 | 5.1 |
| Costa Rica | 53.6 | 23.0 | 27.9 | 7.1 | 15.3 | 43.8 | 56.3 | 11.9 | 16.0 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 61.1 | 113.2 | 242.1 | 200.9 | 176.2 | 98.9 | 174.0 | 90.6 | 110.3 |
| Croatia | 68.2 | 119.3 | 51.3 | .. | .. | 40.5 | 23.4 | .. | .. |
| Cuba | 9.5 | 11.8 | 17.8 | 13.3 | 24.2 | 10.0 | 25.2 | 13.2 | 18.9 |
| Democratic People's Republic of Korea | 35.3 | 9.3 | 1.6 | 24.3 | 2.9 | 9.3 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 2.3 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 517.0 | 311.7 | 753.3 | 433.8 | 501.7 | 213.8 | 391.9 | 511.7 | 616.8 |
| Djibouti | 23.1 | 11.2 | 46.2 | 67.9 | 94.2 | 9.2 | 31.1 | 13.7 | 27.0 |
| Dominica | 14.4 | 6.7 | 2.7 | 34.2 | 18.2 | 9.6 | 18.6 | 12.9 | 11.9 |
| Dominican Republic | 44.3 | 34.8 | 151.8 | 45.3 | 78.3 | 55.7 | 87.6 | 163.8 | 27.8 |
| Ecuador | 53.1 | 60.6 | 67.1 | 189.2 | 28.2 | 42.2 | 62.5 | 57.8 | 65.5 |
| Egypt | 586.9 | 852.9 | 1 063.8 | 2 051.1 | 1 842.8 | 580.4 | 733.0 | 1 521.1 | 1 645.4 |
| El Salvador | 30.2 | 204.2 | 82.8 | 28.2 | 47.6 | 53.4 | 124.2 | 135.4 | 52.7 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.9 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 3.9 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.2 |
| Eritrea | 52.1 | 36.6 | 28.7 | 17.0 | 5.7 | 19.2 | 18.5 | 6.5 | 8.5 |
| Ethiopia | 543.9 | 782.2 | 725.6 | 2 016.2 | 1 017.9 | 530.6 | 758.4 | 595.0 | 891.3 |
| Fiji | 7.8 | 12.1 | 14.9 | 23.9 | 51.6 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 15.6 | 12.0 |
| Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | 53.3 | 50.0 | 75.7 | 264.9 | 48.7 | 34.8 | 49.5 | 77.1 | 132.8 |
| Gabon | 41.7 | 55.6 | 20.8 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 24.6 | 31.9 | 29.5 | 24.4 |
| Gambia | 36.1 | 19.1 | 60.3 | 154.0 | 58.3 | 15.7 | 42.0 | 52.4 | 40.2 |
| Georgia | 104.5 | 242.5 | 363.5 | 515.2 | 207.0 | 156.8 | 227.9 | 335.1 | 342.8 |
| Ghana | 288.0 | 626.9 | 728.5 | 748.3 | 247.9 | 352.7 | 566.4 | 636.9 | 519.6 |
| Grenada | 8.1 | 1.6 | 9.6 | 19.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 6.6 | 0.5 | 3.5 |
| Guatemala | 30.6 | 54.1 | 78.1 | 155.1 | 171.8 | 28.1 | 64.1 | 65.6 | 135.5 |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.6 Aid for Trade by individual recipient country *(page 2 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Guinea | 74.0 | 78.4 | 60.5 | 142.6 | 200.7 | 44.4 | 64.4 | 72.1 | 83.7 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 27.3 | 16.2 | 17.5 | 1.7 | 16.6 | 35.1 | 24.1 | 15.7 | 9.4 |
| Guyana | 44.8 | 57.5 | 59.3 | 107.0 | 34.7 | 17.6 | 72.0 | 63.4 | 57.3 |
| Haiti | 90.0 | 103.4 | 497.2 | 373.9 | 307.4 | 61.7 | 275.6 | 282.0 | 251.2 |
| Honduras | 190.0 | 72.1 | 217.1 | 94.5 | 407.2 | 78.8 | 188.9 | 189.2 | 274.1 |
| India | 1 575.5 | 2 374.8 | 2 718.1 | 3 548.1 | 5 165.0 | 1 269.3 | 1 992.4 | 1 594.9 | 2 112.7 |
| Indonesia | 1 102.5 | 846.9 | 869.7 | 242.4 | 681.8 | 813.3 | 854.1 | 645.2 | 610.1 |
| Iran | 5.0 | 3.4 | 7.1 | 4.2 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 4.2 | 2.6 |
| Iraq | 2 227.4 | 2 172.1 | 429.4 | 671.5 | 60.1 | 1 894.4 | 427.2 | 388.2 | 757.7 |
| Jamaica | 35.7 | 36.7 | 46.9 | 11.1 | 50.7 | 47.9 | 52.2 | 15.2 | 47.0 |
| Jordan | 44.5 | 124.5 | 217.1 | 442.3 | 904.0 | 72.2 | 224.7 | 229.8 | 371.4 |
| Kazakhstan | 38.3 | 115.3 | 88.6 | 6.9 | 9.9 | 97.8 | 63.3 | 32.5 | 46.8 |
| Kenya | 322.4 | 508.4 | 1 166.6 | 2 445.3 | 714.6 | 299.5 | 433.5 | 784.7 | 1 192.3 |
| Kiribati | 7.5 | 7.8 | 38.8 | 7.4 | 19.9 | 10.2 | 7.9 | 27.7 | 32.7 |
| Kosovo | .. | .. | 109.2 | 53.2 | 95.7 | .. | 74.8 | 82.8 | 66.4 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 54.8 | 100.4 | 171.2 | 164.5 | 147.4 | 57.6 | 90.1 | 122.4 | 147.8 |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | 160.1 | 132.4 | 208.0 | 209.8 | 239.9 | 126.9 | 136.4 | 154.9 | 143.3 |
| Lebanon | 30.0 | 88.0 | 56.8 | 41.2 | 117.0 | 56.3 | 109.0 | 105.0 | 86.5 |
| Lesotho | 7.0 | 34.3 | 30.0 | 3.5 | 26.2 | 18.6 | 24.8 | 19.8 | 20.0 |
| Liberia | 0.9 | 78.1 | 234.9 | 382.7 | 432.7 | 46.4 | 108.0 | 143.8 | 185.9 |
| Libya | 2.3 | 4.7 | 10.2 | 3.1 | 20.2 | 12.1 | 15.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Madagascar | 304.0 | 273.1 | 54.4 | 266.5 | 271.4 | 300.5 | 138.4 | 92.8 | 101.3 |
| Malawi | 118.5 | 145.0 | 258.5 | 346.6 | 555.5 | 106.4 | 166.1 | 226.5 | 220.6 |
| Malaysia | 12.5 | 43.4 | 28.9 | 37.1 | 6.8 | 140.0 | 54.8 | 11.3 | 8.1 |
| Maldives | 10.9 | 16.3 | 14.9 | 27.7 | 9.1 | 4.1 | 16.7 | 6.6 | 1.2 |
| Mali | 195.2 | 533.3 | 423.5 | 70.8 | 462.5 | 252.5 | 366.9 | 325.7 | 251.3 |
| Marshall Islands | 5.2 | 1.3 | 7.5 | 16.6 | 6.1 | 1.8 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 13.8 |
| Mauritania | 129.1 | 154.0 | 147.2 | 151.0 | 285.7 | 82.3 | 137.4 | 180.8 | 79.3 |
| Mauritius | 56.8 | 35.4 | 51.4 | 75.4 | 168.2 | 6.8 | 23.6 | 48.5 | 93.5 |
| Mayotte | 19.8 | 25.1 | 24.6 | .. | .. | 21.0 | 29.3 | .. | .. |
| Mexico | 26.6 | 51.2 | 128.8 | 375.4 | 214.2 | 27.7 | 93.2 | 168.0 | 312.2 |
| Micronesia | 13.9 | 17.3 | 8.0 | 4.7 | 37.4 | 9.6 | 14.5 | 4.7 | 23.2 |
| Moldova | 66.8 | 47.4 | 195.2 | 310.1 | 130.6 | 42.7 | 86.7 | 191.8 | 159.3 |
| Mongolia | 60.4 | 260.8 | 181.2 | 146.5 | 94.9 | 70.3 | 138.2 | 182.3 | 268.7 |
| Montenegro | 7.0 | 31.5 | 27.2 | 26.0 | 127.9 | 24.1 | 38.2 | 31.6 | 78.9 |
| Montserrat | 8.0 | 12.3 | 1.6 | 9.7 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 10.3 | 9.5 | 16.6 |
| Morocco | 328.3 | 895.9 | 990.6 | 2 375.2 | 1 297.8 | 448.0 | 797.2 | 1 085.6 | 1 421.6 |
| Mozambique | 363.9 | 484.2 | 469.6 | 374.0 | 1 011.4 | 371.8 | 362.5 | 461.0 | 611.4 |
| Myanmar | 11.0 | 17.0 | 35.8 | 68.6 | 1 211.8 | 17.6 | 51.0 | 39.1 | 366.3 |
| Namibia | 34.0 | 81.2 | 95.2 | 52.9 | 41.7 | 30.9 | 73.7 | 49.8 | 57.9 |
| Nauru | 2.6 | 12.0 | 3.0 | 6.5 | 4.2 | 11.6 | 3.4 | 6.5 | 5.0 |
| Nepal | 175.7 | 218.4 | 398.6 | 429.1 | 980.8 | 134.5 | 230.4 | 267.2 | 320.6 |
| Nicaragua | 203.6 | 209.6 | 237.4 | 237.9 | 269.6 | 146.6 | 222.8 | 221.1 | 209.2 |
| Niger | 121.4 | 117.5 | 121.3 | 339.6 | 215.6 | 93.9 | 107.2 | 126.9 | 157.8 |
| Nigeria | 251.0 | 363.8 | 622.5 | 1 195.4 | 678.9 | 248.3 | 350.7 | 372.9 | 557.1 |
| Niue | 2.5 | 2.1 | 6.3 | 3.1 | 6.6 | 2.4 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 5.1 |
| Oman | 2.9 | 6.8 | 67.9 | .. | .. | 8.0 | 74.7 | .. | .. |
| Pakistan | 619.4 | 731.2 | 765.8 | 1 602.1 | 697.3 | 366.2 | 437.2 | 609.7 | 772.3 |
| Palau | 6.5 | 6.3 | 3.9 | 20.2 | 1.7 | 8.2 | 4.2 | 2.6 | 14.2 |
| Panama | 10.0 | 12.5 | 20.8 | 9.0 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 14.6 | 14.3 | 6.5 |
| Papua New Guinea | 141.9 | 153.0 | 215.5 | 79.6 | 262.8 | 114.2 | 124.7 | 159.7 | 198.7 |
| Paraguay | 17.0 | 91.2 | 91.7 | 16.6 | 85.8 | 35.5 | 46.7 | 55.7 | 31.4 |
| Peru | 135.1 | 130.3 | 153.3 | 205.1 | 211.8 | 200.6 | 138.9 | 169.2 | 128.0 |
| Philippines | 343.4 | 244.2 | 598.9 | 805.9 | 875.3 | 508.2 | 404.5 | 224.7 | 223.2 |
| Rwanda | 79.5 | 136.3 | 318.2 | 241.5 | 456.8 | 107.2 | 227.3 | 194.7 | 226.4 |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.6 Aid for Trade by individual recipient country *(page 3 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Saint Helena | 42.4 | 15.3 | 32.6 | 9.1 | 21.3 | 15.2 | 34.1 | 144.9 | 94.3 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 1.6 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 9.6 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Saint Lucia | 9.5 | 8.6 | 3.8 | 34.3 | 0.6 | 7.5 | 17.1 | 9.6 | 10.6 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 6.7 | 7.4 | 0.8 | 21.0 | 2.9 | 9.8 | 8.2 | 1.6 | 2.3 |
| Samoa | 16.0 | 28.5 | 19.8 | 13.0 | 29.3 | 9.9 | 28.2 | 29.3 | 20.1 |
| São Tomé and Principe | 8.0 | 6.8 | 17.9 | 3.3 | 11.7 | 7.0 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 12.9 |
| Saudi Arabia | 1.7 | 1.2 | .. | .. | .. | 1.3 | .. | .. | .. |
| Senegal | 202.4 | 257.4 | 501.0 | 384.7 | 358.0 | 230.9 | 259.5 | 265.1 | 317.6 |
| Serbia | 452.2 | 301.6 | 664.4 | 1 100.4 | 955.9 | 253.7 | 484.9 | 795.0 | 648.2 |
| Seychelles | 3.2 | 5.7 | 1.6 | 11.0 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 7.0 | 21.3 | 10.4 |
| Sierra Leone | 102.3 | 93.5 | 100.3 | 107.4 | 255.2 | 55.9 | 108.8 | 103.9 | 106.2 |
| Slovenia | 5.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Solomon Islands | 12.6 | 26.2 | 40.2 | 33.1 | 32.5 | 18.1 | 33.4 | 47.4 | 43.3 |
| Somalia | 4.6 | 15.2 | 31.5 | 98.2 | 105.8 | 6.5 | 25.6 | 45.2 | 58.3 |
| South Africa | 134.7 | 166.2 | 170.6 | 79.8 | 350.2 | 202.2 | 178.5 | 102.4 | 224.4 |
| South Sudan | .. | .. | 42.7 | 143.7 | 286.2 | .. | 44.1 | 129.8 | 149.7 |
| Sri Lanka | 497.9 | 379.6 | 432.8 | 589.2 | 488.1 | 303.4 | 393.4 | 423.7 | 386.1 |
| States Ex-Yugoslavia | 56.5 | 2.3 | 1.9 | .. | .. | 4.9 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Sudan | 29.7 | 233.8 | 422.9 | 284.6 | 450.1 | 87.9 | 234.7 | 177.5 | 165.7 |
| Suriname | 24.0 | 18.4 | 22.4 | 14.7 | 0.5 | 24.0 | 34.1 | 27.1 | 17.3 |
| Swaziland | 18.3 | 23.0 | 42.2 | 9.9 | 5.1 | 12.4 | 17.0 | 25.7 | 38.0 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 17.8 | 29.7 | 194.2 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 47.8 | 103.8 | 43.4 | 2.5 |
| Tajikistan | 108.3 | 130.4 | 205.0 | 187.6 | 203.6 | 49.1 | 124.4 | 132.9 | 193.9 |
| Tanzania | 425.6 | 801.0 | 949.0 | 692.6 | 1 563.8 | 430.2 | 651.0 | 807.1 | 1 113.1 |
| Thailand | 354.9 | 245.0 | 337.5 | 27.4 | 28.4 | 180.9 | 166.0 | 180.8 | 600.0 |
| Timor-Leste | 35.1 | 35.5 | 60.0 | 105.4 | 127.4 | 26.1 | 41.2 | 59.6 | 66.3 |
| Togo | 9.3 | 42.2 | 103.5 | 40.6 | 100.8 | 37.5 | 39.4 | 36.3 | 47.7 |
| Tokelau | 1.7 | 1.3 | 4.1 | 13.2 | 10.9 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 7.0 | 13.7 |
| Tonga | 3.1 | 14.7 | 37.9 | 29.2 | 43.0 | 7.8 | 19.7 | 25.0 | 34.6 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 16.2 | 9.4 | 13.4 | .. | .. | 2.2 | 1.1 | .. | .. |
| Tunisia | 221.1 | 293.0 | 368.1 | 1 098.2 | 732.8 | 210.1 | 402.0 | 594.1 | 607.1 |
| Turkey | 453.0 | 424.3 | 1 111.8 | 3 409.5 | 3 074.3 | 396.1 | 1 346.4 | 2 956.3 | 2 444.0 |
| Turkmenistan | 2.8 | 1.9 | 9.1 | 2.3 | 10.6 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 5.1 | 3.7 |
| Turks and Caicos Islands | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| Tuvalu | 4.2 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 4.7 | 28.5 | 5.3 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.6 |
| Uganda | 272.8 | 456.0 | 744.7 | 404.1 | 497.6 | 411.1 | 459.0 | 386.8 | 570.8 |
| Ukraine | 85.1 | 250.9 | 258.5 | 642.8 | 648.0 | 170.3 | 320.1 | 336.7 | 345.2 |
| Uruguay | 6.3 | 4.3 | 10.0 | 5.4 | 77.5 | 6.9 | 14.4 | 3.4 | 18.5 |
| Uzbekistan | 147.5 | 56.6 | 219.0 | 372.3 | 629.3 | 52.0 | 75.7 | 99.2 | 166.6 |
| Vanuatu | 6.8 | 42.4 | 23.2 | 82.1 | 18.3 | 23.3 | 35.6 | 19.5 | 14.8 |
| Venezuela | 2.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.5 | 8.9 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 0.6 |
| Viet Nam | 1 562.3 | 1 845.2 | 2 431.5 | 2 367.7 | 3 625.6 | 1 108.0 | 1 651.9 | 2 521.4 | 2 621.1 |
| Wallis and Futuna | 7.6 | 1.7 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 26.8 | 1.7 | 6.6 | 11.2 | 6.8 |
| West Bank and Gaza Strip | 66.9 | 96.9 | 174.3 | 97.3 | 176.2 | 72.6 | 180.4 | 73.4 | 101.7 |
| Yemen | 62.5 | 165.2 | 447.1 | 156.0 | 289.3 | 79.1 | 135.2 | 98.7 | 103.3 |
| Zambia | 228.5 | 238.4 | 306.6 | 460.9 | 246.8 | 157.6 | 142.4 | 140.7 | 252.1 |
| Zimbabwe | 10.8 | 16.3 | 106.1 | 99.1 | 56.3 | 11.9 | 76.7 | 86.9 | 92.3 |
| **Total recipient countries** | **22 959.3** | **28 579.7** | **36 658.4** | **46 603.0** | **48 677.0** | **20 278.3** | **27 265.2** | **32 494.4** | **35 944.9** |
| Non-country specific | 2315.8 | 4574.1 | 7357.5 | 6993.4 | 6701.0 | 3311.6 | 5978.6 | 5835.2 | 5650.5 |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275.1** | **33 153.8** | **44 015.9** | **53 596.5** | **55 378.0** | **23 589.9** | **33 243.8** | **38 329.6** | **41 595.3** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240497

## TABLE A.7 Top 20 recipients of Aid for Trade in 2013

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Region | Income Group | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| India | Asia | LMIC | 1 575 | 2 375 | 2 718 | 3 548 | 5 165 |
| Viet Nam | Asia | LMIC | 1 562 | 1 845 | 2 431 | 2 368 | 3 626 |
| Turkey | Europe | UMIC | 453 | 424 | 1 112 | 3 410 | 3 074 |
| Afghanistan | Asia | LDC | 791 | 1 557 | 1 863 | 1 830 | 2 267 |
| Egypt | Africa | LMIC | 587 | 853 | 1 064 | 2 051 | 1 843 |
| Bangladesh | Asia | LDC | 813 | 840 | 1 272 | 1 062 | 1 690 |
| Tanzania | Africa | LDC | 426 | 801 | 949 | 693 | 1 564 |
| Morocco | Africa | LMIC | 328 | 896 | 991 | 2 375 | 1 298 |
| Myanmar | Oceania | LDC | 11 | 17 | 36 | 69 | 1 212 |
| Ethiopia | Africa | LDC | 544 | 782 | 726 | 2 016 | 1 018 |
| Mozambique | Africa | LDC | 364 | 484 | 470 | 374 | 1 011 |
| Nepal | Asia | LDC | 176 | 218 | 399 | 429 | 981 |
| Serbia | Europe | UMIC | 452 | 302 | 664 | 1 100 | 956 |
| Jordan | Asia | UMIC | 45 | 124 | 217 | 442 | 904 |
| Philippines | Asia | LMIC | 343 | 244 | 599 | 806 | 875 |
| Tunisia | Africa | UMIC | 221 | 293 | 368 | 1 098 | 733 |
| Kenya | Africa | OLIC | 322 | 508 | 1 167 | 2 445 | 715 |
| Pakistan | Asia | LMIC | 619 | 731 | 766 | 1 602 | 697 |
| Indonesia | Asia | LMIC | 1 103 | 847 | 870 | 242 | 682 |
| Nigeria | Africa | LMIC | 251 | 364 | 623 | 1 195 | 679 |
| **Sub-total** | | | **10 987** | **14 506** | **19 303** | **29 157** | **30 990** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | | | **25 275.1** | **33 153.8** | **44 015.9** | **53 596.5** | **55 378.0** |
| *Top 20 share in total AFT* | | | *43.5%* | *43.8%* | *43.9%* | *54.4%* | *56.0%* |

| | DISBURSEMENTS | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Region | Income Group | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012. | 2013 |
| Viet Nam | Asia | LMIC | 1 108.0 | 1 651.9 | 2 521.4 | 2 621.1 |
| Turkey | Europe | UMIC | 396.1 | 1 346.4 | 2 956.3 | 2 444.0 |
| India | Asia | LMIC | 1 269.3 | 1 992.4 | 1 594.9 | 2 112.7 |
| Egypt | Africa | LMIC | 580.4 | 733.0 | 1 521.1 | 1 645.4 |
| Morocco | Africa | LMIC | 448.0 | 797.2 | 1 085.6 | 1 421.6 |
| Afghanistan | Asia | LDC | 1 027.9 | 1 734.8 | 1 489.0 | 1 214.1 |
| Kenya | Africa | OLIC | 299.5 | 433.5 | 784.7 | 1 192.3 |
| Tanzania | Africa | LMIC | 430.2 | 651.0 | 807.1 | 1 113.1 |
| Bangladesh | Asia | LDC | 396.4 | 413.4 | 866.8 | 902.7 |
| Brazil | America | LDC | 78.8 | 276.5 | 926.0 | 902.7 |
| Ethiopia | Africa | LDC | 530.6 | 758.4 | 595.0 | 891.3 |
| Pakistan | Asia | LDC | 366.2 | 437.2 | 609.7 | 772.3 |
| Iraq | Asia | UMIC | 1 894.4 | 427.2 | 388.2 | 757.7 |
| Serbia | Europe | UMIC | 253.7 | 484.9 | 795.0 | 648.2 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | Africa | LDC | 213.8 | 391.9 | 511.7 | 616.8 |
| Mozambique | Africa | LDC | 371.8 | 362.5 | 461.0 | 611.4 |
| Indonesia | Asia | LMIC | 813.3 | 854.1 | 645.2 | 610.1 |
| Tunisia | Africa | UMIC | 210.1 | 402.0 | 594.1 | 607.1 |
| Thailand | Asia | UMIC | 180.9 | 166.0 | 180.8 | 600.0 |
| Uganda | Africa | LDC | 411.1 | 459.0 | 386.8 | 570.8 |
| **Sub-total** | | | **11 281** | **14 773** | **19 721** | **22 255** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | | | **23 589.9** | **33 243.8** | **38 329.6** | **41 595.3** |
| *Top 20 share in total AFT* | | | *47.8%* | *44.4%* | *51.5%* | *53.5%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240500

## TABLE A.8 Aid for Trade regional and global programmes

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Africa | 620 | 1 274 | 2 050 | 2 243 | 2 137 | 742 | 1 849 | 1 664 | 1 547 |
| America | 202 | 420 | 517 | 584 | 616 | 290 | 463 | 502 | 683 |
| Asia | 193 | 380 | 474 | 391 | 628 | 349 | 376 | 409 | 583 |
| Europe | 54 | 243 | 157 | 155 | 40 | 197 | 208 | 126 | 66 |
| Oceania | 32 | 65 | 86 | 35 | 86 | 53 | 49 | 44 | 50 |
| Global | 1 215 | 2 192 | 4 074 | 3 587 | 3 193 | 1 680 | 3 033 | 3 090 | 2 722 |
| **TOTAL** | **2 316** | **4 574** | **7 358** | **6 993** | **6 701** | **3 312** | **5 979** | **5 835** | **5 650** |
| ***Share in total*** | | | | | | | | | |
| *Africa* | *26.8%* | *27.9%* | *27.9%* | *32.1%* | *31.9%* | *22.4%* | *30.9%* | *28.5%* | *27.4%* |
| *America* | *8.7%* | *9.2%* | *7.0%* | *8.4%* | *9.2%* | *8.8%* | *7.7%* | *8.6%* | *12.1%* |
| *Asia* | *8.3%* | *8.3%* | *6.4%* | *5.6%* | *9.4%* | *10.5%* | *6.3%* | *7.0%* | *10.3%* |
| *Europe* | *2.3%* | *5.3%* | *2.1%* | *2.2%* | *0.6%* | *6.0%* | *3.5%* | *2.2%* | *1.2%* |
| *Oceania* | *1.4%* | *1.4%* | *1.2%* | *0.5%* | *1.3%* | *1.6%* | *0.8%* | *0.8%* | *0.9%* |
| *Non-region specific* | *52.5%* | *47.9%* | *55.4%* | *51.3%* | *47.7%* | *50.7%* | *50.7%* | *53.0%* | *48.2%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240510

## TABLE A.9 Aid for Trade regional and global programmes by category

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Trade Policy & Regulations | 274 | 528 | 823 | 488 | 840 | 369 | 603 | 592 | 639 |
| Economic Infrastructure | 509 | 996 | 1 830 | 2 037 | 1 485 | 519 | 1 380 | 1 410 | 1 329 |
| Building Productive Capacity | 1 533 | 3 050 | 4 701 | 4 468 | 4 376 | 2 424 | 3 995 | 3 833 | 3 682 |
| Trade-related Adjustment | .. | 0 | 4 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 |
| **TOTAL** | **2 316** | **4 574** | **7 358** | **6 993** | **6 701** | **3 312** | **5 979** | **5 835** | **5 650** |
| ***Share in total*** | | | | | | | | | |
| *Trade Policy & Regulations* | *11.8%* | *11.5%* | *11.2%* | *7.0%* | *12.5%* | *11.1%* | *10.1%* | *10.2%* | *11.3%* |
| *Economic Infrastructure* | *22.0%* | *21.8%* | *24.9%* | *29.1%* | *22.2%* | *15.7%* | *23.1%* | *24.2%* | *23.5%* |
| *Building Productive Capacity* | *66.2%* | *66.7%* | *63.9%* | *63.9%* | *65.3%* | *73.2%* | *66.8%* | *65.7%* | *65.2%* |
| *Trade-related Adjustment* | .. | *0.0%* | *0.1%* | .. | *0.0%* | *0.0%* | *0.0%* | .. | *0.0%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240520

## TABLE A.10 Aid for Trade grants and loans by category

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **Trade Policy & Regulations** | | | | | | | | | |
| Grants | 713.4 | 1 070.7 | 1 340.0 | 1 034.3 | 1 492.6 | 720.8 | 975.8 | 975.9 | 1 206.2 |
| Loans | 84.7 | 44.9 | 71.3 | 300.5 | 148.6 | 35.4 | 70.1 | 118.9 | 142.2 |
| **Sub-total** | **798.0** | **1 115.7** | **1 411.3** | **1 334.8** | **1 641.2** | **756.3** | **1 045.9** | **1 094.8** | **1 348.4** |
| **Economic Infrastructure** | | | | | | | | | |
| Grants | **5 241.3** | **7 644.0** | **8 116.8** | **7 068.4** | **9 617.4** | **5 453.1** | **6 431.6** | **6 829.7** | **6 704.6** |
| Loans | **7 961.2** | **10 065.5** | **15 967.1** | **23 381.9** | **23 816.2** | **6 316.6** | **10 485.6** | **14 160.4** | **16 003.2** |
| **Sub-total** | **13 202.6** | **17 709.5** | **24 083.9** | **30 450.3** | **33 433.6** | **11 769.7** | **16 917.2** | **20 990.1** | **22 707.8** |
| **Building Productive Capacity** | | | | | | | | | |
| Grants | **6 638.3** | **8 548.6** | **11 538.0** | **10 999.6** | **11 058.2** | **7 190.9** | **9 584.6** | **8 903.3** | **10 196.6** |
| Loans | **4 636.2** | **5 777.8** | **6 946.9** | **10 811.5** | **9 241.1** | **3 864.1** | **5 654.9** | **7 335.5** | **7 328.0** |
| **Sub-total** | **11 274.5** | **14 326.4** | **18 484.9** | **21 811.0** | **20 299.3** | **11 055.1** | **15 239.5** | **16 238.7** | **17 524.6** |
| **Trade-related Adjustment** | | | | | | | | | |
| Grants | **..** | **2.3** | **32.3** | **0.4** | **3.9** | **8.9** | **40.8** | **6.0** | **14.6** |
| Loans | **..** | **0.0** | **3.6** | **..** | **..** | **0.0** | **0.4** | **0.0** | **0.0** |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **2.3** | **35.9** | **0.4** | **3.9** | **8.9** | **41.2** | **6.0** | **14.6** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275.1** | **33 153.8** | **44 015.9** | **53 596.5** | **55 378.0** | **23 589.9** | **33 243.8** | **38 329.6** | **41 595.3** |
| ***Share in total*** | | | | | | | | | |
| *Total grants* | *49.8%* | *52.1%* | *47.8%* | *35.6%* | *40.0%* | *56.7%* | *51.2%* | *43.6%* | *43.6%* |
| *Total loans* | *50.2%* | *47.9%* | *52.2%* | *64.4%* | *60.0%* | *43.3%* | *48.8%* | *56.4%* | *56.4%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

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## TABLE A.11 Aid for Trade channels of delivery

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Public sector institution | 1 499.4 | 19 621.3 | 25 361.8 | 42 293.2 | 35 416.3 | 8 631.3 | 17 930.5 | 27 448.1 | 25 155.0 |
| NGOs and civil society | 109.8 | 990.8 | 1 519.9 | 1 796.6 | 2 130.7 | 913.8 | 1 892.9 | 1 974.6 | 1 973.5 |
| Public-private partnerships and networks | 1.0 | 25.7 | 311.7 | 82.1 | 222.2 | 12.3 | 353.4 | 92.5 | 223.5 |
| Multilateral organisations | 223.2 | 1 545.6 | 4 132.0 | 4 409.1 | 10 941.9 | 1 251.3 | 3 559.8 | 3 833.4 | 8 615.8 |
| Other | 1 789.9 | 2 257.4 | 3 436.7 | 2 103.3 | 4 217.6 | 2 802.7 | 4 022.4 | 3 729.0 | 4 470.2 |
| Channels not reported | 21 651.7 | 8 713.0 | 9 253.8 | 2 912.2 | 2 449.3 | 9 978.6 | 5 484.8 | 1 252.0 | 1 157.2 |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275.1** | **33 153.8** | **44 015.9** | **53 596.5** | **55 378.0** | **23 589.9** | **33 243.8** | **38 329.6** | **41 595.3** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240545

## TABLE A.12 Aid for Trade shares in sector allocable and total ODA

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Total Aid for Trade | 25 275 | 33 154 | 44 016 | 53 596 | 55 378 | 23 590 | 33 244 | 38 330 | 41 595 |
| Sector allocable ODA | 77674 | 105272 | 129509 | 135408 | 144062 | 82 232 | 107 442 | 111 354 | 119 468 |
| ***Aid for Trade share in sector allocable ODA*** | ***32.5%*** | ***31.5%*** | ***34.0%*** | ***39.6%*** | ***38.4%*** | ***28.7%*** | ***30.9%*** | ***34.4%*** | ***34.8%*** |
| Total ODA | 142 818 | 151 235 | 168 603 | 172 940 | 188 782 | 145 407 | 150 043 | 152 075 | 167 373 |
| ***Aid for Trade share in total ODA*** | ***17.7%*** | ***21.9%*** | ***26.1%*** | ***31.0%*** | ***29.3%*** | ***16.2%*** | ***22.2%*** | ***25.2%*** | ***24.9%*** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240550

## TABLE A.13 Aid for Trade by donor and category, Commitments *(page 1 of 2)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | TOTAL AID FOR TRADE | | | | | TRADE POLICY AND REGULATIONS | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 248.6 | 375.0 | 587.1 | 534.6 | 452.1 | 11.6 | 7.3 | 34.4 | 21.6 | 24.3 |
| Austria | 50.1 | 58.6 | 83.1 | 75.6 | 142.6 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Belgium | 262.5 | 288.7 | 491.5 | 144.9 | 200.8 | 4.5 | 5.5 | 11.8 | 5.2 | 9.0 |
| Canada | 397.6 | 435.8 | 584.7 | 582.2 | 759.6 | 22.5 | 24.2 | 36.7 | 11.2 | 26.5 |
| Czech Republic | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 9.8 | 8.9 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Denmark | 473.4 | 308.1 | 346.5 | 402.6 | 422.9 | 0.5 | 3.3 | 13.1 | 1.3 | 3.8 |
| Finland | 87.8 | 141.7 | 325.7 | 134.2 | 144.5 | 2.7 | 7.0 | 12.9 | 3.6 | 18.8 |
| France | 775.4 | 1 642.9 | 1 573.0 | 3 647.0 | 2 377.8 | 4.7 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 7.4 | .. |
| Germany | 1 347.1 | 2 280.2 | 3 664.1 | 3 511.5 | 5 017.0 | 15.7 | 37.8 | 37.3 | 17.5 | 54.5 |
| Greece | 13.7 | 20.1 | 18.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| Iceland | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 8.7 | 10.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 30.2 | 47.9 | 65.1 | 54.3 | 54.0 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Italy | 287.7 | 262.0 | 188.8 | 198.6 | 94.0 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 4 889.8 | 6 199.9 | 6 675.9 | 7 041.9 | 10 340.0 | 52.1 | 55.4 | 54.6 | 124.6 | 99.3 |
| Korea | 0.0 | 471.4 | 903.9 | 806.4 | 704.0 | .. | 6.9 | 4.2 | 5.7 | 8.6 |
| Luxembourg | 18.9 | 35.4 | 37.9 | 43.0 | 43.6 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1.4 | .. | .. |
| Netherlands | 607.3 | 787.5 | 799.1 | 1 153.7 | 764.1 | 19.6 | 69.7 | 157.6 | 35.4 | 175.1 |
| New Zealand | 23.9 | 48.3 | 103.8 | 86.1 | 109.5 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 5.4 | 7.3 | 0.2 |
| Norway | 361.7 | 596.2 | 1 023.7 | 1 007.4 | 1 253.0 | 12.4 | 34.7 | 15.7 | 18.7 | 23.7 |
| Poland | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Portugal | 48.1 | 31.2 | 56.6 | 22.9 | 22.9 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Slovenia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 1.0 | .. | .. | 0.4 | 0.0 | .. |
| Spain | 418.4 | 764.9 | 950.0 | 89.4 | 95.6 | 1.5 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 0.4 | 1.0 |
| Sweden | 274.3 | 397.3 | 401.4 | 393.5 | 507.7 | 19.8 | 38.8 | 60.9 | 43.5 | 44.7 |
| Switzerland | 320.9 | 288.2 | 298.9 | 288.4 | 505.9 | 40.2 | 18.5 | 36.4 | 52.4 | 46.3 |
| United Kingdom | 757.4 | 941.3 | 1 275.9 | 939.3 | 967.8 | 27.9 | 64.6 | 142.5 | 53.7 | 85.1 |
| United States | 4 039.6 | 5 736.0 | 4 887.3 | 4 018.5 | 3 836.5 | 255.3 | 254.0 | 158.2 | 196.4 | 338.3 |
| **Sub-total** | **15 734.1** | **22 158.5** | **25 351.6** | **25 196.1** | **28 841.0** | **495.8** | **643.1** | **790.1** | **607.4** | **960.4** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 342.4 | 511.2 | 831.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 47.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 43.5 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 282.8 | 236.8 | 1 821.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **..** | **672.2** | **748.0** | **2 656.3** | **..** | **..** | **43.5** | **..** | **0.1** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 161.8 | 775.5 | 1 636.1 | 2 311.9 | 1 385.9 | 24.9 | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 0.0 | 425.3 | 1 127.2 | 977.5 | 986.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | 819.0 | 571.8 | 1 307.8 | 1 404.4 | 2 259.0 | 9.2 | 1.9 | 8.7 | 25.1 | 17.6 |
| BADEA | 0.0 | 0.0 | 27.1 | 112.0 | 113.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 2 882.7 | 3 515.0 | 4 946.0 | 11 801.6 | 10 141.7 | 205.1 | 372.0 | 357.8 | 222.2 | 445.5 |
| FAO | 0.0 | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 | .. | 20.9 | 44.0 | 38.6 | 37.0 |
| GEF | 0.0 | 0.0 | 131.0 | 306.7 | 318.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IADB | 265.2 | 121.8 | 473.9 | 574.3 | 600.0 | .. | 0.7 | 7.8 | 18.8 | 2.5 |
| IFAD | 293.6 | 412.3 | 634.0 | 607.5 | 514.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | 0.0 | 11.3 | 14.8 | 15.9 | 15.3 | .. | 11.3 | 14.8 | 15.9 | 15.3 |
| Islamic Development Bank | 208.9 | 276.7 | 206.3 | 215.7 | 157.4 | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. |
| ITC | 0.0 | 33.0 | 59.1 | 69.3 | 71.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | 0.0 | 0.0 | 378.7 | 533.3 | 477.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNDP | 13.1 | 26.4 | 36.6 | 33.0 | 34.1 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 1.4 | 1.0 |
| UNECE | 0.0 | 1.4 | 4.6 | 2.9 | 4.5 | .. | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| UNESCAP | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.8 | .. | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
| UNESCWA | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.9 | .. | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.5 |
| UNIDO | 0.0 | 29.6 | 67.4 | 42.2 | 0.0 | .. | 4.2 | 8.1 | 14.4 | .. |
| World Bank | 4 895.6 | 4 631.2 | 6 599.9 | 8 291.3 | 6 439.3 | 61.4 | 42.4 | 115.1 | 377.1 | 146.7 |
| WTO | 0.0 | 14.5 | 17.1 | 13.3 | 13.2 | .. | 14.5 | 17.1 | 13.3 | 13.2 |
| Other multilateral donors | 1.1 | 4.5 | 25.1 | 27.9 | 42.2 | .. | 0.9 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **9 541.0** | **10 995.3** | **17 992.2** | **27 652.4** | **23 880.7** | **302.3** | **472.6** | **577.7** | **727.4** | **680.7** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **25 275.1** | **33 153.8** | **44 015.9** | **53 596.5** | **55 378.0** | **798.0** | **1 115.7** | **1 411.3** | **1 334.8** | **1 641.2** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.13 Aid for Trade by donor and category, Commitments *(page 2 of 2)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE | | | | | BUILDING PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY | | | | | TRADE-RELATED ADJUSTMENT | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 84.1 | 174.1 | 285.3 | 206.7 | 177.0 | 152.9 | 193.3 | 267.0 | 306.3 | 250.8 | 0.3 | 0.4 | .. | .. |
| Austria | 26.0 | 20.5 | 28.5 | 32.8 | 43.4 | 24.0 | 36.6 | 54.5 | 42.8 | 99.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Belgium | 60.4 | 83.9 | 100.6 | 29.6 | 35.2 | 197.6 | 199.2 | 379.1 | 110.1 | 156.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Canada | 52.9 | 89.2 | 25.3 | 177.0 | 136.2 | 322.2 | 322.3 | 522.6 | 394.0 | 596.9 | 0.1 | 0.1 | .. | .. |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | 1.6 | 3.5 | 3.1 | .. | .. | 2.3 | 6.2 | 5.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Denmark | 229.0 | 124.8 | 78.6 | 163.2 | 67.3 | 244.0 | 180.1 | 254.9 | 238.1 | 351.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Finland | 32.8 | 21.9 | 99.5 | 51.1 | 43.6 | 52.3 | 112.8 | 209.7 | 79.5 | 82.1 | .. | 3.6 | .. | .. |
| France | 392.9 | 921.8 | 855.7 | 3 036.0 | 1 923.2 | 377.8 | 718.1 | 715.6 | 603.6 | 454.6 | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. |
| Germany | 614.7 | 998.0 | 1 915.3 | 1 529.8 | 2 440.0 | 716.7 | 1 244.4 | 1 711.5 | 1 964.1 | 2 522.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Greece | 7.8 | 8.3 | 15.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 5.5 | 11.2 | 2.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | .. | 0.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | .. | .. | 1.7 | 5.1 | 6.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 7.7 | 2.9 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 22.4 | 43.9 | 63.3 | 53.0 | 52.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Italy | 167.6 | 130.8 | 55.6 | 29.5 | 17.5 | 118.0 | 130.8 | 133.1 | 169.0 | 76.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Japan | 3 849.2 | 4 376.5 | 5 623.0 | 5 644.4 | 8 882.8 | 988.4 | 1 768.0 | 998.2 | 1 272.8 | 1 357.6 | .. | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Korea | .. | 388.0 | 786.4 | 502.9 | 558.5 | .. | 76.5 | 113.3 | 297.8 | 136.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Luxembourg | 1.3 | 6.3 | 2.7 | 6.9 | 5.5 | 17.5 | 28.7 | 33.8 | 36.1 | 38.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Netherlands | 154.5 | 193.8 | 178.8 | 120.7 | 84.7 | 433.2 | 523.9 | 462.7 | 997.6 | 504.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| New Zealand | 4.7 | 17.0 | 49.3 | 40.2 | 47.6 | 17.3 | 27.9 | 49.1 | 38.7 | 61.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Norway | 129.6 | 209.3 | 273.2 | 269.4 | 328.2 | 219.6 | 352.1 | 734.8 | 719.4 | 901.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Portugal | 39.8 | 27.4 | 52.6 | 20.5 | 21.0 | 8.1 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 1.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.6 | .. | .. | 1.4 | 0.8 | 0.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Spain | 254.7 | 470.9 | 297.8 | 4.5 | 15.2 | 162.2 | 289.1 | 648.3 | 84.4 | 79.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Sweden | 124.7 | 109.1 | 79.5 | 49.2 | 72.4 | 129.8 | 249.3 | 260.1 | 300.8 | 387.3 | .. | 0.9 | 0.1 | 3.3 |
| Switzerland | 43.3 | 50.9 | 47.2 | 30.1 | 104.3 | 237.4 | 218.8 | 213.4 | 205.9 | 355.2 | .. | 1.8 | .. | .. |
| United Kingdom | 310.7 | 177.1 | 413.3 | 423.9 | 483.9 | 418.8 | 699.6 | 720.1 | 461.6 | 398.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| United States | 1 866.4 | 3 047.4 | 2 091.2 | 1 517.1 | 1 608.8 | 1 918.0 | 2 434.6 | 2 637.9 | 2 304.9 | 1 889.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **8 454.7** | **11 650.0** | **13 359.6** | **13 893.4** | **17 105.7** | **6 783.6** | **9 865.1** | **11 195.0** | **10 695.1** | **10 771.4** | **0.4** | **6.9** | **0.2** | **3.6** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 325.3 | 496.8 | 712.1 | .. | .. | 17.0 | 14.4 | 119.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 264.7 | 146.3 | 1 268.7 | .. | .. | 18.1 | 90.5 | 553.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **..** | **590.5** | **643.1** | **1 982.1** | **..** | **..** | **38.1** | **104.9** | **674.0** | **..** | **..** | **..** | **..** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 66.6 | 591.6 | 1 318.1 | 2 172.9 | 1 077.3 | 70.3 | 183.8 | 318.0 | 139.0 | 308.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 316.2 | 993.9 | 977.3 | 868.6 | .. | 109.1 | 133.3 | 0.2 | 117.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | 392.8 | 319.5 | 1 010.3 | 715.7 | 1 745.3 | 417.0 | 250.4 | 288.8 | 663.5 | 496.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | .. | 21.6 | 91.1 | 81.1 | .. | .. | 5.5 | 20.9 | 31.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 1 512.2 | 1 944.3 | 2 207.3 | 5 770.4 | 6 103.8 | 1 165.4 | 1 196.8 | 2 354.0 | 5 808.8 | 3 592.3 | 1.9 | 26.9 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 123.6 | 254.7 | 272.3 | 268.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | .. | .. | 67.1 | 140.1 | 184.2 | .. | .. | 63.9 | 166.6 | 134.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IADB | 133.6 | 96.5 | 328.1 | 368.6 | 456.4 | 131.6 | 24.6 | 138.0 | 186.8 | 141.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | 13.8 | 22.9 | 47.9 | 30.9 | 32.8 | 279.8 | 389.4 | 586.1 | 576.6 | 481.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Devopment Bank | 126.7 | 153.7 | 90.0 | 77.9 | 102.7 | 82.2 | 123.0 | 115.9 | 137.7 | 54.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 33.0 | 59.1 | 69.3 | 71.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | .. | 277.2 | 448.6 | 453.1 | .. | .. | 101.4 | 84.7 | 24.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNDP | 2.4 | 5.8 | 9.7 | 8.3 | 7.5 | 9.0 | 17.3 | 23.7 | 23.3 | 25.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNECE | .. | 1.0 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | .. | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.7 | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 |
| UNESCAP | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | .. | 1.4 | 9.0 | 0.8 | .. | .. | 24.0 | 50.2 | 27.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| World Bank | 2 498.6 | 2 603.5 | 3 728.9 | 5 081.1 | 3 205.5 | 2 335.5 | 1 985.3 | 2 753.9 | 2 833.1 | 3 087.2 | .. | 2.1 | .. | .. |
| WTO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Other multilateral donors | 1.1 | 3.1 | 20.9 | 27.9 | 25.2 | .. | 0.6 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 16.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **4 747.9** | **6 059.5** | **10 133.7** | **15 913.8** | **14 345.8** | **4 490.9** | **4 461.3** | **7 251.8** | **11 011.1** | **8 853.9** | **1.9** | **29.0** | **0.1** | **0.3** |
| **TOTAL** | **13 202.6** | **17 709.5** | **24 083.9** | **30 450.3** | **33 433.6** | **11 274.5** | **14 326.4** | **18 484.9** | **21 811.0** | **20 299.3** | **2.3** | **35.9** | **0.4** | **3.9** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240565

## TABLE A.14 Aid for Trade by donor and category, Disbursements *(page 1 of 2)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | TOTAL AID FOR TRADE | | | | TRADE POLICY AND REGULATIONS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 305.8 | 472.6 | 534.6 | 452.1 | 6.8 | 14.4 | 21.6 | 24.3 |
| Austria | 43.6 | 67.3 | 52.5 | 81.5 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Belgium | 199.4 | 435.9 | 211.1 | 224.0 | 4.2 | 10.3 | 7.9 | 8.4 |
| Canada | 330.4 | 602.8 | 616.2 | 579.8 | 18.0 | 36.8 | 45.2 | 7.7 |
| Czech Republic | .. | 3.8 | 10.2 | 8.9 | .. | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Denmark | 297.7 | 377.7 | 430.8 | 375.9 | 0.8 | 3.8 | 13.4 | 22.9 |
| Finland | 68.8 | 152.2 | 163.9 | 152.7 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 6.2 |
| France | 986.9 | 1 285.6 | 2 034.0 | 1 860.8 | 2.5 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 2.1 |
| Germany | 1 850.4 | 2 830.0 | 2 605.1 | 3 437.8 | 27.1 | 30.8 | 34.4 | 31.9 |
| Greece | 20.1 | 18.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | 2.6 | 8.7 | 10.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 47.9 | 65.1 | 54.3 | 54.0 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Italy | 276.1 | 163.6 | 94.3 | 116.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Japan | 4 425.9 | 5 233.2 | 5 890.1 | 6 850.4 | 52.4 | 54.1 | 96.8 | 104.0 |
| Korea | 192.9 | 358.5 | 443.7 | 542.3 | 9.4 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 8.1 |
| Luxembourg | 35.4 | 37.9 | 43.0 | 43.6 | 0.4 | 1.4 | .. | .. |
| Netherlands | 546.8 | 542.9 | 716.2 | 737.3 | 49.8 | 63.0 | 84.7 | 115.9 |
| New Zealand | 32.8 | 56.9 | 95.9 | 91.8 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 4.5 | 3.1 |
| Norway | 539.6 | 715.9 | 1 044.1 | 1 458.9 | 22.3 | 22.7 | 18.2 | 14.6 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | 3.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Portugal | 39.5 | 58.2 | 57.4 | 32.5 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Slovenia | .. | 2.3 | 1.0 | 1.1 | .. | 0.4 | 0.0 | .. |
| Spain | 535.3 | 939.7 | 142.7 | 148.1 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Sweden | 399.4 | 420.8 | 497.5 | 503.3 | 31.2 | 51.1 | 54.5 | 53.7 |
| Switzerland | 266.3 | 235.9 | 271.7 | 293.6 | 26.1 | 23.4 | 52.1 | 36.6 |
| United Kingdom | 965.6 | 1 352.7 | 1 388.2 | 1 430.5 | 49.9 | 126.0 | 95.8 | 119.8 |
| United States | 4 149.4 | 4 086.0 | 3 544.9 | 3 402.6 | 143.0 | 175.0 | 186.1 | 323.6 |
| **Sub-total** | **16 555.9** | **20 518.8** | **20 951.9** | **22 895.3** | **460.9** | **639.9** | **732.7** | **884.5** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | 276.7 | 337.1 | 265.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | 47.0 | .. | .. | .. | 43.5 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 141.2 | 214.0 | 1 219.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **464.9** | **551.2** | **1 485.5** | **..** | **43.5** | **..** | **0.0** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 416.4 | 1 315.5 | 1 036.5 | 1 215.0 | 0.4 | 0.7 | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 260.6 | 785.0 | 745.6 | 749.3 | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. |
| AsDB | .. | 530.9 | 1 011.9 | 1 318.0 | .. | 3.5 | 12.1 | 1.2 |
| BADEA | .. | 16.3 | 65.7 | 74.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | 102.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | 13.7 | 3.2 | 3.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 2 539.1 | 4 390.9 | 8 534.8 | 7 096.3 | 222.6 | 227.0 | 180.2 | 215.2 |
| FAO | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 | 20.9 | 44.0 | 38.6 | 37.0 |
| GEF | 13.6 | 22.0 | 19.4 | 21.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IADB | .. | 388.0 | 520.1 | 550.3 | .. | 5.7 | 7.5 | 11.0 |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | 32.5 | 56.6 | 59.5 | 64.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | 183.6 | 167.8 | 245.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNDP | 25.7 | 36.5 | 33.0 | 34.1 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 1.4 | 1.0 |
| UNECE | 1.4 | 4.6 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| UNESCAP | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| UNESCWA | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| UNIDO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| World Bank | 3 583.0 | 4 192.6 | 4 273.8 | 5 380.3 | 32.4 | 60.2 | 108.4 | 183.8 |
| WTO | 14.5 | 17.1 | 13.3 | 13.2 | 14.5 | 17.1 | 13.3 | 13.2 |
| Other multilateral donors | 2.4 | 7.3 | 27.3 | 35.7 | 0.9 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **7 034.0** | **12 260.1** | **16 826.5** | **17 214.5** | **295.4** | **362.5** | **362.1** | **463.9** |
| **TOTAL** | **23 589.9** | **33 243.8** | **38 329.6** | **41 595.3** | **756.3** | **1 045.9** | **1 094.8** | **1 348.4** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.14 Aid for Trade by donor and category, Disbursements *(page 2 of 2)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE | | | | BUILDING PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY | | | | TRADE-RELATED ADJUSTMENT | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 126.6 | 211.6 | 206.7 | 177.0 | 172.1 | 246.1 | 306.3 | 250.8 | 0.3 | 0.5 | .. | .. |
| Austria | 10.3 | 16.3 | 16.0 | 18.4 | 31.9 | 50.9 | 36.5 | 63.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Belgium | 36.5 | 93.5 | 49.0 | 67.3 | 158.6 | 332.1 | 154.2 | 148.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Canada | 56.9 | 58.6 | 188.3 | 112.4 | 255.6 | 507.4 | 382.6 | 459.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Czech Republic | .. | 1.6 | 3.8 | 3.1 | .. | 2.3 | 6.2 | 5.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Denmark | 147.0 | 143.7 | 137.5 | 127.7 | 149.9 | 230.2 | 279.9 | 225.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Finland | 14.5 | 37.1 | 51.2 | 35.4 | 48.4 | 107.0 | 108.1 | 111.1 | .. | 0.4 | .. | .. |
| France | 394.1 | 670.7 | 1 374.1 | 1 401.7 | 590.3 | 610.5 | 656.8 | 457.1 | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. |
| Germany | 685.4 | 1 360.6 | 1 061.4 | 1 624.0 | 1 137.9 | 1 438.7 | 1 508.9 | 1 781.5 | .. | .. | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Greece | 8.3 | 15.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 11.2 | 2.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | 0.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | .. | 1.7 | 5.1 | 6.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 2.9 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 43.9 | 63.3 | 53.0 | 52.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Italy | 165.7 | 76.2 | 32.8 | 49.8 | 110.1 | 87.1 | 61.3 | 66.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Japan | 3 145.2 | 3 922.2 | 4 745.5 | 5 352.1 | 1 228.3 | 1 256.8 | 1 047.7 | 1 394.0 | .. | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Korea | 131.8 | 280.1 | 341.0 | 410.2 | 51.6 | 71.7 | 94.4 | 123.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Luxembourg | 6.3 | 2.7 | 6.9 | 5.5 | 28.7 | 33.8 | 36.1 | 38.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Netherlands | 130.7 | 147.6 | 140.2 | 125.0 | 366.2 | 332.4 | 491.4 | 496.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| New Zealand | 8.9 | 24.4 | 50.9 | 44.9 | 21.2 | 29.1 | 40.5 | 43.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Norway | 272.3 | 200.2 | 373.3 | 238.2 | 245.0 | 493.0 | 652.6 | 1 206.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | 2.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Portugal | 35.7 | 54.2 | 54.9 | 30.6 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 1.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovenia | .. | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | .. | 1.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Spain | 289.1 | 395.8 | 5.5 | 49.4 | 241.4 | 540.5 | 137.2 | 98.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Sweden | 107.4 | 102.9 | 118.7 | 130.9 | 260.8 | 266.8 | 324.0 | 318.3 | .. | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| Switzerland | 43.8 | 31.0 | 51.5 | 54.1 | 196.4 | 180.5 | 168.1 | 202.9 | .. | 0.9 | .. | .. |
| United Kingdom | 149.8 | 425.6 | 631.8 | 612.4 | 765.8 | 801.1 | 660.6 | 698.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| United States | 2 027.1 | 1 878.9 | 1 174.1 | 1 280.0 | 1 979.3 | 2 032.0 | 2 184.6 | 1 799.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **7 996.4** | **10 154.0** | **10 819.5** | **11 956.1** | **8 098.4** | **9 722.9** | **9 398.9** | **10 053.4** | **0.3** | **2.0** | **0.8** | **1.3** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | 250.8 | 291.5 | 208.6 | .. | 25.9 | 45.6 | 56.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | 3.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 123.8 | 203.4 | 233.3 | .. | 17.4 | 10.6 | 985.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **375.1** | **494.9** | **442.4** | **..** | **46.3** | **56.2** | **1 043.1** | **..** | **..** | **..** | **..** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 194.1 | 605.3 | 802.6 | 981.5 | 221.9 | 709.6 | 233.8 | 233.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 230.7 | 669.6 | 609.3 | 671.5 | 29.9 | 115.1 | 136.3 | 77.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | .. | 366.2 | 720.5 | 910.0 | .. | 161.1 | 279.2 | 406.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | 10.5 | 52.0 | 65.3 | .. | 5.8 | 13.7 | 9.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | 100.8 | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | 13.7 | 3.2 | 3.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 1 417.3 | 2 161.8 | 4 389.9 | 3 866.7 | 890.6 | 1 963.4 | 3 961.8 | 3 002.4 | 8.6 | 38.7 | 2.8 | 12.0 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | 123.6 | 254.7 | 272.3 | 268.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | 6.7 | 6.0 | 4.7 | 9.9 | 6.9 | 16.0 | 14.7 | 11.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IADB | .. | 231.2 | 306.3 | 377.2 | .. | 151.1 | 206.3 | 162.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32.5 | 56.6 | 59.5 | 64.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | 134.3 | 124.2 | 199.9 | .. | 49.3 | 43.5 | 45.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNDP | 5.6 | 9.7 | 8.3 | 7.5 | 16.7 | 23.6 | 23.3 | 25.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNECE | 1.0 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.7 | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 |
| UNESCAP | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| World Bank | 1 916.6 | 2 169.8 | 2 631.8 | 3 090.5 | 1 634.1 | 1 962.0 | 1 531.1 | 2 105.0 | .. | 0.5 | 2.4 | 1.1 |
| WTO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Other multilateral donors | 1.3 | 6.3 | 20.3 | 23.0 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 7.1 | 12.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **3 773.3** | **6 388.1** | **9 675.6** | **10 309.3** | **2 956.7** | **5 470.3** | **6 783.6** | **6 428.0** | **8.6** | **39.2** | **5.2** | **13.3** |
| **TOTAL** | **11 769.7** | **16 917.2** | **20 990.1** | **22 707.8** | **11 055.1** | **15 239.5** | **16 238.7** | **17 524.6** | **8.9** | **41.2** | **6.0** | **14.6** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240574

## TABLE A.15 Aid for Trade by donor and region, Commitments *(page 1 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | AFRICA | | | | | AMERICA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 12.3 | 0.8 | 27.1 | 60.1 | 39.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 3.8 | 8.5 | 4.8 |
| Austria | 10.0 | 16.2 | 20.2 | 32.7 | 51.8 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 7.4 | 2.9 | 6.3 |
| Belgium | 127.3 | 185.1 | 254.7 | 81.7 | 154.7 | 50.4 | 37.9 | 51.0 | 15.6 | 13.9 |
| Canada | 166.0 | 139.3 | 295.2 | 236.6 | 391.7 | 76.1 | 108.9 | 130.3 | 255.3 | 126.6 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.0 | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Denmark | 268.7 | 189.2 | 248.9 | 183.1 | 276.7 | 43.9 | 6.2 | 18.2 | 4.7 | 1.5 |
| Finland | 23.4 | 53.1 | 172.1 | 18.7 | 86.1 | 12.4 | 10.2 | 31.9 | 31.8 | 4.2 |
| France | 451.6 | 936.9 | 866.1 | 1 958.8 | 1 326.2 | 33.2 | 63.4 | 203.8 | 1 034.1 | 38.9 |
| Germany | 415.2 | 465.9 | 819.1 | 1 008.6 | 1 286.0 | 95.1 | 284.6 | 394.8 | 311.6 | 1 055.5 |
| Greece | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.9 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | .. | 1.2 | 3.3 | 5.3 | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.2 |
| Ireland | 24.5 | 32.9 | 48.4 | 38.2 | 42.3 | 0.7 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 1.7 |
| Italy | 156.1 | 108.6 | 26.0 | 166.3 | 31.6 | 43.0 | 13.7 | 22.7 | 7.9 | 5.1 |
| Japan | 348.1 | 965.5 | 1 039.8 | 1 288.9 | 1 000.0 | 109.1 | 231.7 | 184.8 | 397.5 | 127.4 |
| Korea | .. | 71.5 | 222.8 | 65.2 | 232.5 | .. | 14.9 | 85.5 | 83.7 | 75.7 |
| Luxembourg | 8.6 | 19.1 | 13.4 | 18.5 | 18.9 | 2.0 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 3.5 |
| Netherlands | 92.3 | 120.1 | 121.6 | 308.6 | 328.4 | 45.4 | 43.9 | 28.1 | 13.9 | 1.0 |
| New Zealand | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 4.7 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 3.7 |
| Norway | 164.7 | 270.0 | 380.9 | 444.9 | 615.2 | 26.2 | 25.1 | 217.0 | 212.6 | 240.5 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Portugal | 26.6 | 28.6 | 54.7 | 20.9 | 21.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Spain | 123.6 | 346.1 | 412.1 | 21.6 | 28.9 | 104.8 | 132.6 | 227.9 | 54.3 | 64.1 |
| Sweden | 103.0 | 171.1 | 155.3 | 120.3 | 86.5 | 16.2 | 10.2 | 17.3 | 7.7 | 44.1 |
| Switzerland | 76.1 | 70.8 | 54.4 | 93.6 | 188.4 | 49.5 | 42.0 | 43.2 | 32.6 | 33.4 |
| United Kingdom | 242.5 | 299.8 | 575.8 | 317.8 | 404.1 | 71.9 | 20.5 | 66.8 | 122.6 | 99.4 |
| United States | 562.9 | 1 449.1 | 1 361.4 | 954.0 | 1 130.0 | 285.4 | 515.6 | 563.0 | 290.4 | 328.2 |
| **Sub-total** | **3 404.8** | **5 941.0** | **7 173.9** | **7 444.5** | **7 752.7** | **1 071.4** | **1 576.1** | **2 307.3** | **2 898.2** | **2 280.2** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 223.4 | 301.4 | 637.1 | .. | .. | 3.3 | 0.9 | 1.1 |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 0.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 85.5 | 154.5 | 1 054.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **..** | **..** | **..** | **..** | | | | | |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 161.8 | 775.5 | 1 636.1 | 2 311.9 | 1 385.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 303.3 | 757.1 | 805.2 | 769.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | .. | 27.1 | 112.0 | 113.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 1 744.2 | 1 974.7 | 1 761.0 | 4 576.4 | 3 335.1 | 282.9 | 302.5 | 476.3 | 825.9 | 682.1 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | .. | .. | 33.1 | 67.6 | 104.8 | .. | .. | 20.0 | 47.5 | 68.4 |
| IADB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 265.2 | 121.8 | 473.9 | 574.3 | 600.0 |
| IFAD | 152.8 | 208.3 | 384.9 | 366.1 | 280.4 | 13.1 | 19.6 | 18.7 | 13.7 | 34.3 |
| IMF | .. | 4.4 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 5.8 | .. | 2.1 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| Islamic Development Bank | 153.8 | 158.2 | 115.5 | 186.5 | 85.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | .. | 169.1 | 249.8 | 208.3 | .. | .. | 119.9 | 31.6 | 83.3 |
| UNDP | 5.0 | 14.0 | 17.0 | 15.6 | 18.9 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.7 |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCAP | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | .. | 17.0 | 25.8 | 21.1 | .. | .. | 2.2 | 4.4 | 1.4 | .. |
| World Bank | 2 268.0 | 2 565.1 | 3 840.7 | 5 247.5 | 3 570.8 | 143.2 | 97.9 | 165.5 | 130.2 | 44.8 |
| WTO | .. | 5.0 | 4.6 | 1.9 | 2.6 | .. | 3.1 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 0.9 |
| Other multilateral donors | 0.6 | 3.9 | 11.5 | 11.6 | 17.9 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 7.3 | 11.2 | 5.9 |
| **Sub-total** | **4 486.3** | **6 029.3** | **8 790.4** | **13 980.5** | **9 898.6** | **704.8** | **550.1** | **1 290.9** | **1 640.1** | **1 525.0** |
| **TOTAL** | **7 891.1** | **11 970.3** | **16 273.8** | **21 880.9** | **19 343.1** | **1 776.2** | **2 126.2** | **3 601.5** | **4 539.2** | **3 806.2** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.15 Aid for Trade by donor and region, Commitments *(page 2 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | ASIA | | | | | EUROPE | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 116.1 | 187.7 | 344.9 | 250.7 | 234.1 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| Austria | 29.8 | 17.7 | 17.3 | 16.8 | 70.8 | 4.0 | 13.7 | 19.1 | 4.8 | 3.5 |
| Belgium | 34.6 | 21.2 | 36.6 | 22.2 | 10.8 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Canada | 138.9 | 143.2 | 106.6 | 61.5 | 228.1 | 1.6 | 11.6 | 14.6 | 15.4 | 2.1 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | 1.8 | 5.2 | 4.5 | .. | .. | 1.3 | 3.1 | 2.9 |
| Denmark | 132.2 | 96.7 | 51.2 | 174.4 | 115.9 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 20.4 | 1.4 | 19.7 |
| Finland | 36.8 | 42.7 | 61.7 | 49.1 | 13.9 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 5.9 | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| France | 189.6 | 387.8 | 231.4 | 341.1 | 816.6 | 23.2 | 142.7 | 29.6 | 7.6 | 0.1 |
| Germany | 644.6 | 1 043.8 | 1 309.9 | 1 521.9 | 1 664.4 | 112.6 | 333.2 | 436.8 | 419.5 | 584.0 |
| Greece | 3.5 | 5.4 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.4 | 13.1 | 16.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Iceland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 2.4 | 8.8 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 1.9 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Italy | 33.3 | 74.0 | 118.2 | 21.5 | 16.7 | 51.4 | 65.2 | 21.7 | 0.7 | 36.1 |
| Japan | 4 017.6 | 4 818.8 | 5 057.1 | 5 150.9 | 8 915.8 | 323.6 | 16.1 | 287.3 | 7.7 | 20.6 |
| Korea | .. | 376.7 | 589.4 | 649.3 | 383.8 | .. | 3.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.4 |
| Luxembourg | 3.5 | 5.2 | 7.0 | 5.5 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 1.1 |
| Netherlands | 115.9 | 81.1 | 55.8 | 39.3 | 55.9 | 19.9 | 16.4 | 1.7 | .. | .. |
| New Zealand | 7.9 | 10.0 | 22.3 | 21.4 | 12.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Norway | 85.7 | 144.7 | 121.2 | 82.2 | 142.7 | 42.8 | 30.4 | 21.6 | 14.3 | 10.8 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.5 |
| Portugal | 3.0 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 16.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | 2.1 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| Spain | 109.9 | 111.7 | 87.1 | 11.8 | 2.1 | 70.7 | 159.8 | 65.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Sweden | 68.9 | 58.9 | 39.8 | 29.1 | 104.0 | 32.8 | 30.5 | 34.5 | 9.0 | 15.8 |
| Switzerland | 110.4 | 89.9 | 84.9 | 92.1 | 160.2 | 31.6 | 26.9 | 27.5 | 11.3 | 12.8 |
| United Kingdom | 321.5 | 389.4 | 442.8 | 204.3 | 365.5 | 6.8 | 6.3 | 1.9 | 3.7 | 0.4 |
| United States | 2 869.2 | 3 435.4 | 2 470.8 | 2 288.0 | 2 004.3 | 161.4 | 144.2 | 258.6 | 88.0 | 93.8 |
| **Sub-total** | **9 075.3** | **11 552.5** | **11 266.5** | **11 044.8** | **15 330.3** | **917.5** | **1 024.0** | **1 271.3** | **593.5** | **808.0** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 115.2 | 173.0 | 193.7 | .. | .. | 0.5 | 35.9 | .. |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 45.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 177.8 | 74.4 | 742.5 | .. | .. | 16.4 | .. | .. |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | | | | | | |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 122.0 | 364.0 | 172.3 | 212.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | 792.8 | 551.5 | 1 197.7 | 1 378.8 | 2 187.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 286.6 | 312.3 | 345.9 | 653.9 | 717.1 | 381.0 | 652.5 | 1 712.2 | 5 475.9 | 4 749.8 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | .. | .. | 47.3 | 128.9 | 123.5 | .. | .. | 5.8 | 28.2 | 12.6 |
| IADB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | 116.8 | 168.7 | 214.9 | 225.7 | 188.7 | 10.8 | 15.7 | 10.3 | 0.1 | 10.9 |
| IMF | .. | 3.3 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.5 | .. | 1.1 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 1.1 |
| Islamic Development Bank | 49.0 | 99.2 | 78.0 | 26.6 | 69.0 | 3.1 | 10.4 | 5.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | .. | 72.5 | 250.9 | 82.7 | .. | .. | 12.3 | .. | 102.2 |
| UNDP | 7.1 | 10.7 | 14.1 | 13.6 | 8.1 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 1.4 |
| UNECE | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | .. | 1.4 | 4.5 | 2.8 | 4.2 |
| UNESCAP | .. | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | 0.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | .. | 6.1 | 24.6 | 13.5 | .. | .. | 0.6 | 1.7 | 0.6 | .. |
| World Bank | 2 226.5 | 1 850.3 | 2 484.3 | 2 815.9 | 2 771.6 | 252.2 | 82.4 | 32.1 | 88.5 | 12.4 |
| WTO | .. | 1.7 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 2.3 | .. | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other multilateral donors | 0.3 | 0.1 | 6.2 | 1.9 | 14.1 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| **Sub-total** | **3 479.2** | **3 126.1** | **4 855.8** | **5 687.0** | **6 383.2** | **647.6** | **765.3** | **1 786.7** | **5 597.5** | **4 895.0** |
| **TOTAL** | **12 554.5** | **14 678.6** | **16 460.5** | **16 979.1** | **22 650.7** | **1 565.1** | **1 789.2** | **3 076.0** | **6 226.9** | **5 704.1** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.15 Aid for Trade by donor and region, Commitments *(page 3 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | OCEANIA | | | | | NON-REGION SPECIFIC | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 114.8 | 130.5 | 123.2 | 128.3 | 123.9 | 5.0 | 55.8 | 88.0 | 86.9 | 50.0 |
| Austria | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | .. | 0.0 | 1.3 | 5.0 | 18.9 | 18.4 | 10.2 |
| Belgium | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | 48.3 | 41.6 | 148.1 | 25.3 | 21.3 |
| Canada | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.5 | .. | 14.7 | 32.7 | 36.5 | 12.9 | 11.1 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| Denmark | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 28.4 | 15.0 | 7.8 | 39.0 | 9.1 |
| Finland | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 12.3 | 32.8 | 54.0 | 34.1 | 38.9 |
| France | 13.1 | 3.6 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 64.6 | 108.4 | 234.8 | 298.3 | 189.2 |
| Germany | 1.8 | 0.7 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 77.8 | 152.1 | 700.6 | 247.9 | 425.9 |
| Greece | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | 4.5 | 5.0 |
| Ireland | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.3 | 2.8 | 6.0 | 7.0 | 8.1 |
| Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | 3.8 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 2.2 | 3.4 |
| Japan | 43.4 | 115.7 | 51.4 | 100.9 | 185.3 | 48.0 | 52.1 | 55.4 | 96.0 | 90.9 |
| Korea | .. | 1.1 | 2.0 | 1.3 | 2.5 | .. | 3.5 | 3.6 | 6.2 | 9.0 |
| Luxembourg | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | 0.9 | 4.1 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 15.5 |
| Netherlands | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 333.7 | 526.0 | 591.9 | 791.9 | 378.8 |
| New Zealand | 14.5 | 35.7 | 78.8 | 59.2 | 88.0 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 0.4 |
| Norway | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | .. | .. | 42.3 | 126.0 | 282.7 | 253.5 | 243.9 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 |
| Portugal | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Spain | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.3 | 14.6 | 157.4 | 1.7 | 0.5 |
| Sweden | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53.3 | 126.6 | 154.6 | 227.5 | 257.4 |
| Switzerland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53.3 | 58.5 | 88.8 | 58.8 | 111.0 |
| United Kingdom | 8.3 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 106.3 | 224.5 | 187.8 | 290.9 | 98.4 |
| United States | 4.6 | 27.5 | 13.9 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 156.1 | 164.3 | 219.6 | 398.0 | 279.8 |
| **Sub-total** | **201.0** | **315.7** | **282.5** | **299.8** | **409.3** | **1 064.1** | **1 749.2** | **3 050.1** | **2 915.3** | **2 260.6** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 1.6 | .. | 25.0 | .. | .. | 1.4 | 7.9 | .. |
| **Sub-total** | | | | | | | | | | |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 6.0 | .. | 4.2 |
| AsDB | 26.2 | 20.3 | 110.1 | 25.6 | 71.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 40.4 | 25.6 | 45.2 | 36.5 | 128.8 | 147.7 | 247.4 | 605.4 | 233.1 | 528.7 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 |
| GEF | .. | .. | 3.6 | 10.3 | 5.9 | .. | .. | 21.2 | 24.3 | 3.8 |
| IADB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | .. | .. | 5.3 | 1.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3.0 | 8.9 | 7.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 33.0 | 59.1 | 69.3 | 71.5 |
| OFID | .. | .. | 3.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| UNDP | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | .. | .. | 4.0 | 2.5 | 4.0 |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCAP | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | .. |
| UNIDO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3.7 | 10.9 | 5.6 | .. |
| World Bank | 5.6 | 35.5 | 77.3 | 9.2 | 39.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| WTO | .. | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 | .. | 3.9 | 8.1 | 10.8 | 7.2 |
| Other multilateral donors | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.1 | 3.2 | 4.2 |
| **Sub-total** | **72.5** | **82.1** | **246.4** | **84.0** | **246.4** | **150.7** | **442.5** | **1 022.0** | **663.3** | **932.5** |
| **TOTAL AID FOR TRADE** | **273.5** | **397.8** | **530.6** | **383.8** | **680.7** | **1 214.7** | **2 191.7** | **4 073.5** | **3 586.6** | **3 193.2** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240584

## TABLE A.16 Aid for Trade by donor and region, Disbursements *(page 1 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | AFRICA | | | | AMERICA | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 14.6 | 16.4 | 14.8 | 23.3 | 5.6 | 7.5 | 4.5 | 3.2 |
| Austria | 104.3 | 193.3 | 139.6 | 160.9 | 31.8 | 56.5 | 31.1 | 27.4 |
| Belgium | 119.0 | 289.7 | 228.4 | 275.2 | 61.9 | 126.7 | 240.9 | 112.7 |
| Canada | .. | 0.7 | 1.4 | 1.0 | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Czech Republic | 193.1 | 247.1 | 263.9 | 254.9 | 30.7 | 25.6 | 21.8 | 8.8 |
| Denmark | 21.6 | 60.2 | 76.1 | 81.2 | 7.8 | 20.2 | 15.4 | 14.2 |
| Finland | 515.0 | 613.6 | 805.2 | 1 005.7 | 64.3 | 130.0 | 685.5 | 297.5 |
| France | 531.3 | 551.4 | 692.3 | 745.5 | 207.2 | 399.4 | 296.4 | 712.4 |
| Germany | 1.2 | 0.9 | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| Greece | .. | 1.2 | 3.3 | 5.3 | .. | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.2 |
| Iceland | 32.9 | 48.4 | 38.2 | 42.3 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 1.7 |
| Ireland | 169.3 | 53.5 | 28.7 | 48.2 | 22.7 | 16.1 | 8.3 | 5.1 |
| Italy | 583.2 | 718.6 | 750.4 | 982.7 | 184.2 | 236.1 | 144.4 | 97.9 |
| Japan | 35.9 | 56.5 | 122.9 | 144.2 | 22.0 | 17.5 | 21.6 | 26.8 |
| Korea | 19.1 | 13.4 | 18.5 | 18.9 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 3.5 |
| Luxembourg | 101.3 | 106.4 | 140.6 | 272.8 | 37.7 | 39.8 | 24.2 | 10.7 |
| Netherlands | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| New Zealand | 178.7 | 280.7 | 326.5 | 378.7 | 103.9 | 92.3 | 268.6 | 731.2 |
| Norway | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Poland | 26.2 | 55.3 | 55.3 | 30.9 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Portugal | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Slovenia | 166.6 | 383.4 | 54.5 | 74.0 | 138.6 | 197.4 | 53.8 | 52.0 |
| Spain | 164.6 | 150.2 | 157.0 | 170.9 | 18.4 | 15.4 | 14.7 | 23.4 |
| Sweden | 68.9 | 42.2 | 72.9 | 81.1 | 39.6 | 40.7 | 32.5 | 27.8 |
| Switzerland | 330.6 | 597.2 | 594.3 | 691.8 | 24.5 | 70.1 | 126.0 | 113.1 |
| United Kingdom | 506.1 | 1 037.4 | 1 263.1 | 1 359.0 | 279.8 | 463.6 | 403.2 | 280.8 |
| United States | 3 886.9 | 5 542.6 | 5 908.7 | 6 890.0 | 1 289.1 | 1 968.8 | 2 410.6 | 2 555.9 |
| **Sub-total** | **7 770.4** | **11 060.8** | **11 757.4** | **13 740.8** | **2 578.0** | **3 933.6** | **4 812.6** | **5 107.0** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | 197.2 | 245.0 | 180.5 | .. | 5.0 | 11.8 | 9.0 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | 0.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | 32.0 | 86.5 | 1 066.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 229.8 | 331.4 | 1 246.8 | .. | 5.0 | 11.8 | 9.0 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **459.6** | **662.8** | **2 493.5** | **..** | **10.0** | **23.6** | **18.0** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 169.7 | 525.3 | 618.8 | 529.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | .. | 16.3 | 65.7 | 74.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | .. | .. | 47.3 | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | 1 547.2 | 1 725.0 | 3 085.9 | 2 481.0 | 310.4 | 462.9 | 553.1 | 446.4 |
| EU Institutions | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| FAO | 3.3 | 11.2 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 0.8 | 2.2 | 4.2 | 6.3 |
| GEF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 388.0 | 520.1 | 550.3 |
| IADB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | 99.9 | 79.7 | 132.2 | .. | 24.9 | 29.6 | 42.8 |
| OFID | 13.6 | 17.0 | 15.6 | 18.9 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.7 |
| UNDP | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCAP | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | 1 857.6 | 2 364.0 | 2 382.3 | 3 145.1 | 78.2 | 105.2 | 113.0 | 136.3 |
| World Bank | 5.0 | 4.6 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 0.9 |
| WTO | 1.7 | 3.8 | 7.6 | 5.1 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 11.3 | 16.8 |
| Other multilateral donors | 4 014.5 | 6 082.4 | 7 300.6 | 7 657.6 | 393.4 | 987.0 | 1 232.4 | 1 201.9 |
| **Sub-total** | **7 612.5** | **10 849.4** | **13 564.7** | **14 100.2** | **786.8** | **1 973.9** | **2 464.9** | **2 403.7** |
| **TOTAL** | **15 382.9** | **22 369.8** | **25 984.9** | **30 334.5** | **3 364.7** | **5 917.5** | **7 301.1** | **7 528.8** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.16 Aid for Trade by donor and region, Disbursements *(page 2 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | ASIA | | | | EUROPE | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 5.3 | 11.6 | 5.7 | 34.8 | 13.7 | 18.4 | 8.4 | 4.5 |
| Austria | 20.8 | 36.3 | 15.0 | 16.3 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Belgium | 120.5 | 136.2 | 89.5 | 172.5 | 8.3 | 13.1 | 42.6 | 7.6 |
| Canada | .. | 1.8 | 5.3 | 4.5 | .. | 1.2 | 3.3 | 2.9 |
| Czech Republic | 63.3 | 82.6 | 108.0 | 82.2 | 0.1 | 7.7 | 10.8 | 10.6 |
| Denmark | 16.4 | 33.0 | 32.2 | 25.6 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.9 |
| Finland | 192.2 | 223.5 | 266.0 | 306.1 | 90.2 | 74.9 | 29.9 | 1.5 |
| France | 788.0 | 1 054.9 | 1 159.9 | 1 297.6 | 196.5 | 283.8 | 189.3 | 397.2 |
| Germany | 5.4 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13.1 | 16.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Greece | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Iceland | 8.8 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 1.9 | 0.3 | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 52.3 | 46.0 | 27.7 | 51.3 | 30.7 | 47.6 | 26.7 | 7.4 |
| Italy | 3 323.2 | 3 796.6 | 4 685.7 | 5 497.4 | 200.5 | 353.7 | 165.1 | 107.6 |
| Japan | 116.5 | 263.1 | 290.7 | 360.5 | 13.9 | 16.4 | 0.7 | 0.4 |
| Korea | 5.2 | 7.0 | 5.5 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 1.1 |
| Luxembourg | 85.8 | 66.2 | 41.0 | 24.4 | 16.7 | 9.8 | 0.2 | .. |
| Netherlands | 7.6 | 9.6 | 22.8 | 18.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| New Zealand | 127.0 | 109.6 | 109.0 | 107.3 | 24.5 | 20.5 | 17.3 | 11.1 |
| Norway | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | 1.5 |
| Poland | 1.8 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 10.7 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Portugal | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | .. | .. | 2.0 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Slovenia | 96.3 | 103.2 | 26.5 | 15.1 | 118.6 | 94.3 | 0.0 | 0.7 |
| Spain | 62.7 | 51.6 | 53.0 | 60.2 | 31.3 | 42.1 | 43.9 | 27.5 |
| Sweden | 76.7 | 70.3 | 83.1 | 97.8 | 23.9 | 22.0 | 27.6 | 25.7 |
| Switzerland | 416.8 | 497.6 | 312.1 | 384.1 | 7.6 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 0.4 |
| United Kingdom | 3 047.2 | 2 189.3 | 1 504.8 | 1 382.5 | 147.7 | 159.2 | 127.8 | 154.8 |
| United States | 8 779.6 | 9 026.3 | 9 101.1 | 10 180.4 | 955.7 | 1 193.7 | 706.6 | 767.6 |
| **Sub-total** | **17 419.5** | **17 825.1** | **17 951.5** | **20 126.7** | **1 911.5** | **2 387.4** | **1 413.2** | **1 535.2** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | 71.9 | 75.8 | 70.0 | .. | 2.5 | 4.5 | 5.9 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | 45.1 | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | 107.8 | 97.2 | 124.8 | .. | .. | 17.4 | 24.5 |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 224.8 | 173.0 | 195.3 | .. | 3.7 | 21.9 | 30.8 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **449.6** | **346.1** | **390.1** | **..** | **7.4** | **43.8** | **61.2** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 90.5 | 255.5 | 123.4 | 213.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 513.0 | 928.5 | 1 205.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | .. | .. | 54.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.7 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | 234.7 | 334.3 | 474.5 | 507.8 | 308.0 | 1 683.8 | 4 257.1 | 3 517.3 |
| EU Institutions | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| FAO | 8.1 | 5.6 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IADB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | 50.9 | 45.5 | 47.0 | .. | 7.5 | 9.6 | 14.7 |
| OFID | 10.5 | 14.0 | 13.6 | 8.1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 1.4 |
| UNDP | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 4.5 | 2.8 | 4.2 |
| UNECE | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCAP | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | 0.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | 1 547.1 | 1 612.4 | 1 656.7 | 2 019.9 | 96.5 | 87.4 | 84.8 | 25.0 |
| World Bank | 1.7 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| WTO | 0.1 | 2.3 | 5.2 | 9.5 | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Other multilateral donors | 1 892.8 | 2 790.6 | 3 252.9 | 4 074.8 | 407.1 | 1 797.8 | 4 358.2 | 3 566.1 |
| **Sub-total** | **3 785.5** | **5 581.3** | **6 505.9** | **8 149.5** | **814.3** | **3 595.7** | **8 716.3** | **7 132.1** |
| **TOTAL** | **21 205.0** | **23 855.9** | **24 803.5** | **28 666.3** | **2 725.8** | **5 990.5** | **10 173.4** | **8 728.5** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.16 Aid for Trade by donor and region, Disbursements *(page 3 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | OCEANIA | | | | NON-REGION SPECIFIC | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.1 | 0.4 | .. | 0.0 | 4.3 | 13.1 | 19.2 | 15.6 |
| Austria | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | 39.6 | 148.7 | 25.3 | 19.4 |
| Belgium | 0.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | .. | 20.7 | 35.9 | 13.3 | 11.8 |
| Canada | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.5 | 14.8 | 26.3 | 19.4 |
| Denmark | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 21.1 | 35.4 | 36.3 | 27.5 |
| Finland | 6.5 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 118.7 | 236.3 | 240.4 | 243.2 |
| France | 0.4 | 1.0 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 127.1 | 539.6 | 264.4 | 282.9 |
| Germany | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| Greece | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | 4.5 | 5.0 |
| Iceland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.8 | 6.0 | 7.0 | 8.1 |
| Ireland | 0.1 | .. | .. | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 2.9 | 3.4 |
| Italy | 82.9 | 73.5 | 49.3 | 75.1 | 51.9 | 54.7 | 95.2 | 89.7 |
| Japan | 1.1 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 6.2 | 9.0 |
| Korea | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | 4.1 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 15.5 |
| Luxembourg | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | 305.3 | 320.8 | 510.2 | 429.4 |
| Netherlands | 23.5 | 44.8 | 71.2 | 69.9 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.4 |
| New Zealand | 0.0 | 0.2 | .. | .. | 105.4 | 212.6 | 322.7 | 230.6 |
| Norway | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
| Portugal | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 15.1 | 161.4 | 7.9 | 6.3 |
| Spain | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | 122.6 | 161.4 | 228.8 | 221.4 |
| Sweden | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | 57.0 | 60.7 | 55.7 | 61.2 |
| Switzerland | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 185.1 | 185.3 | 352.0 | 241.1 |
| United Kingdom | 11.7 | 26.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 156.9 | 210.0 | 245.9 | 225.3 |
| United States | 256.8 | 289.0 | 261.8 | 281.1 | 1 387.8 | 2 498.6 | 2 563.1 | 2 220.2 |
| **Sub-total** | **384.1** | **446.4** | **395.4** | **438.3** | **2 742.6** | **4 911.9** | **5 039.3** | **4 390.4** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 5.0 | 0.2 | .. | 1.4 | 7.9 | 3.3 |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 0.2 | 5.0 | 0.2 | .. | 1.5 | 7.9 | 3.3 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **0.3** | **10.1** | **0.4** | **..** | **2.9** | **15.8** | **6.6** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 6.3 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 17.9 | 83.4 | 112.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| BADEA | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | 29.8 | 27.1 | 40.1 | 40.5 | 109.1 | 157.9 | 124.0 | 103.3 |
| EU Institutions | .. | .. | .. | .. | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 |
| FAO | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | 3.0 | 4.1 | 2.6 |
| GEF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IADB | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32.5 | 56.6 | 59.5 | 64.1 |
| ITC | .. | 0.3 | 2.8 | 8.2 | .. | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| OFID | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | .. | 4.0 | 2.5 | 4.0 |
| UNDP | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCAP | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | 3.6 | 23.6 | 36.9 | 54.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| World Bank | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 3.9 | 8.1 | 10.8 | 7.2 |
| WTO | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.1 | 3.2 | 4.2 |
| Other multilateral donors | 34.1 | 69.2 | 163.3 | 216.2 | 292.2 | 533.0 | 519.0 | 498.1 |
| **Sub-total** | **68.2** | **138.5** | **326.7** | **432.3** | **584.3** | **1 065.9** | **1 038.1** | **996.2** |
| **TOTAL** | **452.3** | **585.2** | **732.1** | **871.0** | **3 326.9** | **5 980.7** | **6 093.2** | **5 393.3** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240595

## TABLE A.17 Aid for Trade by donor and income group, Commitments *(page 1 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES | | | | | OTHER LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 28.8 | 35.6 | 89.9 | 123.8 | 132.8 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 15.1 | 6.6 |
| Austria | 17.4 | 10.9 | 7.3 | 20.0 | 30.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | .. | 8.0 |
| Belgium | 74.2 | 114.0 | 200.8 | 59.4 | 111.3 | 4.3 | 7.5 | 18.5 | 13.2 | 5.7 |
| Canada | 104.5 | 200.7 | 283.1 | 117.3 | 224.5 | 9.8 | 7.2 | 4.4 | 1.8 | 1.3 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | 1.3 | 3.1 | 2.5 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Denmark | 242.4 | 194.2 | 110.4 | 277.6 | 321.7 | 10.2 | 15.4 | 42.1 | 4.2 | 25.7 |
| Finland | 10.0 | 31.7 | 94.8 | 38.2 | 16.8 | 8.4 | 4.4 | 20.6 | 0.5 | 23.2 |
| France | 144.8 | 211.9 | 236.7 | 259.4 | 274.0 | 21.1 | 43.4 | 128.7 | 180.7 | 184.3 |
| Germany | 232.3 | 229.4 | 305.3 | 322.9 | 613.3 | 24.9 | 29.8 | 86.8 | 13.8 | 44.0 |
| Greece | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | .. | 1.0 | 3.1 | 4.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 24.7 | 35.1 | 47.7 | 39.7 | 37.7 | 0.8 | 2.6 | 3.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| Italy | 112.7 | 76.7 | 55.4 | 77.5 | 34.2 | 1.0 | 6.4 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.5 |
| Japan | 338.7 | 542.9 | 1 139.6 | 702.8 | 3 077.7 | 34.4 | 133.3 | 218.7 | 321.2 | 39.9 |
| Korea | .. | 184.2 | 336.0 | 191.0 | 425.7 | .. | 1.6 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Luxembourg | 5.6 | 10.4 | 11.5 | 16.6 | 17.6 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| Netherlands | 84.1 | 76.8 | 91.7 | 278.3 | 138.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 7.1 | 19.5 |
| New Zealand | 4.4 | 19.9 | 42.7 | 20.1 | 15.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 3.5 |
| Norway | 156.6 | 209.6 | 288.0 | 402.0 | 549.5 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 10.2 | 5.2 | 10.5 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Portugal | 9.6 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 3.6 | 4.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Spain | 44.0 | 59.2 | 119.7 | 22.6 | 16.1 | 0.1 | 5.9 | 1.1 | 0.0 | .. |
| Sweden | 79.3 | 110.8 | 115.4 | 30.3 | 112.9 | 10.1 | 32.9 | 6.8 | 55.2 | 1.8 |
| Switzerland | 67.2 | 59.0 | 57.0 | 65.2 | 142.8 | 15.5 | 3.7 | 5.2 | 2.5 | 12.3 |
| United Kingdom | 180.7 | 247.0 | 274.7 | 80.3 | 336.2 | 14.9 | 6.4 | 50.4 | 29.6 | 43.1 |
| United States | 554.4 | 1 967.0 | 2 162.2 | 2 125.7 | 1 929.9 | 47.9 | 24.0 | 80.4 | 89.0 | 65.5 |
| **Sub-total** | **2 516.5** | **4 633.0** | **6 078.1** | **5 280.5** | **8 570.7** | **210.9** | **330.2** | **694.1** | **744.1** | **500.3** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 123.0 | 213.1 | 528.4 | .. | .. | 13.6 | 21.5 | .. |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 0.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 145.4 | 183.0 | 75.0 | .. | .. | 8.7 | 0.6 | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **..** | **269.1** | **396.1** | **603.6** | **..** | **..** | **22.3** | **22.2** | **..** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 120.1 | 399.1 | 887.1 | 1 251.7 | 902.5 | 25.6 | 89.4 | 69.4 | 423.4 | 171.8 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 283.4 | 393.1 | 294.6 | 465.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | 395.4 | 165.3 | 591.9 | 580.7 | 1 369.9 | 36.0 | 40.4 | 81.8 | 100.5 | 89.9 |
| BADEA | .. | .. | 18.5 | 97.5 | 88.9 | .. | .. | 5.0 | 0.1 | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 1 098.4 | 1 187.2 | 923.6 | 919.4 | 1 684.3 | 50.1 | 43.2 | 145.3 | 292.2 | 65.0 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | .. | .. | 21.4 | 42.4 | 81.0 | .. | .. | 2.5 | .. | 3.0 |
| IADB | 40.5 | 6.5 | 108.1 | 155.5 | 116.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | 159.7 | 201.7 | 368.6 | 404.0 | 308.4 | 5.6 | 11.2 | 10.4 | 26.6 | .. |
| IMF | .. | 3.9 | 6.0 | 6.6 | 5.8 | .. | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| Islamic Development Bank | 153.9 | 182.9 | 118.4 | 157.4 | 74.0 | 8.2 | 9.5 | 18.4 | 2.0 | 23.4 |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | .. | 154.3 | 179.2 | 135.2 | .. | .. | 17.3 | 29.2 | 0.5 |
| UNDP | 6.2 | 16.0 | 20.2 | 19.0 | 19.5 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 3.2 | 2.0 |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCAP | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | .. | 11.8 | 13.7 | 17.2 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | .. |
| World Bank | 2 390.1 | 2 366.2 | 3 303.3 | 3 329.6 | 3 744.3 | 139.7 | 138.8 | 408.0 | 1 110.0 | 120.9 |
| WTO | .. | 2.8 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 0.6 | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Other multilateral donors | 0.6 | 3.9 | 11.5 | 3.4 | 19.1 | .. | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 0.0 |
| **Sub-total** | **4 364.8** | **4 830.6** | **6 940.6** | **7 458.7** | **9 016.3** | **265.8** | **334.2** | **762.9** | **1 990.0** | **477.2** |
| **TOTAL** | **6 881.3** | **9 463.6** | **13 287.8** | **13 135.3** | **18 190.6** | **476.8** | **664.5** | **1 479.4** | **2 756.3** | **977.5** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.17 Aid for Trade by donor and income group, Commitments *(page 2 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES | | | | | UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 143.1 | 225.1 | 312.9 | 208.5 | 200.4 | 35.8 | 37.1 | 25.9 | 38.4 | 26.2 |
| Austria | 19.2 | 11.7 | 17.4 | 26.2 | 25.6 | 9.6 | 12.5 | 12.2 | 4.8 | 1.3 |
| Belgium | 59.3 | 52.9 | 73.2 | 31.2 | 29.5 | 53.5 | 53.1 | 29.8 | 12.0 | 10.5 |
| Canada | 117.0 | 102.6 | 124.1 | 112.9 | 140.2 | 77.3 | 18.5 | 27.3 | 48.1 | 49.9 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | 1.4 | 3.8 | 3.7 | .. | .. | 1.2 | 2.7 | 2.3 |
| Denmark | 152.4 | 64.5 | 100.8 | 48.5 | 20.5 | 27.2 | 15.5 | 18.8 | 1.0 | 25.4 |
| Finland | 22.4 | 23.1 | 51.4 | 42.8 | 9.0 | 23.9 | 15.3 | 23.9 | 3.9 | 3.7 |
| France | 252.4 | 830.7 | 567.3 | 1 587.3 | 1 010.5 | 262.1 | 445.1 | 393.2 | 1 312.7 | 710.3 |
| Germany | 559.0 | 673.5 | 1 068.4 | 1 498.4 | 1 536.7 | 414.9 | 735.7 | 967.0 | 784.4 | 1 417.3 |
| Greece | 3.4 | 4.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 14.3 | 16.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Iceland | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.1 | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 |
| Ireland | 1.7 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 4.2 | 3.0 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Italy | 55.8 | 59.0 | 36.8 | 7.0 | 11.6 | 105.3 | 115.5 | 91.9 | 109.0 | 42.2 |
| Japan | 3 217.9 | 4 053.9 | 4 188.5 | 4 684.1 | 6 787.8 | 1 223.1 | 1 206.5 | 958.2 | 1 181.0 | 178.6 |
| Korea | .. | 246.0 | 520.4 | 577.9 | 243.4 | .. | 33.3 | 40.5 | 23.3 | 20.9 |
| Luxembourg | 6.4 | 11.0 | 8.2 | 10.3 | 6.1 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 2.6 |
| Netherlands | 115.9 | 74.2 | 51.6 | 37.3 | 39.2 | 40.0 | 34.6 | 8.2 | 4.4 | 1.0 |
| New Zealand | 8.8 | 10.2 | 18.4 | 22.8 | 30.8 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 23.9 | 22.2 | 41.0 |
| Norway | 44.4 | 83.5 | 87.9 | 42.7 | 74.6 | 49.6 | 40.7 | 228.7 | 209.5 | 217.5 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Portugal | 18.7 | 23.9 | 49.7 | 18.2 | 17.3 | 17.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | .. | .. | 2.0 | 0.7 | 0.4 |
| Spain | 109.3 | 193.8 | 159.4 | 31.5 | 17.0 | 241.1 | 462.7 | 238.3 | 28.7 | 26.6 |
| Sweden | 44.8 | 29.6 | 43.7 | 25.6 | 59.5 | 36.4 | 26.6 | 26.8 | 7.3 | 13.7 |
| Switzerland | 85.4 | 70.3 | 70.8 | 58.1 | 95.7 | 44.3 | 41.5 | 31.6 | 24.1 | 43.7 |
| United Kingdom | 169.1 | 217.4 | 300.9 | 250.6 | 259.6 | 240.0 | 113.0 | 193.3 | 145.4 | 120.2 |
| United States | 690.6 | 1 599.7 | 1 489.0 | 936.3 | 1 105.9 | 2 457.9 | 1 848.1 | 752.9 | 326.5 | 361.9 |
| **Sub-total** | **5 896.9** | **8 667.4** | **9 350.1** | **10 267.2** | **11 729.8** | **5 380.9** | **5 282.4** | **4 115.5** | **4 295.0** | **3 318.1** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 179.2 | 185.3 | 126.3 | .. | .. | 26.6 | 91.3 | 177.1 |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 71.0 | 44.6 | 1 091.1 | .. | .. | 56.2 | 0.6 | 655.7 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **..** | **250.7** | **229.9** | **1 219.3** | **..** | **..** | **84.1** | **91.9** | **833.2** |
| **MULTILATERAI** | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 7.9 | 42.0 | 158.5 | 260.4 | 89.2 | .. | .. | 0.6 | 2.3 | 3.8 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 95.9 | 540.8 | 521.3 | 331.0 | .. | 46.0 | 187.3 | 161.6 | 185.2 |
| AsDB | 378.4 | 359.4 | 625.4 | 713.0 | 771.2 | 9.2 | 6.7 | 8.8 | 10.1 | 9.1 |
| BADEA | .. | .. | 3.4 | 0.4 | 12.0 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 12.1 | .. |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 467.3 | 669.8 | 853.6 | 3 173.0 | 2 361.6 | 690.7 | 747.3 | 1 883.9 | 5 991.9 | 4 777.4 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | .. | .. | 19.3 | 71.6 | 106.9 | .. | .. | 47.9 | 143.7 | 124.2 |
| IADB | 224.8 | 115.3 | 276.5 | 327.7 | 391.9 | .. | .. | 50.3 | 42.5 | 47.9 |
| IFAD | 98.4 | 141.4 | 233.4 | 167.8 | 154.3 | 29.9 | 58.0 | 21.6 | 9.1 | 51.6 |
| IMF | .. | 3.0 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 4.1 | .. | 3.1 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.7 |
| Islamic Development Bank | 26.4 | 50.6 | 50.4 | 42.4 | 48.6 | 17.4 | 24.6 | 10.6 | 11.4 | 8.7 |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | .. | 115.2 | 261.3 | 182.5 | .. | .. | 55.8 | 60.9 | 155.5 |
| UNDP | 4.1 | 5.3 | 7.9 | 5.0 | 6.1 | 2.0 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| UNESCAP | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| UNIDO | .. | 6.2 | 17.7 | 1.4 | .. | .. | 5.1 | 18.9 | 15.1 | .. |
| World Bank | 2 051.1 | 1 913.6 | 2 787.9 | 3 736.4 | 2 563.3 | 258.6 | 195.6 | 94.9 | 60.8 | 5.2 |
| WTO | .. | 2.3 | 1.2 | 0.2 | 0.5 | .. | 4.8 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
| Other multilateral donors | 0.4 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 12.0 | 6.8 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.8 |
| **Sub-total** | **3 258.8** | **3 404.8** | **5 699.4** | **9 299.0** | **7 030.0** | **1 008.1** | **1 094.8** | **2 389.4** | **6 528.5** | **5 378.5** |
| **TOTAL** | **9 155.7** | **12 072.1** | **15 300.2** | **19 796.0** | **19 979.1** | **6 389.0** | **6 377.2** | **6 589.1** | **10 915.4** | **9 529.8** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.17 Aid for Trade by donor and income group, Commitments *(page 3 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | NON-COUNTRY SPECIFIC | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | |
| Australia | 39.0 | 77.1 | 145.8 | 148.7 | 86.0 |
| Austria | 3.6 | 23.2 | 45.9 | 24.6 | 77.3 |
| Belgium | 71.2 | 61.3 | 169.2 | 29.2 | 43.8 |
| Canada | 88.9 | 106.9 | 145.9 | 302.0 | 343.8 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 |
| Denmark | 41.2 | 18.5 | 74.4 | 71.3 | 29.5 |
| Finland | 23.0 | 67.2 | 134.9 | 48.9 | 91.8 |
| France | 95.1 | 111.7 | 247.1 | 306.9 | 198.8 |
| Germany | 116.0 | 611.9 | 1 236.6 | 892.0 | 1 405.7 |
| Greece | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | .. | 1.3 | 5.1 | 6.4 |
| Ireland | 2.3 | 2.9 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 10.5 |
| Italy | 12.9 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 5.6 |
| Japan | 75.6 | 263.3 | 170.8 | 152.8 | 256.0 |
| Korea | .. | 6.3 | 6.1 | 12.4 | 12.2 |
| Luxembourg | 1.6 | 8.4 | 15.0 | 12.1 | 17.3 |
| Netherlands | 365.7 | 600.2 | 646.0 | 826.6 | 565.8 |
| New Zealand | 4.8 | 12.2 | 18.7 | 21.0 | 18.8 |
| Norway | 107.4 | 258.7 | 408.8 | 348.0 | 401.0 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 |
| Portugal | 2.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Slovenia | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Spain | 23.8 | 43.2 | 431.5 | 6.6 | 35.9 |
| Sweden | 103.7 | 197.4 | 208.8 | 275.1 | 319.8 |
| Switzerland | 108.5 | 113.7 | 134.1 | 138.5 | 211.2 |
| United Kingdom | 152.7 | 357.6 | 456.5 | 433.4 | 208.5 |
| United States | 288.8 | 297.3 | 402.7 | 540.8 | 373.3 |
| **Sub-total** | **1 728.8** | **3 245.6** | **5 113.7** | **4 609.2** | **4 722.1** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | .. | 44.5 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | 1.4 | 7.9 | .. |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **..** | **45.9** | **7.9** | **0.2** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | |
| AfDB | 8.2 | 245.0 | 520.5 | 374.2 | 218.5 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | .. | 0.0 | 6.0 | .. | 4.2 |
| AsDB | .. | .. | .. | .. | 18.8 |
| BADEA | .. | .. | 0.3 | 1.9 | 12.1 |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 576.2 | 867.6 | 1 139.6 | 1 425.0 | 1 253.4 |
| FAO | .. | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 |
| GEF | .. | .. | 39.9 | 49.0 | 3.8 |
| IADB | .. | .. | 39.0 | 48.5 | 43.3 |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | 3.0 | 9.1 | 8.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| ITC | .. | 33.0 | 59.1 | 69.3 | 71.5 |
| OFID | .. | .. | 36.1 | 2.7 | 3.5 |
| UNDP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.0 |
| UNECE | .. | 1.4 | 4.5 | 2.9 | 4.5 |
| UNESCAP | .. | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 |
| UNESCWA | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.8 |
| UNIDO | .. | 6.5 | 16.3 | 8.6 | .. |
| World Bank | 56.1 | 17.0 | 5.9 | 54.7 | 5.6 |
| WTO | .. | 4.6 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 11.3 |
| Other multilateral donors | 0.0 | 0.6 | 7.5 | 9.7 | 14.4 |
| **Sub-total** | **643.5** | **1 330.8** | **2 199.8** | **2 376.3** | **1 978.7** |
| **TOTAL** | **2 372.3** | **4 576.4** | **7 359.5** | **6 993.4** | **6 701.0** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240604

## TABLE A.18 Aid for Trade by donor and income group, Disbursements *(page 1 of 2)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES | | | | LOW MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 35.3 | 82.4 | 123.8 | 132.8 | 0.0 | 12.6 | 15.1 | 6.6 |
| Austria | 10.1 | 9.3 | 11.9 | 13.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.7 |
| Belgium | 68.1 | 144.4 | 115.1 | 121.5 | 1.7 | 8.7 | 3.0 | 14.1 |
| Canada | 125.1 | 297.4 | 132.1 | 166.8 | 7.0 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 4.1 |
| Czech Republic | .. | 1.3 | 3.1 | 2.5 | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Denmark | 146.7 | 194.3 | 206.9 | 192.3 | 14.7 | 26.1 | 33.6 | 24.6 |
| Finland | 9.8 | 32.1 | 37.7 | 47.4 | 3.3 | 8.0 | 7.1 | 9.5 |
| France | 209.6 | 136.7 | 156.8 | 152.1 | 36.4 | 42.1 | 67.2 | 117.7 |
| Germany | 231.7 | 241.4 | 285.7 | 262.4 | 18.9 | 44.2 | 112.5 | 52.9 |
| Greece | 0.1 | 0.2 | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | 1.0 | 3.1 | 4.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ireland | 35.1 | 47.7 | 39.7 | 37.7 | 2.6 | 3.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| Italy | 122.5 | 46.8 | 27.5 | 61.9 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Japan | 342.2 | 542.9 | 906.3 | 1 077.5 | 42.1 | 51.5 | 104.2 | 276.7 |
| Korea | 52.5 | 143.8 | 188.8 | 215.0 | 5.6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.0 |
| Luxembourg | 10.4 | 11.5 | 16.6 | 17.6 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| Netherlands | 69.1 | 70.5 | 105.9 | 144.4 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 8.9 |
| New Zealand | 9.9 | 19.6 | 40.7 | 34.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 |
| Norway | 169.9 | 226.9 | 240.6 | 325.1 | 4.0 | 7.0 | 5.7 | 12.2 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Portugal | 5.8 | 5.5 | 3.6 | 4.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 |
| Slovenia | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Spain | 40.6 | 94.5 | 40.3 | 30.7 | 0.8 | 6.1 | 0.0 | .. |
| Sweden | 111.7 | 107.0 | 117.3 | 127.7 | 24.2 | 21.7 | 17.3 | 14.8 |
| Switzerland | 52.4 | 44.1 | 68.2 | 61.5 | 7.1 | 4.8 | 2.5 | 7.3 |
| United Kingdom | 156.6 | 333.9 | 235.1 | 382.9 | 15.6 | 32.7 | 46.5 | 94.3 |
| United States | 957.6 | 1 785.5 | 1 625.3 | 1 613.7 | 23.0 | 36.1 | 69.9 | 69.2 |
| **Sub-total** | **2 972.9** | **4 620.7** | **4 732.3** | **5 230.4** | **211.7** | **315.9** | **496.2** | **720.0** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | 65.9 | 84.2 | 99.8 | .. | 0.8 | 5.5 | 6.1 |
| Turkey | .. | 0.7 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 41.4 | 107.6 | 39.6 | .. | .. | 3.9 | 3.2 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **107.9** | **191.8** | **139.4** | **..** | **0.8** | **9.5** | **9.3** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 318.8 | 664.5 | 569.4 | 696.2 | 18.7 | 85.4 | 140.8 | 178.7 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 89.7 | 196.2 | 178.7 | 182.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| AsDB | .. | 269.6 | 537.3 | 602.6 | .. | 32.3 | 45.2 | 85.9 |
| BADEA | .. | 13.0 | 41.8 | 54.0 | .. | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | 2.8 | .. | .. | .. | 1.5 |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 1 049.3 | 946.4 | 892.3 | 839.6 | 34.0 | 45.6 | 137.5 | 167.1 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| GEF | 1.8 | 7.2 | 4.6 | 3.6 | 0.0 | 1.0 | .. | 0.5 |
| IADB | .. | 80.1 | 111.9 | 118.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | 74.2 | 67.1 | 90.8 | .. | 12.0 | 2.7 | 7.3 |
| UNDP | 15.5 | 20.2 | 19.0 | 19.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 3.2 | 2.0 |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCAP | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNESCWA | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| UNIDO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| World Bank | 1 844.2 | 2 036.7 | 2 229.1 | 2 946.7 | 103.8 | 143.0 | 172.0 | 308.5 |
| WTO | 2.8 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Other multilateral donors | 1.7 | 3.7 | 8.3 | 5.8 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| **Sub-total** | **3 323.9** | **4 312.8** | **4 659.9** | **5 563.1** | **158.1** | **321.6** | **502.0** | **751.5** |
| **TOTAL** | **6 296.8** | **9 041.5** | **9 584.0** | **10 932.9** | **369.8** | **638.3** | **1 007.7** | **1 480.8** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.18 Aid for Trade by donor and income group, Disbursements *(page 2 of 2)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES | | | | UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES | | | | NON-COUNTRY SPECIFIC | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC COUNTRIES** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 184.6 | 237.9 | 208.5 | 200.4 | 32.0 | 28.4 | 38.4 | 26.2 | 53.9 | 111.3 | 148.7 | 86.0 |
| Austria | 7.9 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 10.1 | 7.5 | 5.9 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 17.7 | 42.4 | 29.3 | 54.8 |
| Belgium | 35.5 | 71.0 | 33.4 | 33.7 | 42.5 | 41.3 | 27.3 | 23.4 | 51.6 | 170.5 | 32.3 | 31.3 |
| Canada | 92.1 | 133.0 | 146.4 | 126.1 | 33.4 | 30.1 | 25.9 | 25.9 | 72.8 | 138.2 | 308.7 | 256.9 |
| Czech Republic | .. | 1.4 | 4.0 | 3.7 | .. | 1.2 | 2.9 | 2.3 | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 |
| Denmark | 106.7 | 79.3 | 97.2 | 54.0 | 14.5 | 20.4 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 15.1 | 57.6 | 68.8 | 80.8 |
| Finland | 9.9 | 25.0 | 22.5 | 21.0 | 10.6 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 6.2 | 35.1 | 77.6 | 86.2 | 68.6 |
| France | 254.9 | 434.5 | 589.6 | 766.7 | 365.3 | 423.0 | 973.1 | 571.1 | 120.7 | 249.3 | 247.2 | 253.3 |
| Germany | 607.9 | 806.6 | 725.4 | 1 069.9 | 465.0 | 682.8 | 638.2 | 922.5 | 526.8 | 1 054.9 | 843.2 | 1 130.2 |
| Greece | 4.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.3 | 16.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.2 | .. | .. |
| Iceland | .. | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.1 | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | 1.3 | 5.1 | 6.4 |
| Ireland | 6.1 | 5.6 | 4.2 | 3.0 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 2.9 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 10.5 |
| Italy | 60.9 | 28.6 | 14.3 | 32.3 | 84.0 | 84.1 | 45.5 | 15.6 | 6.3 | 2.7 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
| Japan | 2 770.9 | 3 396.5 | 3 817.8 | 3 727.6 | 1 014.4 | 1 070.0 | 909.8 | 1 515.1 | 256.3 | 172.4 | 151.9 | 253.4 |
| Korea | 78.9 | 168.2 | 221.4 | 287.2 | 49.9 | 38.4 | 19.5 | 25.8 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 11.5 | 12.2 |
| Luxembourg | 11.0 | 8.2 | 10.3 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 2.6 | 8.4 | 15.0 | 12.1 | 17.3 |
| Netherlands | 79.7 | 66.0 | 32.8 | 27.6 | 41.8 | 24.2 | 6.8 | 4.4 | 354.5 | 380.4 | 567.5 | 552.1 |
| New Zealand | 8.4 | 13.2 | 15.4 | 24.6 | 6.5 | 12.9 | 24.7 | 14.7 | 8.0 | 11.2 | 15.1 | 17.7 |
| Norway | 76.9 | 93.0 | 73.7 | 71.2 | 121.0 | 87.8 | 265.7 | 724.6 | 167.6 | 301.0 | 458.4 | 325.7 |
| Poland | .. | .. | .. | 1.7 | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 |
| Portugal | 21.5 | 50.3 | 52.6 | 26.8 | 10.7 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Slovenia | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | .. | 1.9 | 0.5 | 0.4 | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Spain | 143.5 | 190.2 | 23.9 | 36.0 | 302.8 | 350.2 | 24.6 | 64.4 | 47.6 | 298.7 | 53.9 | 17.0 |
| Sweden | 49.0 | 46.8 | 53.3 | 49.8 | 28.0 | 29.1 | 28.1 | 27.7 | 186.4 | 216.1 | 281.5 | 283.4 |
| Switzerland | 63.8 | 57.0 | 66.4 | 69.0 | 41.2 | 27.3 | 31.3 | 40.1 | 101.8 | 102.7 | 103.2 | 115.6 |
| United Kingdom | 260.5 | 321.0 | 292.3 | 322.9 | 197.9 | 194.3 | 280.8 | 206.0 | 335.0 | 470.8 | 533.6 | 424.4 |
| United States | 682.2 | 1 248.7 | 1 077.2 | 1 010.7 | 2 238.9 | 651.4 | 382.4 | 358.6 | 247.7 | 364.4 | 390.1 | 350.5 |
| **Sub-total** | **5 617.7** | **7 493.5** | **7 592.9** | **7 982.7** | **5 129.0** | **3 835.1** | **3 767.0** | **4 605.0** | **2 624.6** | **4 253.7** | **4 363.5** | **4 357.2** |
| **OTHER BILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | .. | 153.6 | 209.1 | 107.0 | .. | 56.4 | 38.3 | 52.6 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. |
| Turkey | .. | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | .. | .. | .. | 44.5 | .. | .. |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | 48.2 | 58.3 | 1 071.0 | .. | 50.2 | 36.3 | 101.9 | .. | 1.4 | 7.9 | 3.3 |
| **Sub-total** | **..** | **202.3** | **267.4** | **1 178.8** | **..** | **108.0** | **74.6** | **154.7** | **..** | **45.9** | **7.9** | **3.3** |
| **MULTILATERAL** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 35.5 | 133.3 | 180.2 | 259.5 | .. | 0.1 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 43.4 | 432.1 | 144.5 | 79.3 |
| Arab Fund (AFESD) | 98.9 | 344.1 | 421.6 | 329.6 | 71.6 | 240.5 | 141.9 | 230.9 | 0.4 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 6.3 |
| AsDB | .. | 222.9 | 419.8 | 594.0 | .. | 6.0 | 9.5 | 19.6 | .. | 0.1 | .. | 16.0 |
| BADEA | .. | 2.3 | 17.6 | 12.9 | .. | 0.2 | 4.9 | 6.5 | .. | 0.3 | 1.3 | 1.1 |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | 41.4 | .. | .. | .. | 56.3 | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.7 | 3.2 | 3.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| EU Institutions | 494.5 | 695.4 | 1 756.1 | 1 527.4 | 502.1 | 1 911.6 | 4 904.2 | 3 853.9 | 459.2 | 791.9 | 844.6 | 708.3 |
| FAO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 144.5 | 298.7 | 310.9 | 305.7 |
| GEF | 1.4 | 4.1 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 7.6 | 3.7 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 2.8 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 7.8 |
| IADB | .. | 222.6 | 321.6 | 352.9 | .. | 55.5 | 53.5 | 41.8 | .. | 29.9 | 33.1 | 37.3 |
| IFAD | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IMF | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| ITC | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32.5 | 56.6 | 59.5 | 64.1 |
| OFID | .. | 51.9 | 61.7 | 87.1 | .. | 43.5 | 34.8 | 58.4 | .. | 2.1 | 1.4 | 2.2 |
| UNDP | 5.1 | 7.8 | 5.0 | 6.1 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.0 |
| UNECE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 4.5 | 2.9 | 4.5 |
| UNESCAP | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| UNESCWA | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.7 |
| UNIDO | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| World Bank | 1 511.5 | 1 869.4 | 1 769.1 | 1 971.7 | 121.2 | 109.9 | 79.5 | 138.9 | 2.2 | 33.6 | 24.1 | 14.5 |
| WTO | 2.3 | 1.2 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 4.8 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 4.6 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 11.3 |
| Other multilateral donors | 0.0 | 0.2 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 3.0 | 14.9 | 26.4 |
| **Sub-total** | **2 149.1** | **3 555.3** | **4 957.9** | **5 186.8** | **710.9** | **2 389.5** | **5 242.7** | **4 423.2** | **692.0** | **1 680.9** | **1 463.9** | **1 290.0** |
| **TOTAL** | **7 766.8** | **11 251.1** | **12 818.2** | **14 348.3** | **5 839.9** | **6 332.5** | **9 084.3** | **9 182.8** | **3 316.6** | **5 980.5** | **5 835.3** | **5 650.6** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240610

## TABLE A.19. Trade related other official flows by category

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **Trade Policy and Regulations** | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Policy and Admin. Management | 309.5 | 151.4 | 311.1 | 262.6 | 348.0 | 61.5 | 165.2 | 79.9 | 93.8 |
| Trade Facilitation | 90.0 | 31.4 | 254.1 | 525.1 | 606.8 | 17.9 | 188.2 | 80.5 | 171.9 |
| Regional Trade Agreements | 72.6 | .. | 15.1 | .. | .. | .. | 16.6 | .. | .. |
| Multilateral Trade Negotiations | .. | 12.9 | 3.5 | .. | .. | 12.3 | .. | .. | .. |
| Trade Education/Training | .. | .. | .. | 23.6 | 560.0 | .. | .. | 13.7 | 4.1 |
| **Sub-total** | **472.1** | **195.7** | **583.8** | **811.3** | **1 514.8** | **91.7** | **369.9** | **174.1** | **269.8** |
| **Economic Infrastructure** | | | | | | | | | |
| Transport and Storage | 6 450.6 | 9 670.5 | 12 812.8 | 10 549.7 | 13 888.3 | 2 930.3 | 7 672.1 | 7 262.4 | 9 015.9 |
| Communications | 689.0 | 756.9 | 735.6 | 695.9 | 1 576.4 | 365.0 | 821.5 | 656.2 | 1 019.5 |
| Energy Generation and Supply | 2 481.1 | 6 691.2 | 13 867.5 | 9 928.7 | 9 132.2 | 1 334.2 | 7 172.7 | 6 574.5 | 6 543.8 |
| **Sub-total** | **9 620.7** | **17 118.6** | **27 416.0** | **21 174.4** | **24 596.9** | **4 629.5** | **15 666.4** | **14 493.1** | **16 579.2** |
| **Building Productive Capacity** | | | | | | | | | |
| Business And Other Services | 649.6 | 1 529.1 | 2 506.4 | 404.6 | 678.9 | 845.7 | 1 699.0 | 475.8 | 853.4 |
| Banking & Financial Services | 2 645.7 | 2 816.6 | 8 994.5 | 6 947.5 | 10 511.7 | 1 852.9 | 8 117.5 | 5 805.6 | 5 921.8 |
| Agriculture | 1 342.2 | 1 243.5 | 2 286.9 | 1 996.8 | 3 258.2 | 793.0 | 1 230.1 | 1 399.4 | 1 728.5 |
| Forestry | 93.2 | 74.8 | 352.0 | 462.9 | 264.0 | 56.9 | 187.5 | 264.0 | 183.1 |
| Fishing | 8.3 | 1.6 | 50.8 | 27.8 | 79.7 | 1.6 | 22.7 | 12.6 | 81.4 |
| Industry | 1 803.7 | 4 830.1 | 4 910.0 | 4 224.7 | 6 060.0 | 2 365.2 | 4 715.9 | 4 254.0 | 5 762.9 |
| Mineral Resources and Mining | 279.5 | 1 028.3 | 1 872.6 | 1 882.2 | 793.6 | 694.2 | 1 495.5 | 1 023.4 | 543.9 |
| Tourism | 126.7 | 88.7 | 344.4 | 110.2 | 1 021.4 | 59.2 | 115.9 | 122.0 | 759.4 |
| **Sub-total** | **6 948.9** | **11 612.7** | **21 317.5** | **16 056.6** | **22 667.5** | **6 668.7** | **17 584.1** | **13 356.9** | **15 834.4** |
| **TOTAL** | **17 041.6** | **28 927.1** | **49 317.2** | **38 042.3** | **48 779.2** | **11 389.9** | **33 620.4** | **28 024.1** | **32 683.4** |
| ***Share in total*** | | | | | | | | | |
| *Trade Policy and Regulations* | *2.8%* | *0.7%* | *1.2%* | *2.1%* | *3.1%* | *0.8%* | *1.1%* | *0.6%* | *0.8%* |
| *Economic Infrastructure* | *56.5%* | *59.2%* | *55.6%* | *55.7%* | *50.4%* | *40.6%* | *46.6%* | *51.7%* | *50.7%* |
| *Building Productive Capacity* | *40.8%* | *40.1%* | *43.2%* | *42.2%* | *46.5%* | *58.5%* | *52.3%* | *47.7%* | *48.4%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240624

## TABLE A.20 Trade related other official flows by individual provider

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| **DAC countries** | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | .. | 1.1 | 16.4 | 37.0 | 63.3 | 3.2 | 16.4 | 37.0 | 63.3 |
| Austria | 1.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Belgium | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. | 146.7 | 0.3 |
| Canada | .. | .. | 4.9 | .. | 58.5 | .. | 4.9 | .. | 58.5 |
| Denmark | 8.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Finland | 17.8 | 33.5 | 45.8 | 19.9 | 20.0 | 32.8 | 44.6 | 15.5 | 25.0 |
| France | 273.6 | 323.8 | 1 048.6 | 1 587.8 | 1 210.8 | 303.4 | 716.6 | 1 054.7 | 1 178.3 |
| Germany | .. | 1 202.0 | 1 193.5 | 1 332.6 | 958.6 | 940.8 | 1 322.5 | 1 312.0 | 1 178.3 |
| Greece | .. | 1.6 | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | .. | .. | .. |
| Italy | .. | .. | 0.4 | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | .. | .. |
| Japan | 1 011.7 | 1 690.6 | .. | .. | .. | 45.6 | .. | .. | .. |
| Korea | .. | 2 007.2 | 4 211.2 | 6 472.1 | 4 563.8 | 1 830.8 | 3 676.7 | 4 080.8 | 5 374.6 |
| Netherlands | 9.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Portugal | .. | .. | 0.4 | 1.4 | 3.8 | .. | 0.4 | 1.4 | 3.1 |
| Spain | .. | 2.4 | .. | .. | 15.3 | .. | .. | .. | 17.1 |
| Sweden | 2.0 | 0.0 | .. | - 28.3 | 62.7 | 0.1 | .. | - 17.1 | 28.7 |
| United Kingdom | 215.4 | 15.5 | 118.7 | 49.3 | 61.4 | - 5.8 | 118.7 | 49.3 | 61.4 |
| United States | 177.6 | 375.2 | 694.3 | 356.0 | 651.5 | 119.0 | 340.4 | 205.8 | 304.1 |
| **Sub-total** | **1 716.9** | **5 652.9** | **7 334.3** | **9 827.6** | **7 670.0** | **3 271.4** | **6 241.6** | **6 886.0** | **8 292.7** |
| **Other bilateral** | | | | | | | | | |
| United Arab Emirates | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 22.5 | 61.1 | 7.9 |
| **Multilateral** | | | | | | | | | |
| AfDB | 367.0 | 1 029.4 | 3 842.9 | 1 472.8 | 1 625.9 | 534.8 | 2 325.3 | 2 687.2 | 1 716.2 |
| AsDB | 3 666.4 | 4 151.7 | 4 858.5 | 5 868.9 | 6 738.9 | .. | 2 372.9 | 4 155.5 | 4 322.9 |
| Climate Investment Funds (CIF) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 70.0 |
| Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) | .. | .. | 187.3 | 69.8 | 422.2 | .. | 152.3 | 158.0 | 265.6 |
| EBRD | .. | .. | 4 958.9 | 4 899.5 | 5 193.4 | .. | 3 762.0 | 3 253.3 | 3 763.9 |
| EU Institutions | 2 463.5 | 5 720.3 | 3 336.9 | 677.1 | 1 323.2 | 1 678.9 | 3 679.3 | 709.9 | 1 375.8 |
| IADB | 1.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IBRD | 6 262.6 | 7 964.6 | 16 023.7 | 8 380.1 | 7 816.3 | 5 904.8 | 10 225.5 | 7 093.0 | 7 571.9 |
| IDB | 1 897.0 | 2 949.5 | 5 686.1 | 3 836.3 | 6 409.7 | .. | 4 436.6 | 2 704.6 | 4 639.8 |
| IFAD | 24.5 | 38.5 | 70.2 | 289.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| IFC | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8 103.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Islamic Development Bank | 642.0 | 1 420.4 | 2 525.6 | 2 155.5 | 2 697.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| OFID | .. | .. | 492.7 | 565.9 | 778.0 | .. | 402.3 | 315.5 | 656.7 |
| **Sub-total** | **15 324.7** | **23 274.2** | **41 982.9** | **28 214.7** | **41 109.2** | **8 118.5** | **27 356.3** | **21 077.0** | **24 382.8** |
| **TOTAL** | **17 041.6** | **28 927.1** | **49 317.2** | **38 042.3** | **48 779.2** | **11 389.9** | **33 620.4** | **28 024.1** | **32 683.4** |
| ***Share in total*** | | | | | | | | | |
| *Bilateral* | *10.1%* | *19.5%* | *14.9%* | *25.8%* | *15.7%* | *28.7%* | *18.6%* | *24.8%* | *25.4%* |
| *Multilateral* | *89.9%* | *80.5%* | *85.1%* | *74.2%* | *84.3%* | *71.3%* | *81.4%* | *75.2%* | *74.6%* |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933240636

## TABLE A.21 Trade related other official flows by individual recipient *(page 1 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Afghanistan | 8.4 | 26.9 | 21.9 | 3.0 | 65.0 | 14.9 | 18.6 | 6.8 | 8.8 |
| Albania | 13.0 | 46.5 | 196.1 | 106.8 | 322.7 | 14.8 | 107.4 | 112.6 | 51.6 |
| Algeria | 126.4 | 0.0 | 229.3 | .. | 182.8 | 4.8 | 229.3 | 0.8 | 91.4 |
| Angola | .. | 7.1 | 27.3 | .. | .. | 3.4 | 28.6 | .. | .. |
| Argentina | 570.7 | 1 489.2 | 904.4 | 490.2 | 713.2 | 181.1 | 1 060.6 | 740.5 | 880.1 |
| Armenia | .. | 16.0 | 220.8 | 157.5 | 224.0 | 17.0 | 167.4 | 129.9 | 147.0 |
| Azerbaijan | 26.0 | 529.8 | 459.9 | 369.6 | 869.7 | 33.5 | 304.9 | 493.3 | 364.5 |
| Bangladesh | 124.0 | 278.0 | 503.5 | 668.6 | 555.3 | 14.7 | 117.7 | 307.5 | 384.7 |
| Barbados | .. | 4.8 | 26.2 | .. | .. | .. | 16.3 | .. | .. |
| Belarus | .. | 26.2 | 211.1 | 224.8 | 453.4 | 11.8 | 80.2 | 303.0 | 342.7 |
| Belize | 2.7 | 1.0 | 8.0 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 3.6 | 8.6 | 5.9 |
| Benin | 8.8 | .. | 7.6 | 8.7 | .. | .. | .. | 2.4 | .. |
| Bhutan | .. | .. | 17.9 | .. | .. | .. | 12.3 | 6.0 | 0.9 |
| Bolivia | 15.2 | 12.0 | 42.6 | .. | 12.3 | 7.0 | 3.4 | 4.9 | 3.6 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 57.2 | 206.3 | 219.7 | 296.2 | 326.4 | 63.9 | 260.8 | 187.6 | 287.0 |
| Botswana | 14.2 | 2.4 | 758.6 | .. | .. | 2.4 | 364.0 | 39.8 | 14.9 |
| Brazil | 1 861.5 | 1 531.6 | 2 891.4 | 2 420.7 | 3 097.6 | 568.0 | 2 338.7 | 1 097.1 | 1 476.8 |
| Burkina Faso | 2.6 | 5.5 | 11.2 | 9.7 | 100.0 | .. | 1.6 | .. | .. |
| Burundi | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | .. |
| Cabo Verde | .. | 22.0 | 36.5 | 50.0 | 82.0 | .. | 42.5 | 3.9 | 19.5 |
| Cambodia | 5.9 | 1.4 | 22.0 | 54.3 | 159.1 | 5.0 | 17.9 | 52.0 | 99.1 |
| Cameroon | 5.0 | 10.7 | 51.0 | 132.1 | .. | 18.9 | 46.3 | 70.0 | 32.4 |
| Central African Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Chad | 9.1 | 23.5 | 57.1 | 30.0 | .. | 5.2 | .. | 1.2 | .. |
| Chile | 63.9 | 286.1 | 146.0 | 81.6 | 840.1 | 70.8 | 179.3 | 170.5 | 282.1 |
| China (People's Republic of) | 2 368.8 | 3 254.6 | 3 722.9 | 3 005.7 | 5 205.6 | 1 660.1 | 2 917.5 | 3 319.5 | 3 376.7 |
| Colombia | 399.1 | 505.4 | 785.0 | 646.8 | 486.7 | 341.2 | 495.3 | 198.6 | 463.3 |
| Comoros | .. | .. | 1.8 | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | .. | .. |
| Congo | .. | 0.7 | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Cook Islands | .. | .. | 4.6 | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | 7.2 | 0.0 |
| Costa Rica | 59.0 | 32.9 | 118.1 | 481.4 | 705.8 | 22.1 | 177.9 | 180.9 | 201.4 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 7.1 | 51.4 | 17.6 | 147.0 | 498.2 | 1.6 | .. | 14.1 | 41.2 |
| Croatia | 178.6 | 543.5 | 578.9 | .. | .. | 161.8 | 608.9 | .. | .. |
| Cuba | 1.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Democratic People's Republic of Korea | .. | .. | 0.3 | 1.3 | 2.6 | .. | 0.3 | 1.3 | 2.6 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | .. | .. | .. | 10.9 | 4.0 | .. | 2.5 | 13.7 | .. |
| Djibouti | .. | 29.6 | 37.7 | .. | .. | .. | 52.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Dominica | 0.4 | .. | .. | 9.4 | .. | .. | .. | 2.4 | 3.3 |
| Dominican Republic | 139.5 | 38.1 | 389.7 | 174.2 | 169.6 | 51.1 | 221.1 | 57.5 | 92.1 |
| Ecuador | 40.0 | 80.9 | 293.1 | 110.6 | 488.1 | 13.4 | 107.5 | 206.9 | 149.3 |
| Egypt | 628.0 | 1 193.5 | 1 694.5 | 602.9 | 1 323.3 | 489.8 | 844.9 | 681.5 | 710.3 |
| El Salvador | 49.1 | 145.8 | 118.9 | 72.3 | 375.0 | 8.1 | 113.0 | 36.9 | 159.4 |
| Equatorial Guinea | .. | .. | 7.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Eritrea | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Ethiopia | .. | 19.3 | 16.5 | 0.8 | 78.0 | .. | 31.2 | 1.3 | .. |
| Fiji | 6.4 | 11.9 | 15.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | .. | 5.7 | 11.1 | 9.1 |
| Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | 15.3 | 72.8 | 199.6 | 46.9 | 10.6 | 22.0 | 105.0 | 57.4 | 52.1 |
| Gabon | 48.0 | 233.5 | 9.9 | 390.6 | .. | 9.9 | 66.9 | 67.7 | 40.4 |
| Gambia | 3.2 | 0.1 | 13.7 | 27.5 | 10.0 | .. | 4.0 | .. | 14.5 |
| Georgia | 0.3 | 41.2 | 409.6 | 417.1 | 379.5 | 20.7 | 272.4 | 251.3 | 161.5 |
| Ghana | 4.2 | 106.8 | 86.8 | 118.9 | 119.8 | 37.0 | 58.9 | 37.7 | 141.8 |
| Grenada | 0.5 | .. | 4.6 | .. | .. | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.1 | .. |
| Guatemala | 206.4 | 60.2 | 107.7 | 5.0 | 203.7 | 81.0 | 128.6 | 15.8 | 203.7 |
| Guinea | 7.4 | .. | 3.6 | 2.2 | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | .. |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Guyana | .. | 6.5 | 5.2 | .. | 5.5 | .. | 1.1 | 0.0 | .. |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.21 Trade related other official flows by individual recipient *(page 2 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Haiti | .. | 0.2 | 3.5 | 31.0 | 21.0 | - 0.1 | 2.4 | 10.0 | 5.7 |
| Honduras | 2.9 | 70.0 | 30.5 | .. | 145.4 | 4.2 | 21.0 | 28.8 | 65.0 |
| India | 2 529.4 | 2 409.0 | 4 711.5 | 2 712.3 | 3 011.9 | 1 202.0 | 2 859.9 | 1 901.6 | 2 044.4 |
| Indonesia | 432.2 | 853.0 | 1 931.3 | 3 866.7 | 2 059.7 | 701.8 | 964.8 | 2 175.7 | 1 844.7 |
| Iran | 212.1 | 144.6 | 302.7 | 153.3 | 153.7 | 37.3 | 17.4 | 10.8 | 4.2 |
| Iraq | 13.3 | 270.4 | 111.3 | 44.9 | 654.6 | 17.8 | 63.3 | 52.2 | 90.9 |
| Jamaica | 32.8 | 34.6 | 227.7 | 7.3 | 130.0 | 1.0 | 147.4 | 64.8 | 149.9 |
| Jordan | 23.7 | 130.8 | 253.9 | 561.9 | 168.1 | 13.1 | 207.3 | 159.6 | 422.7 |
| Kazakhstan | 70.5 | 124.8 | 1 915.3 | 1 626.2 | 1 130.6 | 114.6 | 1 018.3 | 973.7 | 1 074.7 |
| Kenya | 14.3 | 47.1 | 95.0 | 185.7 | 349.1 | 33.3 | 75.7 | 140.6 | 117.1 |
| Kosovo | .. | .. | 7.0 | 6.9 | 49.6 | .. | 3.3 | 1.4 | 9.1 |
| Kyrgyzstan | .. | .. | 35.4 | 10.1 | 10.0 | .. | 34.4 | 0.1 | .. |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | 28.3 | 10.9 | 8.5 | 54.4 | 8.0 | 13.2 | 11.5 | 33.4 | .. |
| Lebanon | 103.4 | 166.3 | 51.3 | 119.4 | 53.6 | 86.2 | 73.6 | 73.7 | 46.2 |
| Lesotho | .. | .. | 9.3 | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | .. | .. |
| Liberia | .. | 20.5 | 74.7 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 20.1 | 33.0 | 4.8 |
| Libya | .. | 2.7 | 0.0 | 50.3 | .. | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 | .. |
| Madagascar | 0.8 | 388.8 | 212.4 | 4.3 | 0.7 | 174.8 | 340.3 | 44.6 | 0.7 |
| Malawi | 0.7 | 0.5 | 3.3 | .. | 10.0 | 1.8 | .. | .. | .. |
| Malaysia | 152.5 | 87.9 | 11.6 | 2.5 | 26.7 | 0.3 | 5.1 | 2.5 | 6.7 |
| Maldives | .. | 29.7 | .. | .. | 12.0 | .. | 4.1 | .. | .. |
| Mali | 0.3 | 21.7 | 26.6 | 40.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Marshall Islands | .. | .. | 3.1 | .. | .. | .. | 3.1 | .. | .. |
| Mauritania | 8.4 | 24.9 | 157.7 | 19.3 | .. | 10.4 | 26.8 | 117.8 | 127.3 |
| Mauritius | 7.8 | 23.9 | 109.0 | 15.9 | 168.9 | 9.7 | 75.7 | 98.5 | 69.0 |
| Mayotte | 3.2 | 1.9 | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | 1.1 | .. | .. |
| Mexico | 1 322.0 | 616.7 | 2 465.6 | 1 298.3 | 1 226.2 | 598.2 | 2 314.9 | 992.8 | 1 312.5 |
| Micronesia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.7 | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 |
| Moldova | 0.9 | 25.8 | 86.1 | 125.0 | 157.3 | 1.5 | 62.3 | 53.9 | 77.7 |
| Mongolia | .. | .. | 106.8 | 552.7 | 196.5 | .. | 96.0 | 287.0 | 171.1 |
| Montenegro | .. | 21.3 | 181.1 | 50.2 | 110.4 | 17.6 | 88.8 | 142.0 | 55.2 |
| Morocco | 466.4 | 667.7 | 1 069.6 | 1 205.7 | 1 477.1 | 258.1 | 645.9 | 720.2 | 1 051.6 |
| Mozambique | 49.2 | 10.9 | 53.1 | 2.0 | 68.0 | 21.4 | 36.1 | 2.0 | .. |
| Myanmar | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.3 | .. | .. | .. | 7.3 |
| Namibia | 22.2 | 17.9 | 37.7 | 14.3 | 280.5 | 22.9 | 38.2 | 8.9 | 4.2 |
| Nauru | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Nepal | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Nicaragua | 2.8 | 36.4 | 48.3 | 56.9 | 156.0 | 14.8 | 18.2 | 89.8 | 26.8 |
| Niger | 2.7 | 6.8 | 7.3 | 34.2 | 17.7 | .. | 5.8 | 2.8 | 10.5 |
| Nigeria | 57.6 | 141.4 | 234.7 | 64.5 | 985.0 | 29.2 | 166.1 | 72.4 | 382.8 |
| Oman | 48.4 | 394.7 | 2.1 | .. | .. | 212.2 | 42.5 | .. | .. |
| Pakistan | 753.7 | 933.2 | 710.9 | 892.9 | 329.7 | 151.5 | 325.7 | 438.4 | 475.7 |
| Panama | 36.7 | 280.1 | 565.5 | 22.9 | 128.6 | 19.8 | 260.6 | 172.0 | 786.3 |
| Papua New Guinea | 18.3 | 33.9 | 35.3 | 85.8 | 72.7 | 11.3 | 10.5 | 30.2 | 86.0 |
| Paraguay | 10.6 | 181.8 | 129.7 | 84.4 | 403.4 | 21.2 | 130.7 | 93.8 | 120.5 |
| Peru | 282.1 | 442.0 | 596.8 | 198.9 | 577.8 | 168.0 | 600.6 | 170.1 | 223.3 |
| Philippines | 120.4 | 1 217.9 | 209.1 | 94.4 | 595.9 | 150.8 | 181.0 | 66.8 | 160.2 |
| Rwanda | 3.2 | 3.3 | 31.0 | .. | 21.0 | 0.4 | 8.4 | 20.8 | 42.5 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 1.8 | .. | 5.5 | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 | .. |
| Saint Lucia | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.1 | .. |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 1.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | .. |
| São Tomé and Principe | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.0 | .. |
| Saudi Arabia | 37.0 | 84.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Senegal | 16.8 | 20.4 | 175.6 | 61.3 | 1.1 | 7.8 | 26.9 | 105.3 | 38.2 |
| Serbia | 26.2 | 225.2 | 975.3 | 564.3 | 728.2 | 14.2 | 707.0 | 343.2 | 617.7 |
| Seychelles | .. | .. | 13.1 | 2.5 | 3.2 | .. | 5.6 | 12.2 | 0.0 |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

## TABLE A.21 Trade related other official flows by individual recipient *(page 3 of 3)*

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Sierra Leone | .. | .. | 8.3 | 20.1 | 4.5 | .. | .. | 42.4 | 6.9 |
| Slovenia | 71.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Solomon Islands | .. | .. | 1.3 | 1.9 | 11.8 | .. | 1.3 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| Somalia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| South Africa | 162.5 | 197.7 | 2 958.7 | 133.7 | 270.9 | 24.4 | 1 080.4 | 1 813.3 | 942.2 |
| Sri Lanka | 138.0 | 261.4 | 173.6 | 40.3 | 143.0 | 10.3 | 133.4 | 237.8 | 179.3 |
| States Ex-Yugoslavia | 65.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Sudan | 20.1 | 50.0 | 71.5 | 72.7 | 109.1 | 2.3 | 26.0 | 19.5 | 1.7 |
| Suriname | 6.1 | 1.5 | 15.0 | 69.2 | 105.0 | .. | 25.7 | 20.0 | 80.6 |
| Swaziland | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.6 | 4.5 | 0.2 | .. |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 227.1 | 94.3 | 79.2 | .. | .. | .. | 53.0 | .. | .. |
| Tajikistan | .. | .. | 19.8 | 47.4 | 34.9 | .. | 17.6 | 36.4 | 11.8 |
| Tanzania | 7.1 | 18.4 | 9.3 | 22.3 | 214.5 | 16.9 | 10.6 | 7.5 | 58.7 |
| Thailand | 28.2 | 62.7 | 235.7 | 243.1 | 137.7 | 22.4 | 63.5 | 265.3 | 207.0 |
| Timor-Leste | .. | .. | .. | 31.0 | 55.5 | .. | .. | 0.1 | 4.1 |
| Togo | 0.0 | 52.4 | 27.2 | 56.1 | .. | .. | 50.1 | 48.0 | 12.9 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | .. | 4.8 | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.1 | .. | .. |
| Tunisia | 354.4 | 565.3 | 929.8 | 523.4 | 126.0 | 226.1 | 671.5 | 368.8 | 223.7 |
| Turkey | 1 294.1 | 3 810.2 | 3 724.4 | 2 270.8 | 4 788.9 | 1 910.5 | 3 653.9 | 2 412.7 | 3 206.9 |
| Turkmenistan | .. | .. | 280.0 | 18.4 | 10.9 | .. | 12.1 | 67.2 | 46.0 |
| Uganda | 3.3 | 108.2 | 26.9 | 64.1 | 308.4 | 32.8 | 70.2 | 90.7 | 41.4 |
| Ukraine | 63.1 | 464.6 | 1 575.4 | 1 441.8 | 1 372.8 | 214.5 | 1 220.8 | 1 055.0 | 1 086.1 |
| Uruguay | 257.2 | 150.0 | 236.7 | 667.8 | 855.9 | 70.4 | 204.2 | 221.7 | 245.4 |
| Uzbekistan | 135.1 | 101.1 | 396.3 | 1 584.1 | 1 128.5 | 31.5 | 62.1 | 118.2 | 315.5 |
| Vanuatu | 0.1 | .. | 2.0 | .. | 1.5 | .. | 2.0 | .. | .. |
| Venezuela | 14.3 | 290.9 | 595.5 | 7.0 | .. | 0.0 | 399.3 | 10.3 | 3.2 |
| Viet Nam | 32.1 | 779.0 | 1 670.2 | 1 573.0 | 1 776.2 | 207.5 | 796.8 | 980.8 | 1 975.3 |
| Wallis and Futuna | 0.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| West Bank and Gaza Strip | .. | 116.5 | 10.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Yemen | .. | 157.8 | 12.1 | 50.3 | .. | 173.0 | 32.2 | .. | .. |
| Zambia | 16.3 | 34.8 | 23.6 | .. | .. | 34.0 | 10.7 | 5.1 | .. |
| Zimbabwe | .. | .. | .. | 8.0 | 29.1 | .. | 0.0 | 21.6 | 8.0 |
| **Total recipient countries** | **16 892.5** | **28 503.1** | **46 830.2** | **35 247.3** | **45 272.6** | **11 090.7** | **31 973.7** | **26 496.4** | **30 707.8** |
| Non country specific | 149.1 | 424.0 | 2 487.0 | 2 795.0 | 3 506.7 | 299.1 | 1 646.7 | 1 527.7 | 1 975.6 |
| **TOTAL** | **17 041.6** | **28 927.1** | **49 317.2** | **38 042.3** | **48 779.2** | **11 389.9** | **33 620.4** | **28 024.1** | **32 683.4** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

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## TABLE A.22 Trade related other official flows share in sector allocable and total OOF

*USD million (2013 constant)*

| | COMMITMENTS | | | | | DISBURSEMENTS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2002-05 avg. | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 | 2006-08 avg. | 2009-11 avg. | 2012 | 2013 |
| Trade-related OOF | 17 042 | 28 927 | 49 317 | 38 042 | 48 779 | 11 390 | 33 620 | 28 024 | 32 683 |
| Sector allocable OOF | 77 674 | 105 272 | 129 509 | 135 408 | 144 062 | 82 232 | 107 442 | 111 354 | 119 468 |
| ***Share in sector allocable*** | ***32.5%*** | ***31.5%*** | ***34.0%*** | ***39.6%*** | ***38.4%*** | ***28.7%*** | ***30.9%*** | ***34.4%*** | ***34.8%*** |
| Total OOF | 142 818 | 151 235 | 168 603 | 172 940 | 188 782 | 145 407 | 150 043 | 152 075 | 167 373 |
| ***Share in total OOF*** | ***17.7%*** | ***21.9%*** | ***26.1%*** | ***31.0%*** | ***29.3%*** | ***16.2%*** | ***22.2%*** | ***25.2%*** | ***24.9%*** |

*Source:* OECD-DAC/CRS aid activity database.

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# ANNEX B
# DAC LIST OF ODA RECIPIENTS BY INCOME GROUP

## LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | Djibouti | Madagascar | Solomon Islands |
| Angola | Equatorial Guinea | Malawi | Somalia |
| Bangladesh | Eritrea | Mali | South Sudan |
| Benin | Ethiopia | Mauritania | Sudan |
| Bhutan | Gambia | Mozambique | Tanzania |
| Burkina Faso | Guinea | Myanmar | Timor-Leste |
| Burundi | Guinea-Bissau | Nepal | Togo |
| Cambodia | Haiti | Niger | Tuvalu |
| Central African Rep. | Kiribati | Rwanda | Uganda |
| Chad | Lao PDR | São Tomé and Príncipe | Vanuatu |
| Comoros | Lesotho | Senegal | Yemen |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | Liberia | Sierra Leone | Zambia |

## OTHER LOW INCOME COUNTRIES (per capita GNI <= $1 045 in 2013)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kenya | Korea, Dem. Rep. | Tajikistan | Zimbabwe |

## LOWER MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES (per capita GNI $1 046-$4 125 in 2013)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armenia | Guyana | Nigeria | Ukraine |
| Bolivia | Honduras | Pakistan | Uzbekistan |
| Cameroon | India | Papua New Guinea | Vietnam |
| Cape Verde | Indonesia | Paraguay | West Bank and Gaza Strip |
| Congo, Rep. | Kyrgyzstan | Philippines | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Kosovo[1] | Sri Lanka | |
| Egypt | Micronesia, Federated States | Swaziland | |
| El Salvador | Moldova | Syria | |
| Georgia | Mongolia | Tokelau* | |
| Ghana | Morocco | Tonga | |
| Guatemala | Nicaragua | Turkmenistan | |

## UPPER MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES
### (per capita GNI $4 126-$12 745 in 2013)

Albania
Algeria
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belize
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Chile
China (People's Republic of)
Colombia
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Fiji
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Gabon
Grenada
Iran
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Maldives
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Mexico
Montenegro
Montserrat *
Namibia
Nauru
Niue
Palau
Panama
Peru
Saint Helena*
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Serbia
Seychelles
South Africa
Suriname
Thailand
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uruguay
Venezuela
Wallis and Futuna*

*Notes:*
** Territory*
*1. This is without prejudice to the status of Kosovo under international law.*

# ANNEX C
## DAC LIST OF ODA RECIPIENTS BY REGION

### AFRICA

#### North of Sahara

Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia

#### South of Sahara

Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
St. Helena
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

### AMERICA

#### North & Central America

Antigua and Barbuda
Belize
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Montserrat
Nicaragua
Panama
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines

#### South America

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela

## ASIA

### Far East Asia

Cambodia
China (People's Republic of)
Indonesia
Democratic Republic of Korea
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Mongolia
Philippines
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Vietnam

### Middle East

Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
West Bank and Gaza Strip
Yemen

### South & Central Asia

Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Georgia
India
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Maldives
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

## EUROPE

Albania
Belarus
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Kosovo
Moldova
Montenegro
Serbia
Turkey
Ukraine

## OCEANIA

Cook Islands
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Federal States
Nauru
Niue
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tokelau
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Wallis and Fortuna

# ANNEX D
# AID FOR TRADE RELATED CRS PURPOSE CODES BY CATEGORY

| CRS CODE | DESCRIPTION | CLARIFICATIONS/ ADDITONAL NOTES ON COVERAGE |
|---|---|---|
| **Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment** | | |
| 33110 | Trade policy and administrative management | Trade policy and planning; support to ministries and departments responsible for trade policy; trade-related legislation and regulatory reforms; policy analysis and implementation of multilateral trade agreements e.g. technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (TBT/SPS) except at regional level (see 33130); mainstreaming trade in national development strategies (e.g. poverty reduction strategy papers); wholesale/retail trade; unspecified trade and trade promotion activities. |
| 33120 | Trade facilitation | Simplification and harmonisation of international import and export procedures (e.g. customs valuation, licensing procedures, transport formalities, payments, insurance); support to customs departments; tariff reforms. |
| 33130 | Regional trade agreements (RTAs) | Support to regional trade arrangements [e.g. Southern African Development Community (SADC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), African Caribbean Pacific/European Union (ACP/EU)], including work on technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (TBT/SPS) at regional level; elaboration of rules of origin and introduction of special and differential treatment in RTAs. |
| 33140 | Multilateral trade negotiations | Support developing countries' effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations, including training of negotiators, assessing impacts of negotiations; accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other multilateral trade-related organisations. |
| 33181 | Trade education/training | Human resources development in trade not included under any of the above codes. Includes university programmes in trade. |
| 33150 | Trade-related adjustment | Contributions to the government budget to assist the implementation of recipients' own trade reforms and adjustments to trade policy measures by other countries; assistance to manage shortfalls in the balance of payments due to changes in the world trading environment. |
| **Economic Infrastructure** | | |
| | **TRANSPORT AND STORAGE** | |
| 21010 | Transport policy and administrative management | Transport sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to transport ministries; institution capacity building and advice; unspecified transport; activities that combine road, rail, water and/or air transport. |
| 21020 | Road transport | Road infrastructure, road vehicles; passenger road transport, motor passenger cars. |
| 21030 | Rail transport | Rail infrastructure, rail equipment, locomotives, other rolling stock; including light rail (tram) and underground systems. |
| 21040 | Water transport | Harbours and docks, harbour guidance systems, ships and boats; river and other inland water transport, inland barges and vessels. |
| 21050 | Air transport | Airports, airport guidance systems, aeroplanes, aeroplane maintenance equipment. |
| 21061 | Storage | Whether or not related to transportation. |
| 21081 | Education and training in transport and storage | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **COMMUNICATIONS** | |
| 22010 | Communications policy and administrative management | Communications sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; including postal services development; unspecified communications activities |
| 22020 | Telecommunications | Telephone networks, telecommunication satellites, earth stations. |
| 22030 | Radio/television/print media | Telephone networks, telecommunication satellites, earth stations.. |
| 22040 | Information and communication technology (ICT) | Computer hardware and software; internet access; IT training. When sector cannot be specified. |
| | **ENERGY GENERATION AND SUPPLY** | |
| 23010 | Energy policy and administrative management | Energy sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to energy ministries; institution capacity building and advice; unspecified energy activities including energy conservation. |
| 23020 | Power generation/non-renewable sources | Thermal power plants including when heat source cannot be determined; combined gas-coal power plants. |
| 23030 | Power generation/renewable sources | Including policy, planning, development programmes, surveys and incentives. Fuelwood/ charcoal production should be included under forestry (31261). |
| 23040 | Electrical transmission/ distribution | Distribution from power source to end user; transmission lines. |
| 23050 | Gas distribution | Delivery for use by ultimate consumer. |
| 23061 | Oil-fired power plants | Including diesel power plants. |
| 23062 | Gas-fired power plants | |
| 23063 | Coal-fired power plants | |
| 23064 | Nuclear power plants | Including nuclear safety. |
| 23065 | Hydro-electric power plants | Including power-generating river barges. |
| 23066 | Geothermal energy | |
| 23067 | Solar energy | Including photo-voltaic cells, solar thermal applications and solar heating. |
| 23068 | Wind power | Wind energy for water lifting and electric power generation. |
| 23069 | Ocean power | Including ocean thermal energy conversion, tidal and wave power. |
| 23070 | Biomass | Densification technologies and use of biomass for direct power generation including biogas, gas obtained from sugar cane and other plant residues, anaerobic digesters. |
| 23081 | Energy education/training | Applies to all energy sub-sectors; all levels of training. |
| 23082 | Energy research | Including general inventories, surveys. |
| **Building Productive Capacity (including Trade Development)** | | |
| | **BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES** | |
| 24010 | Financial policy and administrative management | Finance sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; financial markets and systems. |
| 24020 | Monetary institutions | Central banks. |
| 24030 | Formal sector financial interme-diaries | All formal sector financial intermediaries; credit lines; insurance, leasing, venture capital, etc. (except when focused on only one sector). |
| 24040 | Informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries | Micro credit, savings and credit co-operatives etc. |
| 24081 | Education/training in banking and financial services | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **BUSINESS AND OTHER SERVICES** | |
| 25010 | Business support services and institutions | Support to trade and business associations, chambers of commerce; legal and regulatory reform aimed at improving business and investment climate; private sector institution capacity building and advice; trade information; public-private sector networking including trade fairs; e-commerce. Where sector cannot be specified: general support to private sector enterprises (in particular, use code 32130 for enterprises in the industrial sector). |
| 25020 | Privatisation | When sector cannot be specified. Including general state enterprise restructuring or demonopolisation programmes; planning, programming, advice. |
| | **AGRICULTURE** | |
| 31110 | Agricultural policy and administrative management | Agricultural sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to agricultural ministries; institution capacity building and advice; unspecified agriculture. |
| 31120 | Agricultural development | Integrated projects; farm development. |
| 31130 | Agricultural land resources | Including soil degradation control; soil improvement; drainage of water logged areas; soil desalination; agricultural land surveys; land reclamation; erosion control, desertification control. |
| 31140 | Agricultural water resources | Irrigation, reservoirs, hydraulic structures, ground water exploitation for agricultural use. |
| | | |
| 31150 | Agricultural inputs | Supply of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural machinery/equipment. |
| 31161 | Food crop production | Including grains (wheat, rice, barley, maize, rye, oats, millet, sorghum); horticulture; vegetables; fruit and berries; other annual and perennial crops. [Use code 32161 for agro-industries.] |
| 31162 | Industrial crops/export crops | Including sugar; coffee, cocoa, tea; oil seeds, nuts, kernels; fibre crops; tobacco; rubber. [Use code 32161 for agro-industries.] |
| 31163 | Livestock | Animal husbandry; animal feed aid. |
| 31164 | Agrarian reform | Including agricultural sector adjustment. |
| 31165 | Agricultural alternative development | Projects to reduce illicit drug cultivation through other agricultural marketing and production opportunities (see code 43050 for non-agricultural alternative development). |
| 31166 | Agricultural extension | Non-formal training in agriculture. |
| 31181 | Agricultural education/training | |
| 31182 | Agricultural research | Plant breeding, physiology, genetic resources, ecology, taxonomy, disease control, agricultural bio-technology; including livestock research (animal health, breeding and genetics, nutrition, physiology). |
| 31191 | Agricultural services | Marketing policies & organisation; storage and transportation, creation of strategic reserves. |
| 31192 | Plant and post-harvest protection and pest control | Including integrated plant protection, biological plant protection activities, supply and management of agrochemicals, supply of pesticides, plant protection policy and legislation. |
| 31193 | Agricultural financial services | Financial intermediaries for the agricultural sector including credit schemes; crop insurance. |
| 31194 | Agricultural co-operatives | Including farmers' organisations. |
| 31195 | Livestock/veterinary services | Animal health and management, genetic resources, feed resources. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **FORESTRY** | |
| 31210 | Forestry policy and administrative management | Forestry sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; forest surveys; unspecified forestry and agro-forestry activities. |
| 31220 | Forestry development | Afforestation for industrial and rural consumption; exploitation and utilisation; erosion control, desertification control; integrated forestry projects. |
| 31261 | Fuelwood/charcoal | Forestry development whose primary purpose is production of fuelwood and charcoal. |
| 31281 | Forestry education/training | |
| 31282 | Forestry research | Including artificial regeneration, genetic improvement, production methods, fertilizer, harvesting. |
| 31291 | Forestry services | |
| | **FISHING** | |
| 31310 | Fishing policy and administrative management | Fishing sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; ocean and coastal fishing; marine and freshwater fish surveys and prospecting; fishing boats/equipment; unspecified fishing activities. |
| 31320 | Fishery development | Exploitation and utilisation of fisheries; fish stock protection; aquaculture; integrated fishery projects. |
| 31381 | Fishery education/training | |
| 31382 | Fishery research | Pilot fish culture; marine/freshwater biological research. |
| 31391 | Fishery services | Fishing harbours; fish markets; fishery transport and cold storage. |
| | **INDUSTRY** | |
| 32110 | Industrial policy and administrative management | Industrial sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; unspecified industrial activities; manufacturing of goods not specified below. |
| 32120 | Industrial development | |
| 32130 | Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development | Direct support to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in the industrial sector, including accounting, auditing and advisory services. |
| 32140 | Cottage industries and handicraft | |
| 32161 | Agro-industries | Staple food processing, dairy products, slaughter houses and equipment, meat and fish processing and preserving, oils/fats, sugar refineries, beverages/tobacco, animal feeds production. |
| 32162 | Forest industries | Wood production, pulp/paper production. |
| 32163 | Textiles, leather and substitutes | Including knitting factories. |
| 32164 | Chemicals | Industrial and non-industrial production facilities; includes pesticides production. |
| 32165 | Fertilizer plants | |
| 32166 | Cement/lime/plaster | |
| 32167 | Energy manufacturing | Including gas liquefaction; petroleum refineries. |
| 32168 | Pharmaceutical production | Medical equipment/supplies; drugs, medicines, vaccines; hygienic products. |
| 32169 | Basic metal industries | Iron and steel, structural metal production. |
| 32170 | Non-ferrous metal industries | |
| 32171 | Engineering | Manufacturing of electrical and non-electrical machinery, engines/turbines. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 32172 | Transport equipment industry | Shipbuilding, fishing boats building; railroad equipment; motor vehicles and motor passenger cars; aircraft; navigation/guidance systems. |
| 32182 | Technological research and development | Including industrial standards; quality management; metrology; testing; accreditation; certification. |
| | **MINERAL RESOURCES AND MINING** | |
| 32210 | Mineral/mining policy and administrative management | Mineral and mining sector policy, planning and programmes; mining legislation, mining cadastre, mineral resources inventory, information systems, institution capacity building and advice; unspecified mineral resources exploitation. |
| 32220 | Mineral prospection and exploration | Geology, geophysics, geochemistry; excluding hydrogeology (14010) and environmental geology (41010), mineral extraction and processing, infrastructure, technology, economics, safety and environment management. |
| 32261 | Coal | Including lignite and peat. |
| 32262 | Oil and gas | Petroleum, natural gas, condensates, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG); including drilling and production. |
| 32263 | Ferrous metals | Iron and ferro-alloy metals. |
| 32264 | Nonferrous metals | Aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc. |
| 32265 | Precious metals/materials | Gold, silver, platinum, diamonds, gemstones. |
| 32266 | Industrial minerals | Baryte, limestone, feldspar, kaolin, sand, gypsym, gravel, ornamental stones. |
| 32267 | Fertilizer minerals | Phosphates, potash. |
| 32268 | Offshore minerals | Polymetallic nodules, phosphorites, marine placer deposits. |
| | **TOURISM** | |
| 33210 | Tourism policy and administrative management | |

## WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

The World Economic Forum is an international institution committed to improving the state of the world through public-private cooperation in the spirit of global citizenship. It engages with business, political, academic and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. Incorporated as a not-for-profit foundation in 1971 and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the Forum is independent, impartial and not tied to any interests. It cooperates closely with all leading international organizations.

## ENHANCED INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

The EIF is a unique global partnership that is dedicated to supporting the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to use trade as a tool for economic growth and poverty reduction through job and income opportunities. The EIF empowers LDCs to identify where and how trade can form an integral part of their national development strategies and assist them in harnessing Aid for Trade (AfT) towards this objective.

Through building trade capacity, the partnership works together to support the LDCs' own drive to:

- identify and address the priority constraints to trade;
- ensure trade directly supports the national development agenda;
- set up institutional and coordination mechanisms for trade related technical assistance; and
- initiate policy reform and mobilize additional financial and technical resources to address priority trade needs.

The EIF provides country specific and customized support that addresses the full suite of trade capacity building needs. In its work, the EIF is guided by three core values, which ensure that the results delivered are sustainable, participatory and fully owned by all stakeholders:

## INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE

ITC is a multilateral agency fully dedicated to developing the international competitiveness of SMEs. As a joint agency of WTO and UN, ITC focuses on small business export success. ITC works especially in least developed countries, land-locked developing countries, fragile and post-conflict countries, Small Island Developing States and sub-Saharan Africa. We help to build vibrant, sustainable export sectors that provide entrepreneurial opportunities, particularly for women, young people and poor communities.

Focus areas for SME competitiveness include:

- Developing trade and market intelligence
- Building a conducive business environment
- Strengthening trade and investment support institutions
- Connecting to value chains
- Supporting regional integration and South-South linkages
- Mainstreaming inclusive and green trade

## UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

UNCTAD, which is governed by its 194 member States, is the United Nations body responsible for dealing with development issues, particularly international trade – the main driver of development. Its work can be summed up in three words: think, debate, and deliver. Reflection on development is at the heart of UNCTAD's work. It produces analyses that form the basis for recommendations to policymakers. UNCTAD is also a forum where representatives of all countries can freely engage in dialogue and discuss ways to establish a better balance in the global economy. In addition, UNCTAD offers direct technical assistance to developing countries and countries with economies in transition, helping them to build the capacities they need to become equitably integrated into the global economy and improve the well-being of their populations.

UNCTAD holds a ministerial-level meeting every four years to discuss major global economic issues and to decide on its programme of work. Every two years, UNCTAD organizes the World Investment Forum, which brings together major players from the international investment community to discuss challenges and opportunities and to promote investment policies and partnerships for sustainable development and equitable growth.

## WORLD BANK

The World Bank Group has set two goals for the world to achieve by 2030: end extreme poverty by decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to no more than 3%; and promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% for every country. In the area of trade and competitiveness, the World Bank Group helps countries achieve these two goals through rapid and broad-based economic growth, centred on strong contributions from the private sector. The World Bank Group is working in this area to help countries expand the volume and value of trade, enhance the investment climate, improve competitiveness in sectors, and foster innovation and entrepreneurship.

## WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global organisation dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world's trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business.

The WTO's main activities are to:

- negotiate the reduction or elimination of obstacles to trade (import tariffs, other barriers to trade) and agreeing on rules governing the conduct of international trade (e.g. antidumping, subsidies, product standards, etc.)
- administer and monitor the application of the WTO's agreed rules for trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property rights
- monitor and review the trade policies of its members, as well as to ensure transparency of regional and bilateral trade agreements
- settle disputes among its members regarding the interpretation and application of the agreements
- build capacity of developing country government officials in international trade matters
- assist the process of accession of some 30 countries who are not yet members of the organization
- conduct economic research and collecting and disseminating trade data in support of the WTO's other main activities
- explain to and educate the public about the WTO, its mission and its activities.

The WTO currently has 161 members, of which 117 are developing countries or separate customs territories.

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Consult this publication on line at ***http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/aid_glance-2015-en.***

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